Escalations
in a New Cold War
The Obama administration poked Russia in the eye
again by activating a missile defense site in
Romania while building up NATO forces on Russia’s
borders, acts that could escalate toward nuclear
war, notes Jonathan Marshall.
By Jonathan Marshall
May 15, 2016 "Information
Clearing House"
- "Consortium
News " -
If the United
States ever ends up stumbling into a major
conventional or nuclear war with Russia, the culprit
will likely be two military boondoggles that refused
to die when their primary mission ended with the
demise of the Soviet Union: NATO and the U.S.
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program.
The
“military-industrial complex” that reaps hundreds of
billions of dollars annually from support of those
programs got a major boost this week when NATO
established its first major missile
defense site at an air base in Romania, with plans
to build a second installation in Poland by 2018.
President
Barack Obama meets with President Vladimir Putin
of Russia on the sidelines of the G20 Summit at
Regnum Carya Resort in Antalya, Turkey, Sunday,
Nov. 15, 2015. National Security Advisior Susan
E. Rice listens at left. (Official White House
Photo by Pete Souza)
Although
NATO and Pentagon spokesmen claim the ABM network in
Eastern Europe is aimed at Iran, Russia isn’t
persuaded for a minute. “This is not a defense
system,”
said Russian President Vladimir Putin on
Friday. “This is part of U.S. nuclear strategic
potential brought [to] . . . Eastern Europe. . .
Now, as these elements of ballistic missile defense
are deployed, we are forced to think how to
neutralize emerging threats to the Russian
Federation.”
Iran
doesn’t yet have missiles capable of striking
Europe, nor does it have any interest in targeting
Europe. The missiles it does have are
notoriously inaccurate. Their inability
to hit a target reliably might not matter so much if
tipped with nuclear warheads, but Iran is
abiding by its stringently verified agreement
to dismantle programs and capabilities that could
allow it to develop nuclear weapons.
The ABM
system currently deployed in Europe is admittedly
far too small today to threaten Russia’s nuclear
deterrent. In fact,
ABM technology is still unreliable,
despite America’s investment of more than $100
billion in R&D.
Nonetheless, it’s a threat Russia cannot ignore. No
U.S. military strategist would sit still for long if
Russia began ringing the United States with such
systems. That’s why the United States and Russia
limited them by treaty — until
President George W. Bush terminated the pact
in 2002.
President
Reagan’s famous 1983 “Star Wars” ABM initiative was
based on a theory developed by advisers Colin Gray
and Keith Payne in a 1980 article titled “Victory is
Possible”: that a combination of superior nuclear
weapons, civil defense programs, and ballistic
missile defenses could allow the United States to
“prevail” in a prolonged nuclear war with the Soviet
Union.
Such
nuclear superiority, Gray argued, could back up
“very large American expeditionary forces” fighting
in a future conflict “around the periphery of Asia.”
By limiting damage to the U.S. homeland, missile
defenses would neutralize Russia’s nuclear deterrent
and help the United States “succeed in the
prosecution of local conflict . . . and — if need be
— to expand a war.”
Gray
published that latter observation in a 1984 volume
edited by Ashton Carter, who as President Obama’s
Secretary of Defense now
champions the new missile shield in
Europe. So it should come as little wonder that
Moscow is going all out these days in a sometimes
ugly campaign to remind the world of its nuclear
potency, lest NATO take advantage of Russia’s
perceived weakness.
Russian Tough Talk
Moscow
spokesmen have
warned that Romania could become a
“smoking ruins” if it continues to host the new
anti-missile site;
threatened Denmark, Norway and Poland
that they too could become targets of attack; and
announced
development of a new generation of
intercontinental ballistic missiles designed to
penetrate the U.S. missile shield.
Secretary
Carter
responded this month that “Moscow’s
nuclear saber-rattling raises troubling questions
about . . . whether they respect the profound
caution that nuclear-age leaders showed with regard
to brandishing nuclear weapons” — even as he
announced new details of a $3.4 billion military
buildup to support NATO’s combat capabilities.
U.S.
military leaders
say they are drawing up even bigger
funding requests to send more troops and military
hardware to Eastern Europe, and to pay for new
“investments in space systems, cyber weapons, and
ballistic missile defense designed to check a
resurgent Russia.”
Speaking in
February at security conference in Munich, Russian
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev
called for an end to such confrontation,
noting that “almost every day [NATO leaders] call
Russia the main threat for NATO, Europe, the U.S.
and other countries. It makes me wonder if we are in
2016 or in 1962.”
But
stepped-up conflict comes as a godsend to the
Pentagon and its contractors, which only a few years
ago faced White House plans for
major cutbacks in funding and troop
strength in Europe. It allows them to maintain — and
increase — military spending levels that today are
greater than they were during the height of the Cold
War.
U.S. and
other NATO leaders justify their buildup by pointing
to Russia’s allegedly aggressive behavior —
“annexing” Crimea and sending “volunteers” to
Eastern Ukraine. They conveniently neglect the
blatant coup d’état in Kiev that triggered the
Ukraine crisis by driving an elected,
Russian-friendly government from power in February
2014. They also neglect the long and provocative
record of
NATO expansion toward Russia’s borders
after the fall of the Soviet Union, contrary to the
pledges of Western leaders in 1990.
That
expansion was championed by the aptly named
Committee to Expand NATO, a hot-bed of
neoconservatives and Hillary Clinton advisers led by
Bruce Jackson, then vice president for
planning and strategy at Lockheed Martin, the
country’s largest military contractor. In 2008, NATO
vowed to bring Ukraine — the largest
country on Russia’s western border — into the
Western military alliance.
Cold War Warnings
George
Kennan, the dean of U.S. diplomats during the Cold
War,
predicted in 1997 that NATO’s reckless
expansion could only lead to “a new Cold War,
probably ending in a hot one, and the end of the
effort to achieve a workable democracy in Russia.”
Last year,
former Secretary of Defense William Perry
warned that we “are on the brink of a new
nuclear arms race,” with all the vast expense — and
dangers of a global holocaust — of its Cold War
predecessor.
U.S.
diplomat George F. Kennan who is credited with
devising the strategy of deterrence against the
Soviet Union after World War II.
And just
this month, President Obama’s own former Defense
Secretary Chuck Hagel
warned that NATO’s plans to deploy four
battalions to the Baltic States could result “very
quickly in another Cold War buildup here, that
really makes no sense for either side.”
If “we
continue to build up the eastern flank of NATO, with
more battalions, more exercises, and more ships and
more platforms,” he told an audience at the Atlantic
Council, “the Russians will respond. I’m not sure
where that takes you.”
Nobody
knows where it takes us, and that’s the problem. It
could take us all too easily from small provocations
to a series of escalations by each side to show they
mean business. And given the trip-wire effect of
nuclear weapons stored on NATO’s soil,
the danger of escalation to nuclear war
is entirely real.
As foreign
policy expert Jeffrey Taylor
commented recently, “The Obama
administration is setting the stage for endless
confrontation, and possibly even war, with Russia,
and with no public debate.”
Returning
to the days of the Cold War will buy less security
and more danger. As President Obama contemplates
what he will say about the lessons of nuclear war in
Hiroshima, he should fundamentally reconsider his
own policies that threaten many more Hiroshimas.
Jonathan Marshall is author or co-author of five
books on international affairs, including The
Lebanese Connection: Corruption, Civil War and the
International Drug Traffic (Stanford
University Press, 2012).
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