The Next
U.S Foreign/Military Policy
By Jack A. Smith
June 15, 2016
"Information
Clearing House"
-
From
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, October 2011 as
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan appeared to be
ending:
"There are
those on the American political scene who are
calling for us not to reposition [to Asia], but
to come home. They seek a downsizing of our
foreign engagement in favor of our pressing
domestic priorities. These impulses are
understandable, but they are misguided. Those
who say that we can no longer afford to engage
with the world have it exactly backward — we
cannot afford not to.... Rather than pull back
from the world, we need to press forward and
renew our leadership. The Asia-Pacific
represents such a real 21st-century opportunity
for usto secure and sustain our leadership
abroad."
President
Obama's recent journey to Japan and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, beyond visiting Hiroshima and
being welcomed by crowds in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh
City, was primarily aimed at strengthening his
administration's most important foreign policy
objective — the political, commercial and military
encirclement of the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Now that
Hillary Clinton is the presumptive Democratic Party
nominee, Obama may rest assured that if she defeats
Republican Donald Trump in November, as expected,
his "rebalance" to Asia will continue apace. Indeed,
a Clinton administration may move faster and more
decisively.
Clinton was a
strong advocate of the rebalance and thoroughly
agrees with Obama that Beijing must never be allowed
to diminish Washington's global hegemony, even
within China's ownSouth Asian region, and, like
Obama, she always uses the code words "American
leadership" in place of "American domination."
Obama
announced what he first termed a "pivot" to Asia in
the fall of 2011 just after a 5,500-word article by
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton titled "America's
Pacific Century" appeared in Foreign Policy
magazine. It began:
"As the war in
Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its
forces from Afghanistan, the United States stands at
a pivot point. Over the last 10 years, we have
allocated immense resources to those two theaters.
In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and
systematic about where we invest time and energy, so
that we put ourselves in the best position to
sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and
advance our values. One of the most important tasks
of American statecraft over the next decade will
therefore be to lock in a substantially increased
investment — diplomatic, economic, strategic, and
otherwise — in the Asia-Pacific region." The
"otherwise" meant military.
While in
Japan, Obama told the newspaper Asahi Shimbun May
26:
"Renewing
American leadership in the Asia Pacific has been
one of my top policy priorities as President,
and I’m very proud of the progress that we’ve
made. The cornerstone of our rebalance strategy
has been bolstering our treaty
alliances—including with Japan, the Republic of
Korea, the Philippines and Australia—and today
each of these alliances is stronger than when I
came into office. We’ve forged new partnerships
with countries like Vietnam, which I just
visited, and with regional institutions like
ASEAN and the East Asia Summit. With the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, the highest-standard
trade agreement in history, we have the
opportunity to write the rules for regional and
global trade for decades to come. I believe that
America’s position in the region has never been
stronger, and I’m confident that the next U.S.
President will continue to build on our
progress."
A week later
in San Diego Clinton delivered a foreign policy
speech. Its purpose was to show that she would be
much better than Republican Donald Trump in
furthering America's global interests. Accusing
Trump of not understanding that Russia and China
"work against us," she declared:
“If
America doesn’t lead, we leave a vacuum — and
that will either cause chaos, or other countries
will rush in to fill the void. Then they’ll be
the ones making the decisions about your lives
and jobs and safety — and trust me, the choices
they make will not be to our benefit. Now Moscow
and Beijing are deeply envious of our alliances
around the world, because they have nothing to
match them. They’d love for us to elect a
president who would jeopardize that source of
strength. If Donald gets his way, they’ll be
celebrating in the Kremlin. We cannot let that
happen.”
Instead of
defining the November election as a contest between
the right/far right Republicans and the center right
Democrats, Clinton depicted it as a choice between
"a fearful America that’s less secure and less
engaged in the world [under Trump], and a strong,
confident America that leads to keep our country
safe and our economy growing.”
Clinton has
thus committed herself to a continuation of
Washington's decades-longimperial foreign/military
policies, replete with cold war rhetoric, the notion
of an indispensible America, the commitment to
"lead" the world, and targeting China and Russia as
virtual enemies. There was no hint of making any
efforts to reduce world tensions peacefully. As a
result of Obama-Clinton policies the relationship
between Beijing and Moscow has become considerably
closer in recent years.
Meanwhile the
Bush-Obama Middle East wars are expected to continue
indefinitely, at least throughout the next
administration and maybe much longer. If Clinton
gains the White House she is expected to intensify
U.S. involvement in these conflicts, particularly in
Syria and Libya. Her primary rival, Sen. Bernie
Sanders, is significantly to Clinton's left in
domestic politics but only moderately less hawkish
in foreign affairs. Trump is a dangerous enigma,
correctly identified by Clinton as “temperamentally
unfit to hold an office that requires knowledge,
stability and immense responsibility.”
U.S. arms for
Vietnam
President
Obama was warmly received by the Vietnamese
Communist Party, the government and it seems by the
people as well during his three-day visit starting
May 22. A number of U.S. news articles marveled at
the fact that Washington appeared to be totally
excused for its brutal two-decade intervention to
prevent the unification of temporarily divided North
and South Vietnam. After all, some to 3.8 million
Vietnamese people died from the American air and
ground war, as did nearly two million in Cambodia
and Laos combined due to U.S. led attacks on
suspected North Vietnamese trails and hideouts in
these neighboring countries. U.S. war deaths were
58,193 between 1955-1975.
Part of the
reason Vietnam doesn't hate the U.S. is that it won
the long war against the world's most powerful
military state following Hanoi's victory against
French colonialism and the earlier Japanese invasion
and occupation. Vietnam was exhausted and in
economic difficulty after 30 years of continual
conflict when the Americans finally fled South
Vietnam in April 1975.
Another reason
for cautiously partnering with the U.S. is the
existence of China on Vietnam's northern border.
Chinese dynasties dominated Vietnam for over 900
years between 111 BCE and 1427 CE. Both Russia and
China supported Vietnam in the fight against U.S.
aggression but grave tensions and even the
possibility of an armed conflict between the two
giant nations was an additional worry for Hanoi,
which needed their material support to pursue the
war. On Dec. 25, 1978,Vietnam invaded and occupied
adjacent Cambodia in order to drive out the
ultra-left Khmer Rouge government after a number of
border clashes between them. In February 1979, China
— which had supported the Khmer Rouge — invaded
northern Vietnam in a brief but bloody one-month
war, with both sides claiming victory. Several short
skirmishes took place until 1989 when Vietnam
withdrew from Cambodia. Since then relations between
the two neighboring countries with governments that
seem to share the same socialist ideology have been
peaceful but distant.
During his
stay in Vietnam, Obama was publicly critical of what
he considered Vietnam's human rights shortcomings,
as though killing five million people in Indochina,
millions in the contemporary Middle East, and
uncritically supporting dictatorships such as Saudi
Arabia gave Washington the international standing to
wag its finger in Hanoi's face.
But
Obama'scriticisms of the country wereprimarily for
show, paving the way for him to announce the ending
of he 41-year ban on lethal arms sales to Vietnam.
In Hanoi, Obama told a press conference that "we
already have U.S. vessels that have come here to
port [at Cam Ranh Bay and] we expect that there will
be deepening cooperation between our militaries."
According to
The Diplomat May 31: "Uncorroborated Vietnamese
sources in Hanoi [state that] prior to Obama’s
visit, U.S. officials proposed to their hosts the
possibility of raising their comprehensive
partnership to a strategic partnership [an important
upgrading]. Vietnamese officials reportedly got cold
feet at the last minute and politely left this
proposal for future consideration.At the same time,
although U.S. officials, including the president,
described bilateral relations as entering a new
phase, no new adjective was placed in front of
comprehensive partnership in the official joint
statement issued by the two presidents to indicate
that relations had advanced significantly since
2013."
China's Global
Times, a party daily tabloid that tends to speak
directly, argued May 26 in reference to the U.S.
decision to sell arms to Vietnam: "This is a new
move by the U.S. to advance its rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific strategy, displaying Washington's
desire to reinforce military cooperation with
China's neighboring countries.... Now, Washington is
ironically trying to manipulate Vietnam's
nationalism to counter China. U.S. Senator John
McCain, a prisoner in the Vietnam War and now
Chairman of Senate Armed Services Committee, plays a
key role in rescinding the ban on the sale of lethal
arms to Vietnam, believing it will rope in Hanoi to
counter China's rise."
In the same
issue of Global Times, Nguyen Vu Tung, acting
president of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in
Hanoi, wrote an op-ed that expressed his "personal"
views, stating: "In July 2013, Vietnam and the U.S.
agreed to elevate their relationship to a
'comprehensive partnership' designed to further
promote bilateral ties in all fields.
It is
noteworthy that the enhancement of Vietnam-U.S.
relations ran parallel with Vietnam's forging its
relations with China, a big neighbor that is of
increasing importance to Vietnam's peace, stability
and prosperity.... Vietnam-U.S. relations are not
developing at the expense of the links between
Vietnam and China. Instead of choosing sides, Hanoi
tries its best to promote relations with both China
and the U.S. and sees its relations with them in
positive-sum terms.....
"The
independent posture of Vietnam's foreign policy
applies especially to Vietnam's defense policy where
Vietnam strictly follows a 'three-no principle.'
Vietnam will not enter any military pact and become
a military ally of any country, will not allow any
country to set up a military base on its soil, and
will not rely on any country to oppose any other
country. Recently, Hanoi has been under some
domestic pressure to review this principle. Yet,
adhering to it is still the policy mainstream."
With the arms
sales Vietnam is now considered an allied member of
the informal U.S. coterie of East Asian and
Southeast Asian nations, six of which are contending
with China's claims to most of the South China Sea,
with Washington's backing. Beijing says it is
willing to negotiate with the six on a one to one
basis but the U.S insists on multilateral talks. In
addition to Vietnam the countries involved in the
claims include Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, the
Philippines and Japan.
China's claim
is based on two points: 1. Implicitly, its long
history — about 4,000 years, nearly all of it under
Chinese dynastic imperial rule until 104 years ago.
2. Explicitly, the 1947 "nine dash line" map
produced by the Chinese Nationalist government in
1947, two years before the success of the Chinese
communist revolution replaced the
semi-capitalist/semi-feudal Nationalist enterprise
called the Republic of China with the People's
Republic of China. The Nationalist government, army
and many civilians fled to Taiwan, an offshore
province of China that still maintains that the nine
dash line is absolutely legitimate, as does the PRC.
The U.S. — which supported the Nationalists to the
extent of keeping Taiwan in China's permanent
Security Council seat until 1971 — did not question
China's claims until fairly recent years. U.S.
support for the six claimants is an important
political part of the containment of China by
increasing the number of regional allies and
dependencies that will support Washington's
political goals.
There are
military and commercial aspects of the rebalance to
Asia in addition to using allies to strengthen
opposition to China.
The U.S. has
militarily dominated the East Asia region since the
end of World War II in 1945 but it has been
significantly increasing its military might since
launching the pivot to Asia. More Army and Air force
units have been ordered to existing bases in Japan,
South Korea, the Philippines, Guam, and other nearby
locations, as well as a new base in Australia. Up to
90,000 U.S. military personnel are in the vicinity.
Navy aircraft carriers, other warships and
submarines have been shifted from the Atlantic to
the Pacific Oceans. An aircraft carrier battle group
is patrolling the East China Sea. Some U.S. ships
navigate extremely close to small Chinese islets
that are being upgraded — a practice that could
inadvertently spark an armed confrontation.
The principle
commercial element of the effort to contain China is
the corporation-dominated Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) — Washington's neoliberal free-trade proposal
for 12 Pacific Rim countries that is intended to
enlarge U.S. economic influence in the region at the
expense of China, which has not been invited to
join. The 12 signatories to the TPP agreement in
2010 included Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, United States and Vietnam.
Ratification
of the trade pact the may not happen, not least
because recent political developments in the U.S.
may bury this major Bush-Obama initiative. Hillary
Clinton, once a strong advocate as secretary of
state, turned against the TPP during the Democratic
primary in order to opportunistically convey the
impression she was as radical as Sanders in order to
attract his constituency. She also wanted to retain
the support of the AFL-CIO, which strongly opposes
the pact. Trump rejects the TPP because many working
class supporters believe that such trade deals take
away American jobs, which they do. Some commentators
suggest Obama may be able to get it passed after the
elections and before the new president assumes
office, but it's a long shot.
Vietnam
supports the TTP because its economy stands to gain
from increased trade.It is of interest that China is
Vietnam's biggest trading partner and will remain
so, as is true of most regional nations aligning
with the U.S. superpower. Beijing's rise over the
last 20 years has benefitted all these states, not
to mention the transfer of reasonably priced
reliable goods throughout area.
U.S. President
visits Hiroshima
Obama arrived
in Japan May 25 to attend a Group of Seven meeting
and to further strengthen Japan's commitment to help
in the effort to surround China, but the
international media focused entirely on the first
American presidential visit to Hiroshima in the 71
years since the United States obliterated Hiroshima
and Nagasaki with nuclear weapons.
He didn't
apologize to Japan because that would be unpopular
with many Americans and alsowith Korea and China,
countries that suffered woefully from the vicious
and racist Japanese invasion and occupation. They
believe Japan hasn't sufficiently atoned for its
numerous wartime atrocities.
Instead Obama
delivered a quite moving speech: "We come to ponder
a terrible force unleashed in the not-so-distant
past. We come to mourn the dead, including over
100,000 Japanese men, women and children, thousands
of Koreans, a dozen Americans held prisoner. Their
souls speak to us. They ask us to look inward, to
take stock of who we are...."
His address
was hypocritical, particularly when he declared: "We
may not be able to eliminate man’s capacity to do
evil. So nations and the alliances that we formed
must possess the means to defend ourselves. But
among those nations like my own that hold nuclear
stockpiles, we must have the courage to escape the
logic of fear and pursue a world without them. We
may not realize this goal in my lifetime, but
persistent effort can roll back the possibility of
catastrophe. We can chart a course that leads to the
destruction of these stockpiles. We can stop the
spread to new nations and secure deadly materials
from fanatics. And yet, that is not enough, for we
see around the world today how even the crudest
rifles and barrel bombs can serve up violence on a
terrible scale. We must change our mindset about war
itself."
In reality
Obama is not only slower than his three predecessors
in reducing nuclear weapons but he has initiated a
trillion dollar effort to upgrade America's entire
nuclear arsenal and delivery systems.
In his Asahi
Shimbun interview Obama also said: "I believe that
we’ve substantially enhanced America’s credibility
in the Asia Pacific, which is rooted in our
unwavering commitment to the security of our allies.
We continue to modernize our defense posture in the
region, including positioning more of our most
advanced military capabilities in Japan. As I’ve
said before, our treaty commitment to Japan's
security is absolute. With our new defense
guidelines, American and Japanese forces will become
more flexible and better prepared to cooperate on a
range of challenges, from maritime security to
disaster response, and our forces will be able to
plan, train and operate even more closely. I’m very
grateful for Prime Minister Abe’s strong support of
our alliance."
Abe is a hawk
about China. "No one country is more enthusiastic
than Japan to advocate containing China," according
to a May 19 commentary by Zhang Zhixin, the head of
American Political Studies at China's Institute of
American Studies. He continued:
"The strategic
competition between the [U.S. and China] is becoming
more apparent. In economic and trade areas, the EU
and U.S. denied granting market economy status to
China. In the South China Sea, where China is trying
to secure its maritime sovereignty and rights, the
U.S. believes China is challenging its regional
hegemony and military dominance in the area. As
deputy Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said,
the U.S. is intensely focused on China’s 'assertive
and provocative behavior.' Therefore, the U.S. Navy
is pushing for a more aggressive policy of
patrolling close to Chinese-fortified islands and
caused more dangerous encounters between the U.S.
reconnaissance aircraft and Chinese jet planes.
"What makes
the situation more complicated is that Japan, as an
outsider in the South China Sea issue, is trying to
insert itself into the conflict. At the end of last
year, the Japanese Foreign Minister talked about the
possibility of joint patrol with the U.S. Navy in
the [South China Sea] area. This year, Japan is
becoming increasingly aggressive in charging that
China's a threat in the Asia Pacific region. It is
understandable for the Prime Minister Abe to do so
to the domestic audience to sell his proposal of
revising the pacifist Constitution, but when he was
selling his viewpoint to the EU countries, that’s
too much. Japan is allied with the U.S., but the
latter never restrained Japan’s anti-China rhetoric.
Furthermore, Japan actively sold advanced weapons to
countries around the South China Sea, participated
in more multilateral military exercises, and
conducted more port calls in the area, which just
made the regional situation more tense."
Another area
of sharp Chinese-Japanese contention is in the East
China Sea. Both countries claim rocky, uninhabited
protuberances known as Senkaku by Tokyo and Diaoyu
by Beijing. China scrambled jets to meet Japanese
military aircraft in disputed airspace May 21.
Japanese officials said it was the closest Chinese
jets had flown to their planes. It came as China was
holding air-sea naval exercises with Russia in the
region. Tokyo officially protested to Chinese
ambassador Cheng Yonghua June 9 about a "Chinese and
three Russian warships" that entered what Japan
called the "contiguous zones" near the disputed
Islands. The Chinese Defense ministry responded June
9 calling the navigation legal and reasonable,
insisting "China's naval ships have every right to
navigate in waters under its jurisdiction." The
reply came a day a before the beginning of a
large-scale eight-day joint military drill in the
western Pacific involving the U.S., Japan and India.
According to
Stratfor in a June 10 analysis: "Japan under Abe has
upset Beijing by broadening the geographic and
functional scope of the operations of the Japan
Self-Defense Forces, which Japan's postwar pacifism
long limited. Perceptions of Chinese expansionism
have prompted Japan to prioritize responding in the
South China Sea. In 2015, Japan announced the start
of talks with the Philippines on a Visiting Forces
Agreement that would permit Japan Maritime
Self-Defense Force personnel to rotate through
Philippine bases. Later that year, Japan secured an
agreement with Vietnam to allow Japanese warships to
make port calls at Cam Ranh Bay, which they did in
April of this year. Even more ambitiously, Japan has
responded that it might be amenable to U.S. calls
for regional powers to join freedom of navigation
operations in waters far beyond the Japan Maritime
Self-Defense Force's traditional domain in Japan's
near seas. Though these steps are incremental, they
represent slow and steady progress toward a clear
endpoint most unwelcome in Beijing —the routine
presence of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
operations in the South China Sea."
The 42ndG7
summit meeting in Japan May 26–27 accomplished
little. It was "an opportunity lost" according to
Montreal Star columnist Thomas Walkom, who wrote
June 1: The leaders of seven important countries had
a chance to do something that would rekindle the
sputtering global economy.Some, including Japanese
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Canada’s Justin
Trudeauurged their fellow leaders to foreswear
austerity and, among other growth-inducing measures,
spend money to stimulate the world economy.
"They failed.
Italy’s Matteo Renzi was on side with Canada and
Japan, as were France’s François Hollande and U.S.
President Barack Obama. But Germany’s Angela Merkel
and Britain’s David Cameron insisted that debt and
deficit control were more important than fiscal
stimulus.The final communiqué from the session said
essentially that each nation would continue to do
what it thought best.So what do we make of the G7?
In some ways, its time has passed. It no longer
represents the world’s major economies. China is
conspicuously absent. Russia, briefly a member of
what was then called the G8, was summarily expelled
in 2014 for annexing Crimea."
The importance
of India
As soon as
President Obama returned home he put aside time to
work out plans for ensnaring rising India more
deeply into Washington's informal anti-China
coalition. He met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi
in the White House June 7. This was their seventh
meeting in the two years since the Indian leader was
elected in May 2014, which must be some kind of
record. Modi addressed Congress the next day and his
speech was received with great applause. Earlier
Indian governments, while friendly to the U.S. were
closer to Russia (and the USSR in earlier days) and
nonaligned countries than to America. Modi is
campaigning for a much closer relationship with
Washington, which is exactly what the Obama
administration wants.
The Economist
noted June 11: "China worries about signs that
Western countries are cozying up to its giant
neighbor. It fears that Modi will exploit better
ties with America as a source of advantage. For
years the Pentagon has pursued India as part of an
effort to counterbalance growing Chinese strength,
but only in recent months have Indian military
officials begun to show eagerness for co-operation.
This month the two countries will hold their annual
naval exercises not in Indian waters, but in the Sea
of Japan, with the Japanese navy, near islands
claimed by both Japan and China. In a wide-ranging
speech before a joint session of Congress on June 8
Modi said that America was India’s “indispensable
partner.” An outright military alliance between
India and America remains unlikely, but even the
remote prospect of one will concentrate Chinese
minds.
In her pivot
to Asia article referred to earlier, Clinton foresaw
intense U.S. involvement in the region "stretching
from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores
of the Americas.... Among key emerging powers with
which we will work closely are India and Indonesia,
two of the most dynamic and significant democratic
powers of Asia, and both countries with which the
Obama administration has pursued broader, deeper,
and more purposeful relationships." India and
Indonesia are second and fourth ranking countries in
population. (China is first, U.S. third.)
According to
the Center for International Studies "Washington has
made it clear that Jakarta is central to the U.S.
rebalance, toward the Asia Pacific, both in its own
right and as a leader in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN.)"It is also the
largest Muslim country by far.
India,
however, is the big prize.As a result of U.S.-Indian
talks after the Modi government took power India has
been designated a "Major Defense Partner" by
Washington, although it is not entirely understood
what this unusual title obligates India to do. For
its part the U.S. is supplying India with
technology, loans,equipment,and other means of
enhancing India's economy and military.
Commenting on
the Obama-Modi meeting June 7 the Associated Press
reported "The two governments said they had
finalized the text of a defense logistics agreement
to make it easier for their militaries to operate
together. The U.S. and India share concern about the
rise of China, although New Delhi steers clear of a
formal alliance with Washington.
In an article
published by the Cato Institute April 29 and titled
Persistent Suitor: Washington Wants India as an Ally
to Contain China, Ted Galen Carpenter wrote:
"A growing
number of policymakers and pundits see India not
only as an increasingly important economic and
military player generally, but as a crucial
potential strategic counterweight to a rising
China.... Strategic ties have gradually and
substantially deepened. President Barack Obama has
characterized the relationship between the United
States and India as 'a defining partnership of the
21st century,' and Indian Prime Minister Modi has
termed it 'a natural alliance.'” Perhaps more
significant, India has contracted to receive some
$14 billion in supposedly defensive military items
from the United States in less than a decade.
Washington has now edged out Moscow as India’s
principal arms supplier.
"Bilateral
strategic ties received an additional boost in
mid-April 2016 with the visit of U.S. Secretary of
Defense Ashton Carter to Delhi. That trip generated
considerable uneasiness in China, where opinion
leaders noted not only was it Carter’s second trip
to India during his relatively brief tenure as
Pentagon chief, but that he cancelled a previously
scheduled trip to Beijing so that he could make this
latest journey. That move, they feared, suggested a
rather unsubtle tilt against China in favor of one
of its potential regional geostrategic competitors.
The agreement that came from Carter’s visit would do
nothing to reassure the Chinese....
"Moreover,
India maintains an important economic relationship
of its own with China. Indeed, according to most
calculations, China has now emerged as India’s
largest trading partner. Trade between the two Asian
giants topped $80 billion in 2015. In addition to
the economic stakes, there are bilateral security
issues, primarily unresolved border disputes, as
well as security issues throughout Central Asia of
concern to Delhi that could be exacerbated if
relations with Beijing deteriorated.Shrewd Indian
policymakers may well conclude that the best
position for their country is one of prudent
neutrality (perhaps with a slight pro-American tilt)
in the growing tensions between the United States
and China."
U.S.-China
Relations
The
contradiction between Washington's words and deeds
is no better exemplified than in its relations with
China. U.S. rhetoric rarely includes threats, except
occasionally regarding the South China Sea. Most
though not all its multitude of discussions with
Chinese leaders are soft spoken and civil. From time
to time the U.S. speaks of China as a "partner."
Never stated openly is the fact that Washington will
continue pressuring Beijing until it learns how to
behave in a fashion acceptable to the world's only
military and economic superpower. Part of that
pressure consists of continual exaggerations of
China's military power, which is far behind that
U.S.
The Beijing
government never threatens the U.S. It is well aware
of the meaning behind Washington's friendly words
because it is surrounded by U.S. military power and
Washington's obedient allies in the region, by
exclusionary trade deals, the rejection of its
claims in the South China Sea and innumerable
efforts by the White House to undermine China in all
the political and economic associations and
coalitions in the East Asia region.
Beijing rarely
mentions this publicly and works to develop a
cooperative "win-win" relationship with Washington.
China clearly recognizes the U.S. as the world's
great power and occasionally appears slightly
deferential.
The following
June 6 report from Xinhua news agency about the
annual China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue
held in Beijing that day is typical example of the
Chinese approach:
"President Xi
Jinping urged China and the United States to
properly manage differences and sensitive issues and
deepen strategic mutual trust and cooperation at a
high-level bilateral dialogue. The differences
between China and the United States are normal, Xi
said.
"As long as
the two sides tackle differences and sensitive
issues in the principle of mutual respect and
equality, major disturbances in bilateral relations
can be avoided, Xi said, adding that China and the
United States should strengthen communication and
cooperation on Asia-Pacific affairs.
"The broad
Pacific Ocean, Xi said, 'should not become an arena
for rivalry, but a big platform for inclusive
cooperation. China and the United States have
extensive common interests in the region and should
maintain frequent dialogues, cooperate more, tackle
challenges, jointly maintain prosperity and
stability in the region, and "cultivate common
circles of friends' rather than 'cultivate exclusive
circles of friends.'
"The Chinese
president also called on the two sides to expand
mutually beneficial cooperation, uphold the win-win
principle, and raise the level of bilateral
cooperation.... [He] stressed that China will
unswervingly pursue the path of peaceful development
and promote the building of a new model of
international relations with win-win cooperation at
its core."
At the same
time, as we have written at length [1], China openly
rejects in principle the existence of a unilateral
global hegemon — a position the U.S. has occupied
for the last quarter century since the implosion of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Beijing
advocates a form of shared global leadership.
Washington is convinced that it deserves the right
to in effect rule the world and has no intention of
dismantling its shadow empire. This is the principal
contradiction between the U.S. and China.
Beijing is
doing what it can to avoid a major clash with the
United States, short of appearing to kowtow to
Washington. The U.S. does not want a clash as well.
Both sides fear the possibility of war and each is
aware that one may eventually take place. That is
certainly one of the reasons the Obama
administration has launched its decades-long program
costing a trillion dollars to modernize America's
nuclear arsenal.
China, for all
its progress since the 1980s, is still a developing
country and behind the U.S. in many ways, but is
destined to become a major power in a few decades at
most. The U.S. cannot but accept China's inevitable
growth. At issue is whether Beijing will eventually
subordinate itself to the U.S. as have other powers,
such as Germany, UK, France and Japan, have done, or
in any other acceptable fashion.
There are
current and historical reasons why China will not do
so. At this point the U.S. is drawing upon all its
resources to contain and surround the growing giant.
This can only lead to big trouble in time, for both
countries and the world.
Unfortunately,
both U.S. neoliberal capitalist political parties
are absolutely dedicated to world domination and
ultimately to the use of terrible violence to defend
American "leadership." Unless this changes
substantially imperialism eventually will lead to
global calamity. This is a matter that goes far
beyond the Hillary, Donald, and Bernie political
preoccupation of the moment. None of them would
substantially transform the existing
foreign/military policy. Only a genuinely left wing
mass movement in the U.S. has a chance of changing
direction.
— [1] For
article "The Hegemony Games — USA v. PRC," click on
5-31-15 Newsletter Hegemony Games
Jack
A. Smith, editor of
the Hudson Valley Activist Newsletter at
http://activistnewsletter.blogspot.com/,
who may be reached at
jacdon@earthlink.net.
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