August 12, 2021"Information
Clearing House" - "Consortium
News" -
In
my previous
letter
I discussed how Julian Assange’s case had taken a
strange and worrying twist. The results of
Wednesday’s High Court hearing is even more
troubling for the WikiLeaks publisher.
The High
Court in July granted the U.S. government permission
to appeal the Jan. 4 decision of District Judge
Vanessa Baraitser to refuse the U.S. government’s
request for Assange’s extradition to the United
States, where he faces charges under the Espionage
Act 1917 and for conspiracy to commit computer
intrusion.
The grant
of permission was however limited to essentially a
single ground: whether Baraitser erred by failing to
provide the U.S. government with an opportunity to
provide her with ‘assurances’ about the conditions
of detention in which Assange would be held if he
were extradited and convicted in the United States.
Permission
to appeal on another ground, whether Baraitser was
right to base her assessment of Assange’s health,
and of the risk that he might commit suicide if he
were to be kept in rigorous conditions of
confinement in the United States, on the evidence of
Professor Michael Kopelman, was however refused.
The U.S.
government would not accept this decision, and in a
most unusual step, obtained a hearing in the High
Court on Wednesday in order to appeal that part of
the High Court’s decision which had refused
permission to challenge the part of the appeal which
concerned the issues of Assange’s health and the
evidence of Professor Kopelman.
As
previously reported by Joe Lauria,
at this hearing the High Court reversed its earlier
decision to refuse the U.S. government permission to
appeal the matter of Assange’s health.
This means
the U.S. government has now obtained permission to
appeal on all the grounds it has sought. The full
appeal will be heard by the High Court on Oct. 27
and 28.
In my
previous
letter
I said that both grounds of appeal looked
threadbare.
There had
been nothing to prevent the U.S. government from
giving its ‘assurances’ (that it would not put
Assange in special confinement and would let him
serve his sentence in Australia) to Baraitser at the
substantive hearing last September.
Its
attempt to do so now, months after Baraitser’s
decision had been made, was an attempt to use the
appeal process in order to introduce the
‘assurances’ as new evidence in the case, so as to
change a decision which had already been made. This
makes the ‘assurances’ new evidence, which is
normally inadmissible on appeal.
As for
Baraitser’s decision to base her assessment of
Assange’s health and of his potential risk of
suicide on the evidence of Professor Kopelman, that
was an assessment for her to make as the trial judge
in the case, and there is no reason why the High
Court on appeal should seek to interfere in it. Mr.
Justice Swift, the High Court Judge who refused the
U.S. government permission to appeal on this ground
in July, was of precisely this view.
It is this
decision of Swift which the High Court at
Wednesday’s hearing has reversed. In doing so, the
High Court admitted it is highly unusual for an
appeal court to question a trial judge’s assessment
of the evidence. However in this case supposedly it
is ‘arguable’ that it should do so.
Lord
Justice Holroyde, a Court of Appeal Judge senior to
Mr. Justice Swift,
explained the decision
in this way:
“I bear very much
in mind that the District Judge saw and heard
from all the expert witnesses and made her
assessment of Professor Kopelman with that
advantage, which an appellate court cannot
share. I accept that, in general, this court
rightly takes a cautious approach when
considering the findings of fact. They may
consider challenges to findings of fact,
including assessments made by the judge below.
It is however, very unusual for an appellate
court to have to consider the position of an
expert witness whose written evidence have been
found to be misleading, but whose opinion has
nonetheless been accepted by the court below.
The general approach does not operate as a
complete bar for this court to find that the
judge below was wrong in her assessment of the
evidence. I have come to the conclusion that it
is here at least arguable that the present case
is one in which such a power may operate.”
Holroyde
then went on to say that in his opinion Baraitser
might have given a “more critical consideration” of
Professor Kopelman’s evidence.
“For those reasons,
I respectfully disagree with Mr Justice Swift. I
would grant the appeal on ground three. It will
be for the court in the appeal hearing to
determine the admissibility of the initial
evidence on which the appellant seeks to
revive.”
No
Mention of Assange Relationship
This issue
has arisen because of an omission of a fact in
Professor Kopelman’s first witness statement. In
that statement Kopelman omitted to mention the fact
that Assange was in a relationship with Stella Moris,
with whom he has had two children.
Kopelman
omitted this fact from his witness statement because
of
Moris’s understandable anxiety for privacy for her
children.
Kopelman, sympathetic to Moris’s anxiety but
conscious of his duty to the Court, consulted
Assange’s lawyers. They apparently agreed with him
that the fact of Moris’s relationship with Assange,
and the fact that they had had two children
together, could be kept out of the witness statement
without this diminishing its evidential value, and
without this detracting from Kopelman’s duty to the
Court.
It was
quickly realised that this was a mistake, and in a
second witness statement, which is Kopelman’s full
expert report to the Court, he disclosed Assange’s
relationship with Moris, and the fact that they had
had two children together. This second witness
statement was provided to the Court last year,
before the start of the substantive hearing in the
autumn, and was seen by Baraitser before the hearing
began.
Baraitser
accordingly made her decision to refuse extradition
in the full knowledge that Kopelman’s first witness
statement was incomplete, and that at the time when
it was made Kopelman was concealing the existence of
Assange’s relationship with Moris, and of the fact
that the two had had children together. She was also
aware of the reasons why this was done. In her
judgment Baraitser both acknowledged the fact of the
concealment, and excused it:
“In
my judgment, professor Kopelman’s decision to
conceal [Assange and Moris’s]
relationship was
misleading and inappropriate in the context of
his obligations to the court, but an
understandable human response to Ms. Moris’s
predicament…..In
short, I found Professor Kopelman’s opinion to
be impartial and dispassionate; I was given no
reason to doubt his motives or the reliability
of his evidence.”
Holroyde
and the High Court now say that this approach of
Baraitser’s was ‘arguably’ wrong, and that Baraitser
should have taken a ‘more critical consideration’ of
Kopelman’s evidence than she did.
Open
Route for U.S. to Give ‘Assurances’
At
the October hearing, the question of the state of
Assange’s health, and of the degree to which he
really is a suicide risk, will be reconsidered.
At that hearing the U.S.
government can give its ‘assurances’ to the Court,
which it did not previously give to Baraitser.
Assuming the Court accepts the ‘assurances’, an
order for Assange’s extradition to the U.S. may be
made. If an appeal of that order to the Supreme
Court is refused, Assange can be handed over to the
United States, and the British authorities can wash
their hands of the matter.
This is
not a foregone conclusion. The High Court at the
hearing in October is not bound to follow the
opinions expressed by Holroyde at the hearing on
Wednesday. His forthright comments show that he will
not be part of the appeal panel which will hear the
appeal in October.
However,
though Holroyde was careful to say that the final
decision is for the appeal panel in October to make,
his words strongly imply that he thinks Baraitser
should have handled Kopelman’s evidence differently.
The
fact that Kopelman sought advice from Assange’s
lawyers, who are technically officers of the Court,
to my mind show that he did not intend to mislead
the Court. As Baraitser put it, his actions, and
those of the lawyers, were “an understandable human
response to Ms. Moris’s
predicament”. No harm was
intended or done. Though a mistake was made, it was
corrected shortly after, and at the time of the
hearing Baraitser was in possession of all the
facts.
Baraitser,
as the trial judge, was therefore in a position to
assess the evidence, which Holroyde admits it was
her right to do. Having assessed the evidence, and
in full knowledge of all the facts, including those
of the so-called “concealment.” she chose to give
weight to the evidence of Kopelman, which she found
to be “impartial and dispassionate”. There is no
reason why an appeal court would want to interfere
with such an approach, and as Holroyde admits, and
as Swift found, ‘normally’ it would not do so.
In fact, Holroyde
admitted that the High Court on appeal cannot
itself revisit the evidence. An appeal court is
not a trial court. Its only purpose is to
decide whether or not Baraitser was wrong. If
it does decide on appeal that Baraitser was
wrong – and it hasn’t done so yet, though
Holroyde clearly thinks it should – it has two
options:
(1) Send the issue
back to the Westminster Magistrates’ Court, who
would then decide the health issue all over
again at a fresh hearing this time disregarding
or placing little weight on Kopelman’s evidence;
or
(2) Decide the
issue of Assange’s health itself, at the same
hearing as the hearing of the appeal, and
directly after the appeal has been heard and
decided, accepting Baraitser’s other findings of
fact, but excluding or placing little weight on
the evidence of professor Kopelman.
The proper course
is (1) but I would not be at all surprised (if
the appeal goes badly for Assange) that the High
Court chooses (2).
There is
moreover an absurd dimension to this whole affair.
Assange, at the time when he began his relationship
with Moris, was the target of round-the-clock
surveillance by the U.S. and British authorities,
who were spying on him in the Ecuadorian embassy,
even to the point where they were observing his
interactions with his lawyers.
It beggars
belief that the U.S. and British authorities were
unaware of Assange’s relationship with Moris, or of
the fact that he had had two children by her.
At the
time Kopelman drafted his first witness statement
the extent to which Assange had been under placed
under surveillance was known to Assange’s lawyers,
and to Assange and Moris themselves. They would have
known, or at the very least guessed, that the U.S.
and British authorities were aware of Assange’s
relationship with Moris, and of the fact that he had
had two children by her. This is borne out by the
testimony in a Spanish court last year that U.S.
intelligence officers ordered the confiscation of
one of the children’s nappies to prove Assange’s
paternity by testing the DNA.
That makes
it impossible that the omission of a reference to
the relationship between Assange and Moris in
Kopelman’s first witness statement was intended to
conceal this relationship from the U.S. and British
authorities, and from the Court, and that there was
any intention to mislead the Court. Had such an
attempt to conceal the relationship and the
existence of the children from the Court been made,
it would have failed, with catastrophic consequences
for Assange’s case.
Obviously
the concealment was intended, not to mislead the
Court, but to conceal the existence of the
relationship from Britain’s notoriously salacious
tabloid press, who are able to access Court
documents, such as Kopelman’s witness statement,
which are documents of public record.
In other
words it was
intended to protect the family’s privacy,
just as Kopelman, the lawyers, and Moris, say that
it was.
The way it
was done was certainly a mistake, but one made, as
Baraitser says, for understandable human reasons,
and clearly intended as a temporary measure to
protect the privacy of the family until the moment
came for full disclosure to the Court. This took
place
at a bail hearing in April 2020,
months before the substantive hearing before
Baraitser in the autumn of that year, and months
before the U.S. filed its second superseding
indictment,
which was the indictment actually before the Court
when the case was tried.
As
Baraitser rightly says, the fact that these steps to
protect the privacy of the family were taken,
(privacy being a human right pursuant to
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
which is part of British law) does not mean that
Kopelman is not an “impartial and dispassionate”
witness, even if some of the steps which were taken
were wrong. It is wrong to say otherwise.
A Dark
Turn and a Clouded Prospect
In my
previous letter I wrote of the relentless way in
which the U.S. government has pursued Julian
Assange. Moreover its refusal to take no for an
answer, and its readiness to resort to unusual
procedural devices in order to get its way, looks
from the latest decision to be starting to bear
fruit. I doubt any other party would be able to bend
events to its will in such a way.
Regardless, the case has taken a dark turn, and the
prospects in October are clouded.
Alexander
Mercouris is a legal analyst, political
commentator and editor of The
Duran.
Registration is necessary to post comments.
We ask only that you do not use obscene or offensive
language. Please be respectful of others.