|
Russian
Military Options in Syria and the Ukraine
The Saker
August 17,
2013 "Information
Clearing House"
- The past two weeks have been rich in military
developments directly affecting Russia:
Syria:
1) Russia
has announced that
she will transform the Khmeimim airfield into a
full-fledged military base with a permanently
deployed task force.
2) Russia
will deploy her heavy aircraft-carrying missile
cruiser (often referred to in the West as an
“aircraft carrier”)
Admiral Kuznetsov to the eastern Mediterranean
to to check the combat capabilities of the ship and
its strike group and to engage, for the very first
time, the state-of-the-art
Ka-52K Katran helicopters.
The
Ukraine:
1)
Following
the failure of the Ukronazis to infiltrate saboteurs
on the Crimean Peninsula ,which President Putin
called “stupid and criminal”,Poroshenko has
now ordered a
reinforcement of his military forces on border with
Crimea and eastern Ukraine and placed its military
on its highest alert.
2)
The authorities in Kiev decided
not to accept the credentials of the
new Russian ambassador to the Ukraine.
3)
President Putin declared that in this context,
negotiations with Kiev are “pointless”.
While not
directly connected, all of these news items point to
a possible military escalation which could result in
Russia having to engaged her military in combat
operations in Syria, Crimea and Novorussia. Thus is
makes sense at this point to review the Russian
options in all these theaters of war.
The Syrian theater:
There is a
great deal of misunderstanding about the Russian
military options in Syria. Just as the major Russian
military intervention which was initially expected
failed to materialize (the actual Russian
intervention was very limited in both size and
time), the reinforcement of the Khmeimim airbase
will not result in a major strategic shift in the
regional balance of power. A couple of reminders:
First, the
Russian naval base at Tartus is not really a “naval
base” at all. It is a port which the Russian Navy
has been using, but it lack the capability to dock
large ships and it is not defended in a way a normal
Russian military base would be. In fact, the Russian
refer to it as a “пункт материально-технического
обеспечения“ or “material-technical supply point”.
It is possible, even likely, that in time Russia
will expand and reinforce Tartus, but for the
foreseeable future Tartus will not be a major
military outpost for the Russian Navy.
Second, the
airbase in Khmeimin is located in a very dangerous
spot: roughly 1000km from the Russian border and
only 50km from the Turkish border. It is also nicely
wedged right between the CENTCOM “area of
responsibility” and NATO. This is most definitely
not a location you want to try to threaten US forces
from. Finally, this is also
not a location which Russia would defend with
nuclear forces.
Defense
Minister Shoigu did, in fact,
clearly spell out what the purpose of the
Russian presence in Khmeimim will be: a) to attack
terrorists and b) to defend Russian nationals.
Again, these are very limited goals which will be
attained by using limited means. To be sure,
Khmeimim will also become a crucial intelligence hub
for Russia and, once the airbase is expanded, the
Russian search and rescue capabilities will be
dramatically enhanced. For both of these task
Russian special forces will be permanently stationed
at the airbase. Finally, the Russians will increase
the size of the runways to make it accessible to the
heaviest Russian transport aircraft. But the
fundamental characteristic of the Khmeimim airbase
will always remind that it will remain vulnerable
due to its location and long distance from Russia.
As for the
deployment of the Kuznetsov, which is primarily a
formidable air defense ship, it will allow the
Russians to get a much fuller signal intelligence
picture of the region and will provide solid
protection for both Tartus and Khmeimim. The
first-time deployment of the Ka-52K (which were
initially commissioned to be deployed on the French
“Mistrals”) will be a testing side show but not a
crucial game changer in the war.
All in all,
the Russians are most definitely increasing their
capabilities and the range of options to chose from
different options depending on the evolution of the
situation. At this point, there are no signs of a
major shift in the Russian position: ever since the
“semi-withdrawal” of Russian Aerospace forces from
Syria, Russia is still counting primarily on her
long-rage bombers (Tu-22M3). These can, if needed,
be supplemented by Su-34/Su-30/Su-35 strike groups
flying out of southern Russia.
The Ukrainian theater:
The
situation in the Ukraine is much more unpredictable
than the one in Syria and it has been so for a long
while now. Almost every week we saw warnings about a
possible Ukrainian attack, sometimes even announced
as “imminent” and then that attack fails to
materialize. The dangerous thing about these false
warnings is that they were not false at all and that
these attacks truly could have happened almost any
week. Worst of all, there is now a “boy
who cried wolf” phenomenon taking place where
everybody is becoming bored with the endless
warnings about an imminent Ukronazi attack. The
problem is that, of course, such attack is becoming
more and more likely with every passing day.
There are
those who argue that an Ukronazi attack against
Crimea would be suicidal, and they are absolutely
correct, and that an Ukronazi attack against
Novorussia would be exceedingly unlikely to succeed,
and they are correct again. The assumption here is
that the regime in Kiev is capable of rational
calculation and that the purpose of such an attack
would be victory. But, in reality, victory was
never a Ukronazi goal. Instead, the goal was
always to draw Russia into a open war. The Ukronazis
themselves are deluding themselves in the hope that
they will get to do what the Croats did in 1995 when
they, backed by the full airpower of NATO, attacked
the (disarmed) Croatian Serbs in the so-called
“Krajinas”. In reality, the situation in the Donbass
is totally different: not only are the Novorussians
not disarmed like the Krajina Serbs were (all their
“heavy weapons” were in UNPROFOR controlled depots),
but unlike the poor Serbs (who were betrayed by
Milosevic), the Novorussians know that if things get
tough Russia will back them, including by deniable
long-range artillery strikes (as she did in July
2014). As for Crimea, even the most deluded
Ukrainians must realize by now, even if they don’t
admit this, that
they will never re-take Crimea.
The problem
for Russia is that while the regime in Kiev is
slowly rotting into irrelevance, there is only one
thing which the Ukraine can offer the AngloZionist
Empire: to become the sacrificial lamb in a
desperate effort to provoke Russian into an
intervention and thereby make the current “tepid
war” between NATO and Russia fully irreversible or
even “hot”. An overt Russian counter-attack in the
Donbass, or even from Crimea, is every Neocon’s
dream come true.
So far, all
the Ukronazis were capable of doing is constantly
shelling the civilians of the Donetsk and Lugansk
republics which, being 100% dependent on Moscow, had
to put up with this infamy even though scores of
innocents civilians have been killed every day.
There is also a lot of indirect evidence that the
military capabilities of the Novorussians have
dramatically increased over the past year or so and
that makes it even more frustrating for them to put
up with the constant provocations and murders of
civilians. The Kremlin, however, has evidently
decided that a small and steady stream of murdered
civilians in the Donbass is still preferable to a
full-scale military operation followed by, and this
is often overlooked, the occupation of some part of
the Ukrainian territory. Indeed, once you occupy it
– you own it and you are responsible for it. Nobody
in Russia is willing to shoulder the costs of a war
and the subsequent occupation and reconstruction of
a territory currently under Ukronazi control.
Finally, why give the regime in Kiev a life-saving
distraction when it does such a world-class job of
slowly but surely destroying itself?
The paradox
here is that the Russian strength is also the
Russian weakness: chances are that the Novorussians
are capable of not only stopping a Ukronazi attack,
but even of an operationally deep counter-attack.
Thus, it is most likely that Russia herself would
not be pulled into an overt war over the Donbass.
But in Crimea there are no Novorussians, no Donetsk
or Lugansk people’s republics. In Crimea there are
only Russians and Crimea is Russia. Thus any
Ukronazi attack on Crimea would be a direct act of
war against Russia which Russia could not ignore or
reply to by using a “voentorg” + “northern
wind” combo (voentorg: covert supplying of
weapons; “northern wind” covert supplying of
military specialists). If Crimea is attacked, the
Russians will have to strike back, whether they want
it or not.
If that
happens, the Russian counter-strike will most likely
be limited and will probably focus on the forces
directly responsible for the attack. But if the
Ukronazis use their artillery from well-entrenched
positions to unleash a steady barrage on the towns
of northern Crimea or if, God forbid, the Ukronazis
use ballistic missiles to target major urban centers
in Crimea, the Russians will have no choice but to
counter-attack swiftly and decisively. And since
8/8/8 it is become clear that the West will *always*
blame Russia, even if she is first attacked by
another party.
In purely
military terms, any conflict between the Russian
armed forces and the Ukronazis would be a massacre:
all the Ukrainians can bring to the battlefield are
numbers, but they are completely out-gunned,
quantitatively and, even more so, qualitatively by
the Russians. The Russian artillery is currently the
most capable on the planet, it is even far superior
to anything in the West, and its effects on the
Ukrainian military have been absolutely devastating
in the past. Russia has an unique combination of UAV
(Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) and EW (Electronic
Warfare) capabilities which are directly plugged-in
into the targeting systems of Russian
multiple-rocket launchers which can reach as far as
90km into the enemy’s rear. Finally, the Russians
have been working for years on advanced submunitions
and thermobaric warheads which can be used with
devastating effect on armored forces and fortified
positions.
This combo
of UAV and advanced multiple-rocket launchers form
what the Russians call a “reconnaissance-strike
complex” or RSC (разведывательно-ударный комплекс)
which is a concept first developed by the Soviets as
far back as the 1960s. The RSC fully integrates all
the following elements: reconnaissance, guidance,
electronic counter-measures, navigation and
engagement of high-precision weapons.
Now, with
the advent of new UAV and counter-battery radars,
this concept has reached its full maturity and is
now the cornerstone of Russian combined-arms
operations. What this all means in practical terms
is that the Russians now have the capability
completely destroy several mechanized battalions in
only 2-3 minutes. And there is nothing, nothing at
all, which the Ukrainians could do against this.
The
Russians also have vastly superior armor, electronic
warfare capabilities, aerospace forces, intelligence
and reconnaissance capabilities, training – you name
it. The Ukrainians don’t stand a chance.
One big
canard is the notion that US deliveries of “lethal
weapons” to the Ukraine would somehow tip the
balance. In reality, no amount of weapons would make
any difference. Russian capabilities today are as
far superior to the Ukrainian ones as the
capabilities of the US military were superior to the
Iraqi military in 1990 during Desert Storm. While in
1991 the Ukrainian military was nominally larger
than the Russian one (the Ukraine inherited the
entire Soviet strategic 2nd echelon
forces), it did not have a war in Chechnia to force
it to begin reorganizing like the Russian one had
to, nor did it have a President like Putin who as
soon as he came to power embarked on an immense
military reform whose fruits are now finally
showing. As a result, the Russians have now achieved
several generational breakthroughs while the
Ukrainians are basically stuck with 1980s gear and a
completely disorganized, corrupt and incompetent
military. It will take the Ukraine decades to
catch-up to the Russians, and that only if some kind
of highly improbable economic miracle happens.
Conclusion:
The wars in
the Syria and the Ukraine are, as is so often the
case, largely predetermined by geography. There is
really nothing Russia could do to meaningfully and
directly oppose the US military in the Middle-East
or the Mediterranean. Likewise, there is nothing the
US can to meaningfully and directly oppose the
Russian armed forces in eastern Ukraine. This is why
both sides will try to act indirectly, on the
margins, via proxies but without getting directly
exposed. While this strategy is fundamentally sound,
it is also dangerous because indirect warfare by
proxy is harder to control and leaves both sides
open to provocations, false flag operations and the
covert involvement of third parties. This is why
both wars are so frustrating to follow: on one hand
all sorts of highly speculative scenarios cannot be
simply dismissed, but on the other hand, nothing
much seems to be happening. And when something
finally does happen, it is unclear as to what the
possible consequences might be. Finally, both wars
involve highly ideological and fundamentally
irrational actors (the Ukronazis, the Daesh crazies,
the Neocons) who cannot be counted on to act
rationally. Alas, all the theories of deterrence
always assume a rational actor. But how do you deter
a delusional maniac?
The Russian
options in both of these conflicts are limited by
objective circumstances and by larger political
considerations. I would argue that Russia has done
an absolutely amazing job in Syria with very limited
means and in a supremely dangerous environment. As
for the Donbass, I would be much more nuanced. And
while I do believe that Russia took the right
decision by not overtly sending her armed forces in
the eastern Ukraine, I also have to admit that she
also showed poor timing and even indecision in
dealing with the Nazi crazies in Kiev: it took the
Russians a long time to get the Voentorg and
“Northern Wind” up and running and while this was
the correct response, it was also one which took a
long time to become fully effective. Then there is
the issue of the (now former) Russian ambassador to
Kiev, Mikhail Zurabov, who was totally ineffective
in getting anything done at all (while he was left
in place for so long is still a mystery to me).
True, Zurabov had nobody to speak to, but that does
not justify him cozying up and playing buddies with
Poroshenko as he reportedly did. Now that the
Russians have finally appointed a competent person
to this role,
Mikhail Babich,
the Ukrainians are refusing to accredit him
which, apparently, the Kremlin is accepting with
bizarre equanimity. In December, Putin also
appointed another very powerful figure,
Boris Gryzlov, a permanent member of the
Security Council of the Russian Federation, as the
plenipotentiary representative of the Russian
Federation in the Contact Group on settlement of the
situation in Ukraine. It took Russia a very long
time, but now with Gryzlov and Babich involved,
Russia is finally involving some high octane
personalities in the negotiations process dealing
with the war in the Ukraine. Again, a good decision,
but a very belated one.
Could this
also indicate that the Russians have information
that something major will happen with the Ukraine?
Possibly. I sure don’t know, but it does look to me
that they are preparing for something.
As for
Syria, the Russian are trying to increase their
options, but it is unlikely that anything major
happens before the next US administration comes in.
Besides, with Erdogan still busy with his crackdown
on any opposition, it is also unclear what course
Turkey will take once the purges are completed.
And then
this, just in:
According
to al Masdar news (https://www.almasdarnews.com),
Iran has just granted Russia the right to use the
Hamedan Air Base in western Iran. The original
article entitled “Russia deploys jets at
Iranian Airbase to combat insurgents in Syria
(Pictures)” (https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/russia-deploys-jets-iranian-airbase-combat-insurgents-syria-pictures/)
even claims to show pictures of Russian Tu-22M3s
already deployed in Iran. IF this is true, this is
very significant. Unlike Khmeimim, Hamedan is safe
and is perfectly located to conduct military strikes
in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle-East. One
problem though: al Masdar is an Israeli project,
part the
Israel Project, a “pro-Israel public
diplomacy organization founded in the United States
at the height of the second intifada”. I checked
with a well-informed Iranian source, and it is not
confirming any of this at this time. The Russian
blogger “Colonel Cassad”, however,
did some investigating of his own and seems to
consider that information as plausible.
Other Russian sources are confirming that Russia
has asked Iran to allow Russian cruise missiles to
fly through Iranian airspace. It does appear like
the collaboration between Iran and Russia is
strengthening which is, of course, very good news.
Finally, if
Erdogan is serious about collaborating with Russia
and Iran against Daesh, then one way for Turkey to
do that would be to open the Turkish airspace to
Russian air and missile strikes against Daesh. If
that happens, Russia will have the choice of four
locations to launch strikes: Crimea, southern Russia
(Abkhazia), Khmeimim in Syria and, hopefully,
Hamedan in Iran.
A place to
keep a special eye on is the Bombora military
airfield near Gudauta, in Abkhazia.
According to Lentra.ru, the length of the main
runway is 4km (this is a mistake,
the actual length is 3km) and this runway ends
right on the seashore allowing aircraft to take off
at very low altitudes and thereby remain under enemy
radar coverage (see image next page). This airfield
is currently protected by some 4’000 Russian
soldiers deployed in Abkhazia who are equipped by
the newest Russian weapon systems and who form the
backbone of the Russian 7th Base [for
more on this base, see
here (from and anti-Russian source) and
here (including some pretty interesting
photographs)]. This airfield is ideally located to
become a major hub for the operations of Russian
Aerospace forces.
UPDATE:
First,
as Aram Mirzaei
correctly pointed out, I made a mistake and
confused two websites called Al-Masdar (the source):
One is the Israeli project mentioned in this
article, led by chief editor Shimrit Meir. This
website is called Al-Masdar.net.
The other page is a pro-Syrian-Iranian-Russian news
website called almasdarnews.com. I
apologize for this mistake.
Second,
it seems that
almasdarnews.com is correct. Several Iranian
websites are now also reporting the Russian
deployment at the Hamedan Air Base:
http://www.eghtesadonline.com/بخش-جهان-29/140628-استقرار-بمب-افکن-های-روسی-در-پایگاه-هوایی-همدان-عکس
http://www.akharinnews.com/آخرین_اخبار/item/112646-بمب-افکن-های-روسیه-وارد-فرودگاه-نظامی-همدان-شدند.html
http://damadam.ir/۲۴-آنلاین-24onlinenews/اخبار-سیاسی/title/بمب-افکن-های-روسیه-وارد-فرودگاه-نظامی-همدان-شدند/id/3321242
RT is
now also quoting the Al Masdar article thus
indirectly confirming it:
https://www.rt.com/news/356098-russian-bombers-iran-hamadan/
This is an
extremely important and positive development which
shows that the military cooperation between Russia
and Iran has now reached a new level and which will
have a major impact upon this war. This is very,
very good news.
http://thesaker.is/russian-military-options-in-syria-and-the-ukraine/
See
also
Russian bombers use Iran base
for air strikes:
: Currently, the
strategic TU-22M3 bombers take flight from southern
Russia at Modzok airfield; however, this newly
signed military agreement with Iran will allow
Russia to reduce flight time by 60%, saving both
money and improving airstrike effectiveness.
No permanent strategic
bombers & nukes in Syria but Khmeimim base to be
enlarged – Russian senator:
Russia’s military base in Khmeimim, Syria, will be
converted to make it a permanent site, a Russian
senator has said. After various questions are agreed
with the Syrian authorities, the base will have
extended operational capabilities.
|
