So Why Did Turkey Shoot Down That Russian
Plane?By Conn Hallinan
December 11, 2015 "Information
Clearing House" - "FPIF"
- Why did Turkey shoot down that Russian warplane?
It was certainly not because the SU-24 posed
any threat. The plane is old and slow, and the Russians were
careful not to arm it with anti-aircraft missiles. And it wasn’t
because the Turks are quick on the trigger, either. Three years
ago, Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan emphatically declared that a “short-term violation
of airspace can never be a pretext for an attack.” There are
even
some doubts about whether the Russian plane ever crossed
into Turkey’s airspace at all.
Indeed, the whole November 24 incident looks
increasingly suspicious, and one doesn’t have to be a paranoid
Russian to think the takedown might have been an ambush. As
retired Lt. Gen. Tom McInerney, former U.S. Air Force chief of
staff,
told Fox News, “This airplane was not making any maneuvers
to attack the [Turkish] territory.” He called the Turkish action
“overly aggressive” and concluded that the incident “had to be
preplanned.”
It certainly puzzled the
Israeli military, not known for taking a casual approach to
military intrusions. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon told
the press on November 29 that a Russian warplane had violated
the Israeli border over the Golan Heights. “Russian planes do
not intend to attack us, which is why we must not automatically
react and shoot them down when an error occurs.”
So why was the plane downed?
Perhaps because, for the first time in four
years, some major players are tentatively inching toward a
settlement of the catastrophic Syrian civil war, and powerful
forces are maneuvering to torpedo that process. If the Russians
hadn’t kept their
cool, several nuclear-armed powers could well have found
themselves in a scary faceoff, and any thoughts of ending the
war would have gone a-glimmering.
A Short Score Card
There are multiple actors on the Syrian stage
— and a bewildering number of crosscurrents and competing
agendas that, paradoxically, make it both easier and harder to
find common ground. Easier, because there is no unified position
among the antagonists; harder, because trying to herd heavily
armed cats is a tricky business.
A short score card on the players:
The Russians and the Iranians are supporting
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and fighting a host of
extremist organizations ranging from al-Qaeda to the Islamic
State, or ISIS. But each country has a different view of what a
post-civil war Syria might look like. The Russians want a
centralized and secular state with a big army. The Iranians
don’t think much of “secular,” and they favor
militias, not armies.
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and most the
other Gulf monarchies are trying to overthrow the Assad regime,
and are the major supporters of the groups Russia, Iran, and
Lebanon’s Hezbollah are fighting. But while Turkey and Qatar
want to replace Assad with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi
Arabia might just hate the Brotherhood more than it does Assad.
And while the monarchies are not overly concerned with the
Kurds, Turkey is
bombing them, and they’re a major reason why Ankara is so
deeply enmeshed in Syria.
The U.S., France, and the United Kingdom are
also trying to overthrow Assad, but are currently focused on
fighting ISIS using the Kurds as their major allies —
specifically the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party, an offshoot of
the Turkish Kurdish Workers Party that the U.S. officially
designates as “terrorist.” These are the same Kurds that the
Turks are bombing and who have a friendly alliance with the
Russians.
Indeed, Turkey may discover that one of the
price tags for shooting down that SU-24 is the sudden appearance
of new Russian weapons for the Kurds, some of which will be
aimed at the Turks.
A Suspension of Rational Thought
The Syrian war requires a certain suspension
of rational thought.
For instance, the Americans are unhappy with
the Russians for bombing the anti-Assad Army of Conquest, a
rebel alliance dominated by the Nusra Front, al-Qaeda’s
franchise in Syria. That would be the same al-Qaeda that brought
down the World Trade Center towers and that the U.S. is
currently bombing in Yemen, Somalia, and Afghanistan.
Suspension of rational thought is not limited
to Syria.
A number of Arab countries initially joined
the U.S. air war against the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, because
both organizations are pledged to overthrow the Gulf monarchies.
But Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar
have now
dropped out to concentrate their air power on bombing the
Houthis in Yemen.
The Houthis, however, are by far the most
effective force fighting ISIS and al-Qaeda in Yemen. Both
extremist organizations have made major gains in the last few
weeks because the Houthis are too busy defending themselves to
take them on.
Moves Toward a Settlement
In spite of all this political derangement,
however, there are several developments that are pushing the
sides toward some kind of peaceful settlement that doesn’t
involve regime change in Syria. That is exactly what the Turks
and the Gulf monarchs are worried about, and a major reason why
Ankara shot down that Russian plane.
The first of these developments has been
building throughout the summer: a growing flood of Syrians
fleeing the war. There are already almost 2 million in Turkey,
over a million each in Jordan and Lebanon, and as many as
900,000 in Europe. Out of 23 million Syrians, some 11 million
have been displaced by the war, and the Europeans are worried
that many of those 11 million people will end up camping out on
the banks of the Seine and the Ruhr. If the war continues into
next year, that’s an entirely plausible prediction.
Hence, the Europeans have quietly
shelved their demand that Assad resign as a prerequisite for
a ceasefire and are leaning on the
Americans to follow suit. The issue is hardly resolved, but
there seems to be general agreement that Assad will at least be
part of a transition government. At this point, the Russians and
Iranians are insisting on an
election in which Assad would be a candidate because both
are wary of anything that looks like “regime change.” The role
Assad might play will be a sticking point, but probably not an
insurmountable one.
Turkey and Saudi Arabia are adamant that Assad
must go, but neither of them is in the
driver’s seat these days. While NATO supported Turkey in the
Russian plane incident, according to some of the Turkish press,
many of its leading officials consider Erdogan a
loose cannon. And Saudi Arabia — whose economy has been hard
hit by the worldwide fall in oil prices — is preoccupied by its
Yemen war, which is turning into a very expensive quagmire.
Russia’s Role
The second development is the Russian
intervention, which appears to have
changed things on the ground, at least in the north, where
Assad’s forces were being hard pressed by the Army of Conquest.
New weapons and airpower have dented a rebel offensive and
resulted in some gains in the government’s battle for Syria’s
largest city, Aleppo.
Russian bombing also took a heavy toll on the
Turkmen insurgents in the Bayir-Bucak region, the border
area that Turkey has used to
infiltrate arms, supplies, and insurgents into Syria.
The appearance of the Russians essentially
killed Turkey’s efforts to create a “no fly zone” on its border
with Syria, a proposal that the U.S. has never been
enthusiastic about. Washington’s major allies, the Kurds,
are strongly opposed to a no fly zone because they see it as
part of Ankara’s efforts to keep the Kurds from forming an
autonomous region in Syria.
The Bayir-Bucak area and the city of Jarabulus
are also the exit point for Turkey’s lucrative oil smuggling
operation, apparently overseen by one of Erdogan’s sons, Bilal.
The Russians have embarrassed the Turks by publishing
satellite photos showing miles of tanker trucks picking up
oil from ISIS-controlled wells and shipping it through Turkey’s
southern border with Syria.
“The oil controlled by the Islamic State
militants enters Turkish territory on an industrial scale,”
Russian President Vladimir Putin
said November 30. “We have every reason to believe that the
decision to down our plane was guided by a desire to ensure the
security of this oil’s delivery routes to ports.”
Erdogan and NATO
Erdogan didn’t get quite the response he
wanted from NATO following the shooting down of the SU-24. While
the military alliance backed Turkey’s defense of its
“sovereignty,” NATO then called for a peaceful resolution and
de-escalation of the whole matter.
At a time when Europe needs a solution to the
refugee crisis — and wants to focus its firepower on the
organization that killed 130 people in Paris — NATO cannot be
happy that the Turks are dragging them into a confrontation with
the Russians, making the whole situation a lot more dangerous
than it was before the November 24 incident.
The Russians have now deployed their more
modern SU-34 bombers and armed them with
air-to-air missiles. The bombers will now also be escorted
by SU-35 fighters. The Russians have also fielded S-300 and
S-400
anti-aircraft systems, the latter with a range of 250 miles.
The Russians say they’re not looking for trouble, but they’re
loaded for bear should it happen.
Would a dustup between Turkish and Russian
planes bring NATO — and four nuclear armed nations — into a
confrontation? That possibility ought to keep people up at
night.
Coming to the Table
Sometime around the New Year, the countries
involved in the Syrian civil war will come together in Geneva. A
number of those will do their level best to derail the talks,
but one hopes there are enough sane — and desperate — parties on
hand to map out a political solution.
It won’t be easy, and who gets to sit at the
table has yet to be decided. The Turks will object to the Kurds;
the Russians, Iranians, and Kurds will object to the Army of
Conquest; and the Saudis will object to Assad. In the end it
could all come apart. It’s not hard to torpedo a peace plan in
the Middle East.
But if the problems are great, failure will be
catastrophic. That may be the glue that keeps the parties
together long enough to hammer out a ceasefire, an arms embargo,
a new constitution, and internationally supervised elections.