9/11 - The Evidence For Insider Trading
By Mark H.
Gaffney
May 25, 2016 "Information
Clearing House"
-
After 9/11, there were indications that traders with
inside information had benefited financially from
the terrorist attacks. It also appeared that the
phenomenon was not limited to US markets. The list
of affected nations was long and included, in
addition to the US, Germany, Japan, France
Luxembourg, the UK, Switzerland, Spain, and even
Hong Kong.i
One consultant, Jonathan Winer, told ABC, “It’s
absolutely unprecedented to see cases of insider
trading covering the entire world from Japan to the
US to North America to Europe.”ii
Soon, independent investigations were underway on
three continents, in the belief that the paper trail
would lead to the terrorists. Press statements by
leading figures in the international banking
community left little doubt that the evidence was
compelling. Ernst Welteke, President of the German
Deutsche Bundesbank, told the Miami Herald
that “a preliminary review by German regulators and
bank researchers showed there were highly suspicious
sales of shares in airlines and insurance companies,
along with major trades in gold and oil markets,
before September 11 that suggest … advance knowledge
of the attacks. Welteke said that his researchers
came across … almost irrefutable proof of insider
trading.” Welteke himself was emphatic: “If you look
at the movements in markets before and after the
attacks, it really makes your brow furrow.… What we
found makes us sure that people connected to the
terrorists must have been trying to profit from this
tragedy.”iii
In the UK, London City regulators investigated a
flurry of suspicious sales processed just before the
attack. A Financial Services Authority (FSA)
spokesperson confirmed that market regulators in
Germany, Japan and the US had received information
about short selling of insurance company shares and
airline stocks, which fell sharply as a result of
the attacks. The FSA was “drawn into the
investigation because it had a transaction
monitoring department that checks suspicious share
movements.” Richard Crossley, a London analyst,
“said that he had tracked suspicious short selling
and share dumping in a swath of stocks badly
affected by the terrorist attacks.iv
Among the World Trade Center tenants were dozens of
banks and insurance companies, including several
that were now going to have to pay out billions to
cover heavy losses from the attacks. Assuming
nefarious individuals were armed with foreknowledge,
they stood to make a windfall by dumping stock and
selling competitors short, not to mention vast
potential profits from last-minute electronic money
laundering via computers which, the perpetrators had
to know, would be destroyed within hours.
CBS also reported a sharp upsurge in purchases of
put options on both United and American Airlines. A
put option is a contract that allows the holder to
sell a stock at a set price during a specified time
period, which can reap huge profits should the stock
plummet. The uptick had occurred in the days prior
to 9/11.
Sources on Wall Street told CBS that they had never
before seen that kind of trading imbalance. The only
airlines affected were United and American, the two
involved in the attack. American Airlines stock
dropped 39% in a single day. United Airlines stock
fell even more, a whopping 44%.v
Although many stocks tumbled, there were also big
winners, especially in the military sector.
Contractors like L-3 Communications, Alliant
Techsystems and Northrop Grumman all reported large
gains. The biggest winner, though, was Raytheon,
which manufactures Tomahawk missiles. In the trading
week of September 17-21, 2001, Raytheon stock
climbed by an astounding 37%.vi
On the day prior to 9/11, the purchase of call
options for Raytheon had suspiciously surged by
600%.vii
The sale of five-year US Treasury Notes also spiked
just before 9/11, as reported by the Wall Street
Journal. Among the purchases was a single $5
billion transaction, which pointed to large
investors: “Five-year Treasury notes are among the
best investments in the event of a world crisis,
especially one that hits the US. The notes are
prized for their safety and their backing by the US
government, and usually rally when investors flee
riskier investments, such as stocks.” According to a
Wall Street bond-market strategist: “If they were
going to do something like this they would do it in
the five-year part of the market. [Because] It’s
extremely liquid, and the tracks would be hard to
spot.” The article noted that the value of those
notes rose sharply during the three weeks following
the events of September 11.viii
The Securities and Exchange Commission led the US
government probe of allegations of insider trading.ix
For weeks, the SEC remained close-mouthed about the
scope of its investigation; then it sent out a
request to securities firms around the world for
more information on trading in thirty-eight
different stocks.x
SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt told the House Financial
Services Committee, “We will do everything in our
power to track those people down and bring them to
justice.”xi
By this time, however, the fix was apparently in.
View the SEC’s list of 38 suspect companies here:
http://coto2.wordpress.com/2011/09/11/911-insider-trading-38-us-stocks/
The San Francisco Chronicle reported that the
SEC took the unprecedented step of deputizing
“hundreds, if not thousands, of key players in the
private sector.” Wrote the Chronicle, “In a
two-page statement issued to ‘all securities-related
entities’ nationwide, the SEC asked companies to
designate senior personnel who appreciate ‘the
sensitive nature’ of the case and can be relied upon
to ‘exercise appropriate discretion’ as ‘point’
people linking government investigators and the
industry.” The requested information was to be held
in strictest confidence. The SEC statement included
the following passage: “We ask that you disseminate
the information within your institution only on a
need-to-know basis [my emphasis].”xii
In his book Crossing the Rubicon, former LAPD
detective Michael Ruppert described the SEC’s move
to deputize: “What happens when you deputize someone
in a national security or criminal investigation is
that you make it illegal for them to disclose
publicly what they know … In effect, they become
government agents and are controlled by government
regulations rather than their own conscience. In
fact, they can be thrown in jail without a hearing
if they talk publicly. I have seen this implied
threat time and again with federal investigations,
intelligence agents, and even members of the United
States Congress who are bound so tightly by secrecy
oaths and agreements that they are not even able to
disclose criminal activities inside the government
for fear of incarceration … members of congressional
intelligence committees … sign even more draconian
secrecy agreements in order to get their
assignments.”xiii
This surely means that Al Qaeda had nothing to do
with the insider trading.xiv
When the evidentiary trail led back to Wall Street,
the SEC moved quickly to control the evidence and
muzzle potential whistleblowers. Despite the best
efforts of the SEC, however, a few details did leak
to the world press. In mid-October 2001, The
Independent (UK) reported, “To the embarrassment
of investigators, it has … emerged that the firm
used to buy many of the ‘put’ options – where a
trader, in effect, bets on a share price fall – on
United Airlines stock was headed until 1998 by Alvin
‘Buzzy’ Krongard, now executive director of the
CIA.”xv
For the most part, the US press failed to pick up
the story, which linked Wall Street and the US
intelligence community to the 9/11 attacks. Indeed,
even before the leak, some of the press had begun
backing away from the early reports of insider
trading. For example, in a story posted on October
1, 2001, the New York Times cited experts who
attributed the spike in put options for United and
American Airlines as most likely due to a slumping
airline industry.xvi
George Tenet writes in his memoirs that in February
1998 he recruited Buzzy Krongard to become his
Councilor,xvii
in which capacity Krongard probably served as
Tenet’s personal liaison to Wall Street. Krongard’s
known ties to the CIA, however, go back at least as
far as 1992.xviii
In the mid-1990s Krongard served as a consultant to
CIA director James Woolsey. Then he returned to
finance and was named chairman of America's oldest
investment banking firm, Alex Brown and Sons, Inc.,
which in 1997 merged with Bankers Trust. In 1999, BT
Alex Brown was in turn acquired by Deutsche Bank,
the firm that placed the UAL put options.
In 1998, BT Alex Brown refused to cooperate with a
Senate subcommittee that was conducting hearings on
the involvement of US banks in money-laundering
activities.xix
At the time, BT Alex Brown, like other large US
financial institutions, was in the business of
private banking, meaning that it catered to unnamed
wealthy clients, often for the sole purpose of
setting up shell companies in foreign jurisdictions,
such as on the Isle of Jersey, where effective bank
regulation and oversight are nonexistent. According
to Michael Ruppert, Krongard’s last job at Alex
Brown was to oversee “private client relations,”xx
meaning that Krongard personally arranged
confidential transactions and transfers for the
bank’s unnamed wealthy clientele.
Private banks typically offer a range of services to
their clients for the purpose of shielding them from
oversight. Private banks set up multiple offshore
accounts in multiple locations under multiple names.
They also facilitate the quick, confidential and
hard-to-trace transfer of money across
jurisdictional boundaries. In many such cases, the
private banks do not even know who owns the account,
which, of course, means that not even the bankers
can follow the transactions with “due diligence.”
Many private banks do not even try, for fear of
scaring away business, especially from foreign
clients. Even though private bankers are responsible
for enforcing legal controls against money
laundering, where such laws exist, in practice
oversight is typically weak or nonexistent.
You may be surprised to learn that although it is
illegal for US banks to launder ill-gotten money
originating within the United States, it is
perfectly legal for them to accept dirty money from
elsewhere. Thus, many US banks openly solicit
business from Central American drug lords, arms
merchants and other shady entities.
Computer technology has also introduced a new level
of anonymity, in the form of faceless transactions
that do not require the intermediation of a
financial institution. Internet money transfers and
new payment technologies such as “e-cash,”
electronic purses and other electronic payment
systems have created new ways to disguise the source
and ownership of illicit money, as discussed in a US
Treasury report of September 2001 on money
laundering.xxi
It is therefore little wonder that law enforcement
has failed to stem the growing international
proliferation of laundered drug money and other
illicit assets over the past several decades. The
failure has been truly spectacular. In 1999, a
consensus of experts in Germany, Switzerland and at
the US Treasury agreed that 99.9% of laundered money
routinely escapes detection. The experts estimated
that the annual total was between $500 billion and a
trillion dollars, a mind-boggling number, about half
of which is washed into the US economy, the rest
into Europe.xxii
After Buzzy Krongard’s departure to the CIA, his
successor at BT Alex Brown was his former deputy
Mayo Shattuck III, who had worked at the bank for
many years. In 1997, Shattuck helped Krongard
engineer the merger with Bankers Trust, and he
stayed on after Deutsche Bank acquired BT Alex Brown
in 1999.xxiii
According to the New York Times, Bankers
Trust was “one of the most loosely managed [banks]
on Wall Street,” and during the 1990s was repeatedly
rocked by scandal. In 1994, clients and regulators
accused the bank “of misleading customers about its
risky derivative products.” The case went viral when
tape recordings were made public that showed bank
salesmen snickering about ripping off naïve
customers.
In 1999, BT Alex Brown pled guilty to criminal
conspiracy charges, after it was revealed that
top-level executives had created a slush fund out of
at least $20 million in unclaimed funds.xxiv
The firm had to pay a $63 million fine and would
have been forced to close its doors but for the fact
that it was purchased, just at this time, by
Deutsche Bank, Europe’s largest. According to the
New York Times, Mayo Shattuck III stayed on and
was named “co-head of investment banking in January
[2001], overseeing Deutsche Bank's 400 brokers who
cater to wealthy clients.”xxv
Shattuck himself reportedly handled the private
accounts of such dubious notables as Saudi financier
Adnan Khashoggi and Seagram’s owner Edgar Bronfmann.xxvi
His sudden unexplained resignation immediately after
the 9/11 attacks must therefor be viewed as highly
suspicious.
Shocking as all of this may sound, the CIA has a
long history of quietly playing the stock market,
and this may include illicit or insider trading.
Such is the view of Victor
Marchetti and John D. Marks, co-authors of a
best-selling 1974 book, The CIA and the Cult of
Intelligence. Marchetti was a former CIA analyst
and Marks served at the State Department. Their
well-researched book was one of the first to expose
questionable CIA activities. Indeed, Langley was so
threatened by the imminent release of their book
that it attempted to block publication, though
failed in the end, fortunately.xxvii
The authors assert that with the
approval of top CIA leadership a small group of
senior officers for years played the stock market
using the CIA’s “employee retirement fund, certain
agent and contract-personnel escrow accounts, and
the CIA credit-union’s capital.” In more recent
years, the assets likely included slush funds
generated from the illicit sale of arms, possibly
kickbacks from the drug trade, plus assets derived
from a vast quantity of Japanese gold seized after
World War II.
Initially, the CIA played the markets through a
Boston-based brokerage house. But eventually the
Agency economists, accountants, and lawyers
concluded that the Boston brokers’ investment
strategy was too conservative, and that they would
do better on their own.
Marchetti and Marks go so far as
to suggest that the CIA group may have engaged in
insider trading on occasion, for example, in 1970 at
the time of a major CIA covert operation in Chile to
prevent the election of Salvador Allende. The CIA
could easily have reaped a windfall by shorting
Anaconda copper stock, which evidently tumbled as a
result of the CIA’s political interference in the
country. Given the Agency’s tradition of secrecy and
the near total absence of fiscal accountability,
certainly the potential for this kind of abuse was
high, and remains so.
The CIA involvement in the stock
market probably evolved over time, 9/11 being a
logical outcome. No question, Marchetti and Marks’
early research bolsters the credibility of the
leaked information linking the CIA’s number three
executive Buzzy Krongard to the pre-9/11 insider
trading scam.xxviii
Was Krongard simply freelancing, or was inside
trading part of a larger CIA covert operation?
The 9/11 Commission Report
Careful readers of The 9/11 Commission Report
know that many of its most important details are
buried in the endnotes. This is certainly true with
regard to its discussion of the insider-trading
flap. The text of the report itself casts no light
on the subject, beyond pronouncing government
investigations as “exhaustive” and exonerating of Al
Qaeda (pp. 171-72):
There also have been claims that al Qaeda financed
itself through manipulation of the stock market
based on its advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks.
Exhaustive investigations by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, FBI, and other agencies have
uncovered no evidence that anyone with advance
knowledge of the attacks profited through securities
transactions.130
Endnote 130 is more detailed, though hardly more
revealing (p. 499). It mentions that a “single
U.S.-based institutional investor with no
conceivable ties to Al Qaeda purchased 95 percent of
the UAL puts,” a likely reference to Mayo Shattuck
III:
Highly publicized allegations of insider trading in
advance of 9/11 generally rest on reports of unusual
pre-9/11 trading activity in companies whose stock
plummeted after the attacks. Some unusual trading
did in fact occur, but each such trade proved to
have an innocuous explanation. For example, the
volume of put options—investments that pay off only
when a stock drops in price—surged in the parent
companies of United Airlines on September 6 and
American Airlines on September 10—highly suspicious
trading on its face. Yet, further investigation has
revealed that the trading had no connection with
9/11. A single U.S.-based institutional investor
with no conceivable ties to al Qaeda purchased 95
percent of the UAL puts on September 6 as part of a
trading strategy that also included
buying
115,000 shares of American on September 10
[Commission’s emphasis]. Similarly, much of the
seemingly suspicious trading in American on
September 10 was traced to a specific U.S.-based
options trading newsletter, faxed to its
subscribers on Sunday, September 9, which
recommended these trades. These examples typify the
evidence examined by the investigation. The SEC and
the FBI, aided by other agencies and the securities
industry, devoted enormous resources to
investigating this issue, including securing the
cooperation of many foreign governments. These
investigators have found that the apparently
suspicious consistently proved innocuous [my
emphasis]. Joseph Cella interview (Sept. 16, 2003;
May 7, 2004; May 10-11, 2004); FBI briefing (Aug.
15, 2003); SEC memo, Division of Enforcement to SEC
Chair and Commissioners, "Pre-September 11, 2001
Trading Review," May 15, 2002; Ken Breen interview
(Apr. 23, 2004); Ed G. interview (Feb. 3, 2004).
Evidently, we are supposed to presume that
“American” in the above note means American
Airlines. But here it could just as easily refer to
American Express, which was also on the SEC’s
suspect list. If the major trading of the unnamed
“US-based institutional investor with no conceivable
ties to al Qaeda” was truly hedged as The 9/11
Commission Report states, this would exonerate
it of “informed” or insider trading. However,
without more information, it is impossible to
establish the facts regarding even this one
particular investing institution.
As we know that thirty-eight firms were under
investigation, the Commission’s token nod at the
issue is unconvincing. What about the pre-9/11 surge
in call options for Raytheon, for instance, or the
spike in put options for the behemoth Morgan
Stanley, which had offices in the South Tower? And
what of the Greenberg insurance firm, Marsh &
McClennan (also on the list, along with AIG), whose
offices in the North Tower took the full impact of
American Airlines Flight 11, and which also saw the
second highest spike in pre-9/11 put option
activity, second only to United Airlines?xxix
One will search The 9/11 Commission Report in
vain for any discussion of these or other suspect
stocks. The truth, we must conclude, is to be found
between the lines, in the Report’s
conspicuous skirting of the whole insider-trading
issue.
Three Academic Papers
The case for insider trading is strongly supported
by three published scientific studies, all of which
confirm an unusual volume in options trading in the
days before 9/11. The first of these peer-reviewed
papers was by Professor Allen Poteshman of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and was
based on trading data from the Chicago Board Option
Exchange (CBOE). Poteshman’s study appeared in the
respected Journal of Business, and should
have been known to the 9/11 Commission because it
was accepted for publication in 2004, while the
official investigation was still underway. The
Commission’s Final Report, however, makes no
mention of it, probably because Poteshman’s
conclusion that insider trading occurred, to a
probability of 99%, flatly contradicts the official
findings.xxx
The second study, by Professor Marc Chesney and two
colleagues, one from the University of Zurich and
another from the Swiss Finance Institute, examined
in detail fourteen suspect corporations and found
evidence of insider trading in a number of stocks,
including American and United Airlines, Boeing,
Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan, Citigroup and Bank of
America.xxxi
Chesney’s paper also refutes early reports that some
inside traders failed to collect their winnings out
of fear of exposure and subsequent arrest.xxxii
On the contrary; the data shows that all of
the 9/11-related put options were exercised, meaning
that pay-outs occurred for each and every stock
option. This was also confirmed by no less than
Joseph Cella, the SEC official who headed up the SEC
insider trading probe.xxxiii
Which of course means that the traders with
foreknowledge of the attacks got away with their
obscene winnings. The total pay out for the options
studied by Chesney was an estimated $15 million.
However, according to Paul Zarembka, an economics
professor at the State University of New York (SUNY)
at Buffalo, the total pay-out of all the
options before and after 9/11 was probably on the
order of $30 million.xxxiv
A third study by two Asian economists and a
professor at the University of Wisconsin further
embarrassed the 9/11 Commission by examining the
Standard & Poor’s 500 Index, which according to the
SEC and 9/11 Commission could not be investigated
due to the high volume of trading.xxxv
Nonetheless, when the professors did what was
supposedly impossible, they found a “significant
abnormal increase in the trading volume in the
option market just before the 9-11 attacks.” The
authors concluded there was “credible circumstantial
evidence to support the insider trading claim.”xxxvi
They also refuted the counter argument that the
spike in options was due to a generally declining
stock market. Incidentally, the SEC’s failure to
investigate Standard & Poor’s fatally undermines the
Commission’s description of the SEC investigation as
“exhaustive.” Clearly, it was anything but.
In sum, three separate statistical studies by three
academic teams all reached the same conclusion. The
joint probability that all three were “nothing more
than random outliers seems” in the words of
economist Paul Zarembka, “astronomically low.”xxxvii
Nor has anyone to date refuted any of the three
important studies.
If the options trading in the days before September
11, 2001 was truly “innocuous,” as the 9/11
Commission repeatedly insists in its report, then
why did the SEC muzzle potential whistleblowers by
deputizing everyone involved with its investigation?
The move by the SEC had the result of limiting the
flow of information to those with a “need to know,”
which, of course, means that only a very few
participants in the SEC investigation, those at the
top, had the full picture. Did the SEC judge that an
open process was too risky, as it might expose the
unthinkable?
This would certainly explain the SEC’s shredding of
evidence. In 2009, David Callahan,
executive editor of SmartCEO
Magazine,
submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request to the SEC for copies of the documentary
evidence of its insider trading probe. The SEC
responded that it was unable to comply because “the
potentially responsive records have been destroyed.”xxxviii
The SEC’s response ought to have surprised no one
familiar with the Commission’s long history of
destroying records to cover up Wall Street crimes.xxxix
All of this hints at the likely frightening extent
of criminal activity on Wall Street in the days and
hours before (and during?) 9/11. The SEC was like a
surgeon who opens a patient on the operating room
table to remove a tumor only to sew him back up
again after finding that the cancer has metastasized
throughout the body.
At an early stage of its investigation, perhaps
before SEC officials were fully aware of the
implications, the SEC did recommend that the
FBI investigate a number of suspicious transactions.
We know about this thanks to a 9/11 Commission
memorandum declassified in May 2009, which
summarizes an August 2003 meeting at which FBI
agents briefed the Commission on the insider-trading
issue. The document indicates that the SEC had
passed on the information about the suspicious
trading to the FBI on September 21, 2001, just ten
days after the attacks.xl
Although the names in the cases are censored from
the declassified document, thanks to some nice
detective work by Kevin Ryan we know whom (in one
case) the SEC was referring to. Ryan was able to
fill in the blanks because, fortunately, the
government censor was not 100% efficient, and
inadvertently left enough details in the document to
infer the name of the suspicious trader. His
identity, it turns out, is a stunner and should have
been prime-time news on every television network,
world-wide.xli
The trader was none other than Wirt Walker III, a
distant cousin to then-President G.W. Bush. Several
days before 9/11, Walker and his wife Sally
purchased 56,000 shares of stock in Stratesec, one
of the companies that provided security at the World
Trade Center up until the day of the attacks.
Notably, Stratesec also provided security at Dulles
International Airport, where AA 77 took off on 9/11,
and also security for United Airlines, which owned
two of the other three allegedly hijacked aircraft.
At the time, Walker was a director of Stratesec. You
can’t get more inside than that. Incredibly, as if
this were not shocking enough, president Bush’s
brother Marvin also sat on the board! Walker’s
investment paid off handsomely, gaining $50,000 in
value in a matter of days. Given the links to the
World Trade Center and the Bush family, the SEC lead
should have sparked an intensive FBI investigation.
Yet, in a mind-boggling display of criminal
malfeasance, the FBI concluded that because Walker
and his wife had “no ties to terrorism….there was no
reason to pursue the investigation.” The FBI did not
conduct a single interview.
The Recovered Hard Drives
The 9/11 Commission Report also fails to
mention other compelling evidence for insider
trading: the approximately four hundred computer
hard drives found by workmen in the ruins of the
World Trade Center. In December 2001, Reuters and
CNN reported that US credit card, telecommunications
and accounting firms had hired a German company
named Convar to recoup data from the damaged hard
drives. Convar got the contract because it had
developed an effective method for recovering data
using a cutting-edge laser scanning technology.
Richard Wagner, a data-retrieval expert at Convar,
told CNN that the new laser process made it
“possible to read the individual drive surfaces and
then create a virtual drive.” Convar had already
examined thirty-nine hard drives and in most cases
had succeeded in recovering 100% of the data; at
least sixty-two more were in line for processing.xlii
By searching for encryption keys, indicating a
financial record, Convar found evidence stored on
the drives of an “unexplained surge” in large credit
card transactions prior to the attacks. According to
Reuters: “Unusually large sums of money, perhaps
more than $100 million, were rushed through the
computers as the disaster unfolded.” Evidently, the
criminals wrongly assumed that it would be
impossible to trace their transactions after the
computers were destroyed.
Convar director Peter Henshel elaborated:
The suspicion is that insider information about the
attack was used to send financial transaction
commands and authorizations in the belief that
amidst all the chaos the criminals would have, at
the very least, a good head start … Of course, it’s
possible that Americans went on an absolute shopping
binge, that Tuesday morning. But at this point there
are many transactions that cannot be accounted for.
Not only the volume but the size of the transactions
was far higher than usual for a day like that. There
is a suspicion that these were possibly planned to
take advantage of the chaos.xliii
Henshel was confident that those responsible would
ultimately be exposed. Yet, after the initial
reporting by Reuters and CNN, the issue of
the WTC hard drives disappeared from the news, and
nothing has been heard since. Although reports on
the Internet that Kroll meanwhile purchased Convar
remain unsubstantiated, it is nonetheless clear that
someone made the story (and the evidence?) go away.xliv
But why would anyone wish to do so unless the
initial indications from Convar of insider trading
were correct?
Related evidence for insider trading was also
provided in chilling fashion by a Deutsche Bank New
York branch employee who survived the attacks. The
whistleblower, who insisted on remaining anonymous
for his own protection, told Michael Ruppert that
“about five minutes before the
attack the entire Deutsche Bank computer
system had been taken over by something
external that no one in the office
recognized, and every file was downloaded at
lightning speed to an unknown location [my
emphases].”xlv
Chilling indeed.
The second expanded/updated edition of Mark H.
Gaffney’s book Black 9/11, originally published in
2012, will be released in September 2016. Mark can
be reached for comment at
markhgaffney@earthlink.net
Notes
ii
World News Tonight, September 20, 2001.
vi Less than a month after the attacks,
Bloomberg News reported about suspicious
imbalances in a number of sectors: “Bank of
America among 38 stocks in SEC's attack probe,”
Bloomberg News, October 3, 2001, archived
at
http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/sept11/bloombberg_BAamong38.html.
By September 2002, it was clear who the big
winners were: Michelle Ciarrocca, “Post-9/11
Economic Windfalls for Arms Manufacturers,”
Foreign Policy in Focus, September 2002,
posted at
http://old.911digitalarchive.org/objects/50.pdf.
vii “Bank of America among 38 stocks in
SEC's attack probe,” Bloomberg News,
Wednesday, October 3, 2001.
viii
Charles Gasparino and Gregory Zuckerman,
“Treasury Bonds Enter Purview Of U.S. Inquiry
Into Attack Gains,” Wall Street Journal,
October 2, 2001. p. C.1.
ix According to a 9/11 Commission staff
document, the SEC agreed to play the lead role
at a multi-agency meeting held on September 17,
2001: John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena
Wille, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, Monograph on Terrorist
Financing, Staff Report to the Commission.
Although the document is undated, it probably
was completed in 2004.
x The list included six airline stocks:
American, United, Continental, Northwest,
Southwest and US Airways, as well as Martin,
Boeing, Lockheed Martin Corp., AIG, American
Express Corp, American International Group, AMR
Corporation, Axa SA, Bank of America Corp, Bank
of New York Corp, Bank One Corp, Cigna Group,
CNA Financial, Carnival Corp, Chubb Group, John
Hancock Financial Services, Hercules Inc, L-3
Communications Holdings, Inc., LTV Corporation,
Marsh & McLennan Cos. Inc., MetLife, Progressive
Corp., General Motors, Raytheon, W.R. Grace,
Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., Lone Star
Technologies, American Express, the Citigroup
Inc., Royal & Sun Alliance, Lehman Brothers
Holdings, Inc., Vornado Reality Trust, Morgan
Stanley, Dean Witter & Co., XL Capital Ltd., and
Bear Stearns; “Bank of America among 38 stocks
in SEC's attack probe,” Bloomberg News,
October 3, 2001, see note 7.
xi Erin E. Arvedlund, “Follow The Money:
Terrorist Conspirators Could Have Profited More
From Fall Of Entire Market Than Single Stocks,”
Barron’s (Dow Jones and Company), October
6, 2001.
xiii Michael Ruppert, Crossing the
Rubicon (New Society Publishers,
2004), p. 243.
xv
Chris Blackhurst, “Mystery of terror ‘insider
dealers’,” The Independent (UK), October
14, 2001.
xvi “Whether advance knowledge of U.S.
attacks was used for profit,” New York Times,
October 1, 2001, archived at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/2001/10/01/stories/06010006.htm.
xvii George Tenet, At the Center of the
Storm (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), p.
19.
xviii
In 2014, Baltimore Magazine posted an
interview with Ed Hale, chairman of the board of
Baltimore Bank, who had just published a memoir,
Hale Storm, in which he reveals how his
Baltimore Bank, who had just published a memoir,
Hale Storm, in which he reveals how his
friend Buzzy Krongard recruited him in 1992 to
work for the CIA. Amy Mulvihill, “Cameo: Ed
Hale,” Baltimore Magazine, October 31,
2014.
xxi “The 2001 National Money Laundering
Strategy,” prepared by the Office of
Enforcement, US Department of the Treasury, in
consultation with the US Department of Justice,
September 2001; p. 29 and note 19.
xxiii “Chief Steps Down At Alex Brown,”
New York Times, September 15, 2001.
xxv “Chief Steps Down At Alex Brown,” New
York Times, September 15, 2001.
xxvi
David Guyatt, Nexus Magazine, Vol. 10,
Number 6, October-November 2003.
xxvii
Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA
and the Cult of Intelligence (New York,:
Dell Books, 1974), p. 55-57.
xxviii
The leak connecting the
pre-9/11 purchase of put options to Krongard and
A.B. Brown is further supported by a 9/11
Commission document which identifies the
“specific US-based options trading newsletter”
that faxed its 2,000 subscribers a
recommendation to buy put options on American
Airlines on September 9, 2001.
http://911myths.com/images/0/01/T-0148-911MFR-00139.pdf
Also see Also see http://imgur.com/a/MPDpN
The newsletter was Steve
Sarnoff’s Options Hotline, published by a
Baltimore-based company known as Agora
Financial, itself a subsidiary of a holding
company also named Agora, one of whose founders,
the late Gregory Barnhill, was a protege and
close associate of Buzzy Krongard. (Barnhill
reportedly committed suicide in 2012.) The bank
A.B.Brown is also based in Baltimore.
More recently, Agora
Financial has promoted the writings of economist
James Rickards, who purports to be a financial
adviser to the US intelligence community. In the
first chapter of his 2014 book The Death of
Money, Rickards absurdly argues that Al
Qaeda was responsible for the pre-9/11 insider
trading, an obvious and transparent attempt to
divert attention from the actual insiders.
http://research.agorafinancial.com/research/html/awn_bigdrop_0315/
xxix
Kyle F. Hence, “Massive pre-attack ‘insider
trading’ offers authorities hottest trail to
accomplices,” Global Research, April 21,
2002. Posted at
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/HEN204B.html
xxx
Allen M. Poteshman, “Unusual Option Market
Activity and the Terrorist Attacks of September
11, 2001,” Journal of Business, 2006,
vol. 79, no. 4. Posted at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/503645?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
xxxi
Chesney’s paper evolved through several drafts
between 2010-2015, when the most recent
peer-reviewed version was published.
Marc Chesney, et al., “Detecting Informed
Trading Activities in the Options Markets,”
Journal of Empirical
Finance,
Volume 33,
September 2015, pages 263–275; posted at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927539815000262
xxxii Christian Berthelsen, Scott Winokur,
“Suspicious profits sit uncollected,” San
Francisco Chronicle, September 29, 2001,
archived at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/09/29/MN186128.DTL.
xxxiii
See the 2003 9/11 Commission interview with
Cella, posted at
https://cryptome.org/nara/sec/sec-03-0916.pdf
xxxiv
Lars Schall, “Insight into the 9/11 Debate:
Economists are scared,” Asia Times, April
27, 2012.
xxxv
See the 9/11 Commission’s 2004 interview with
Department of Justice official Ken Breen, posted
at http://media.nara.gov/9-11/MFR/t-0148-911MFR-00074.pdf
xxxvii
Paul
Zarembka, “Evidence of Insider Trading Before
9/11 Re-examined,” in The 9/11 Toronto
Report, ed. James Gourley (Dallas:
International Center for 9/11 Studies, 2013), p.
148.
xxxviii
Email from David Callahan, July 10, 2013; also
see http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2010/06/sec-government-destroyed-documents-regarding-pre-911-put-options.html
xxxix
Matt Taibbi, “Is the SEC Covering Up Wall Sreet
Crimes?”, Rolling Stone,
August 17, 2011; posted at
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/is-the-sec-covering-up-wall-street-crimes-20110817
xli
Kevin Ryan, “Evidence for Informed Trading on
the Attacks of September 11,” Foreign Policy
Journal, November 18, 2010. Posted at
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/11/18/evidence-for-informed-trading-on-the-attacks-of-september-11/all/1/
xlii Rick Perera, “Computer disk drives from
WTC could yield clues,” CNN, December 20, 2001,
posted at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/TECH/industry/12/20/wtc.harddrives.idg/.
xlv Michael Ruppert, see note 15, p. 244.
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