Lies,
Damned Lies, and Statistics... and U.S. Africa
Command
By Nick Turse
June 24,
2016 "Information
Clearing House"
- "TomDispatch"
- One of the strangest news developments of our time
is the way the media now focus for days, if not
weeks, 24/7, on a single event and its
ramifications. Omar Mateen’s slaughter of 49 people
at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando is only the latest
example of this. If no other calamitous or
eye-catching event comes along (“‘Unimaginable’:
Toddler’s body recovered by divers after alligator
attack at Disney resort”), it could, like the San
Bernardino shootings, top the news, in all its
micro-ramifications and repetitions, for three or
four weeks.
Such
stories – especially mass killings, especially those
with an aura of terrorism about them – are
particularly easy for strapped, often downsizing
news outfits to cover. They are, in a sense,
pre-packaged. A template for them is already in
place: starting with the breaking news of some
horror and soon after a tagline like “America in
shock, [grief,] [mourning,] wondering what comes
next.” Then follow the inevitable grainy smartphone
videos of some aspect of the horror as reporters fan
out to capture the weeping faces; the brave or
tearful accounts of wounded survivors; the backstory
on the killer or killers and his or their tangled
motivations; commentary from the usual terror (or
mass shooting) experts; the latest on the FBI’s
follow-up investigations; the funerals for the
victims, including the comments of grief counselors
meant to help a nation “in mourning”; and finally,
of course, the issue of “closure” and “healing,” all
topped – if “terrorism” is part of the package – by
an endless frisson of horror and
fascination when it comes to the influence of ISIS
(or allegiance pledged to the same), lone wolves,
the role of social media, and so on. In this strange
election season, there is, of course, the added
thrill of watching Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton,
and President Obama in mortal battle. Who could ask
for more? Not the TV news outfits that now mobilize
for these events the way the military might mobilize
for war. So, as the New York Times
put it recently, “the news industry descended on
Florida” last week, and so they did.
Such events
overwhelm us, as they are meant to. They glue
eyeballs, as they are also meant to, and the
reporting of all of this is now so enmeshed in the
events themselves that it is essentially
indistinguishable from them. Undoubtedly – given the
allure of such intense, over-the-top media attention
– it actually works to encourage future acts that
will rivet similar attention on the next lone wolf
or group.
There is,
however, one small problem worth mentioning. For
days or weeks on end, a single place – call it
Newtown, San Bernardino, or Orlando (one school, one
gathering of government workers, one club) – is the
center of our universe. The rest of the world? Not
so much. However significant the 24/7 event may be,
it blots out just about everything else and so plays
havoc with our sense of what’s important and what
isn’t. It also ensures that, at least in the
mainstream, ever fewer reporters cover ever fewer
non-24/7 stories.
For
so much that’s basic to our world and will matter
far more in the long run than local slaughters, no
matter how horrific, there are few or no reporters
and next to no coverage. This means, for instance,
that in the distant reaches of the imperium, much of
the time the U.S. military can operate remarkably
freely, without fear of significant scrutiny. Which
is why, on the subject of the U.S. military’s
“pivot” to Africa, it’s lucky that Nick Turse has
been
on the beat (almost alone) for TomDispatch.
Otherwise in our new media universe, what we don’t
know could, in the end, hurt us.
~ Tom
The Numbers Racket
AFRICOM Clams Up After Commander Peddles
Contradictory Statements to Congress
By Nick Turse
General
David Rodriguez might be a modern military celebrity
– if he hadn’t spent his career ducking the
spotlight. After graduating from West Point in 1976,
he began his long march up the chain of command,
serving in Operation Just Cause (the U.S. invasion
of Panama) and Operation Desert Storm (Iraq War 1.0)
before becoming deputy commander of United States
Forces, Afghanistan, and commander of the
International Security Assistance Force-Joint
Command in 2009.
In 2011,
the 6’5”
former paratrooper
received his fourth star and two years later the
coveted helm of one of the Defense Department’s six
geographic combatant commands,
becoming the third chief of U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM). Rodriguez has held that post ever since,
overseeing a colossal American military expansion on
that continent. During his tenure, AFRICOM has grown
in every conceivable way, from outposts to manpower.
In the process, Africa has become a key hub for
shadowy U.S. missions against terror groups from
Yemen,
Iraq, and
Syria to
Somalia and
Libya. But even as he now prepares to turn over
his post to Marine Lieutenant General
Thomas Waldhauser, Rodriguez continues to
downplay the scope of U.S. operations on the
continent, insisting that his has been a kinder,
gentler combatant command.
As he
prepares to retire, Rodriguez has an additional
reason for avoiding attention. His tenure has not
only also been marked by an
increasing number of
terror attacks from
Mali and
Burkina Faso to, most recently,
Côte d’Ivoire, but questions have arisen about
his recent testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC). Did the outgoing AFRICOM
chief lie to the senators about the number of
missions being carried out on the continent? Is
AFRICOM maintaining two sets of books in an effort
to obscure the size and scope of its expanding
operations? Is the command relying on a redefinition
of terms and massaging its numbers to buck potential
oversight?
If
Rodriguez knowingly deceived the Senate Armed
Services Committee in an effort to downplay the size
and scope of his command’s operations, that act
would be criminal and punishable by law, experts
say. That’s a big “if.” But U.S. Africa Command’s
response hardly inspires confidence. AFRICOM has
refused to comment on the subject, stonewalling
TomDispatch on questions about why Rodriguez
has been peddling contradictory figures about his
command’s activities to Congress. And this rejection
of transparency and accountability is only the
latest incident in a long history of AFRICOM
personnel ducking questions, rebuffing press
inquiries, and preventing Americans from
understanding what’s being done in their name and
with their tax dollars in Africa.
Numbers Game
In March
2015, General David Rodriguez appeared before the
Senate Armed Services Committee to report on the
previous year’s military missions in Africa. “In
Fiscal Year 2014, we conducted 68 operations, 11
major joint exercises, and 595 security cooperation
activities,” he told the senators. The U.S. had, in
other words,
carried out a total of 674 military missions
across Africa, nearly two per day, up from 546 the
year before. Those 674 missions amounted to an
almost 300% jump in the number of annual operations,
exercises, and military-to-military trainings since
U.S. Africa Command was established in 2008.
These
missions form the backbone of U.S. military
engagement on the continent. “The command’s
operations, exercises, and security cooperation
assistance programs support U.S. Government foreign
policy and do so primarily through
military-to-military activities and assistance
programs,” according to AFRICOM. “These activities
build strong, enduring partnerships with African
nations, regional and international organizations,
and other states that are committed to improving
security in Africa.”
Very little
is known about most of these missions due to
AFRICOM’s secretive nature. Only a small fraction of
them are reported in the command’s press releases
with little of substance chronicled. An even tinier
number are covered by independent journalists.
“Congress and the public need to know about U.S.
military operations overseas, regardless of what
euphemism is used to describe them,” says William
Hartung, a senior adviser to the Security Assistance
Monitor which tracks American military aid around
the globe. “Calling something a ‘security
cooperation activity’ doesn’t change the fact that
U.S. troops are working directly with foreign
military forces.”
This
spring, at his annual appearance before the SASC,
Rodriguez provided the senators with an update on
these programs. “In fiscal year 2015,” he announced,
“we conducted 75 joint operations, 12 major joint
exercises, and 400 security cooperation activities.”
For the first time ever, it seemed that AFRICOM had
carried out fewer missions than the year before –
just 487. This 28% drop was noteworthy, if
little noticed.
But was it
true?
Things
started getting hazy when Rodriguez went on to offer
a new version of the number of missions AFRICOM had
carried out in 2014. To hear him tell it, 2015
hadn’t represented a drop in those missions but a
banner year for them. After all, its 75 joint
operations, he told the senators, topped the 68 of
2014. Twelve major joint exercises one-upped the 11
of a year earlier. And 400 security cooperation
activities beat the 363 of the year before.
I did a
double take and reread his 2015 statement. The
discrepancy couldn’t have been plainer. His
exact words last year: “In Fiscal Year 2014, we
conducted 68 operations, 11 major joint exercises,
and 595 security cooperation activities.” And this
year he
said: “[W]e conducted 68 operations, 11 major
joint exercises, and 363 security cooperation
activities in fiscal year 2014.” Somehow, between
2015 and 2016, more than 200 missions from 2014 had
simply vanished and, months later, AFRICOM has still
failed to offer an explanation for what happened,
while the Senate Armed Services Committee has,
apparently, not even bothered to ask for any
clarification.
A
discrepancy of 232 security cooperation activities
can’t be chalked up to a mere miscount. And since
both numbers were presented to the SASC in written
statements, the AFRICOM chief can’t simply have
misspoken.
Such a
discrepancy in the total number of “security
cooperation activities” conducted by his command
raises questions about what AFRICOM is actually
doing on the continent (or whether it even knows
what it’s doing). The figure Rodriguez offered this
year also contradicts projections laid out in U.S.
Army Africa (USARAF) documents obtained by
TomDispatch via the Freedom of Information Act
in 2014. These
refer to more than 400 activities scheduled for
Army troops alone in Africa that year.
Despite
numerous requests over several weeks, AFRICOM has
failed to provide any comment or clarification to
TomDispatch. It also failed to respond to
requests to interview Rodriguez. A Pentagon
spokesperson was able to coax a reply out of the
command as to the correct number of security
cooperation activities in 2014. According to AFRICOM,
that number is indeed 363, directly contradicting
Rodriguez’s 2015 testimony and suggesting that,
whether purposely or not, the general misled members
of Congress. Messages seeking comment from the SASC
staff, including Dustin Walker and Chip Unruh –
spokespeople, respectively, for U.S. Senators John
McCain and Jack Reed, the chairman and the ranking
member of the committee – were not returned.
“The fact
that General Rodriguez gave such wildly conflicting
figures, and that members of Congress aren’t
pressing him for an explanation, is just one more
example of how U.S. military activities in Africa
and beyond have spun out of control,” says Hartung.
Bending the Law – or Breaking It?
With
Rodriguez, Africa Command, and the staff of the
Senate Armed Services Committee staying silent, it’s
impossible to know what motives – if any – lay
behind the bogus numbers offered by the AFRICOM
chief.
The command
may, without public announcement, have redefined
“security cooperation activities” thanks to an
as-yet-unreleased 2014 Defense Department memorandum
meant to provide guidance on the so-called Leahy
Law, which prohibits the U.S from providing
assistance to foreign security forces implicated in
human rights abuses. Reclassifying certain types of
training missions makes it more difficult than ever
to track both the dollars spent by AFRICOM and the
number of activities it conducted on that continent.
Africa
Command, its subordinate units, and partners also
have a long history of being unable to effectively
track and manage their own efforts. A 2015 study by
the Government Accountability Office
noted that AFRICOM “identifies and synchronizes
security cooperation activities through various
planning processes, but the brigades allocated to
AFRICOM sometimes lack key information about these
activities.” According to officials involved in the
process, “the increasing number of activities being
conducted in Africa… challenges the ability of the
Offices of Security Cooperation to fully coordinate
individual activities with the host nation, AFRICOM,
USARAF, the other service components, and DOD
executing units.”
A 2013
report by the Department of Defense’s Inspector
General on AFRICOM’s Combined Joint Task Force-Horn
of Africa
found recordkeeping so abysmal that its
officials “did not have an effective system to
manage or report community relations and low-cost
activities.” A spreadsheet supposedly tracking such
missions during 2012 and 2013 was, for example, so
incomplete that 43% of such efforts went
unmentioned.
New
definitions, poor recordkeeping, ineffective
management, and incompetence aren’t, however, the
only possible explanations for the discrepancies.
AFRICOM has a history of working to thwart efforts
aimed at transparency and accountability and has
long been
criticized for its atmosphere of secrecy. Beyond
spin, the highly selective release of information,
the cherry-picking of reporters to cover a tiny
fraction of its undertakings, and the issuing of
news
releases that tell a very
limited story about the command,
AFRICOM
has
taken
steps to
thwart press coverage of its
footprint and
missions.
After I
started asking the command questions about the
shifting count of security cooperation activities,
Rodriguez
told Stars and Stripes that the command
had carried out “roughly 430 annual ‘theater
security cooperation’ activities” last year, a
difference of 30 from the figure he provided to the
Senate Armed Services Committee in March. Why he has
continued to peddle different numbers at different
times is unclear.
Under
Section 1623 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code,
knowingly making contradictory statements in court
or a grand jury while under oath can get you five
years in prison. While that statute doesn’t cover
Rodriguez’s testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, experts point to Section 1621 of
Title 18, which prohibits lying to Congress while
under oath and Section 1001 covering testimony given
while not under oath, as the operative portions of
the U.S. Code. A person convicted of the former
faces up to five years in jail and fines of up to
$250,000. There is, however, a high burden of proof
when it comes to perjury, including clear evidence
of intent.
Rodriguez
could, for example, have been provided with faulty
numbers by subordinates or the command might have
altered the way it tracks missions. If, however,
Rodriguez intentionally manipulated the numbers to
deceive Congress, he broke the law, according to
Andrew McBride, who served in the Department of
Justice for a decade and is now a partner with the
Washington D.C.-based law firm of Wiley Rein. “If he
has a reason to do it and he knows what he’s doing,
that is perjury. That is willfully lying under
oath,” says McBride. And under Section 1001, a
person does not even have to be under oath for the
federal government to bring a false statements
charge. It’s enough for an individual to provide
false information with an intent to deceive a
federal agent or entity.
There is,
as yet, no evidence that Rodriguez violated the law,
but should he find himself in hot water, it would
not be a first for an AFRICOM chief. Just after
Rodriguez was
nominated to take the helm of AFRICOM back in
2012, its first commander, General William Ward, was
demoted as he was retiring from the military and
ordered to repay the government $82,000 for lavish
spending on the taxpayers’ dime.
On the eve
of his own retirement, Rodriguez now finds himself
the subject of scrutiny, with his subordinates
stonewalling requests for comment. Numerous emails
sent to AFRICOM spokesman Lieutenant Commander
Anthony Falvo – including those with a subject line
indicating a request to interview the AFRICOM chief
– were, according to automatic return receipts,
“deleted without being read.”
At a time
when the number of U.S. troops,
bases, and – perhaps – missions in Africa are
increasing, along with the number of terrorist
groups and terror attacks on the continent, hundreds
of already murky missions have apparently been
disappeared, purged from the command’s rolls and the
historical record. As troubling as this may be, the
stakes go far beyond numbers, says the Security
Assistance Monitor’s William Hartung. Precise
figures about foreign military engagements are
essential in a world where blowback from military
operations is an ever-present reality, but they are
only a first step.
“Providing
accurate public information on what U.S. troops are
doing would at least provide early warning of what
might be to come, and allow for scrutiny and
accountability,” he points out. “Not only should
AFRICOM report the number of activities, but there
should be some description of what these activities
entail. Arming and training missions can escalate
into more substantial military involvement.”
Nick Turse is the managing editor of
TomDispatch, a fellow at the Nation
Institute, and a contributing writer for the
Intercept. He is the author of the
New York Times bestseller
Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in
Vietnam. His latest book is
Next Time They’ll Come to Count the Dead: War and
Survival in South Sudan.
His website is
NickTurse.com.
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