The Real
Secret of the South China Sea
By Pepe
Escobar
July 27, 2016
"Information
Clearing House"
- "Sputnik
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South China Sea is and will continue to be the
ultimate geopolitical flashpoint of the young 21st
century – way ahead of the Middle East or Russia’s
western borderlands. No less than the future of Asia
– as well as the East-West balance of power – is at
stake.
To
understand the Big Picture, we need to go back
to 1890 when Alfred Mahan, then president of the
US Naval College, wrote the seminal The
Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783.
Mahan’s central thesis is that the US should go
global in search of new markets, and protect
these new trade routes through a network
of naval bases.
That is
the embryo of the US Empire of Bases – which de
facto started after the Spanish-American war,
over a century ago, when the US graduated
to Pacific power status by annexing the
Philippines, Hawaii and Guam.
Western –
American and European — colonialism is strictly
responsible for the current, incendiary sovereignty
battle in the South China Sea. It’s the West that
came up with most land borders – and maritime
borders — of these states.
The roll
call is quite impressive. Philippines and Indonesia
were divided by Spain and Portugal in 1529. The
division between Malaysia and Indonesia is owed
to the British and the Dutch in 1842. The border
between China and Vietnam was imposed to the Chinese
by the French in 1887. The Philippines’s borders
were concocted by the US and Spain in 1898. The
border between Philippines and Malaysia was drawn
by the US and the Brits in 1930.
We are
talking about borders between different colonial
possessions – and that implies intractable problems
from the start, subsequently inherited
by post-colonial nations. And to think that it had
all started as a loose configuration. The best
anthropological studies (Bill Solheim’s,
for instance) define the semi-nomadic communities
who really traveled and traded across the South
China Sea from time immemorial as the Nusantao – an
Austronesian compound word for “south island” and
“people”.
The Nusantao
were not a defined ethnic group; rather a maritime
internet. Over the centuries, they had many key
hubs, from the coastline between central Vietnam and
Hong Kong to the Mekong Delta. They were not
attached to any “state”, and the notion of “borders”
didn’t even exist.
Only by the
late 19th century the Westphalian system managed
to freeze the South China Sea inside an immovable
framework. Which brings us to why China is so
sensitive about its borders; because they are
directly linked to the “century of humiliation” –
when internal Chinese corruption and weakness
allowed Western barbarians to take possession
of Chinese land.
Tension in the nine-dash line
The eminent
Chinese geographer Bai Meichu was a fierce
nationalist who drew his own version of what was
called the “Chinese National Humiliation Map”. In
1936 he published a map including a “U-shaped line”
gobbling up the South China Sea all the way down to
James Shoal, which is 1,500 km south of China
but only over 100 km off Borneo. Scores of maps
copied Meichu’s. Most included the Spratly Islands,
but not James Shoal.
The crucial
fact is that Bai was the man who actually invented
the “nine-dash line”, promoted by the Chinese
government – then not yet Communist – as the letter
of the law in terms of “historic” Chinese claims
over islands in the South China Sea.
Everything
stopped when Japan invaded China in 1937. Japan had
occupied Taiwan way back in 1895. Now imagine
Americans surrendering to the Japanese in the
Philippines in 1942. That meant virtually the entire
coastline of the South China Sea being controlled
by a single empire for the fist time in history. The
South China Sea had become a Japanese lake.
Not for long;
only until 1945. The Japanese did occupy Woody
Island in the Paracels and Itu Aba (today Taiping)
in the Spratlys. After the end of WWII and the US
nuclear-bombing Japan, the Philippines became
independent in 1946; the Spratlys immediately were
declared Filipino territory.
In 1947 the
Chinese went on overdrive to recover all the
Paracels from colonial power France. In parallel,
all the islands in the South China Sea got Chinese
names. James Shoal was downgraded from a sandbank
into a reef (it’s actually underwater; still Beijing
sees is as the southernmost point of Chinese
territory.)
In December
1947 all the islands were placed under the control
of Hainan (itself an island in southern China.) New
maps — based on Meichu’s — followed, but now
with Chinese names for the islands (or reefs, or
shoals). The key problem is that no one explained
the meaning of the dashes (which were originally
eleven.)
So in June
1947 the Republic of China claimed everything
within the line – while proclaiming itself open
to negotiate definitive maritime borders with other
nations later on. But, for the moment, no borders;
that was the birth of the much-maligned “strategic
ambiguity” of the South China Sea that lasts to this
day.
“Red” China
adopted all the maps — and all the decisions. Yet
the final maritime border between China and Vietnam,
for instance, was decided only in 1999. In 2009
China included a map of the “U-shaped” or “nine-dash
line” in a presentation to the UN Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf; that was the first
time the line officially showed up on an
international level.
No wonder
other Southeast Asian players were furious. That was
the apex of the millennia-old transition from the
“maritime internet” of semi-nomadic peoples to the
Westphalian system. The post-modern “war” for the
South China Sea was on.
Gunboat freedom
In 2013 the
Philippines – prodded by the US and Japan – decided
to take its case about Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)
in the South China Sea to be judged according to the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Both
China and Philippines ratified UNCLOS. The US did
not. The Philippines aimed for UNCLOS – not
“historical rights”, as the Chinese wanted —
to decide what is an island, what is a rock, and who
is entitled to claim territorial rights (and thus
EEZs) in these surrounding waters.
UNCLOS itself
is the result of years of fierce legal battles.
Still, key nations – including BRICS members China,
India and Brazil, but also, significantly, Vietnam
and Malaysia – have been struggling to change an
absolutely key provision, making it mandatory
for foreign warships to seek permission
before sailing through their EEZs.
And here we
plunge in truly, deeply troubled waters; the notion
of “freedom of navigation”.
For the
American empire, “freedom of navigation”, from the
West Coast of the US to Asia – through the Pacific,
the South China Sea, the Malacca Strait and the
Indian Ocean – is strictly subordinated to military
strategy. Imagine if one day EEZs would be closed
to the US Navy – or if “authorization” would have
to be demanded every time; the Empire of Bases would
lose “access” to…its own bases.
Add to it
trademark Pentagon paranoia; what if a “hostile
power” decided to block the global trade on which
the US economy depends? (even though the premise —
China contemplating such a move — is ludicrous). The
Pentagon actually pursues a Freedom of Navigation
(FON) program. For all practical purposes, it’s 21st
century gunboat diplomacy, as in those aircraft
carriers showboating on and off in the South China
Sea.
The Holy
Grail, as far as the 10-member Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is concerned, is
to come up with a Code of Conduct to solve all
maritime conflicts between Philippines, Vietnam,
Malaysia, Brunei and China. This has been dragging
on for years now because mostly the Philippines
wanted to frame the Chinese under a set of binding
rules but was only ready to talk until all ten ASEAN
members had agreed on them first.
Beijing’s
strategy is the opposite; bilateral discussions
to emphasize its formidable leverage. Thus China
assuring the support of Cambodia – quite visible
early this week when Cambodia prevented a
condemnation of China regarding the South China Sea
at a key summit in Laos; China and ASEAN settled for
“self-restraint.”
Watch Hillary pivoting
In 2011 the
US State Department was absolutely terrified
with the planned Obama administration withdrawals
from both Iraq and Afghanistan; what would happen
to superpower projection? That ended in November
2011, when then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
coined the by now
famous “pivot to Asia”.
“Six lines
of action” were embedded in the “pivot”. Four
of these Clinton nicked from a 2009 report by the
Washington think tank CSIS; reinvigorating
alliances; cultivating relationships with emerging
powers; developing relationships with regional
multilateral bodies; and working closely with South
East Asian countries on economic issues. Clinton
added two more: broad-based military presence
in Asia, and the promotion of democracy and human
rights.
It was clear
from the start – and not only across the global
South — that cutting across the rhetorical fog the
“pivot” was code for a military offensive to contain
China. Even more seriously, this was the
geopolitical moment when a South East Asian dispute
over maritime territory intersected with the
across-the-globe confrontation between the hegemon
and a “peer competitor”
What
Clinton meant by “engaging emerging powers” was,
in her own words, “join us in shaping and
participating in a rules-based regional and global
order”. This is code for rules coined by the hegemon
– as in the whole apparatus of the Washington
consensus.
No wonder the
South China Sea is immensely strategic, as American
hegemony intimately depends on ruling the waves
(remember Mahan). That’s the core of the US National
Military Strategy. The South China Sea is the
crucial link connecting the Pacific to the Indian
Ocean, the Persian Gulf and ultimately Europe.
And so we
finally discover Rosebud — the ultimate South China
Sea “secret”. China under Clinton’s “rule-based
regional and global order” effectively means that
China must obey and keep the South China Sea open
to the US Navy.
That spells
out inevitable escalation further on down the sea
lanes. China, slowly but surely, is developing an
array of sophisticated weapons which could
ultimately “deny” the South China Sea to the US
Navy, as the Beltway is
very much aware.
What makes
it even more serious is that we’re talking
about irreconcilable imperatives. Beijing
characterizes itself as an anti-imperialist power;
and that necessarily includes recovering national
territories usurped by colonial powers allied
with internal Chinese traitors (those islands that
The Hague has ruled are no more than “rocks” or even
“low-tide elevations”).
The US,
for its part, is all about Exceptionalism and
Manifest Destiny. As it stands, more than Russia’s
western borderlands, the Baltics or “Syraq”, this is
where the hegemon “rules” are really being
contested. And the stakes couldn't be higher.
That’ll be the day when the US Navy is “denied”
from the South China Sea; and that’ll be the end
of its imperial hegemony. |