The announcement last week by the United
States of the largest military aid
package in its history – to Israel – was
a win for both sides.
Israeli prime
minister Benjamin Netanyahu could boast
that his lobbying had boosted aid from
$3.1 billion a year to $3.8bn – a 22 per
cent increase – for a decade starting in
2019.
Mr Netanyahu has presented this as a
rebuff to those who accuse him of
jeopardising Israeli security interests
with his government’s repeated affronts
to the White House.
In the past weeks alone, defence
minister Avigdor Lieberman has compared
last year’s nuclear deal between
Washington and Iran with the 1938 Munich
pact, which bolstered Hitler; and Mr
Netanyahu has implied that US opposition
to settlement expansion is the same as
support for the “ethnic cleansing” of
Jews.
American president Barack Obama,
meanwhile, hopes to stifle his own
critics who insinuate that he is
anti-Israel. The deal should serve as a
fillip too for Hillary Clinton, the
Democratic party’s candidate to succeed
Mr Obama in November’s election.
In reality, however, the Obama
administration has quietly punished Mr
Netanyahu for his misbehaviour. Israeli
expectations of a $4.5bn-a-year deal
were whittled down after Mr Netanyahu
stalled negotiations last year as he
sought to recruit Congress to his battle
against the Iran deal.
In fact, Israel already receives
roughly $3.8bn – if Congress’s
assistance on developing missile defence
programmes is factored in. Notably,
Israel has been forced to promise not to
approach Congress for extra funds.
The deal takes into account neither
inflation nor the dollar’s depreciation
against the shekel.
A bigger blow still is the White
House’s demand to phase out a special
exemption that allowed Israel to spend
nearly 40 per cent of aid locally on
weapon and fuel purchases. Israel will
soon have to buy all its armaments from
the US, ending what amounted to a
subsidy to its own arms industry.
Nonetheless, Washington’s renewed
military largesse – in the face of
almost continual insults – inevitably
fuels claims that the Israeli tail is
wagging the US dog. Even The New York
Times has described the aid package as
“too big”.
Since the 1973 war, Israel has
received at least $100bn in military
aid, with more assistance hidden from
view. Back in the 1970s, Washington paid
half of Israel’s military budget. Today
it still foots a fifth of the bill,
despite Israel’s economic success.
But the US expects a return on its
massive investment. As the late Israeli
politician-general Ariel Sharon once
observed, Israel has been a US
“aircraft carrier” in the Middle East,
acting as the regional bully and
carrying out operations that benefit
Washington.
Almost no one blames the US for
Israeli attacks that wiped out Iraq’s
and Syria’s nuclear programmes. A
nuclear-armed Iraq or Syria would have
deterred later US-backed moves at regime
overthrow, as well as countering the
strategic advantage Israel derives from
its own nuclear arsenal.
In addition, Israel’s US-sponsored
military prowess is a triple boon to the
US weapons industry, the country’s most
powerful lobby. Public funds are
siphoned off to let Israel buy goodies
from American arms makers. That, in
turn, serves as a shop window for other
customers and spurs an endless and
lucrative game of catch-up in the rest
of the Middle East.
The first F-35 fighter jets to arrive
in Israel in December – their various
components produced in 46 US states –
will increase the clamour for the
cutting-edge warplane.
Israel is also a “front-line
laboratory”, as former Israeli army
negotiator Eival Gilady admitted at the
weekend, that develops and field-tests
new technology Washington can later use
itself.
The US is planning to buy back the
missile interception system Iron Dome –
which neutralises battlefield threats of
retaliation – it largely paid for.
Israel works closely too with the US in
developing cyberwarfare, such as the
Stuxnet worm that damaged Iran’s
civilian nuclear programme.
But the clearest message from
Israel’s new aid package is one
delivered to the Palestinians:
Washington sees no pressing strategic
interest in ending the occupation. It
stood up to Mr Netanyahu over the Iran
deal but will not risk a damaging clash
over Palestinian statehood.
Some believe that Mr Obama signed the
aid package to win the credibility
necessary to overcome his domestic
Israel lobby and pull a rabbit from the
hat: an initiative, unveiled shortly
before he leaves office, that corners Mr
Netanyahu into making peace.
Hopes have been raised by an expected
meeting at the United Nations in New
York on Wednesday. But their first talks
in 10 months are planned only to
demonstrate unity to confound critics of
the aid deal.
If Mr Obama really wanted to pressure
Mr Netanyahu, he would have used the aid
agreement as leverage. Now Mr Netanyahu
need not fear US financial retaliation,
even as he intensifies effective
annexation of the West Bank.
Mr Netanyahu has drawn the right
lesson from the aid deal – he can act
against the Palestinians with continuing
US impunity.
- See more at: http://www.jonathan-cook.net/2016-09-19/palestinians-lose-in-us-military-aid-deal-with-israel/#sthash.fL4Eq28N.dpuf
October 05, 2016 "Information
Clearing House"
- "FPIF"
- While the mainstream media focuses on
losers and winners in the race between
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, a
largely unreported debate is going on
over the future course of U.S.
diplomacy. Its outcome will have a
profound effect on how Washington
projects power—both diplomatic and
military—in the coming decade.
The issues at stake are hardly abstract.
The United States is currently engaged
in active wars in Afghanistan, Iraq,
Syria, Yemen, and Somalia. It has
deployed troops on the Russian border,
played push –and-shove with China in
Asia, and greatly extended its military
footprint on the
African continent. It would not be
an exaggeration to say—as former U.S.
Secretary of Defense William Perry has
recently done—that the world is a more
dangerous place today than it was during
darkest times of the Cold War.
Tracking the outlines of this argument
is not easy, in part because the
participants are not always forthcoming
about what they are proposing, in part
because the media oversimplifies the
issues. In its broadest framework,
“realists” represented by former
National Security Advisor Henry
Kissinger, Harvard’s Steven Walt, and
University of Chicago’s John Mearsheimer
have squared off against “humanitarian
interventionists” like current UN
Ambassador Samantha Power. Given that
Power is a key advisor to the Obama
administration on foreign policy and is
likely to play a similar role if Clinton
is elected, her views carry weight.
In
a recent essay in the
New York Review of Books,
Power asks, “How is a statesman to
advance his nation’s interests?” She
begins by hijacking the realist position
that U.S. diplomacy must reflect
“national interests,” arguing that they
are indistinguishable from “moral
values.” What happens to people in other
countries, she argues, is in our
“national security.”
Power—along with Clinton and former
President Bill Clinton—has long been an
advocate for “humanitarian
intervention,” behind which the United
States intervened in the Yugoslav civil
war. Humanitarian intervention has since
been formalized into “responsibility to
Protect,” or R2P, and was the rationale
for overthrowing Muammar Gaddafi in
Libya. Hillary Clinton has argued
forcibly for applying R2P to Syria by
setting up “no-fly zones” to block
Syrian and Russian planes from bombing
insurgents and the civilians under their
control.
But Power is proposing something
different than humanitarian
intervention. She is suggesting that the
United States elevate R2P to the level
of national security, which sounds
uncomfortably like an argument for U.S.
intervention in any place that doesn’t
emulate the American system.
Facing Off against the Kremlin
Most telling is her choice of examples:
Russia, China, and Venezuela, all
currently in Washington’s crosshairs. Of
these, she spends the most time on
Moscow and the current crisis in
Ukraine, where she accuses the Russians
of weakening a “core independent norm”
by supporting insurgents in Ukraine’s
east, “lopping off part of a neighboring
country” by seizing Crimea, and
suppressing the news of Russian
intervention from its own people. Were
the Russian media to report on the
situation in Ukraine, she writes, “many
Russians might well oppose” the
conflict.
Power presents no evidence for this
statement because none exists.
Regardless of what one thinks of
Moscow’s role in Ukraine, the vast
majority of Russians are not only aware
of it, but overwhelmingly support
President Vladimir Putin on the issue.
From the average Russian’s point of
view, NATO has been steadily marching
eastwards since the end of the Yugoslav
war. It is Americans who are deployed in
the Baltic and Poland, not Russians
gathering on the borders of Canada and
Mexico. Russians are a tad sensitive
about their borders, given the tens of
millions they lost in World War II,
something of which Power seems
oblivious.
What Power seems incapable of doing is
seeing how countries like China and
Russia view the United States. That
point of view is an essential skill in
international diplomacy, because it is
how one determines whether or not an
opponent poses a serious threat to one’s
national security.
Is
Russia—as
President Obama recently told the
UN—really “attempting to recover lost
glory through force,” or is Moscow
reacting to what it perceives as a
threat to its own national security?
Russia did not intervene in Ukraine
until the United States and its NATO
allies supported the coup against the
President Viktor Yanukovych government
and ditched an agreement that had been
hammered out among the European Union,
Moscow, and the United States to
peacefully resolve the crisis.
Power argues that there was no coup, but
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
Victoria Nuland and the U.S. Ambassador
to the Ukraine, Geoffrey Pyatt were
caught on tape talking about how to
“mid-wife” the takeover and choose the
person they wanted to put in place.
As
for “lopping off” Crimea, Power had no
problem with the United States and NATO
“lopping off” Kosovo from Serbia in the
Yugoslav War. In both cases local
populations—in Crimea by 96
percent—supported the takeovers.
Understanding how other countries see
the world does not mean one need agree
with them, but there is nothing in
Moscow’s actions that suggests that it
is trying to re-establish an “empire,”
as Obama characterized its behavior in
his recent speech to the UN. When
Hillary Clinton compared Putin to
Hitler, she equated Russia with Nazi
Germany, which certainly posed an
existential threat to our national
security. But does anyone think that
comparison is valid? In 1939, Germany
was the most powerful country in Europe
with a massive military. Russia has the
11th largest economy in the
world, trailing even France, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Italy, and Brazil.
Turkey has a larger army.
Power’s view of what is good for the
Russian people is a case in point.
Although one can hardly admire the
oligarchy that dominates Russia—and the
last election would seem to indicate
considerable voter apathy in the
country’s urban centers—the “liberals”
Power is so enamored with were the
people who instituted the economic
“shock therapy” in the 1990s that
impoverished tens of millions of people
and brought about a calamitous drop in
life expectancy. That track record is
unlikely to get one elected. In any
case, Americans are hardly in a position
these days to lecture people about the
role oligarchic wealth plays in
manipulating elections.
The View from China
The Chinese are intolerant of internal
dissent, but Washington’s argument with
Beijing is over sea lanes, not voter
rolls.
China is acting the bully in the South
China Sea, but it was President Bill
Clinton who sparked the current tensions
in the region when he deployed two
aircraft carrier battle groups in the
Taiwan Straits in 1995-96 during a
tense standoff between Taipei and
the mainland. China did not then—and
does not now—have the capacity to invade
Taiwan, so Beijing’s threats were not
real. But the aircraft carriers were
very real, and they humiliated—and
scared—China in its home waters. That
incident directly led to China’s current
accelerated military spending and its
heavy-handed actions in the South China
Sea.
Again, there is a long history here.
Starting with the Opium Wars of 1839 and
1860, followed by the Sino-Japanese War
of 1895 and Tokyo’s invasion of China in
World War II, the Chinese have been
invaded and humiliated time and again.
Beijing believes that the Obama
administration designed its “Asia pivot”
as to surround China with U.S. allies.
While that might be an over
simplification—the Pacific has long been
America’s largest market— it is a
perfectly rational conclusion to draw
from the deployment of U.S. Marines to
Australia, the positioning of
nuclear-capable forces in Guam and Wake,
the siting of anti-ballistic missile
systems in South Korea and Japan, and
the attempt to tighten military ties
with India, Indonesia, and Vietnam.
“If you are a strategic thinker in
China, you don’t have to be a paranoid
conspiracy theorist to think that the
U.S. is trying to bandwagon Asia against
China,” says
Simon Tay, chair of the Singapore
Institute of International Affairs.
Meanwhile in Latin America…
As
for Venezuela, the U.S. supported the
2002 coup against Hugo Chavez and has
led a campaign of hostility against the
government ever since. For all its
problems, the Chavez government
cut poverty rates from 54.5 percent
of the population to 32 percent, and
extreme poverty from around 20 percent
to 8.6 percent. Infant mortality fell
from 25 per 1,000 to 13 per 1,000, the
same as for Black Americans.
And the concern for the democratic
rights of Venezuelans apparently doesn’t
extend to the people of Honduras. When a
military coup overthrew a progressive
government in 2009, the United States
pressed other Latin American countries
to recognize the illegal government that
took over in its wake. Although
opposition forces in Venezuela get
tear-gassed and a handful jailed, in
Honduras they are murdered by death
squads.
Power’s view that the United States
stands for virtue instead of simply
pursuing its own interests is a uniquely
American delusion. “This is an image
that Americans have of themselves,” says
Jeremy Shapiro, research director of
the European Council on Foreign
Relations, “but is not shared, even by
their allies.”
The “division” between “realists” and
R2P is an illusion. Both end up in the
same place: confronting our supposed
competitors and supporting our allies,
regardless of how they treat their
people. Although she is quick to call
the Russians in Syria “barbarous,” she
is conspicuously silent on U.S. support
for Saudi Arabia’s air war in
Yemen, which has targeted hospitals,
markets, and civilians.
The argument that another country’s
internal politics is a national security
issue for the United States elevates R2P
to a new level, sets the bar for
military intervention a good deal lower
than it is today, and lays the
groundwork for an interventionist
foreign policy that will make the Obama
administration look positively pacifist.
Looking Toward November
It
is impossible to separate this debate on
foreign policy from the current race for
the White House. Clinton has been
hawkish on most international issues,
and she is not shy about military
intervention.
She has also surrounded herself with
some of the same people who designed the
Iraq war, including founders of the
Project for a New American Century.
It is rumored that if she wins she will
appoint former Defense Department
official
Michele Flournoy as secretary of
defense. Flournoy has called for bombing
Assad’s forces in Syria.
On
the other hand, Trump has been less than
coherent. He has made some reasonable
statements about cooperating with the
Russians and some distinctly scary ones
about China. He says he is opposed to
military interventions, although he
supported the war in Iraq (and now lies
about it). He is alarmingly casual about
the use of nuclear weapons.
In
Foreign Affairs, Stephen
Walt, a leading “realist,” says that
Trump’s willingness to consider breaking
the nuclear taboo makes him someone who
“has no business being commander in
chief.” Other countries, writes Walt,
“are already worried about American
power and the ways it gets used. The
last thing we need is an American
equivalent of the impetuous and
bombastic Kaiser Wilhelm II.” The Kaiser
was a major force behind World War I, a
conflict that inflicted 38 million
casualties.
Whoever wins in November will face a
world in which Washington can’t call all
the shots. As Middle East expert
Patrick Cockburn points out, “The
U.S. remains a superpower, but is no
longer as powerful as it once was.”
Although it can overthrow regimes it
doesn’t like, “it can’t replace what has
been destroyed.”
Power’s framework for diplomacy is a
formula for a never-ending cycle of war
and instability.
Conn Hallinan can be read at
dispatchesfromtheedgeblog.wordpress.com
and middlemepireseries.wordpress.com