The announcement last week by the United
States of the largest military aid
package in its history – to Israel – was
a win for both sides.
Israeli prime
minister Benjamin Netanyahu could boast
that his lobbying had boosted aid from
$3.1 billion a year to $3.8bn – a 22 per
cent increase – for a decade starting in
2019.
Mr Netanyahu has presented this as a
rebuff to those who accuse him of
jeopardising Israeli security interests
with his government’s repeated affronts
to the White House.
In the past weeks alone, defence
minister Avigdor Lieberman has compared
last year’s nuclear deal between
Washington and Iran with the 1938 Munich
pact, which bolstered Hitler; and Mr
Netanyahu has implied that US opposition
to settlement expansion is the same as
support for the “ethnic cleansing” of
Jews.
American president Barack Obama,
meanwhile, hopes to stifle his own
critics who insinuate that he is
anti-Israel. The deal should serve as a
fillip too for Hillary Clinton, the
Democratic party’s candidate to succeed
Mr Obama in November’s election.
In reality, however, the Obama
administration has quietly punished Mr
Netanyahu for his misbehaviour. Israeli
expectations of a $4.5bn-a-year deal
were whittled down after Mr Netanyahu
stalled negotiations last year as he
sought to recruit Congress to his battle
against the Iran deal.
In fact, Israel already receives
roughly $3.8bn – if Congress’s
assistance on developing missile defence
programmes is factored in. Notably,
Israel has been forced to promise not to
approach Congress for extra funds.
The deal takes into account neither
inflation nor the dollar’s depreciation
against the shekel.
A bigger blow still is the White
House’s demand to phase out a special
exemption that allowed Israel to spend
nearly 40 per cent of aid locally on
weapon and fuel purchases. Israel will
soon have to buy all its armaments from
the US, ending what amounted to a
subsidy to its own arms industry.
Nonetheless, Washington’s renewed
military largesse – in the face of
almost continual insults – inevitably
fuels claims that the Israeli tail is
wagging the US dog. Even The New York
Times has described the aid package as
“too big”.
Since the 1973 war, Israel has
received at least $100bn in military
aid, with more assistance hidden from
view. Back in the 1970s, Washington paid
half of Israel’s military budget. Today
it still foots a fifth of the bill,
despite Israel’s economic success.
But the US expects a return on its
massive investment. As the late Israeli
politician-general Ariel Sharon once
observed, Israel has been a US
“aircraft carrier” in the Middle East,
acting as the regional bully and
carrying out operations that benefit
Washington.
Almost no one blames the US for
Israeli attacks that wiped out Iraq’s
and Syria’s nuclear programmes. A
nuclear-armed Iraq or Syria would have
deterred later US-backed moves at regime
overthrow, as well as countering the
strategic advantage Israel derives from
its own nuclear arsenal.
In addition, Israel’s US-sponsored
military prowess is a triple boon to the
US weapons industry, the country’s most
powerful lobby. Public funds are
siphoned off to let Israel buy goodies
from American arms makers. That, in
turn, serves as a shop window for other
customers and spurs an endless and
lucrative game of catch-up in the rest
of the Middle East.
The first F-35 fighter jets to arrive
in Israel in December – their various
components produced in 46 US states –
will increase the clamour for the
cutting-edge warplane.
Israel is also a “front-line
laboratory”, as former Israeli army
negotiator Eival Gilady admitted at the
weekend, that develops and field-tests
new technology Washington can later use
itself.
The US is planning to buy back the
missile interception system Iron Dome –
which neutralises battlefield threats of
retaliation – it largely paid for.
Israel works closely too with the US in
developing cyberwarfare, such as the
Stuxnet worm that damaged Iran’s
civilian nuclear programme.
But the clearest message from
Israel’s new aid package is one
delivered to the Palestinians:
Washington sees no pressing strategic
interest in ending the occupation. It
stood up to Mr Netanyahu over the Iran
deal but will not risk a damaging clash
over Palestinian statehood.
Some believe that Mr Obama signed the
aid package to win the credibility
necessary to overcome his domestic
Israel lobby and pull a rabbit from the
hat: an initiative, unveiled shortly
before he leaves office, that corners Mr
Netanyahu into making peace.
Hopes have been raised by an expected
meeting at the United Nations in New
York on Wednesday. But their first talks
in 10 months are planned only to
demonstrate unity to confound critics of
the aid deal.
If Mr Obama really wanted to pressure
Mr Netanyahu, he would have used the aid
agreement as leverage. Now Mr Netanyahu
need not fear US financial retaliation,
even as he intensifies effective
annexation of the West Bank.
Mr Netanyahu has drawn the right
lesson from the aid deal – he can act
against the Palestinians with continuing
US impunity.
- See more at: http://www.jonathan-cook.net/2016-09-19/palestinians-lose-in-us-military-aid-deal-with-israel/#sthash.fL4Eq28N.dpuf
An Obsolescent Military: Bombing Everything,
Gaining Nothing
By Fred Reed
September 24, 2016 "Information
Clearing House"
- What, precisely, is the US military for,
and what, precisely, can it do? In practical
terms, how powerful is it? On paper, it is
formidable, huge, with carrier battle
groups, advanced technology, remarkable
submarines, satellites, and so on. What does
this translate to?
Military power does not exist independently,
but only in relation to specific
circumstances. Comparing technical
specifications of the T-14 to those of the
M1A2, or Su-34 to F-15, or numbers of this
to numbers of that, is an interesting
intellectual exercise. It means little
without reference to specific circumstances.
For
example, America is vastly superior
militarily to North Korea in every category
of arms – but the North has nuclear bombs.
It can’t deliver them to the US, but
probably can to Seoul. Even without nuclear
weapons, it has a large army and large
numbers of artillery tubes within range of
Seoul. It has an unpredictable government.
As Gordon Liddy said, if your responses to
provocation are wildly out of proportion to
those provocations, and unpredictable,
nobody will provoke you.
An
American attack by air on the North, the
only attack possible short of a preemptive
nuclear strike, would offer a high
probability of a peninsular war, devastation
of Seoul, paralysis of an important trading
partner – think Samsung – and an uncertain
final outcome. The United States hasn’t the
means of getting troops to Korea rapidly in
any numbers, and the domestic political
results of lots of GIs killed by a serious
enemy would be politically grave. The
probable cost far exceeds any possible
benefit. In practical terms, Washington’s
military superiority means nothing with
regard to North Korea. Pyongyang knows it.
Or
consider the Ukraine. On paper, US forces
overall are superior to Russian. Locally,
they are not. Russia borders on the Ukraine
and could overrun it quickly. The US cannot
rapidly bring force to bear except a degree
of air power. Air power hasn’t worked
against defenseless peasants in many
countries. Russia is not a defenseless
peasant. Europe, usually docile and obedient
to America, is unlikely to engage in a
shooting war with Moscow for the benefit of
Washington. Europeans are aware that Russia
borders on Eastern Europe, which borders on
Western Europe. For Washington, fighting
Russia in the Ukraine would require a huge
effort with seaborne logistics and a
national mobilization. Serious wars with
nuclear powers do not represent the height
of judgment.
Again, Washington’s military superiority
means nothing.
Or
consider Washington’s dispute with China in
the Pacific. China cannot begin to match
American naval power. It doesn’t have to.
Beijing has focused on anti-ship missiles –
read “carrier-killer” – such as the JD21
ballistic missile. How well it works I do
not know, but the Chinese are not stupid. Is
the risk of finding out worth it? Fast,
stealthed, sea-skimming cruise missiles are
very cheap compared to carriers, and
America’s admirals know that lots of them
arriving simultaneously would not have a
happy ending.
Having a fleet disabled by China would be
intolerable to Washington, but its possible
responses would be unappealing. Would it
start a conventional war with China with the
ghastly global economic consequences? This
would not generate allies. Cut China’s oil
lanes to the Mideast and push Beijing toward
nuclear war? Destroy the Three Gorges Dam
and drown god knows how many people? If
China used the war as a pretext for annexing
bordering counties? What would Russia do?
The
consequences both probable and assured make
the adventure unattractive, especially since
likely pretexts for a war with China – a few
rocks in the Pacific, for example – are too
trivial to be worth the certain costs and
uncertain outcome. Again, military
superiority doesn’t mean much.
We
live in a military world fundamentally
different from that of the last century.
All-out wars between major powers, which is
to say nuclear powers, are unlikely since
they would last about an hour after they
became all-out, and everyone knows it. In
WWII Germany could convince itself,
reasonably and almost correctly, that Russia
would fall in a summer, or the Japanese that
a Depression-ridden, unarmed America might
decide not to fight. Now, no. Threaten
something that a nuclear power regards as
vital and you risk frying. So nobody does.
At
any rate, nobody has. Fools abound in DC and
New York.
What then, in today’s world, is the point of
huge conventional forces?
The
American military is an upgraded World War
II military, designed to fight other
militarizes like itself in a world like that
which existed during World War II. The
Soviet Union was that kind of military.
Today there are no such militaries for
America to fight. We are not in the same
world. Washington seems not to have noticed.
A
World War II military is intended to destroy
point targets of high value – aircraft,
ships, factories, tanks – and to capture
crucial territory, such as the enemy’s
country. When you have destroyed the
Wehrmacht’s heavy weaponry and occupied
Germany, you have won. This is the sort of
war that militaries have always relished,
having much sound and fury and clear goals.
It
doesn’t work that way today. Since Korea,
half-organized peasant militias have baffled
the Pentagon by not having targets of high
value or crucial territory. In Afghanistan
for example goatherds with rifles could
simply disperse, providing no point targets
at all, and certainly not of high value. No
territory was crucial to them. If the US
mounted a huge operation to take Province A,
the resistance could just fade into the
population or move to Province B. The US
would always be victorious but never win
anything. Sooner or later America would go
away. The world understands this.
Further, the underlying nature of conflict
has changed. For most of history until the
Soviet Union evaporated, empires expanded by
military conquest. In today’s world,
countries have not lost their imperial
ambitions, but the approach is no longer
military. China seems intent on bringing
Eurasia under its hegemony, and advances
toward doing it, but its approach is
economic, not martial. The Chinese are not
warm and fuzzy. They are, however, smart. It
is much cheaper and safer to expand
commercially than militarily, and wiser to
sidestep martial confrontation – in a word,
to ignore America. More correctly it is
sidestepping the Pentagon.
Military and diplomatic power spring from
economic power, and China is proving
successful economically. Using commercial
clout, she is expanding her influence, but
in ways not easily bombed. She is pushing
the BRICS alliance, from which the US is
excluded. She is enlarging the SCO, from
which America is excluded. Perhaps most
importantly, she has set up the AIIB, the
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, which
does not include the US but includes
Washington’s European allies. These
organizations will probably trade mostly not
in dollars, a serious threat to Washington’s
economic hegemony.
What is the relevance of the Pentagon? How
do you bomb a trade agreement?
China enjoys solvency, and hegemonizes
enthusiastically with it. Thus in Pakistan
it has built the Karakoram Highway from Xian
Jiang to Karachi, which will increase trade
between the two. It is putting in the two
power reactors near Karachi. It is investing
in Afghan resources, increasing trade with
Iran. . When the US finally leaves, China,
without firing a shot, will be predominant
in the region.
What is the relevance of aircraft carriers?
Beijing is talking seriously about building
more rail lines, including high-speed rail,
from itself to Europe, accompanied by
fiber-optic lines and so on. This is not
just talk. China has the money and a very
large network of high-speed rail
domestically. (The US has not a single
mile.) Google “China-Europe Rail lines.”
What is the Pentagon going to do? Bomb the
tracks?
As
trade and ease of travel from Berlin to
Beijing increase, and as China prospers and
wants more European goods, European
businessmen will want to cuddle up to that
fabulously large market – which will loosen
Washington’s grip on the throat of Europe.
Say it three times slowly: Eur-asia.
EurasiaEurasia I promise it is what
the Chinese are saying.
What is the Pentagon’s trillion-dollar
military going to bomb? Europe? Railways
across Kazakhstan? BMW plants?
All
of which is to say that while the US
military looks formidable, it isn’t
particularly useful, and aids China by
bankrupting the US. Repeatedly it has
demonstrated that it cannot defeat
campesinos armed with those most
formidable weapons, the AK, the RPG, and the
IED. The US does not have the land forces to
fight a major or semi-major enemy. It could
bomb Iran, with unpredictable consequences,
but couldn’t possibly conquer it.
The
wars in the Mideast illustrate the principle
nicely. Iraq didn’t work. Libya didn’t work.
Iran didn’t back down. ISIS and related
curiosities? The Pentagon is again bombing
an enemy that can’t fight back – its
specialty – but that it seems unable defeat.
Wrong military, wrong enemy, wrong war,
wrong world.
Fred, a keyboard mercenary with a
disorganized past, has worked on staff for
Army Times, The Washingtonian, Soldier of
Fortune, Federal Computer Week, and The
Washington Times.
http://fredoneverything.org/p26/
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