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Putin’s
Invitation to War
By Felix
Imonti
March 10,
2016 "Information
Clearing House"
- Putin’s unwelcomed invitation to rescue Bashar
Al-Assad from collapse was issued on television in
the summer of 2015 when the world was told that four
years of constant warfare had decimated the ranks of
the Syrian National Army. The revelation of a
pending disaster was in fact an ultimatum to Putin.
The collapse of Al-Assad’s regime would result in
Russia’s losing its only foreign port at Tardus and
Russia’s remaining regional influence. Putin had no
options but was forced into a war that he cannot
afford to lose nor afford to fight.
Preserving
national dignity and his own political career left
Vladimir Putin with no other choice than to join
forces with Assad. However, he is faced with the
dilemma of how to engage in a war without becoming
embroiled in that war. He faced a similar problem in
the Ukraine and managed successfully to achieve his
limited objectives of neutralizing the Ukraine by
blocking it from joining NATO and the EU. This was
accomplished by keeping the conflict below a level
at which NATO would be forced to be involved.
The tool
was those infamous “little green men” who organized
local resistance to the Kiev administration. The
real Army remained on the Russian side of the
frontier as a warning to NATO.
While
Russia has to minimize its profile in the Ukraine,
it has to maximize it in Syria. Putin is being
forced to deploy the military when its modernization
is still in its early stages and is handicapped by
budget restrictions from collapsing oil prices and
sanctions.
Creating
from the outset the image of a powerful modern
military was an essential part of what was “Surprise
and Awe.” Russian air forces arrived in Syria in
grand style by reaching their base in Latakia
undetected.
Once the
bombing was underway, cruise missiles were launched
from ships in the Caspian Sea and from the
Rostov-on-Don submarine in the Mediterranean. It was
an opportunity to impress the world with the quality
of its weapons.
High on the
list of vital objectives was to interdict the
corridor between Turkey and the Islamic State in
Syria which the United States has avoided attacking.
Convoys of oil tankers were carrying crude oil for
sale in Turkey at a third of world prices and
supplies as well as fresh recruits were crossing
into Syria.
The target
is a stretch of land sixty-two miles wide along the
Northern border of Syria. It is that territory of
1,550 square miles under the control of the Islamic
State, Jabhat al-Nusra and the FSA that Erdagon of
Turkey has been attempting to make a no-fly-zone or
safe-zone where refugees from Syria can be held
outside of Turkish territory. The presence of
thousands of refugees offers the extra benefit of
providing a shield against efforts to interdict the
vital trade route between the Islamic State, Jabhat
al-Nusra, and Turkey.
Recep
Tayyip Erdagon has begun a sustained artillery
bombardment on Kurdish positions crossing the
Euphrates River in order to occupy the territory. If
the Turks do move against the Kurds, it will have to
be without the backing of NATO or the U.S. The
recent acquisition of the Rmeilan airfield in the
Kurdish province of Hasakah in Northern Syria by the
U.S. is a clear signal to Ankara that Washington is
shifting its support to the Kurds. The reversal of
the U.S. stand towards the continuation of the
Al-Assad administration and the agreement to accept
Russian bombing around Aleppo confirms that
Washington has accepted Russian-Iranian strategy.
Supported
by Arab units of the U.S. sponsored Syrian
Democratic Force, the Kurds are moving against
the towns of Azaz, al-Bab, Manbaj and Jarabulus.
When they gain control of the stretch of land,
they will complete the bridge between the two
Kurdish enclaves that comprise Western
Kurdistan, Rojava.
Erdagon
fears that a contiguous Kurdish territory from
the Iraq border to the shore of the
Mediterranean will be followed by a declaration
of independence. He is likely correct that an
independent Rojava is on the horizon and will
encourage the twenty million Kurds of Turkey to
seek their separation from a country that denies
them equal standing.
Already, the Kurds in Rojava have formed local
administrations in a unique structure that
incorporates the various ethnic groups. The
infrastructure for an independent state is being
put in place and Bashar Al-Assad has granted de
facto independence to the Kurds. They have
established what is, in effect, a diplomatic
office in Moscow with additional offices planned
for other capitals.
By
aiding the Kurdish aspiration for a single
united geographic state, Vladimir Putin can
build a Kurdish Wall that is his ultimate weapon
against the Islamic State at little cost to
Russia. If IS cannot sell its oil and import
recruits, the caliphate will slowly wither.
Putin
does not need to commit large numbers of Russian
troops onto the battlefield. He has thousands of
little green men in the form of Kurds, the
Syrian National Army, and the Iranian IRG to
provide the combat forces. Russia has the fire
power from its aircraft, and the newly
introduced long range artillery and tanks to
force the opposition into a grinding war of
attrition.
The
Russians can declare that their strategy is
proving to be successful, but there is a
potential flaw in the plan, namely Turkey and
Saudi Arabia. The Saudis along with the Turks
are seeing their five yearlong campaign to
overthrow the Al-Assad regime facing defeat.
Their last hope is to persuade Washington to
lead an invasion into Syria, but the United
States has no interest in jumping into another
minefield. Washington is opting for what is
believed to be the better strategy of having the
Kurds, Russians and others do the fighting while
the United States does the minimum.
Felix
Imonti studied international relations at UCLA. He
was the director of a private equity firm and has
lived in seven countries. |
