That may
be the case – from Tehran clinching a deal to
buy 114 planes from Airbus to Iranian oil soon
hitting Western markets. But the key question is
actually how, at what pace, and with what
partners Tehran plans to rejoin global markets.
All the
commotion, at the moment, predictably revolves
around oil. Iran’s Deputy Oil Minister for
Commerce and International Affairs, Amir Hossein
Zamaninia, said the new oil export target is an
extra 500,000 barrels a day within a few months.
Tehran may indeed boost production by 600,000
barrels a day in six months, and add up to
800,000 barrels a day in output before the end
of 2016.
Not
even the sharper oil analysts really know what
this will mean in terms of an all-out, open
market-share battle between Iran and Saudi
Arabia. What even some sections of Western
corporate media are not
buying anymore are Saudi diversionist
tactics about their cheap oil strategy – which
has been essentially designed to hurt Iran, and
Russia.
The
fact is Iran is already selling more oil as we
speak. Over 1,000 lines of credit have been
opened for banks, according to President Hassan
Rouhani. Energy-hungry Europeans are predictably
going nuts. Even with non-denial denials, the
fact is Shell executives, for instance, are
already in Tehran, talking about Iran’s “energy
potential” and solidifying their positioning as
Iran’s “prime partner” in energy. Meanwhile,
Iran’s oil tankers are already sailing under
Lloyd’s insurance.
Into
this frenzy steps in none other than the
aspiring ‘New Master of the Universe’; Chinese
President Xi Jinping, currently on a ultra
high-profile Middle East tour of Saudi Arabia,
Egypt and, of course, Iran.
This is Beijing’s cool, calculated way of
laterally selling One Belt, One Road – or the
New Silk Roads project – by carefully increasing
“strategic cooperation” in the energy sphere.
Take
the strategic cooperation agreement signed this
Tuesday in Riyadh between Aramco and China’s
Sinopec. It may be worth no more than $1.5
billion, but there will be others in its wake;
after all Saudi Arabia, on and off, remains the
biggest supplier of crude oil to China.
Yet the
really crucial strategic partnership here is
Beijing-Tehran.
China
has been Iran’s biggest trade partner since
2010, as well as the top buyer of Iranian crude
and non-petroleum products (ore, agriculture)
even under UN, US and EU sanctions.
Beijing
was active in solidifying the Iranian nuclear
deal clinched last July – backing the Russians
at the table.
And in
a graphic demonstration for the entire world to
see, Xi is the first head of state to visit Iran
since nuclear-related sanctions were lifted this
past weekend.
All
this leads to a long-term question: is Iran the
new China, in terms of a capitalist development
bonanza, and will Iran follow a Chinese-style,
centrally controlled, development project from
now on?
What’s
certain is that Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Khamenei stressed over and over again that the
renewal of negotiations with the US touched only
the nuclear issue. And he repeatedly warned
about the cultural, political and security
consequences of an economic opening that could
eventually weaken the Islamic Republic.
So
forget about Iran as a US partner. That won’t
happen. In the West, the privileged partner will
be the EU, especially concerning investment in
energy and in the sprawling, young, educated,
virtually “virgin” Iranian market. And then,
there’s Eurasia integration.
Relations with Russia will remain solid – from
the need to secure Iran’s northern frontier to a
counterbalance to the American encirclement
(which remains in place). Tehran and Moscow
still need to solve the status of the Caspian
Sea. But both share serious strategic interests
in the Caucasus-Caspian-Central Asia arc – from
fighting Salafi-jihadism (whose ideological
matrix is, who else, Saudi Arabia) to the most
crucial categorical imperative; the drive by the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for a
Central Asian security mechanism limiting all
Washington’s options.
This
means that much sooner rather than later,
perhaps in a few months, Iran will become a
full-fledged member of the SCO.
It
certainly does not hurt that in militarily Iran
finally received Russia’s S-300 missiles, and
their political-military coordination is in full
effect; see for instance those Russian cruise
missiles launched from the Caspian last October
against ISIS/ISIL/Daesh traversing Iranian
airspace.
In both
Syria and Iraq, the Russia-China strategic
partnership - as well as Iran - shares the same
basic objectives; support for the governments in
both Damascus and Baghdad; containment of NATO;
and the overall fight against Salafi-jihadism.
The same applies to Afghanistan; Iran – and the
SCO – will do what it takes to prevent
Afghanistan from being a perennial jihadist
platform.
And in
the ‘Pipelineistan’ domain, Iran’s relations
with Pakistan tend to stabilize; after all
Islamabad badly needs the Iran-Pakistan (IP)
pipeline, which will eventually become IPI
(reaching India, with which Iran has excellent
relations).
And
that brings us back once again to the ultimate
confrontation; the vicious proxy war between
Tehran and the (collapsing) House of Saud on
multiple theaters, from “Syraq”, Bahrain and
Yemen to the oil market.
Everything is irreconcilable here. Wahhabism
(spawning Salafi-jihadism) against Shi’ism. A
tribal, dynastic, corrupt monarchy against a
republic born out of a popular revolution. The
weaponized American umbrella over the Persian
Gulf against activist anti-imperialism.
Xi
Jinping’s Middle East trip cannot possibly work
as a messianic cure. The strategic relationship
that matters is Beijing-Tehran – from the energy
sphere to Eurasia integration via One Belt, One
Road. But Beijing also needs Saudi oil.
Warrior
prince Mohammed bin Sultan – who’s actually
running the show in Riyadh - is thinking of
selling Aramco. Why not offer it to Beijing? But
be prepared to be paid in yuan. And all the oil
goes to China. Talk about a New Silk Road offer
one can’t refuse.