Russia’s
Achilles Heel – Reflections from St. Petersburg
By F.
William Engdahl
July 05, 2016
"Information
Clearing House"
- For three days this month, June 16-18, I had the
opportunity to participate as a panelist in the
annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum
in Russia. I’ve been in Russia many times since the
Ukraine US-backed coup d’état of February 2014, and
the deliberate escalations of NATO military and
economic tensions and sanctions against the Russian
Federation. This year’s forum, my second as
participant, gave me a rare opportunity to speak
with leading representatives from every sector of
the Russian economy- from CEOs of the energy sector
to the Russian Railways to the national Russia Grid
electricity provider to numerous small and mid-sized
businessmen, to a wide range of economists. It
sharpened my perception of just how precarious the
situation of Russia today is.
What became
clearer to me in the course of the three days of
discussions in St Petersburg is precisely how
vulnerable Russia is. Her Achilles Heel is the
reigning ideology that controls every key economic
post of the Government of the Russian Federation
under Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. Under the
terms of the Russian Constitution adopted in the
chaos of the Yeltsin years and enormously
influenced, if not literally drafted, by Russia’s
foreign IMF advisers, economic policy is the
portfolio responsibility of the Prime Minister and
his various ministers of Economics, Finance and so
forth. The Russian President, today Vladimir Putin,
is responsible for defense and foreign policy.
Making the job
virtually impossible of reviving credit flows to
fuel genuine real investment in urgently needed
infrastructure across the vast land expanse of
Russia is the Central Bank of Russia. The Central
Bank of Russia was given two
constitutionally-mandated tasks when it was created
as an entity independent from the Russian Government
in the first months of the Russian Federation
following the breakup of the Soviet Union. It must
control Russian domestic inflation and it must
stabilize the Ruble against major foreign
currencies. Like western central banks, its role is
almost purely monetary, not economic.
In June, 2015
as I participated the first time in the St
Petersburg forum, the Russian Central Bank base
rate, interest charged to banks, was 11%. In the
peak of the so-called Ruble crisis in January 2015
it had reached 17%. Expectations last summer were
that Elvira Nabiullina, the central bank governor
since 2013, would begin to bring central rates
rather rapidly down to manageable levels, especially
at a time when central banks such as the European
Central Bank, the US Fed and the Bank of Japan were
lowest in some 500 years at zero or even negative.
Further, since January 2016 oil prices, a
significant factor in the Ruble strength as Russia
is the world’s largest oil exporter, began a rise of
more than 60% from lows below $30 a barrel in early
January to levels near $50 six months later.
That lowering
of rates by the Central Bank hasn’t happened.
Instead it is slowly killing the economy. One year
later, in early June, 2016 the Russian Central Bank
under Governor Nabiullina made the first rate cut
since June 2015…to a still-deadly 10.5%. Perhaps
it’s notable that monetarist Nabiullina was named by
the London Euromoney magazine as their 2015
Central Bank Governor of the Year. That should be
seen as a bad omen for Russia. Equally ominous was
the fulsome praise the head of Washington’s IMF had
for Nabiullina’s monetarist handling of the early
2015 Ruble crisis.
Operation
Success…patient died
What I
experienced in my discussions at the conference–this
year with record attendance of more than 12,000
business people and others from around the world–was
a sense that there coexist two Russian governments,
each the polar opposite of the other. Every key
economic and finance post is firmly occupied at
present by monetarist free-market liberal economists
who might be called “Gaidar’s Kindergarten.” Yegor
Gaidar was the architect, along with Harvard’s
Jeffrey Sachs, a Soros-backed economist, of the
radical “shock therapy” that was responsible for the
economic hardships that plagued the country in the
1990s resulting in mass poverty and hyperinflation.
Today’s Gaidar
Kindergarten includes former Finance Minister Alexei
Kudrin, another Euromoney favorite in 2010 as
international Finance Minister of the Year. It
includes Economics Minister, Alexey Ulyukaev. It
also includes Medvedev’s Deputy Prime Minister,
Arkady Dvorkovic.
Dvorkovic, a
graduate of Duke University in North Carolina, is a
protégé, directly serving during his earlier years
under Yegor Gaidar. In 2010 under then Russian
President Medvedev, Dvorkovic proposed a lunatic
scheme to make Moscow into a world financial center
by bringing in Goldman Sachs and the major Wall
Street banks to set it all up. We might call it
inviting the fox into the hen house. Dvorkovic’s
economic credo is “Less state!” He was the chief
lobbyist in Russia’s WTO accession campaign, and
tried to ram through rapid privatization of the
assets that remain
state-owned.
This is the
core group around Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev
today who are strangling any genuine Russian
economic recovery. They follow the western playbook
written in Washington by the International Monetary
Fund and the US Treasury. Whether they do this at
this stage out of honest conviction that that is
best for their nation or out of a deep psychological
hatred for their country, I’m not in a position to
say. The effects of their policies, as I learned in
my many discussions this month in St Petersburg are
devastating. In effect, they are self-imposing
economic sanctions on Russia far worse than any from
the USA or EU. If Putin’s United Russia party loses
the elections on 18 September, it will be due not to
his foreign policy initiatives for which he still
enjoys 80+% popularity polls. It will be because
Russia has not cleaned the Augean Stables of the
Gaidar Kindergarten.
Obeying
Washington Consensus
From various
discussions I learned to my shock that the official
policy of Medvedev’s economic team and of the
Central Bank today is to follow the standard IMF
“Washington Consensus” budget austerity policies.
This is so despite the fact that Russia, years ago,
repaid its IMF loans and is no longer under IMF “conditionalities,”
as it was during the 1998 Ruble default crisis.
Not only that,
Russia has one of the lowest debt-to-GDP ratios of
state debt of any major country in the world, a mere
17% while the USA “enjoys” a 104% ratio, the
Eurozone countries have an average debt level of
over 90% of GDP, far from the mandated 60%
Maastricht level. Japan has a staggering 229%
debt-to-GDP.
The official
economic policy today of the Central Bank of Russia
with its absurdly high rates is to reduce an
inflation rate of a mere 8% to its target of 4%
through an explicit policy of budget austerity and
consumption reduction. No economy in recorded
history has managed an economic policy under forced
reduction of consumption, certainly not Greece nor
any African nation. Yet the Russian Central Bank, as
if on automatic pilot, religiously sings the
Gregorian death chants of the IMF as if they were a
magic formula. If Russia continues down this Central
Bank monetarist path it may well soon be that, “the
operation was a success, but the patient died,” as
the cynical saying goes.
Stolypin Club
There is a
coherent, experienced and growing opposition to this
liberal western cabal around Medvedev. They at
present are represented in something called the
Stolypin Club, created by a group of Russian
national economists in 2012 to draft comprehensive
alternative strategies to lessen Russia’s dependence
on the dollar world and boost growth of the real
economy.
I had the
honor of appearing on a major panel together with
several members and founders of this group. It
included a co-founder of the Stolypin Club, Boris
Titov, a Russian businessman and open ideological
foe of Kudrin, who is chairman of the All-Russian
“Business Russia” organization. He insists on the
need to increase domestic production of goods,
stimulate demand, attracting investment, tax cuts
and the cuts to the refinancing rate of the Central
Bank. Titov is a central figure today in Russia’s
recent China initiatives. He served as chairman of
the Russian part of the Russian-Chinese Business
Council, and member of the Presidium of the National
Council on Corporate Governance.
My panel also
included Stolypin Club leading members Sergei
Glazyev, Adviser to the President of the Russian
Federation, and Andrey Klepach, Deputy Chairman of
the VEB Bank for Development. Klepach, a co-founder
of the Stolypin Club, was formerly Deputy Economics
Minister of Russia, and director of the
macroeconomic forecasting department of the Ministry
of Economic Development and Trade. My impression was
that these are serious, dedicated people who
understand that the heart of true national economic
policy is human capital and human well-being not
inflation or other econometric data.
Stolypin Bonds
At this point,
expanding on my remarks to the audience in St.
Petersburg, I would like to share a proposal for
getting Russia’s vast and rich economy and people
into a positive growth path despite sanctions and
high central bank interest rates.
All the
necessary elements are there. The country has the
largest land expanse of any nation in the world. It
has arguably the richest untapped mineral and
precious metals resources. It has some of the finest
scientific and engineering minds in the world, a
skilled workforce, highly intelligent wonderful
people.
What is
lacking is the coordination of all the instruments
to make an harmonic national economic symphony.
Still there is a fear of being accused of reversion
to Soviet Gosplan central planning among too many in
Government positions. Only partly are the scars of
Russia’s national trauma much healed under the years
of Putin, someone who has allowed Russians to again
feel respected in the world.
The scars came
not only from the travails of communism. They came
from the manner in which the United States under
President George H.W. Bush in the early 1990’s and
after under every US president since, has gone out
of its way to humiliate and heap contempt on Russia
and everything Russian. Sadly, those scars,
consciously or unconsciously, still hamper many in
positions of responsibility across Russia.
On the
positive side, there are many successful models of
growing an economy in a positive, debt-free manner.
One is Germany following the World War in the 1950’s
through the state special credit authority,
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (The Credit
Authority for Redevelopment), which restored Germany
from the ashes of war with subsidized interest
rates. It was also used to rebuild the former German
Democratic Republic after unification in 1990.
There is the
successful model in the 1960s under French President
Charles de Gaulle, called Planification,
where every region with representatives of all major
social groups—farmers, small-to-midsize businesses,
labor, large companies—met and debated their
regional priorities and sent them to a central body
to draft the Five Year Plan. Five years not because
of Soviet imitation but because major infrastructure
requires a minimum of five years and the possible
correction of ineffective or outdated plans needs a
short span of five years.
I would
propose establishing of a unique, separate State
Authority for National Infrastructure Development,
independent of the Central Bank of Russia or of the
Finance Ministry. It ideally would have an impartial
overseeing board of most respected and economically
experienced Russian nationals from each region.
Perhaps it would make sense to place it directly
under the responsibility of the President. It could
adopt the “best practices” of the above two models
as well as others successful in recent years such as
South Korea after the 1950’s.
The model
developed by Russia’s Pyotr Arkadyevich Stolypin,
the namesake of the Stolypin Club group of national
economists today, is appropriate. As Czar Nicholas
II’s appointed chairman of the Council of Ministers,
Stolypin served as both Prime Minister and Minister
of Internal Affairs from 1906 to 1911. He introduced
successful land reforms to create a class of
market-oriented smallholding landowners, and
construction of a second track of Sergei Witte’s
monumental Trans-Siberian Railway, one along the
Amur River border with China. He began to transform
Russia’s economy dramatically.
I would
propose the suggested separate State Authority for
National Infrastructure Development be given the
authority to issue special “Stolypin Bonds” to
finance a wide variety of agreed national
infrastructure projects that would rapidly
accelerate the Eurasian economic integration and
creation of vast new markets with China, Kazakhstan,
Belarus on to India and Iran.
The Stolypin
Bonds would be issued to only Russian nationals, pay
an attractive and fair interest rate, and not
transferable to foreign bondholders. Because of this
internal financing, it would not be vulnerable to
western financial warfare. The debt incurred would
not be any problem because of the quality of the
investment and because of the present extraordinary
low debt levels of the Russian State. Emergency
conditions require extraordinary solutions.
Sale of the
special bonds would be direct from the new state
authority, and not via banks, thus increasing the
possible interest rate attractiveness for the
Russian population. Bonds could be distributed to
the public through the national network of Post
Offices, minimizing distribution costs. As was done
in Germany and other countries previously with great
success, the bonds could be collateralized by
something Russia has more of than anyone—its land.
Because the
bonds go exclusively to infrastructure projects
deemed national priority, they would be
anti-inflationary. This is because of the “secret”
of government infrastructure investment. By making
the arteries of the national economy flow more
efficiently across all Russia, where today, for lack
of modern infrastructure, none exist. They will
create new markets, significantly lower
transportation costs.
The new
enterprises and the newly-created jobs to construct
the infrastructure will repay the State Budget
manifold in raised tax revenues for a prospering
economy. It is the opposite of the current, failed
Central Bank “consumption-reduction” anti-inflation
model. This expanding investment in turn would
undercut current Central Bank power over the
national economy until such time the members of the
Duma realize it is time to roll-back the 1991
Central Bank law and reincorporate it into the
state. State sovereign control over its money is one
of the most essential attributes of sovereignty.
Objectively,
today Russia possesses everything she needs to
become an economically prosperous world economic
giant and technology pacesetter in addition to her
already made decision to become world leading
agriculture exporter of GMO-free, natural
agriculture.
What was clear
from my St Petersburg talks this time is that events
are approaching a decisive “do or die” turn in which
either economic policy is formally put into the
hands of competent national economy circles such as
those of Boris Titov, Andrey Klepach and Sergey
Glazyev, or she will succumb to the insidious poison
of Washington Consensus and liberal free market
nonsense. After my recent private talks I am
optimistic regarding prospects for a positive
change.
F.
William Engdahl is strategic risk consultant and
lecturer, he holds a degree in politics from
Princeton University and is a best-selling author on
oil and geopolitics, exclusively for the online
magazine “New
Eastern Outlook”
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