The U.S. Army’s War Over Russia
Top brass profess to be really worried
about Putin. But a growing group of
dissenters say they’re overreacting to
get a bigger share of the defense
budget.
By Mark Perry
May 19, 2016 "Information
Clearing House"
- "Politico"
- During
the Battle of the Wilderness in 1864, a
unit of Robert E. Lee’s army rolled up
some artillery pieces and began shelling
the headquarters of Union commander
Ulysses S. Grant. When one of his
officers pleaded that Grant move,
insisting that he knew exactly what Lee
was going to do, Grant, normally a
taciturn man, lost his temper: “Oh, I am
heartily tired of hearing about what Lee
is going to do,” he said. “Some of you
always seem to think he is going to turn
a double somersault, and land in our
rear and on both of our flanks at the
same time. Go back to your command and
try to think what we are going to do
ourselves, instead of what Lee is going
to do.”
The story was recalled to me a few weeks
ago by a senior Pentagon officer in
citing the April 5
testimony of Army leaders before a
Senate Armed Services Subcommittee. The
panel delivered a grim warning about the
future of the U.S. armed forces: Unless
the Army budget was increased, allowing
both for more men and more materiel,
members of the panel said, the United
States was in danger of being “outranged
and outgunned” in the next war and, in
particular, in a confrontation with
Russia. Vladimir Putin’s military, the
panel averred, had outstripped the U.S.
in modern weapons capabilities. And the
Army’s shrinking size meant that “the
Army of the future will be too small to
secure the nation.” It was a sobering
assessment delivered by four of the most
respected officers in the Army—including
Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, his service’s
leading intellectual. The claim is the
prevailing view among senior Army
officers, who fear that Army readiness
and modernization programs are being
weakened by successive cuts to the U.S.
defense budget.
Story Continued Below
But not everyone was buying it.
“This is the ‘Chicken-Little,
sky-is-falling’ set in the Army,” the
senior Pentagon officer said. “These
guys want us to believe the Russians are
10 feet tall. There’s a simpler
explanation: The Army is looking for a
purpose, and a bigger chunk of the
budget. And the best way to get that is
to paint the Russians as being able to
land in our rear and on both of our
flanks at the same time. What a crock.”
The Army panel’s assessment of the
Russian danger was reinforced by an
article that appeared in these pages
two days later. The article reported on
an expansive study that McMaster has
ordered to collect the lessons of
Ukraine. It paraphrased Army leaders and
military experts who warn the
Russian-backed rebel army has been using
“surprisingly lethal tanks” and
artillery as well as “swarms of unmanned
aerial vehicles” to run roughshod over
Ukrainian nationalists. While the
reporting about the Army study made
headlines in the major media, a large
number in the military’s influential
retired community, including former
senior Army officers, rolled their eyes.
“That’s news to me,” one of these highly
respected officers told me. “Swarms of
unmanned aerial vehicles? Surprisingly
lethal tanks? How come this is the first
we’ve heard of it?”
These guys want us to believe the
Russians are 10 feet tall. There’s a
simpler explanation: The Army is
looking for a purpose, and a bigger
chunk of the budget.”
The fight over the Army panel’s
testimony is the latest example of a
deepening feud in the military community
over how to respond to shrinking budget
numbers. At issue is the military’s
strategic future: Facing cuts, will the
Army opt to modernize its weapons’
arsenal, or defer modernization in favor
of increased numbers of soldiers? On
April 5, the Army’s top brass made its
choice clear: It wants to do both, and
Russia’s the reason. But a
growing chorus of military voices says
that demand is both backward and
dangerously close-minded—that those same
senior military officers have not only
failed to understand the lessons of
Afghanistan and Iraq and embrace service
reform, they are inflating foreign
threats to win a bigger slice of the
defense budget.
Indeed, the numbers seem to be on the
sign of the reformers. Recent
estimates show the Russian military
is overmatched. The United States spends
seven times the amount of money on
defense as Russia ($598 billion vs. $84
billion), has nearly twice the number of
active duty personnel (1.4 million vs.
766,000), just under six times as many
helicopters (approximately 6,000 vs.
1,200), three times the number of
fighters (2,300 vs. 751) and four times
the total number of aircraft. We have 10
aircraft carriers, the Russians have
one. And while it’s true that the
Russians field nearly twice the number
of tanks as the U.S. (15,000 vs. 8,800),
their most recent version, the T-14
Armata, broke down during the 2015
Moscow May Day Parade. America’s M1A1
Tank, on the other hand, has never been
defeated in battle. Ever. The idea that
you can look at these numbers and think
that the U.S. military is in serious
trouble is ridiculous, the reformers
say.
The most outspoken critic of the Army
panel’s testimony has been retired Air
Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula, head of
the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace
Studies. “It’s time to stop waving the
bloody red shirt,” he wrote to me.
“Calling for more resources because
you’re taking casualties is a wake-up
call for a new approach—not for throwing
more folks into the meat grinder. We
really need to think in a deliberate
goal-oriented way to secure national
interests, not just parochial Army
interests.”
To
underscore this point, Deptula and Doug
Birkey published an
article singling out McMaster’s
testimony that the U.S. military
would be “outranged and outgunned by
many potential adversaries in the
future.” The statement was true, Deptula
and Birkey pointed out, so long as you
don’t count the Air Force. “What was
troubling about General McMaster’s
testimony is that he advocated a single
service approach,” Deptula and Birkey
wrote. (McMaster declined to comment for
this article.) “Contrary to his
testimony, it is exceedingly unlikely
the U.S. Army will ever be ‘outranged
and outgunned’ because when the U.S.
goes to war it does so with components
from all the services—not just the U.S.
Army.”
What Deptula and Birkey were saying is
what senior Air Force officers have been
quietly saying since the end of World
War II, and the sentiment has been
echoed by many across the services in
the wake of the Army panel’s Armed
Service Subcommittee hearing. In the
words of a senior Air Force commander,
“the Army would like to pretend that
they’re the only ones who fight
America’s wars.”
It
didn’t help the Army’s position that the
panel’s testimony was reinforced by
retired Army General Wesley Clark, who
told
Politico that the Russians had
developed tanks that are “largely
invulnerable to anti-tank missiles.”
According to the senior Pentagon officer
with whom I spoke, the Clark statement
sparked a near-chorus of derisive hoots,
even among those who agree that the Army
needs to upgrade its capabilities. “What
nonsense. If the Russians have developed
tanks that can’t be destroyed that would
be the first time that’s happened in the
history of warfare,” the officer noted.
“Amazing.”
(Clark defended his statement in a
telephone conversation with this
reporter. “I never said that Russian
tanks are invulnerable,” he argues.
“What I said is that the Russians have
developed a technology that makes their
tanks difficult to defeat and we have to
acknowledge that. That’s a military
assessment that I’ll stand behind.”)
Calling for more resources because
you’re taking casualties is a
wake-up call for a new approach—not
for throwing more folks into the
meat grinder.”
But Clark is hardly a disinterested
observer. The retired general and former
presidential candidate led NATO in its
1999 war against Serbian strongman
Slobodan Milosevic, whose Serb-backed
forces were murdering Muslim Albanians
in Kosovo. When the conflict ended,
Clark famously ordered British Lt. Gen.
Sir Mike Jackson to send British
paratroopers to confront Russian
peacekeepers occupying Kosovo’s airport
at Pristina. Jackson was stunned, and
refused: “I’m not going to start the
Third World War for you,” he told Clark.
(“This incident is a little more
complicated than you think,” Clark told
me. “General Jackson was exhausted and
overwrought. I was stunned by his
statement. The last thing I wanted was a
confrontation with the Russians.”)
But Clark’s public statements certainly
make him sound like he’s pushing for a
confrontation with the Russians. During
a series of speeches in early 2015, he
warned that Russian-backed forces
would invade the Ukraine in a “renewed
offensive from the east” before VE day,
on May 8, which the U.S. should respond
to by providing lethal aid to the
Ukrainian military. The invasion never
happened. And during an appearance at
Northwestern University, Clark, who was
accompanied by political aides to
Ukrainian President and Russia adversary
Petro Poroshenko, compared Russia to
Nazi Germany.
Clark also recently
suggested that the real reason
Russia withdrew some of its forces from
Syria was so they could reinforce their
troops on the Ukraine’s border—which,
unless the U.S. responded with more
troops of its own, could mean “the
practical end of the European Union.”
But it’s not just the Army that is
issuing a “sky is falling” assessment of
the Russian threat. A number of
currently serving senior Pentagon
officers of all branches told me they
have been concerned with a series of
inflammatory statements issued by Air
Force General Philip Breedlove who,
until just last week, was America’s NATO
commander in Europe. While Breedlove’s
replacement, Army General Curtis
Scaparrotti, is known for taking a more
measured approach to the U.S. buildup in
Europe, Breedlove’s warnings rankled
America’s European allies.
Six weeks ago, in early March,
Breedlove, who declined to comment for
this article, told a group of Washington
reporters that Russia had “upped the
ante” in Ukraine with “well over a
thousand combat vehicles, Russian combat
forces, some of their most sophisticated
air defense [units and] battalions of
artillery.” The situation, Breedlove
said, “is not getting better. It is
getting worse every day.”
The problem with the Breedlove report,
according to a senior civilian Pentagon
adviser, was that it wasn’t true. “I
have no idea what the hell he’s talking
about,” he told me. That comment echoed
statements coming from Berlin, where
advisers to German Chancellor Angela
Merkel characterized Breedlove’s
comments as “dangerous propaganda.” It
sounded to Merkel’s advisers like
Breedlove was purposely undermining
Germany’s efforts to mediate the Ukraine
dispute—what one American diplomat
disparagingly
described as “Merkel’s Moscow
stuff.” It wasn’t the first time Merkel
had been undermined, according to German
officials. An article that appeared in
Der Spiegel in the wake of
Breedlove’s statement catalogued a
series of Breedlove claims that played
“directly into the hands of
[anti-Russian] hard-liners in the U.S.
Congress and in NATO.”
Ironically, given Breedlove’s Air Force
background, the warnings also played
into the hands of the Army—specifically
those officers like McMaster who are
arguing that Russia’s growing military
strength requires that the U.S. send
more troops to Europe—which would demand
a larger Army budget. In late March,
just a few weeks after Breedlove
released his assessment, the Pentagon
announced that it would send an
additional Brigade Combat Team to Europe
to “reassure” America’s NATO allies “in
the wake of an aggressive Russia in
Eastern Europe and elsewhere.”
But retired Lt. Col. Daniel Davis, a
prominent Army critic whose high profile
2013 article in the Armed Forces
Journal called for Pentagon reform,
including a “purge” of the Army’s
leadership, doubts the Europeans will be
reassured—or the Russians intimidated.
“You think Putin is scared of a brigade
combat team?” Davis asks. “This doesn’t
scare anybody. In fact, it does just the
opposite—it plays right into Putin’s
narrative, gives him an excuse to spend
more money on his own military and
pushes the Russian public into his
hands. This is all very predictable:
He’ll up the ante and the Army will say
‘See, we don’t have enough troops.’ So
here we go again.”
McMaster and his fellow officers
aren’t asking for more money for
enhanced combat capabilities—they
want a bigger Army. But bigger isn’t
necessarily better.”
Indeed, the escalating spiral Davis
warns about seems to be in motion. The
March announcement that an additional
U.S. brigade would be sent to Europe
reinforced the Army’s warnings that
increasing threats would stretch the
Army’s existing capabilities—buttressing
McMaster’s April 5 warning that the Army
would now have a “harder and harder time
for the small force to keep pace with
the demand” and would have to sacrifice
modernization programs to keep up with
the new requirements.
A
growing group of dissenters both in and
out of uniform think that McMaster’s
grim warnings about Army capabilities
dodges the real issue—of whether the
Army is willing to change the way it
fights wars. “We’ve always been
outnumbered,” Deptula notes. “We’ve been
outnumbered since 1945. That’s the whole
point of developing an offset—we’re
offsetting their numbers with our
capabilities. But the Army has always
resisted that by arguing for more
soldiers.” He adds: “The Army is just
dead wrong on this. We need to fight
smarter instead of just blowing the
whistle and sending our boys over the
top.”
Retired Colonel Douglas Macgregor, a
longtime outspoken Army critic renowned
for his leadership of armored combat
troops in Desert Storm (and McMaster’s
former commander), agrees. He slammed
the April 5 testimony, and the budget
ask. “If you read the statement you’ll
realize that McMaster and his fellow
officers aren’t asking for more money
for enhanced combat capabilities—they
want a bigger Army,” he said. “But
bigger isn’t necessarily better.”
Macgregor also took on former Army Chief
of Staff Gordon Sullivan, the
influential head of the Association of
the U.S. Army, the service’s powerful
advocacy arm. In an April 14 article,
Sullivan defended McMaster’s statements
by painting his appeal for more money as
a defense of the common soldier. A
“broken budget process,” Sullivan
warned, would cost American lives. “It’s
soldiers we are thinking of when
worrying about the undermanned,
under-ready and underfunded Army we’ve
created,” Sullivan wrote.
“The statement is sickeningly false,”
Macgregor wrote to me. “If the generals
actually gave a damn about the soldiers
the last 15 years would have been
totally different. What happened to the
thousands of lives and trillions of
dollars squandered in Iraq and
Afghanistan? What happened to the
billions lost in a series of failed
modernization programs since 1991?”
As
entrenched as the views of McMaster and
his colleagues seem in the upper
echelons of the Army there are signs of
cracks. Even Army Chief of Staff Mark
Milley appears to have doubt.
While Milley supported the statement
before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, on April 6, just one day
after McMaster issued his warning, his
defense was tepid—at best. “I love
[H.R.] like a brother,” he said, but
then squirmed through the rest of the
answer. “To say ‘many’ is probably an
overstatement. … In terms of size of
force, yes, I agree with his comment on
size of force. But outranged, outgunned
on the ground, I think it is a mixed
bag.”
According to the senior Pentagon officer
with whom I spoke, Milley’s statement
was evidence that many in the Army were
uncomfortable with McMaster’s claim—and
the firestorm of comment it sparked. In
this case, the officer said, McMaster’s
well-earned reputation for bluntness
would cause Milley problems with the
other service chiefs, who have purposely
refrained from any public criticism of
the Army’s budget views. That restraint,
Milley apparently fears, may be at an
end—with the other services now debating
whether to issue public criticisms that
the Army is looking out for its own
interests, at their expense.
“When your commander says he ‘loves you
like a brother’ watch out,” this officer
said, “because it is usually followed by
the phrase ‘you dumb son-of-a-bitch.’”
The Pentagon officer explained that,
prior to his testimony, Milley had given
a private, informal, briefing to an Army
War College class that focused on
capabilities—and underplayed the
question of whether the Army actually
needs more soldiers. “It was very
impressive,” he said, “because it
advocated interservice cooperation and
modernization. This might be the best
chief of staff we’ve had in a long time,
because he’s telling his commanders to
stop whining about budget numbers and
figure out how to fight. There was
absolutely no sense of panic. It struck
just the right tone.”
In
fact, Milley’s Army War College remarks
seemed to imply that the Army’s problem
is not that it doesn’t have enough
soldiers, but that it has them in the
wrong places. Milley reinforced this
view in his April 6 Senate testimony.
“We need to pare down our headquarters,”
he said, adding that the Army’s
top-heavy brigade structure provides a
potential enemy with “nothing but a big
target”—a point the Army’s critics have
been making for the past 10 years. For
Army reform partisans, Milley’s views
provided a stark shift from those of
previous Army leaders, who’d focused on
leadership, courage—and numbers—instead
of capabilities. “They don’t get it,”
this officer noted. “If I can shoot my
armored piercing shell further than you
can shoot yours, I live and you die.
It’s that simple.”
The argument over numbers and
capabilities might strike some Americans
as exotic, but the debate is much more
fundamental—with enormous political
implications. “You know, which would you
rather have—a high-speed rail system, or
another brigade in Poland? Because
that’s what this is really all about.
The debate is about money, and there
simply isn’t enough to go around,” the
Pentagon officer told me. “Which is not
to mention the other question, which is
even more important: How many British
soldiers do you think want to die for
Estonia? And if they don’t want to, why
should we?”
Which means that the debate over
whether, in fact, the U.S. is “outranged
and outgunned,” is unlikely to end
anytime soon. As Milley, McMaster,
Deptula, Davis and Macgregor surely
know, the claim of American military
weakness provides ready political
fodder, particularly during an election
season, where talk of U.S. military
weakness is a red flag for voters who
see a terrorist on every corner—and a
Russian soldier on every flank.
Correction: An earlier version of this
article said the U.S. has 19 aircraft
carriers. it has 10.