America’s
Two-Faced Policy on Iran
The Obama administration seeks to demonize Iran —
along with Russia and China — while also demanding
their help in areas of U.S. interest, an approach
that is both disingenuous and dangerous, as British
diplomat Alastair Crooke explains.
By Alastair Crooke
May 10, 2016 "Information
Clearing House"
- "Consortium
News"
-
In an article
entitled “Why America needs Iran in Iraq,” former
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad argues that
“the chaos in Baghdad, culminating in the temporary
occupation of the parliament by followers of Shiite
Islamist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, is undermining the
war against the Islamic State; weakening Iraq’s
economy; and accelerating the country’s
disintegration.
“Without
cooperation between the United States, Iran and
Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Sistani, the
crisis could very well lead to the collapse of the
entire political system set up in Iraq during the
temporary U.S. occupation … To prevent this,
Washington needs Tehran’s help. And Iran should be
as motivated to seek stability [in Iraq] as much as
Washington, because” Khalilzad asserts, “Iran,
currently is losing favour in Iraq.”
Putting
aside the questionable implication that Iran might
somehow, through co-operation with America, raise
its standing amongst Iraqis, Khalilzad’s presumption
that Iran should now attend to America’s needs in
Iraq, coupled with Secretary of State John Kerry’s
insistence that Iran should help America to end the
conflict in Syria too, throw into sharp relief the
paradox inherent at the heart of U.S. diplomacy
towards Iran, Russia (and China also).
This
approach has been dubbed the “middle way” by former
special adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State,
Jeremy Shapiro: the U.S. Administration has no
desire for an all-out confrontation with these three
states. They are militarily hard nuts, and there is
not much appetite for yet more military
confrontation amongst a weary and wary American
public (to the continuing frustration of the neocons).
More
prosaically, the global financial system is now so
brittle, so delicately poised, that it is not at all
certain that the prospect of conflict would give the
lift to America’s flagging economy that war
generally is supposed to give. It might just snap
the financial system, instead — hence the Middle
Way.
Shapiro
points out the obvious contradiction to this
two-track approach: the U.S. no longer can ignore
such powerful states. Its window of absolute,
unchallenged, uni-polar power has passed. America
needs the help of these states, but at the same
time, it seeks precisely to counter these states’
potential to rival or limit American power in any
way.
And America
simply ignores the core complaints that fuel the
tensions between itself and these states. It simply
declines to address them. Shapiro concludes that
this foreign policy approach is unsustainable, and
bound to fail: “This dual-track approach, condemning
Russia [or Iran] as an aggressor one day, [whilst]
seeking to work with Moscow [or Tehran] the next …
would [ultimately] force ever-greater
confrontation.”
The
‘Middle Way’
In a sense,
the U.S. approach towards Iran seems to be mirroring
the so-called “middle way” policy which the U.S.
Administration pursues towards Russia, whereby the
putative “reset” with Russia was set aside (when
President Vladimir Putin assumed the Presidency for
the second time), and Obama – rather than seek
outright confrontation with Russia – ruled that
America however, would only co-operate with Russia
when it suited it, but the U.S. would not deign to
address Russia’s core issues of its “outsider”
status in Europe, or its containment in Asia — or
its concerns about a global order that was being
used to corner Russia and to crush dissenter states
who refused to enter the global order on America’s
terms alone.
And Obama
did little to drawback the NATO missile-march
towards Russia’s borders (ostensibly, it may be
recalled, to save Europe from Iranian missiles).
Ostensibly,
too, the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action)
could have been America’s “reset” with Iran. Some,
including a number of prominent Iranian politicians,
thought it was.
But
National Security Advisor Susan Rice was very
explicit to Jeffrey Goldberg in The
Atlantic that this was never intended: “It is
assumed, at least among his critics, that Obama
sought the Iran deal because he has a vision of a
historic American-Persian rapprochement. But his
desire for the nuclear agreement was born of
pessimism as much as it was of optimism.
“The Iran
deal was never primarily about trying to open a new
era of relations between the U.S. and Iran,” Susan
Rice told [Goldberg]. “It was far more pragmatic and
minimalist. The aim was very simply to make a
dangerous country substantially less dangerous. No
one had any expectation that Iran would be a more
benign actor.”
And so, we
see a similar pattern, the possibility of a real
“reset’ with Iran is pre-meditatively set aside (as
per Rice), whilst the dual-track approach of
condemning Iran for its ballistic missile tests
(which have nothing to do with JCPOA), and its
support for Hizbullah, are condemned one day, whilst
Iran’s help in Iraq and Syria is being demanded on
the next day.
At the same
time, Iran’s core dispute with the U.S. – its
complaints that exclusion from the international
financial system is not being ameliorated as JCPOA
was supposed so to do – are not being addressed.
Rather they are being met with a shrug that implies
“did they really expect anything else?”
Well, some
(but by no means all) Iranian politicians had done
just that: they had raised the Iranian public’s
expectations that all sanctions – other
than specific U.S. sanctions – would be lifted.
They rather bet their credibility on it, as it were,
and may pay a political price eventually.
And as
NATO deploys a
further 4,000 troops in the Baltic states and
Poland, on Russia’s border, so too the U.S. Congress
continues its figurative advance on Iran’s
frontiers.
Here is
Iran’s (conservative) Keyhan newspaper:
“The draft of a new resolution has been presented to
the US Congress in which Iran is accused of creating
tension in the Persian Gulf, and the US Government
has been urged to confront Iran and impose new
sanctions against our country. Randy Forbes, a
Republican member of the US House of
Representatives, has drafted a resolution, which if
passed by the Congress, condemns Iran’s military
presence in the Persian Gulf as a provocation”
(emphasis added)
Shapiro’s
specific warning about the “middle way” approach was
that “political and bureaucratic factors on both
sides would force ever-greater confrontation.” But
this is not the only risk, nor does it even
constitute being the biggest risk (besides that of
having undermined those in Iran and Russia who had
put their “hat in the ring” of contemplating Entente with
the United State).
America’s Bad Faith
Rather, it
is by making this policy approach quite general to
those states which have taken on themselves the
burden of being the symbol for a non-Western,
alternative vision (Russia, Iran and China, inter
alia), that a perceived breach of the
spirit of the JCPOA (at the least), will have
wider repercussions.
Russia and
China both spent political capital in order to help
persuade Iran to sign up to the JCPOA: Will they not
wonder whether America is to be trusted? China has
complicated negotiations in hand with America on
trade and financial issues, whilst Russia has been
trying to resolve ballistic missile, as well as
Ukraine sanctions issues, with America.
Is it not a
straw in the wind for the consequences to this
policy when a prominent Russian commentator, Fyodor
Lukyanov, who is not at all hostile to rapprochement
with the West, writes in End
of the G8 Era that using Russia’s prospective
inclusion in the G8 as an instrument of pressure on
Russia is pointless?:
“The G8
reflected a certain period of history when Russia
really wanted to be integrated into the so-called
Extended West. Why it did not happen? Something went
wrong? This is another topic. The most important
thing is that it did not happen at all … it seemed
(in the 1990s) that this membership would not mean
just participation in yet another club, but a
strategic decision aimed at the future.
“However,
the desirable future did not come, and probably
won’t come. It is obvious now, that the world does
not develop in the direction of the Western model.
So, now we have what we have, and there is no reason
to restore the G8.”
May this
general sentiment come to be reflected in Iran too,
as the sanctions-lifting issue drags on? Did the
U.S. then “win one over Iran” through the JCPOA
accord – as the shrugs of U.S. shoulders at Iranian
complaints, might imply? Was Iran just naïve? Did
they really think that the U.S. was simply going to
empower Iran financially?
It is
pretty clear that the Supreme Leader understood the
situation precisely — he had, after all some
experience of U.S. non-compliance with agreements
from the Lebanese hostage negotiations of the 1980s.
But what
has Iran lost by the JCPOA? A few Iranians may have
had their fingers burned in the process, but
Iran achieved three important things: the world now
knows that it was not Iran that was the impediment
to a nuclear deal; the deal has transformed Iran’s
public image – and created an opening – with the
rest of the world (including Europe); and it has, in
the process, constructed and strengthened strategic
political and economic ties with Russia and China.
But most
important of all, the rift within Iran that
stemmed from the sense amongst some Iranian
orientations, that President Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric
was a principal obstacle to normalizing with the
West, has been addressed: an Iranian
government, with a Western-friendly face, has been
given, and seen to have been given, the full chance
to negotiate a solution to the nuclear issue.
Whatever the final outcome, that boil has been
lanced.
No, the
Iranian leadership has not been naïve.
Alastair
Crooke is a British diplomat who was a senior figure
in British intelligence and in European Union
diplomacy. He is the founder and director of the
Conflicts Forum, which advocates for engagement
between political Islam and the West. |