Preparing
for the Collapse of the Saudi Kingdom
By Sarah
Chayes and Alex de Waal
February
19, 2016 "Information
Clearing House"
-
"The
Atlantic" -
For
half a century, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been
the linchpin of U.S. Mideast policy. A guaranteed
supply of oil has bought a guaranteed supply of
security. Ignoring autocratic practices and the
export of Wahhabi extremism, Washington stubbornly
dubs its ally “moderate.” So tight is the trust that
U.S. special operators dip into Saudi petrodollars
as a counterterrorism
slush fund without a second thought. In a sea of
chaos, goes the refrain, the kingdom is one state
that’s stable.
But is it?
In fact,
Saudi Arabia is no state at all. There are two ways
to describe it: as a political enterprise with a
clever but ultimately unsustainable business model,
or as an entity so corrupt as to resemble a
vertically and horizontally integrated criminal
organization. Either way, it can’t last. It’s past
time U.S. decision-makers began planning for the
collapse of the Saudi kingdom.
In recent
conversations with military and other government
personnel, we were startled at how startled they
seemed at this prospect. Here’s the analysis they
should be working through.
Understood
one way, the Saudi king is the CEO of a family
business that converts oil into payouts that buy
political loyalty. They take two forms: cash
handouts or commercial concessions for the
increasingly numerous scions of the royal clan, and
a modicum of public goods and employment
opportunities for commoners. The coercive “stick” is
supplied by brutal internal-security services
lavishly outfitted with American equipment.
The United
States has long counted on the ruling family having
bottomless coffers of cash with which to rent
loyalty. Even accounting for today’s low oil prices,
and even as Saudi officials step up arms purchases
and military adventures in Yemen and elsewhere,
Riyadh is hardly running out of funds.
Still,
expanded oil production in the face of such low
prices—until the February 16 announcement of
a Saudi-Russian output freeze at very high
January levels—may reflect an urgent need for
revenue as well as other strategic imperatives.
Talk of a Saudi Aramco IPO similarly suggests a
need for hard currency.
A political
market, moreover, functions according to demand as
well as supply. What if the price of loyalty rises?
It appears
that is just what’s happening. King Salman
had to spend lavishly to secure the allegiance of
the notables who were pledged to the late King
Abdullah. Here’s what played out in two other
countries when this kind of inflation hit. In South
Sudan, an insatiable elite not only diverted the
newly minted country’s oil money to private pockets
but also kept up their outsized demands when the
money ran out, sparking a descent into chaos. The
Somali government enjoys generous donor support, but
is priced out of a very competitive political market
by a host of other buyers—with ideological,
security, or criminal agendas of their own.
Such
comparisons may be offensive to Saudi leaders, but
they are telling. If the loyalty price index keeps
rising, the monarchy could face political
insolvency.
Looked at
another way, the Saudi ruling elite is operating
something like a sophisticated criminal enterprise,
when populations everywhere are making insistent
demands for government accountability. With its
political and business elites interwoven in a
monopolistic network, quantities of unaccountable
cash leaving the country for private investments and
lavish purchases abroad, and state functions bent to
serve these objectives, Saudi Arabia might be
compared to such kleptocracies as Viktor
Yanukovich’s Ukraine.
Increasingly, Saudi citizens are seeing themselves
as just that: citizens, not subjects. In countries
as diverse as Nigeria, Ukraine, Brazil, Moldova, and
Malaysia, people are contesting criminalized
government and impunity for public
officials—sometimes violently. In more than half a
dozen countries in 2015, populations took to the
streets to protest corruption. In three of them,
heads of state are either threatened or have had to
resign. Elsewhere, the same grievances have
contributed to the expansion of jihadist movements
or criminal organizations posing as Robin Hoods.
Russia and China’s external adventurism can at least
partially be explained as an effort to re-channel
their publics’ dissatisfaction with the quality of
governance.
For the
moment, it is largely Saudi Arabia’s Shia minority
that is voicing political demands. But the highly
educated Sunni majority, with unprecedented exposure
to the outside world, is unlikely to stay satisfied
forever with a few favors doled out by geriatric
rulers impervious to their input. And then there are
the “guest workers.” Saudi officials, like those in
other Gulf states, seem to think they can exploit an
infinite supply of indigents grateful to work,
whatever the conditions. But citizens are now
heavily outnumbered in their own countries by
laborers who may soon begin claiming rights.
For
decades, Riyadh has eased pressure by exporting its
dissenters—like Osama bin Laden—fomenting extremism
across the Muslim world. But that strategy can
backfire: Bin Laden’s critique of Saudi corruption
has been taken up by others, and it resonates among
many Arabs. And King Salman (who is 80, by the way)
does not display the dexterity of his half-brother
Abdullah. He’s reached for some of the familiar
items in the autocrats’ toolbox: executing
dissidents, embarking on foreign wars, and whipping
up sectarian rivalries to discredit the demands of
Saudi Shiites and boost nationalist fervor. Each of
these has grave risks.
There are a
few ways things could go, as Salman’s brittle grip
on power begins cracking.
One is a
factional struggle within the royal family, with the
price of allegiance bid up beyond anyone’s ability
to pay in cash. Another is foreign war. With Saudi
Arabia and Iran already confronting each other by
proxy in Yemen and Syria, escalation is too easy.
U.S. decision-makers should bear that danger in mind
as they keep pressing for regional solutions to
regional problems. A third scenario is
insurrection—either a nonviolent uprising or a
jihadi insurgency—a result all too predictable given
episodes throughout the region in recent years.
The United
States keeps getting caught off-guard when
purportedly solid countries come apart. To do better
this time, U.S. military and intelligence officials
should at the very least, and immediately, run some
rigorous planning exercises to test different
scenarios and potential actions aimed at reducing
codependence and mitigating risk. They should work
hard to identify the most likely, and most
dangerous, regional outcomes of a Saudi collapse—or
the increasingly desperate efforts of its rulers to
avoid one. And above all, they should abandon the
automatic-pilot thinking that has been guiding U.S.
policy to date.
“Hope is
not a policy” is a hackneyed phrase. But choosing
not to consider alternatives amounts to the same
thing.
Copyright © 2016 by The Atlantic Monthly Group |