August 17/18, 2023 -
Information Clearing House
- "Code
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President
Biden
wrote in the
New York
Times
in June 2022 that the United States was
arming Ukraine to “fight on the battlefield
and be in the strongest possible position at
the negotiating table.”
Ukraine’s
fall 2022 counteroffensive left it in a
stronger position, yet Biden and his NATO
allies still chose the battlefield over the
negotiating table. Now the
failure
of Ukraine’s long-delayed “Spring
Counteroffensive” has left Ukraine in a
weaker position, both on the battlefield and
at the still empty negotiating table.
So, based
on Biden’s own definition of U.S. war aims,
his policy is failing, and it is hundreds of
thousands of Ukrainian soldiers, not
Americans, who are paying the price, with
their
limbs
and their lives.
But this
result was not unexpected. It was predicted
in leaked Pentagon
documents
that were widely published in April, and in
President Zelenskyy’s
postponement
of the offensive in May to avoid what he
called “unacceptable” losses.
The delay
allowed more Ukrainian troops to complete
NATO training on Western tanks and armored
vehicles, but it also gave Russia more time
to reinforce its anti-tank defenses and
prepare lethal kill-zones along the 700-mile
front line.
Now, after
two months, Ukraine’s new armored divisions
have advanced only 12 miles or less in two
small areas, at the cost of tens of
thousands of casualties.
Twenty
percent
of newly deployed Western armored vehicles
and equipment were reportedly destroyed in
the first few weeks of the new offensive, as
British-trained
armored divisions tried to advance through
Russian minefields and kill-zones without
demining operations or air cover.
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Meanwhile,
Russia has made similar
small
advances
toward Kupyansk in eastern Kharkiv province,
where land around the town of
Dvorichna
has changed hands for the third time since
the invasion. These tit-for-tat exchanges of
small pieces of territory, with massive use
of heavy artillery and appalling losses,
typify a brutal war of attrition not unlike
the First World War.
Ukraine’s
more successful counteroffensives last fall
provoked serious debate within NATO over
whether that was the moment for Ukraine to
return to the
negotiating
table
it had abandoned at British and U.S. urging
in April 2022. As Ukrainian forces advanced
on Kherson in early November,
La Republicca
in Italy
reported
that NATO leaders had agreed that the fall
of Kherson would put Ukraine in the position
of strength they had been waiting for to
relaunch peace talks.
On
November 9, 2022, the very day that Russia
ordered its withdrawal from Kherson, General
Mark Milley, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff,
spoke at
the Economic Club of New York, where the
interviewer asked him whether the time was
now ripe for negotiations.
General
Milley compared the situation to the First
World War, explaining that leaders on all
sides understood by Christmas 1914 that that
war was not winnable, yet they fought on for
another four years, multiplying the million
lives lost in 1914 into 20 million by 1918,
destroying five empires and setting the
stage for the rise of fascism and the Second
World War.
Milley
concluded his cautionary tale by noting
that, as in 1914, “… there has to be a
mutual recognition that military victory is
probably in the true sense of the word, is
maybe not achievable through military means.
And therefore, you need to turn to other
means… So things can get worse. So when
there’s an opportunity to negotiate, when
peace can be achieved, seize it, seize the
moment.”
But Milley
and other voices of experience were ignored.
At Biden’s February State of the Union
speech in Congress, General Milley’s face
was a study in gravity, a rock in a sea of
misplaced self-congratulation and ignorance
of the real world beyond the circus tent,
where the West’s incoherent war strategy was
not only sacrificing Ukrainian lives every
day but flirting with nuclear war. Milley
didn’t crack a smile all night, even when
Biden
came over
to glad-hand after his speech.
No U.S.,
NATO or Ukrainian leaders have been held
accountable for failing to seize that moment
last winter,
nor the previous
missed chance
for peace in April 2022, when the U.S. and
UK blocked theTurkish and Israeli mediation
that came so close to bringing peace, based
on the
simple
principle
of a Russian withdrawal in exchange for
Ukrainian neutrality. Nobody has demanded a
serious account of why Western leaders let
these chances for peace slip through their
fingers.
Whatever
their reasoning, the result is that Ukraine
is caught in a war with no exit. When
Ukraine seemed to have the upper hand in the
war, NATO leaders were determined to press
their advantage and launch another
offensive, regardless of the shocking human
cost. But now that the new offensive and
weapons shipments have only succeeded in
laying bare the weakness of Western strategy
and returning the initiative to Russia, the
architects of failure reject negotiating
from a position of weakness.
So the
conflict has fallen into an intractable
pattern common to many wars, in which all
parties to the fighting—Russia, Ukraine and
the leading members of the NATO military
alliance—have been encouraged, or we might
say deluded, by limited successes at
different times, into prolonging the war and
rejecting diplomacy, despite appalling human
costs, the rising danger of a wider war and
the existential danger of a nuclear
confrontation.
But the
reality of war is laying bare the
contradictions of Western policy. If Ukraine
is not allowed to negotiate with Russia from
a position of strength, nor from a position
of weakness, what stands in the way of its
total destruction?
And how
can Ukraine and its allies defeat Russia, a
country whose nuclear weapons policy
explicitly
states
that it will use nuclear weapons before it
will accept an existential defeat?
If, as
Biden has warned, any
war between
the United States and Russia, or
any use
of “tactical” nuclear weapons, would most
likely escalate into full-scale nuclear war,
where else is the current policy of
incremental escalation and ever-increasing
U.S. and NATO involvement intended to lead?
Are they
simply praying that Russia will implode, or
give up? Or are they determined to call
Russia’s bluff and push it into an
inescapable choice between total defeat and
nuclear war? Hoping, or pretending, that
Ukraine and its allies can defeat Russia
without triggering a nuclear war is not a
strategy.
In place
of a strategy to resolve the conflict, the
United States and its allies harnessed the
natural impulse to resist Russian aggression
onto a U.S. and British plan to prolong the
war indefinitely. The results of that
decision are hundreds of thousands of
Ukrainian casualties and the gradual
destruction of Ukraine by millions of
artillery shells fired by both sides.
Since the
end of the First Cold War, successive U.S.
governments, Democratic and Republican, have
made catastrophic miscalculations regarding
the United States’ ability to impose its
will on other countries and peoples. Their
wrong assumptions about American power and
military superiority have led us to this
fateful, historic crisis in U.S. foreign
policy.
Now
Congress is being asked for another $24
billion to keep fueling this war. They
should instead listen to the majority of
Americans, who, according to the latest
CNN poll,
oppose more funding for an unwinnable war.
They should heed the words of the
declaration
by civil society groups in 32 countries
calling for an immediate ceasefire and peace
negotiations to end the war before it
destroys Ukraine and endangers all of
humanity.
Medea
Benjamin and Nicolas J. S. Davies are the
authors of
War in
Ukraine: Making Sense of a Senseless
Conflict,
published by OR Books in November 2022.
Nicolas J. S. Davies is an independent
journalist, a researcher for CODEPINK and
the author of
Blood on Our
Hands: The American Invasion and Destruction
of Iraq.