Pentagon’s Own Map of U.S. Bases in Africa
Contradicts Its Claim of “Light” Footprint
A formerly secret map from AFRICOM shows a
network of 29 U.S. military bases that stretch
from one side of Africa to another.
By Nick Turse
Last month, about a dozen al-Shabab
fighters infiltrated the perimeter of a
military base in Manda Bay, Kenya. One
of them took aim with a rocket-propelled
grenade, firing at a U.S. surveillance plane
and touching off an hourslong firefight.
When it was all over, the two American
pilots of that plane and a U.S. soldier were
dead, two other U.S. military personnel were
wounded, six surveillance aircraft and
helicopters were destroyed, and parts of the
airfield were in flames.
Where there are U.S. bases, there is the
potential for such attacks, because bases
are not just launching pads for offensive
military operations, but targets for them
too. Since 9/11, the U.S. military has built
a sprawling network of outposts in more than
a dozen African countries. The Intercept has
obtained U.S. military documents and a set
of accompanying maps that provide the
locations of these African bases in 2019,
including the one at Manda Bay. These
formerly secret documents, created by the
Pentagon’s Africa Command and obtained via
the Freedom of Information Act, offer an
exclusive window into the footprint of
American military operations in Africa.
Maps
of U.S. “Enduring” and “Non-Enduring”
bases in Africa. The Pentagon defines
“enduring” bases as providing “strategic
access and use to support United States
security interests for the foreseeable
future.” “Non-Enduring” outposts — also
known as “contingency locations” — are
defined as supporting and sustaining
“operations during contingencies or
other operations.” Contingency locations
can be categorized as initial,
temporary, or semipermanent.
Images:
U.S. Africa Command
During testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee late last month, Stephen
Townsend, the commander of AFRICOM, echoed
a line favored by his predecessors that
AFRICOM maintains a “light and relatively
low-cost footprint” on the continent. This
“light” footprint consists of a
constellation of more than two dozen
outposts that stretch from one side of
Africa to the other. The 2019 planning
documents provide locations for 29 bases
located in 15 different countries or
territories, with the highest concentrations
in the Sahelian states on the west side of
the continent, as well as the Horn of Africa
in the east. Since the plans were created,
according to AFRICOM spokesperson John
Manley, two bases have been shuttered,
leaving the U.S. with an archipelago of 15
“enduring locations” and 12 less-permanent
“contingency locations.” The documents note,
however, that AFRICOM is actively seeking to
enhance its presence and is primed for
expansion in the future.
ENDURING FOOTPRINT 2019 |
NON-ENDURING FOOTPRINT 2019 |
Chebelley, Djibouti |
Bizerte, Tunisia |
Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti |
Arlit, Niger |
Entebbe, Uganda |
Dirkou, Niger |
Mombassa, Kenya |
Diffa, Niger |
Manda Bay, Kenya |
Ouallam, Niger |
Liberville, Gabon |
Bamako, Mali |
St. Helena, Ascension Island |
Garoua, Cameroon |
Accra, Ghana |
Maroua, Cameroon |
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso |
Misrata, Libya |
Dakar, Senegal |
Tripoli, Libya |
Agadez, Niger |
Baledogle, Somalia |
Niamey, Niger |
Bosasso, Somalia |
N’Djamena, Chad |
Galcayo, Somalia |
|
Kismayo, Somalia |
|
Mogadishu, Somalia |
|
Wajir, Kenya |
U.S. Africa Command’s
“Enduring Footprint” and “Non-Enduring
Footprint” in 2019.
Violent extremism and insecurity on the
continent has increased exponentially during
the very years that the U.S. has been
building up its network of bases, providing
billions of dollars in security assistance
to local partners, conducting persistent
counterterrorism operations that include
commando raids,
combat by U.S. Special Operations forces in
at least 13 African countries between 2013
and 2017, and a
record number of U.S. airstrikes in Somalia
(just over one attack per week in 2019).
There are now roughly
25 active militant Islamist groups
operating in Africa, up from
just five in 2010 — a jump of 400
percent — according to the Defense
Department’s Africa Center for Strategic
Studies. Militant Islamist activity also hit
record levels in 2019. There were
3,471 reported violent events linked to
these groups last year, a 1,105 percent
increase since
2009. Reported fatalities resulting from
African militant Islamist group activity
also increased by 7 percent over last year,
to an estimated 10,460 deaths. The situation
has become so grim that U.S. military aims
in West Africa have recently been scaled
back from a strategy of degrading the
strength and reach of terror groups to
nothing more than “containment.”
The current archipelago of U.S.
outposts in Africa represents a decrease of
seven sites from the
34 bases detailed in a set of briefing
documents by AFRICOM science adviser Peter
Teil that were published by The Intercept in
2018. The new 2019 AFRICOM planning
documents provide information on five bases
slated for closure, including a
longtime “enduring” site in Gaborone,
Botswana, and four contingency
locations, or CLs, in Faya Largeau, Chad;
Lakipia, Kenya; Benina, Libya; and Gao,
Mali. Shuttering the CLs, according to the
documents, is part of an effort to “seek
efficiencies by consolidating … functions at
a reduced number of posture locations,”
while the removal of Gabrone was chalked up
to “a lack of DoD [Department of Defense]
property or routine DoD presence” and the
fact that “Botswana does not acknowledge or
desire any formal DoD access at the
international airport.”
Manley refused to say which two
additional bases were dropped from the 2019
list. “The fluctuation in the number is not
related to Misrata and Tripoli,” he told The
Intercept in response to a question about
whether the Libyan outposts were the others
closed. But it is worth noting that since
the 2019 base posture document was produced,
the U.S. pulled its forces out of the North
African nation. “Due
to increased unrest in Libya, a
contingent of U.S. forces supporting U.S.
Africa Command temporarily relocated from
the country in response to security
conditions on the ground,” AFRICOM announced
last April as the
Libyan civil war flared up. Those troops
have never returned, according to Manley,
and a recent inspector general’s report
states that they won’t be redeployed until
there is a
ceasefire in
Libya’s civil war.
It’s also worth noting the documents
state that U.S. Army Africa uses space at
“host nation facilities” in Theis, Senegal,
and Singo, Uganda, even though the bases are
not listed on AFRICOM’s maps. While these
“cooperative training locations” are not
officially considered outposts by the
command, they raise the question of whether
29 bases is actually a more accurate count.
Whatever the real number of bases, the
recent alteration of AFRICOM’s footprint in
2019 appears to be a strategic consolidation
as the command fortifies its presence in
some of the continent’s hottest hotspots. Of
the 6,000 or more U.S. personnel deployed in
Africa, about 1,200, according to Manley,
are in West Africa, with
a significant percentage in Niger, which
has become the key American hub on that side
of the continent. Around
500 Special Operations forces are
reportedly deployed on the other side of the
continent in Somalia, the site of America’s
most intense and longest-running undeclared
war in Africa.
While the five U.S.
outposts in Somalia rank second only to the
six in Niger when it comes to America’s
footprint on the continent, AFRICOM is
actively seeking to expand its presence in
the Horn of Africa. “Additional posture
and/or capacity is required in East Africa
to more efficiently employ limited aviation
resources in support of U.S. activities in
southern Somalia,” according to the formerly
secret files, which also mention the
“potential establishment of one or more
[contingency locations] in Somalia to
support Somali National Security Force
development.” The 2019 planning documents
also state that five “contingency locations”
were recommended to be upgraded to
“semi-permanent” status: Baledogle, Kismayo,
and Mogadishu in Somalia, and Arlit and
Diffa in Niger.
What are the forces at
these bases doing there? In Diffa, according
to a
recent inspector general’s report, a
small unit of U.S. Special Forces has been
providing advice and assistance to Niger’s
51st Special Intervention Battalion, which
conducts operations in the Lake Chad region.
Another Special Forces detachment has been
engaged in train, advise, and assist
activities with a local counterterrorism
force in Arlit, Niger.
The presence of U.S.
commandos at
Diffa and Arlit first came to widespread
notice in the wake of the
October 2017 ambush by Islamic State
militants in Tongo Tongo, Niger, that killed
four U.S. soldiers. The U.S. base at
Baledogle received attention last September
when it was
attacked by the Somali terrorist group, al-Shabab.
Manda Bay, Kenya, where al-Shabab killed the
American soldier and U.S. pilots, is still
another “enduring” location from AFRICOM’s
2019 list. In the wake of the attack last
month, its defenses were also hardened and
its troop strength markedly increased.
“I think it’s self-obvious
we were not as prepared there in Manda Bay
as we needed to be,” AFRICOM’s Townsend told
the Senate Armed Services Committee on
January 30. “Al-Shabab managed to penetrate
onto that airfield. A lot of people don’t
know, but the base where our troops live is
not where the airfield is. But they were
able to get access to that airfield, kill
three Americans and destroy six aircraft
there. … There’s about 120 infantrymen there
on the ground now who are securing that
place, and they’ve been working hard since 6
January to put in the appropriate level of
defenses. So I am confident that by the time
they are done, Manda Bay will be much more
properly defended.”
The attack in Kenya came at a time when
Defense Secretary Mark Esper was already
considering proposals for a
major drawdown of U.S. forces on the other side
of the continent, in West Africa, including
the possible abandonment of a recently built
$110 million
drone base in Agadez, Niger. According to
Manley, the Pentagon’s so-called Blank Slate
Review process is still ongoing, and there has
been no change to U.S. “force posture” in Africa
as of yet. “I haven’t made any decisions yet on
West Africa or East Africa,” Esper said
recently, while at the same time calling on
European nations to “step up in Africa.”
Talk of scaling back U.S. posture and
presence in Africa has prompted fierce pushback
in Congress. “These personnel and installations
are critical in combatting the ever-increasing
number of violent extremist groups throughout
the region that pose an immediate threat to our
partners and allies,” wrote U.S. Sens. Lindsey
Graham, R-S.C., and Chris Coons, D-Del., in a
January 15 letter to Esper. The senators argued
that “any withdrawal or reduction would likely
result in a surge in violent extremist attacks
on the continent and beyond as well as increase
the geopolitical influence of competitors like
Russia and China.” James Inhofe, chair of the
Senate Armed Services Committee echoed these
concerns. “Today, more than a dozen terrorist
groups with ties to Al Qaida and ISIS are
operating across Africa,” he said late last
month. “Many of these groups have ambition to
attack Americans and our partners. Without
sustained pressure, the threat posed by these
groups will.”
But in the face of deteriorating security and
gloomy Pentagon assessments, some experts
question this rationale. “The current, overly
militarized approach to fighting terrorism in
Africa is not working,” said William Hartung,
the director of the arms and security project at
the Center for International Policy, or CIP. “As
the U.S. military footprint and military
activities have increased, terrorist violence
has grown and terrorist groups have
proliferated.”
His colleague, Temi Ibirogba, a program and
research associate with the Africa Program at
CIP, noted that the rise of violent extremism in
Africa in the face of persistent U.S. military
engagement since 9/11 should be cause for
skepticism of the “more is better” strategy.
“The U.S. military should be considering
alternative approaches like better coordination
with African regional and continental
organizations and encouraging African
governments to consider negotiations in certain
cases,” she told The Intercept.
In recent years, the U.S. military has
carried out no fewer than
36 named operations and activities in
Africa, including at least eight “127-echo”
programs, which are named for the budgetary
authority that allows U.S. Special Operations
forces to use host-nation military units as
proxies in missions aimed at violent extremist
organizations, or VEOs. Run by
Joint Special Operations Command, the
secretive organization that controls the Navy’s
SEAL Team 6 and the Army’s Delta Force, or by
theater special operations forces, these 80- to
120-person units, operating with the assistance
of U.S. commandos, are primarily engaged in
counterterrorism operations, especially ones
aimed at high-value targets.
The 2019 AFRICOM planning document notes that
U.S. forces will “continue to conduct
counter-VEO-focused activities” from 16 separate
bases. Even discounting the two counter-VEO
bases in Libya that appear to have been closed
since the map was created by AFRICOM, this
leaves one each in Kenya, Mali, and Tunisia, as
well as five in Somalia, four in Niger, and two
in Cameroon at Garoua and Maroua. The site in
Garoua is a drone base that
was profiled by The Intercept in 2016. In
2017, the Intercept revealed that while the U.S.
military fortified its base in Maroua, known as
Camp Salak, the outpost also served as a scene
of
illegal imprisonment, torture, and even killings.
Facing a potential drawdown of forces,
AFRICOM has been making the case that its bases
and the missions run from them are integral to
U.S. interests. “Strategic access to Africa, its
airspace, and its surrounding waters is vital to
U.S. national security,” Townsend told the
Senate Armed Services Committee late last month.
He and others have argued for what they contend
is AFRICOM’s supposed bang for the buck. “What
U.S. Africa Command accomplishes with relatively
few people and few dollars, on a continent
three-and-a-half times the size of the
continental United States, is a bargain for the
American taxpayer,” Manley told The Intercept.
But a recent inspector general’s report,
examining U.S. counterterrorism efforts in
Africa, raises serious questions about the
utility of billions of tax dollars spent on U.S.
bases, operations, and assistance to local
partners. Even after a decade-plus spent
fighting militants in Somalia, “the threat posed
by al Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia in East Africa
remains ‘high,’ despite continued U.S.
airstrikes and training of Somali security
forces,” the Defense Intelligence Agency told
the Defense Department’s Inspector General. The
DoDIG further noted that al-Shabab not only
“remains a potent threat” due to its “ability to
conduct high-profile attacks, recruit fighters,
and finance ongoing operations,” but that the
group “appears to be a growing threat to U.S.
personnel and interests in the region.”
The DoDIG’s assessment of West Africa was
even more dire. “VEO violence in West Africa
grew rapidly over the past 2 years; in Burkina
Faso, Mali, and Western Niger, VEO violence
increased by 250 percent since 2018,” according
to the report. AFRICOM told the DoDIG that
security in West Africa continued to deteriorate
during the final quarter of 2019 as terrorist
groups “launched a growing number of offensive
attacks against military facilities and troops …
often resulting in large numbers of casualties”
to U.S.-allied armed forces. “VEOs
in West Africa are not degraded nor contained to
the Sahel and Lake Chad region,” the command
admitted.
Given the current state of affairs, the
Center for International Policy’s Hartung
believes that the United States needs to
reevaluate its approach. “It’s time for an
honest reassessment of U.S. anti-terror strategy
in Africa, including greater transparency about
the size and scope of U.S. military operations
there,” he told The Intercept. “The underlying
drivers of terrorism, including poverty,
corruption, and repression, do not have military
solutions.”
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