The
Kingmaker Club
By Stephen
Kinzer
September 14,
2016 "Information
Clearing House"
- "Boston
Globe"
-
Violently intervening in
the affairs of other countries
has brought the United States much grief over the
last century. We are hardly the only ones who do it.
The club of interventionist nations has a shifting
membership. During the current round of Middle East
conflict, two new countries have joined: Turkey and
Saudi Arabia. Both have succumbed to the imperial
temptation. Both are paying a high price. They are
learning a lesson that Americans struggle to accept:
Interventions have unexpected consequences and often
end up weakening rather than strengthening the
countries that carry them out.
Turkey’s
long intervention in Syria has failed to bring about
its intended result, the fall of President Bashar
Assad. Instead it has intensified the Syrian
conflict, fed a regional refugee crisis, set off
terrorist backlash, and deeply strained relations
between Turkey and its NATO allies. As this blunder
has unfolded, Saudi Arabia has also been waging war
outside its territory. Its bombing of neighboring
Yemen was supposed to be a way of asserting regional
hegemony, but it has aroused indignant condemnation.
The bombing campaign has placed Saudi Arabia under
new scrutiny, including more intense focus on its
role in promoting global terror, which the Saudi
royal family has managed to keep half-hidden for
years.
Turkey and
Saudi Arabia intervened in foreign conflicts hoping
to establish themselves as regional kingmakers. Both
miscalculated. They overestimated their ability to
secure quick victory and failed to weigh the
strategic costs of failure or stalemate. If the
Turks and Saudis had studied the history of American
interventions, they would have been more prudent. We
know the sorrows of empire. From Iran to Cuba to
Vietnam to Afghanistan and Iraq, the legacy of our
interventions continues to haunt us. Ambitious
powers, however, continue to ignore the stark lesson
that American history teaches. Turkey and Saudi
Arabia are the latest to repeat our mistake. It is
the same mistake that has undermined many nations
and empires. They overestimated their ability to
shape events in foreign lands. Now they are paying
for their delusional overreach.
When
protests in Syria turned violent in 2011, Turkey
might have supported the Assad government or adopted
a hands-off policy. Instead it wholeheartedly
embraced the rebel cause. Turkey shipped weapons to
militant groups, helped foreign fighters travel to
battle fronts, and allowed wounded jihadists to be
treated at clinics in border towns. Turkish leaders
calculated that this semi-clandestine operation
would quickly topple Assad’s government. Instead the
war dragged on for years. Turkey’s intervention in
Syria failed. Worse, it brought the war into parts
of southern Turkey. Syrians began killing each other
on the streets of Turkish towns.
Turkey has
finally begun accepting the reality that partnership
with jihadist groups does not pay off. Under intense
pressure from Washington, it is turning on its
former friends, even sending its regular army into
northern Syria to fight them. Turkey is also
fighting Kurdish nationalists. Its shifting,
multifront war has outraged both Kurdish and
Islamist militants. They are taking revenge by
launching terror attacks inside Turkey. Intervention
in Syria was supposed to pacify the region and
increase Turkey’s strategic power. It has done the
opposite.
Saudi
Arabia has also broken violently beyond its borders.
It has taken sides in Yemen’s civil war. Saudi
planes are regularly hitting targets inside Yemen.
Many civilians are reported to have been killed.
Revulsion at this carnage has cast a new and
unwelcome light on Saudi Arabia. Partly as a result
of the Yemen campaign, Saudi-bashing has become
fashionable in Washington and other places where
people have long chosen to ignore Saudi excesses.
Last week, more than 60 members of Congress signed a
letter seeking to block the Obama administration’s
plan to sell Saudi Arabia $1.15 billion worth of
weaponry — a brazen challenge that would have been
unthinkable until recently. Saudi Arabia’s
intervention in Yemen, like Turkey’s in Syria,
failed to achieve either a military or political
objective.
These
forays into regional war marked dizzying reversals
for Turkey and Saudi Arabia. During the 20th and
early 21st centuries, both countries slowly
consolidated their strategic power by following
modest foreign policies. The founder of modern
Turkey, Kemal Ataturk, took pains to assure
neighbors that his new country had no desire to
reconstitute the Ottoman Empire, and he bequeathed
to Turkey a strongly non-interventionist foreign
policy. Saudi Arabia has been equally conservative,
ruled by a monarchy determined to avoid conflict at
all costs. Generations of Turkish and Saudi leaders
believed that stability in the Middle East served
their strategic interest. Their approach to regional
politics epitomized Lord Salisbury’s 19th-century
dictum, “Whatever happens will be for the worse, and
therefore it is in our interest that as little
should happen as possible.”
After
patiently guarding regional stability for nearly a
century, Turkey and Saudi Arabia suddenly changed
course. New leaders in both countries, brimming with
overconfidence, developed outsized appetites and
unrealistic ambitions. They plunged into conflicts
beyond their own borders. These interventions have
not gone well. Two more countries have now learned
that ill-conceived foreign wars can sap national
power. Americans could tell our Turkish and Saudi
friends, “Now you know. Welcome to the club.”
Stephen
Kinzer is a senior fellow at the Watson Institute
for International and Public Affairs at Brown
University. Follow him on Twitter
@stephenkinzer. |