Saudi
Arabia Faces Collapse
America’s Middle Eastern Ally May Not Survive This
Latest Oil Crisis
Petroleum accounts for 90 percent of the country's
economy. A depressed market has exposed its fragile
fundamentals
By Vijay
Prashad
May 08,
2016 "Information
Clearing House"
- "AlterNet"
- Saudi
Arabia is in serious trouble. The Binladin Group,
the kingdom’s largest construction company, has
terminated the employment of fifty thousand foreign
workers. They have been issued exit visas, which
they have refused to honor. These workers will not
leave without being paid back wages. Angry with
their employer, some of the workers set fire to
seven of the company’s buses.
Unrest is on the cards in the Kingdom. In April,
King Salman fired the water and electricity minister
Abdullah al-Hasin, who had come under criticism for
high water rates, new rules over the digging of
wells and cuts in energy subsidies. The restructured
ministry was to save the Kingdom $30
billion—precious money for an exchequer that is
spluttering from low oil prices. Eighty-six percent
of Saudis say that they want the water and
electricity subsidies to continue. They are not
prepared to let these disappear. They see this as
their right. Why, they say, should an energy rich
country not provide almost free energy for its
subjects?
When King Salman took over last year, he inherited a
kingdom in dire straits. Saudi Arabia’s Treasury
relies upon oil sales for over ninety percent of its
revenue. The population does not pay tax, so the
only way to raise funds is from oil sales. As oil
prices fell from $100/ barrel to $30/barrel, oil
revenues for the Kingdom collapsed. Saudi Arabia
lost $390 billion in anticipated oil profits last
year. Its budget deficit came to $100 billion—much
higher than it has been in memory. For the first
time since 1991, Saudi Arabia turned to the world of
private finance to raise $10 billion for a five-year
loan. That this country, with a vast sovereign
wealth fund, needs to borrow money to cover its
bills is an indication of its fragile fundamentals.
What does a country do when it enters a period of
crisis? It calls the consulting firm McKinsey. That
is precisely what Saudi Arabia did. McKinsey sent
its crack analysts to the Kingdom. They returned—in
December 2015—with Saudi Arabia Without Oil: The
Investment and Productivity Transformation. This
report could have been written without a site visit.
It carries all the clichés of neo-liberalism:
transform the economy from a government-led to a
market-led one, cut subsidies and transfer payments,
and sell government assets to finance the
transition. There is not one hint of the peculiar
political economy and cultural context of Saudi
Arabia. The report calls for a cut in Saudi Arabia’s
public-sector employment and a cut in its three
million low-wage foreign workers. But the entire
political economy of Saudi Arabia and the culture of
its Saudi subjects are reliant upon state employment
for the subjects and low-wage subservience from the
guest workers. To change these two pillars calls
into question the survival of the monarchy. A Saudi
Arabia without oil, McKinsey should have honestly
said, is a Saudi Arabia without a monarchy.
What would the McKinsey transformation produce? “A
productivity-led transformation,” wrote the eager
analysts, “could enable Saudi Arabia to again double
its [Gross Domestic Product] and create as many as
six million new Saudi jobs by 2030.”
The King’s son, Mohammed Bin Salman (MbS), took
McKinsey at its word. He then copied and pasted the
report in his own Saudi Vision 2030. Little of
Prince MbS’s statement differs from the McKinsey
proposal. The eagerness of the Prince shows his lack
of experience. It is unlikely that he has read Naomi
Klein’s The Shock Doctrine, a full-scale assault on
the idea of economic transformation. Even more
unlikely that he has read Duff McDonald’s The Firm,
an evisceration of McKinsey’s smoke and mirrors
model. To base an entire country’s future on a
McKinsey report seems reckless. But then Prince MbS
has a streak of recklessness in him. He led the
Saudi war on Yemen – and that has not turned out
well at all. The peace talks over that war being
held in Kuwait remain stalled. Saudi Arabia made
almost no gains in Yemen. Should the man who led
Saudi Arabia into humiliating failure in Yemen now
be in charge of its economic transformation?
Saudi Arabia is a monarchy. Prince MbS has the
King’s favor. His talents are measured by the King
and not by the people. They will have to tolerate
his shenanigans with the economy just as they have
had to tolerate his failed war on Yemen.
What is Prince MbS’s Saudi Vision 2030? Despite the
attempts to create some stability in the oil market,
there is no indication that oil prices would be
raised to safe levels anytime soon. If oil remains
below $50/barrel, Saudi Arabia has to revise its own
economic project. That means that Saudi Arabia will
have to find new ways to create revenues. To shift
from an oil-dependent economy to an
industrial-tourism-finance economy will require a
massive dose of investment. To secure that
investment, Saudi Arabia plans to sell a small stake
of its state-owned oil firm—ARAMCO. The plan is to
raise at least $2 trillion from that sale and from
the sale of other state assets. This money will
bolster the depleted Sovereign Wealth Fund, which
might otherwise run dry by 2017-2020.
The enhanced Sovereign Wealth Fund will be used to
develop new industrial sectors such as
petrochemicals, manufacturing at the medium scale
and finance as well as tourism. Foreigners will be
allowed to own property in the Kingdom and
entrepreneurial activity will be encouraged by the
state. How does all this happen by 2020 – the date
proposed by Prince MbS—or even by 2030—the name of
the Prince’s plan? Will Saudi Arabia be able to
rapidly transform its population from being
satisfied with receipts of oil revenues to being
workers in an insecure market environment? History
suggests a long period of dissatisfaction amongst
the public during this kind of enormous transition.
Can the Saudi royal family manage the level of anger
and humiliation that this change will evoke?
The IMF’s director of Middle East and Central Asia—Masood
Ahmed—is sure that the transition will work just
fine. In fact, Ahmed believes that the McKinsey plan
is perhaps a little too modest. What the Saudis need
to do, said Ahmed, is to attract more private
investment to help the diversification plan. Where
will this private investment come from? Perhaps from
China, which has already signed a large ($2.48
billion) nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia. The kingdom
is China’s largest oil supplier. China’s Sinopec,
PetroChina and Yunnan Yuntianhua work closely with
ARAMCO to build oil refineries in the kingdom and on
the Chinese coastline. Chinese construction
companies are building the Haramain railroad that
will eventually link Mecca and Madina. China is the
largest trading partner of Saudi Arabia. The
Binladin group will mothball some of its cranes, but
that does not mean that cranes will hang over the
skyline of the kingdom. Chinese construction firms
are prepared to build the new infrastructural base
in Saudi Arabia. Washington, if it is paying
attention, must see the drift of its old ally—either
into social chaos or into the Chinese orbit. No
other alternative exists. |