December 09, 2015 "Information
Clearing House" -
The Guardian today has a huge story
based on a 'masterplan' text I leaked to the paper entitled
'Principles in the Administration of the Islamic State'. The
text- likely written at some point between June and October
2014- concerns a variety of aspects of administration,
including management of oil resources, composition of
military ranks and propaganda. You can read the whole text,
which I translated,
here.
The sign-off notably says that admin
cadres are to receive instruction in administration
according to the text. The question then arises of how far
the Islamic State is actually following this administrative
plan. Here are a few thoughts of my own:
1. The text calls for breaking down the
differences between muhajireen (foreign fighters) and ansar
(local Iraqis and Syrians) by integrating them together in
the military ranks, uniformly accepting a fundamentally
Arabic and Islamic character to their identity of
affiliation with the Caliphate alone. In the pre-Caliphate
era, one will have noted the existence of foreign fighter
battalions for what was then ISIS fundamentally based around
single nationalities and ethnicities, such as Katiba al-Battar
al-Libi (Libyan while attracting some Europeans of Maghrebi
and north African origin) and the
Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi Battalion (Gazan). However, since
the Caliphate declaration, these battalions have generally
dropped off the radar of social media, and as
colleague Michael Weiss was able to establish in an
interview with an Islamic State defector, the Katiba al-Battar
al-Libi was in fact disbanded for precisely these reasons of
discouraging affiliations on ethnicity, which of course may
give rise to loyalties beyond those owed to the Caliph.
2. Distinctions are made as to who
must/need not be affiliated with the Islamic State in the
oil and gas industries: while the oil and gas fields are
themselves owned by the Islamic State and anyone who makes a
direct investment in them must have an allegiance to the
Caliph, those who wish to purchase the crude substance from
the fields and then refine/transport/deal in the products,
inside or outside the territory of the Caliphate, need not
have this allegiance. Therefore, refiners, truckers and
those who sell to civilians are not necessarily affiliated
with the Islamic State, and the ultimate sale of oil to
outside actors such as the territories of the rebels and the
Assad regime, even though they are enemies of the Islamic
State, is officially sanctioned and allowed. All of this has
been well established and corroborated in reporting.
3. The text sanctions co-optation of
personnel who worked under prior governments as a means to
run projects under the Islamic State. In other words, when
the Islamic State claims to provide services under its Diwan
al-Khidamat, the personnel running the projects are often
the same people who worked in the services offices of prior
systems. This is particularly true of Iraq-controlled
territories of the Islamic State, such as Mosul, where
municipal office employees are working under Diwan al-Khidamat.
Internal documents show an established pattern of compelling
such personnel to
return to work under threat of confiscating property.
Compare also with the
threats to confiscate property of medical personnel who
leave Islamic State territory and will not work under its
Diwan al-Siha.
4. The section on media is particularly
interesting with regards to auxiliary media outlets. In
analysis of Islamic State propaganda, one notes the
existence of as shadowy 'Amaq News agency, which ostensibly
uses more neutral language in its reports on Islamic State
operations: e.g. "muqatilun" ('fighters') rather than "mujahidun".
Further, while 'Amaq News covers military operations against
external enemies and aspects of life under the Islamic
State, it does not cover implementation of hudud punishments
like cutting hands of thieves, or internal security
operations featuring execution of spies. This exactly
mirrors the plans outlined here.
In the name of God, the compassionate, the
merciful:
“No, by your Lord, they will not believe until
they have you rule over them in what they have disagreed and find in
themselves from what you have judged and willingly submit.”
Principles in the administration of the
Islamic State – 1435AH [2103-2014]
Introduction
In the name of God, the compassionate, the
merciful
As for what follows:
After 50 years of jihad whose sides have fallen
prostrate in the totality of the land, and the states gathered
against the centres of the Sunni jihad in the world, God ennobled
his true soldiers whom he selected to establish the caliphate state
whose fortresses had fallen at the hands of global Zionism in
al-Astana [Istanbul] 100 years ago. [Note: This is a reference to
the end of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924].
Indeed the establishment of the Islamic State, its
concept does not stand on the basis of a mujahid soldier fighting
and bearing his arms, nor does it rest on da’wa [evangelising] in a
mosque or a street, but rather it is a comprehensive system
requiring the leaders of the ummah [Muslim nation] to realise its
concepts.
So on the expansion of the Islamic State, the
state requires an Islamic system of life, a Qur’anic constitution
and a system to implement it, and there must not be suppression of
the role of qualifications, skills of expertise and the training of
the current generation on administering the state.
From the start of the uprising of blessed
Syria against the Nusayris [derogatory for Alawites], the
mujahideen came in great numbers out of zeal for their religion. But
some of them harboured Arab nationalist and tribalist arrogance, and
others a zeal and will without shari’a aims.
But it was inevitable that there would be an
organisation of these numbers and their principles as a shari’i
[Islamically legitimate] organisation accepting the current reality
that the world marshalled against it from its soldiers and
intelligence services.
And from then there would be the confrontation of
altering the principles and selling out to which the first
mujahideen [fighters] did not show deference in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Chechnya and elsewhere.
And from then there would be the cultivation of
educational and societal change with which the muhajireen
[immigrants] co-existed and organisation of their ranks with the
ansar [natives] – the people of the land.
And there were many challenges and difficulties
that one would have to deal with according to its establishment and
according to its special ideological programme, and one must deal
with each one of them on an individual basis.
Chapter one
Announcement of the Islamic Caliphate
The announcement of the renewal of the caliphate
in Iraq in the year 1427AH [2006] was the arbiter between division
and separation as well as the glory of the Muslims. That year was
tantamount to the hemiplegia for the idolatrous west that began
preparing equipment and projects to strike any project of the
Islamic State, and the announcement of the caliphate.
And the announcement of the caliphate was the
result of the mujahideen’s realising the lack of advantage in
fighting against the idolaters without the existence of a leader and
caliph who could gather the Muslims under his banner and be a figure
of strength for them.
America and its allies were able to destroy the
caliphate project [ie the Islamic State of Iraq] to a great extent
in Iraq after they established the Sunni Iraqi Sahwa forces [Sunni
Awakening tribal forces that fought the Islamic State of Iraq] and
struck the Sunni nursemaid [ie basis of Sunni support for the
Islamic State of Iraq], by portraying it as a treacherous terrorist
state of hypocritical political projects, with great marshalling of
the media to accomplish that. The deeds of the soldiers of the state
thus became limited to security operations to strike American
targets and their allies.
After the arising of the blessed uprising of
Syria, the Islamic State had a great role in striking the Nusayris
in it and destroying the pillars of the rule of Assad in the heart
of the command centres.
And it has therefore been the case that the lesson
to be learned from the prior leaders of the state is the way to
benefit from prior mistakes, and the means to preserve the
revolutionaries of Syria on the jihadi trend while not moulding them
in a western framework which that western support brings.
And in the second chapter is a statement on the
administration of the muhajir (foreign) mujahid in particular and
developing the creed of the Islamic State among the ansar in Syria.
The announcement of the caliphate in Syria was a
powerful blow that the agents of the west who were set on the
direction of the Sahwat of Iraq by whom the west thought that it
could put an end to the Islamic caliphate project as it had weakened
it in Iraq did not expect.
There were new modified problems that the
leadership of the state was able to deal with, among them [Abu
Muhammad] al-Joulani, [Note: the leader of al-Qaida in Syria
formerly of Islamic State]
announcement of his rejection of joining the Islamic State
despite his allegiance to the caliph in Iraq, and in that he was
trying to split the ranks and sabotage the project in subordination
to his personal agendas bound with regional states, and his
rejection was a confrontation for the Islamic project that God gave
victory to despite the multitude of those discouraged and the
callers to humiliation and servitude.
And the one who witnesses the events of Syria sees
how God has given might to the Islamic State and lowered Joulani and
those with him.
Chapter two
Organisation of the individual and group
With the entry of the second year of the uprising
of Syria, the Shia militias of various nationalities entered Syria
to fight at the side of the Nusayri-Rafidite [Assad] regime which
flaunted its crimes with regards to the Sunnis, which led to a
global Islamic uprising represented in the hijra [migration] of
thousands of Muslim youths to fight in the rank of the Sunnis from
the various regions of the land.
Thousands migrated to Syria to fight alongside the
mujahideen, without their knowing the direction of any faction, its
affiliation or private agendas.
It was necessary to prepare a sound programme in
which the muhajireen might take refuge as their jihad is the result
of the glory to Islam and the monotheists.
So the announcement of the caliphate was the
obligation that gathers those arriving in the land of jihad,
strengthens their hearts – and through it their minds are set – and
gathers them over the difference of their colours under one banner,
one word and one caliph
The majority of the first muhajireen came from the
Gulf states and the Arabic Maghreb whose zeal for their religion
urged them on, and among them were those with zeal for their Arab
Sunni brothers without religious jihadist inhibition, and without
there being for them prior expertise in global jihadi organisations.
After them was hijra [migration] from the states
of the world after the announcement of the caliphate, as no
disbelieving state has remained which hasn’t also suffered from the
hijra [migration] of its youth to support the Islamic State which
the soldiers of Joulani and the apostate Sahwa forces from the Free
[Syrian] Army and others besides them rejected.
And after that, Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
ordered to establish a first camp which included the new muhajireen
[immigrants] who had no deeply ingrained expertise and creed, near
the prior borders for the Sykes-Picot “Iraq-Syria” lines.
And the camp included the organisation of the
muhajir [immigrant] individual in the Islamic State and laying aside
local tribalism and ignorance before him, and making his affiliation
to the religion alone and under one banner.
And the camp included nurturing the spirit of the
brothers between the muhajireen and the ansar through laying aside
the prior identity for the muhajir, and making him a resident in the
Islamic State with his family without feelings of estrangement or
distinguishing between him and his brothers from the muhajireen and
the ansar.
And without Islam it is not possible for this
change to be included which encountered difficulty in the beginning
on account of place affiliation that the mujahideen felt on the day
of their fight with the Free Army Sahwa and inclinations of
nationalism and ethnic division which was making the muhajir lose
his zeal to fight alongside them.
And there resulted from the camp the formation of
joint fighting groups between the muhajireen and the ansar
established on the basis of the leadership of the individual most
capable of bearing responsibility, having prior expertise and the
military and sharia [law] tests of the camp.
And there also resulted from the camp the
formation of groups composed of the muhajireen from the western
states in particular in view of the difficulty of linguistic
communication in the beginning and launch stage and in view of the
mutual understanding and precedence of coordination between some of
the muhajireen from Chechnya and France to fight in single cells
without the existence of any distinction for members from those
besides them [ie there was no differential treatment on the basis of
ethnic identity].
And it was inevitable that Arabic character should
precede over the character of the muhajireen, for the language of
the Qur’an is Arabic, and the prophetic hadiths [sayings] are in
Arabic and the customs of Islamic society were Arabic in great part,
and in view of the nature of the local society of the peoples of
Syria it was inevitable that Arabic character should be cultivated
in the language and religious culture in the muhajireen and laying
aside the foreign identity that bears in its hidden nature hostility
to Islam, its culture and its roots.
For unifying the life of the mujahid and his
language and culture is the guarantor for unifying the rank of the
mujahideen and realising their total belonging in the Islamic State
that includes muhajireen from every corner of the earth.
Chapter three
Administration of the camps
The preparatory camp is the first home and school
of the mujahid in which his military and jihadi training sessions
take place and he undergoes sufficient education in matters of his
religion, life and jihad.
And according to the plans of the Islamic State to
nurture the caliphate generation, the camps are divided into three
types:
1. Continuation camps
And these are special camps for the mujahideen who
lead in the jihad and those who are masters of expertise in managing
and planning the battle in beginning and end. And the camp includes
physical preparation for 15 days. And that is in a training session
every year, and the mujahid through that camp comes upon the latest
arts of using weapons, military planning and military technologies
currently put forth in battles and weapons whose use by the enemy
are anticipated, along with detailed commentary on the technologies
of enemy use of the weapons, areas of their use, their strength and
how the soldiers of the state can take advantage of them.
2. First preparation camps
For the mujahid on the day he joins the Islamic
State, whether as a muhajir or from the ansar: and the camp includes
sharia sessions through which the mujahid studies the fiqh
[jurisprudence] of the rulings, Islamic doctrine, al-wala’ and
al-bara’ [loyalty and disavowal], in addition to the arts of
fighting and the arts of using weapons, with screening of every
mujahid in a specialty in which he excels and completing his camp
according to his skill in specific weapons.
3. Preparation camp for children
The camp includes sharia sessions in fiqh of
doctrine and rulings, with special sessions in Islamic society and
manners, and training on bearing light arms and the principles of
use.
Outstanding individuals are selected from them for
security portfolio assignments, including checkpoints, patrols and
the various Amniyat units [internal security units].
And the camps administration is responsible for
planning, aims and results, and as the results of the camp should be
in alignment with the aims and principles of the Islamic State, it
has been necessary to establish a centre for the administration of
the camps whose tasks are as follows:
1. Preparing special sharia sessions in the camps
in coordination with the al-Buhuth and al-Eftaa [fatwa – legal
opinion] committee.
2. Preparing educational programmes to teach the
Arabic language and recitation of the Qur’an in coordination with
the Diwan al-Ta’aleem [department of education] for every province.
3. Preparing military programmes teaching the
types of weapons and military tactics with the supervision of the
military commander in every province.
4. Studying expenditures and allowances for every
camp whose study and analysis are to be completed by the military
leader or wali [governor] of every area according to the needs
connected with every wilaya [province] and submitting the study to
the wali.
5. Overseeing the selection of the educational and
training staff in the camp.
6. Putting in place detailed planning and
programmes on the course of the battle.
7. Tracking the supervision of the camp according
to the defined programmes.
8. Assessing the camp session and raising a report
to the officials concerning the readiness of the session after the
camp.
Chapter four
Direction administration
The mujahid [soldier] remains in need of direction
and tracking after his completion of the special training session
for him, for spiritual direction is the foundation of his success in
every matter he undertakes and the mujahid’s direction in every
stage will consist of reminding him of the aims of the Islamic State
and hadiths [prophetic sayings] on the virtue of the mujahid and
persevering and continuing despite the difficulty of the path of
jihad.
1. Direction before the battle
And here the military commander for the mission or
the sharia official accompanying him should undertake it, and the
direction should be a little before the launching of the mujahid to
battle through mentioning hadiths on the virtue of jihad and
endurance on encountering the enemy as well as following the
decisions and instructions of the field commander during the battle,
along with the virtue of martyrdom in the path of God to raise the
banner of Islam and the caliphate and the virtue of the one struck
with wounds in the land of the battle. All this should be done
during the readying and preparation for the battle. And the director
oversees the mujahideen in all their moments until their absence
from him in the battle.
And the director should not be discouraged, having
doubts, hesitating or cowardly because he is the example that the
mujahid summons whenever the furnace of the battle flares up.
2. Direction after the battle:
In the event of victory, the director summons what
came from the Prophet from sayings on the virtue of the mujahid and
their feelings that what they have accomplished aspires to be in the
service of their religion and creed, with their being reminded to
embrace the instructions coming from the battle leadership from the
rulings of spoils and not adopting any decision to plunder the
wealth of the people except by its rights and by explicit order from
the commander responsible.
In the event of being broken, the direction should
be on patience, reckoning and steadfastness on meeting the enemy
while not heeding those having doubts and those who spread rumour
and terror in the ranks of the soldiers.
3. Lasting direction:
Remaining on activity and steadfastness with the
mujahid in all his states and lessons in al-wala and al-bara
[loyalty and disavowal] as well as fiqh, Islamic creed and listening
to and obeying the amir [leader].
The staff of direction in every province should be
from the cream of the crop of free sharia and military officials who
have the ability to argue, convince and encourage as well as from
the soldiers around whom the group have congregated and should be
possessors of confidence among them.
Chapter five
Organisation of the provinces
The Sykes-Picot agreement and after them the
indirect rule of the west over the states of Islam tried to place
administrative borders drawing social,
madhhabist and ethnic differences in every region, and deepening
the roots of the differences between the Sunni Muslims.
Thus the distinction of the Sunnis from the Shia
in the provinces of Iraq and oversight of the centres of
administration in every Sunni region, and even the appointment of
officials in the Sunnis’ regions from the filth of the Rafidites
have been clear, while the regions have been entrusted under the
rule of [their own] Kurdish and Shia sects independent in
decision-making from the ruling presidency as we have seen in Kirkuk
and Irbil and in even smaller regions including from them in the
cursed Najaf and Karbala and that have enjoyed “religious”
administrative independence, unannounced.
All those divisions have also forbidden the Sunnis
from the simplest of their rights while making the Nusayris masters
of the sea, and the Shia in Iraq the kings of oil and the merchant
pathways, and the Yazidi Kurds the sheikhs of the mountains while
the Druze have become masters over the mountains overseeing Israel.
All that has not merely been a coincidence, but it
was a dirty political decision in order to implement a tightening
stranglehold on the Sunnis and make them the most remote people and
strip them of all assets for advancement or thinking of a
rightly-guided Islamic State.
If we were to see today the borders of the Islamic
State and the borders of the Sunnis regions, we would see them torn
apart, besieged and persecuted, for there are the Shia from the
south of Iraq, the Nusayris from the west of Syria and the communist
Kurdish parties to their north, and the Druze to their south.
So it is no surprise that today we see the
bloodshed flowing in the land of Syria and Iraq.
So it has been from the law and sound mind to
redraw the borders of the provinces and give lengthy consideration
to every development that occurs in the region. Thus we protect the
power of the Sunnis and strengthen its expansion and focal points,
and then special teams can be deployed for fundamental change in the
structuring of the regions that are subject to the rule of the
Islamic State.
And that was what the companions [of the Prophet
Muhammad] and after them the caliphs pursued against every heretic
community: that is, dispersing their groupings so there no longer
remained any impeding opinion, strength or ability, and the Muslim
alone remains the master of the state and decision-making and no one
is in conflict with him.
And in what there is no doubt is the fact that
among the assets of the ummah [Islamic nation] are: its wealth, the
nature of its land, its inhabitants and its water. And in everything
is distinction:
1. Wealth of the state
It is the principal component and source of
financing for all internal and external operations, and the
existence of secure financial resources whose value does not change
in every time and place is a must – and the need of the people for
them should be clear with the nations unable to do without them
despite the existence of the impediments that prevent their use and
purchase from the land of the state.
This includes oil and gas and what the land
possesses including gold as currency that does not deteriorate or
decline, as well as trade routes from which they have no wealth and
all of it should be the intervention of the Islamic State as a
powerful side in all their plans and such that they cannot pretend
that it has no existence and might.
2. The nature of its land
The state cannot remain without the existence of
the land that allows for its continuation and expansion, for the
assets of the land are – the mountains, the agricultural lands, the
sea and the river – for these natural assets are what makes the
Islamic State acquire its importance and the importance of location,
and the agreement of the west in Sykes-Picot were established on the
basis of depriving the Sunnis from those assets, as the mountains
were granted to the Kurds, Druze and Alawites, while the sea was
granted to the Rafidites and Nusayris, while the river and what
surrounds it in investment for the Jews and the agricultural lands
under their administration.
And that was a new setback that was added to all
the ambitions in establishing the Islamic State and freeing it from
servitude of the filthy Nusayris and the disbelieving Rafidites
[Alawites and Shia]. When there is no asset for them the enemy have
been shut on their openings from every side.
3. The traitorous governments have tried to
mislead the Sunni peoples in every Arab land, as corrupt programmes
were introduced for them and there spread among them the love of
vice, bonds, bribery, usury and abandoning worship and forgetting
the rulings of jihad. So the Sunnis in Syria have lived in a new
ignorance after ignorance during the French occupation of their land
as there was the Alawite government that planted its vices in every
house, permitted the forbidden and made forbidden development and
civilisation.
But after the uprising undertaken by the Sunnis in
Iraq and Syria and their getting rid of the servitude to the tyrants
began the second plan that requires implementing the “demographic”
change in their regions and expelling the Sunnis from their areas,
for it has been what we saw in Fallujah, Aleppo, Homs, Tikrit and
other areas besides them from the regions of the Sunnis many of
whose people have suffered during their presence in their land.
Indeed they realise that the Islamic State cannot
renew the ummah’s blood without a human member capable of always
producing, and there was the alluring of the best of its youth and
plundering the land with hijra outside their areas and liquidating
many of them.
And today it is necessary to have a studied plan
that responds in kind and brings about like change in the profane
abode of disbelief, expelling its people and killing its people
until there is no base for them and the land is for God and his
servants.
And in turn implementing the plans that include
the return of the Muslim youth to their land and bringing together
the skills from the land of the Muslims, and the going out of the
state for specialised staff in their fields if they are not of those
of the pact in Islam [ie Jews and Christians].
Chapter six
Administration of wealth
Indeed the might of the Islamic State can only be
through its being free entirely from all bonds of tyranny that the
west possesses as means of leverage against it, and it moves them
according to its need and whim based on knowing from it the need of
the mujahideen for support, wealth and weapons.
Jihadi groups in Iraq and Syria have lived through
long bonds of humiliation pledged on conditional western support,
until they seized wide areas of the land and possessed all assets of
advancement.
And all of that is on account of the ignorant
administration that controls them and keeps them under western
guardianship for all their activities, wars and expansion.
Indeed the Islamic State’s seizure of vast areas
includes all assets of advancement that does not suffice without the
existence of an administration managing the interests and managing
the crises. So it is necessary for a plan to be put in place
including the might of the state and its independence as we specify
in the following points:
- Preserving the capabilities [personnel and
infrastructure] that managed the production projects under the prior
governments, whilst taking into account the need to place strict
oversights and an administration affiliated with the Islamic State.
- Placing specialists in accounting and oversight
over all production directorates in the Islamic State including
establishments of oil, gas, archaeological areas and factories for
manufacturing and production.
- Preserving additional reserves that ensure the
continuation of operation in one successive arrangement in all
circumstances.
- Regulating expenses through a comprehensive
administration including collective expenses and collective
production without singling out a province or group by provision of
estimates exceeding their needs in normal circumstances.
- Establishing factories for local military and
food production and independence from the monopoly of arms dealers
for materials of necessity and cutting them off in the event of
contravening the interests.
- Realising local needs and providing for them
within the borders of the state in isolated safe zones and
connecting trade routes inside the state through principal centres
and beneficiary wings.
- Reducing excess expenditure through the
administration of the province; it must operate independently and be
able to take its own decisions in matters concerning the province.
- Relying on external business as a principal
source of income through the openings of the state to the other side
without an intermediary. Direct exchange has better guarantees than
the monopoly of the intermediary for business transactions and means
of connection.
Chapter seven
Administration of the projects
In parallel with military preparation in the lines
of fighting and the camps, a committee is to be put in place to
administer production projects and put in place plans to implement
new investment projects.
The one who invests in the lands of the state is
to be given comprehensive protection according to the agreement that
arises with the observance of the interests of the Islamic State in
production, exporting and prices.
The independence of the investor from the
administration of the province is a more preferred means for the
administration of the wealth, increasing local production and
improving the capability of the producing material, and regulating
the time and expenditure. And it will [also] be a better guarantee
against losses resulting from any sizeable investment project.
For the independent foundation is outside the
limits of liability that arise for those projects that are
affiliated with a province of the Islamic State.
And it is not right for the investor according to
the law, to hand over the production to those who have no right to
it and they [those who have the right to it] are the ones determined
in an agreement by the administration that is entrusted over the
project and overseeing its organisation by the province in which the
project is established.
And such an agreement is stipulated on determining
the beneficiaries and the means of profit with the guarantee of the
[Islamic] State to convey the products internally to the borders of
the Islamic State without exposing them to any risk.
And it is not allowed to invest in the following
projects:
1. Oil products
It is not allowed for a person who has no pledge
of allegiance on his neck to the caliph to invest in an oil or gas
field or what has arisen from their trajectory, but it is allowed
besides that to produce derivatives after buying the crude products
from the fields of the Islamic State, just as it is allowed to sell
and deal in them inside and outside the state.
2. Gold and antiquities
It is not allowed to excavate for gold and
antiquities except by expressed agreement from the resources
department, and all transferred and stored materials will be
confiscated for the interest of the treasury.
And it is allowed to deal in gold not excavated
from the ground according to the well-known aharia frameworks with
immediate effect.
3. Weapons
It is forbidden to establish factories to produce
weapons and materials particular to them without granting of any
explicit permits for the situation, just as it is forbidden to
establish shops to sell public weapons besides personal weapons and
deal in them without prior knowledge and agreement from the
responsible military amir in the wilaya.
As for the other principal goods that also come
under the crux of people’s lives, the officials must know about all
means of operation and production like dealing in water, flour and
livestock.
Chapter eight
Administration of education
Education is the foundation upon which Islamic
society is built, and it is the division that makes the Muslims
differ in their lives from the rest of the paths of disbelief.
The previous Ba’athist and Shia governments tried
to deviate the Muslim generation from their path through their
educational programmes that concord with their governments and
political whims.
The programmes focused on glorifying the ruling
authorities and discarding differences between sects, stripping
Sunnis of their identity.
And among the most important of their goals were:
1. Focusing on glorifying and eternalising the
leaders and taking refuge in God and inserting them into hidden
shirk [idolatry] through immortalising ephemeral, temporary
personalities.
2. Spreading the aims of their parties and their
ideas whilst distancing the nurtured from Islamic thought, because
the ruling party considers itself the pulse of society and the
symbol of its endurance, while Islamic principles are for the mosque
only and between man and his Lord with severe proceedings against
all those who tried to do away with party thinking or modify it.
3. Discarding the difference with the disbelieving
sects, and considering co-existence with them as the true societal
bond that the ummah must operate in accordance with in order to
preserve its goals, while in reality protection is implemented for
the rights of all the communities of disbelief while oppressing the
Sunnis and their principles.
4. Spreading the culture of moral dissolution by
promoting it through expressions of civilisation and exchanges of
cultures with the west.
And thus it was that the ummah entered into
labyrinths of confusion that made it forget its glory, its strength
and its past, while the prior Islamic caliphates were portrayed as
being a foreign occupation that arose on the basis of ignorance and
the decline of the ummah and nationalism.
- And among the aims of the Islamic programme in
the Islamic State:
1. Implanting Islamic values in society as well as
sound, sharia-based societal manners and customs.
2. Correcting the erroneous narrations that the
prior programmes had implanted about the prior caliphs and imams.
3. Developing Islamic society on the basis of
manners and on sharia.
4. Raising a knowledgeable Islamic generation
capable of bearing the ummah and its future without needing the
expertises of the west.
So it is also that the Islamic school is one of
the houses of worship, whose aims are confined to acquiring
knowledge also, but also it is an educational nurturing ground that
raises the individual with comprehensive development of mind and
body.
And in it there should be training facilities for
mind, body and vocation, as successful programmes cannot rely on
what is written between the lines, without practical training on all
given subjects.
Also it is the case that the interest in the
Arabic language and its use in daily life for the individual is an
important matter in the Islamic State as is distancing from vulgar
expressions that were put forward in society in a well-considered
plan to guarantee the forgetting of the Islamic identity for
society.
Chapter nine
Administration of relations
External relations are the first foundation for
building every nascent state, and they are among the foundations
that show the strength and might of the state. They should
constitute for it a general stance in everything that happens in the
world with the people of Islam and be for it an external hand
protecting its dealings.
And the Prophet (peace be upon him) was considered
the master of the global Islamic message; it was necessary for him
to be acquainted with what was happening around him in the
neighbouring states, and knowing their latest affairs and thus
inviting them to Islam. And indeed the messenger (God’s peace and
blessings be upon him and his family) established his proficiency
and skill in external movements through viewing at a distance and
personifying the just of the just, and appropriate evaluation of
matters as well as outstanding ability in the operation of
recruiting to Islam.
Indeed external relations are key to knowing the
international politics surrounding the Islamic State, and alliances
should be as a guarantee of force and leverage that the Islamic
leadership can use in all its matters with the external world.
According to sharia politics, the leadership is
not allowed to adopt decisions to ally with a state or implement an
agreement with it if that violates sharia politics, as agreed on by
the majority of ulama [religious scholars] and symbols of jihad. So
indeed every agreement must include the following:
1. The internal sovereignty of the Islamic State
and not allowing for other states to intervene in matters of Islamic
rule or the general politics of the Islamic State.
2. Protecting the borders of the Islamic State
from every mushrik [idolater], disbeliever, aggressor and even
friend, for no army or other force is allowed to enter the borders
of the Islamic State whatever the pretext.
3. A provision that the [Islamic] State should be
witness to good treatment of Muslims in its lands and mutual
affection with Muslims in other areas of the world, and that it is
not allowed to deal with another state that has a history of
hostility to Islam’s spread, the building of mosques and oppression
of Muslims in its lands.
4. A provision that the agreement should first be
in the interest of the Muslims, not in the interest of the
disbelievers.
5. That the agreement should not include any
future provisions touching on the freedom and sovereignty of the
Muslim state, and no bonds of debt or conditions of harmful
exploitation even if in the future with regards to the matters of
the state.
6. That there should be for the Muslims their
rights and freedoms within the state that is to enter into an
agreement with us.
7. That all points of the agreement should be
clear to the imam [the caliph] and those with him.
And in the event of the nullification of any one
of the conditions or lack of their provision, it is not allowed for
the imam to enter the ummah and the Muslims into dubious bonds that
oppress the ummah and the fate of its development.
Chapter ten
Administration of media
Indeed everything that I have previously mentioned
constitutes practical steps on the ground and [so] there must be a
principal means to promote them that should be comprehensive. All of
its ideas and activities should be advertised in the interest of the
aforementioned practical steps. That will not be realised without
media foundations that are branched out and comprehensive in
operation within one administration and background.
So there should be one media foundation branched
out within multiple pockets according to the following outline:
1. The Base Foundation:
To be directly affiliated with the Diwan al-Khilafa
[office of the caliph] or Majlis al-Shura [advisory council] of
whoever so represents them, and the official for it should be
connected by his relations with the military commander, [chief]
security official and the caliph himself. The office will put
implement the main media principles and tasks and it should be
supervising the distribution of the media offices in the provinces
and the media foundations that take a name and are independent from
the administration of the provinces [ie so-called auxiliary agencies
and foundations mentioned below].
And the Base Foundation defines the priorities of
publication and broadcasting as well as the media campaigns, just as
it directly supervises through a committee the activities of the
offices and undertakes inspection campaigns in the provinces and
activist places.
The foundation also sets the preparation of media
staff, their expenses and requirements and receives monthly reports
on the activities of every office.
2. The provincial media
And in every province there should be a media
office affiliated with the governor himself and in coordination with
the military and security official in its region, and its director
should be in direct contact with the media official in the Base
Foundation.
And among the offices’ tasks are covering the
military operations and their results, with issues concluding the
end of every great military operation or distinguished operations
for the soldiers of the state, as well as services’ facilities,
implementing sharia rulings and the course of life in the province.
Also the office should be interested in
implementing tasks of printing and distribution or supervising them
within the province.
3. Auxiliary agencies and foundations:
It is suggested that production foundations or
auxiliary agencies are established according to the mother office’s
needs and interests.
The auxiliary office specialises in tracking
military and services coverage in a province or number of provinces
without there being in the name of the foundation or its symbol
something to directly link it with the Islamic State.
The auxiliary foundations are not to be allowed to
cover security operations or implementations of [judicial] rulings.
These are general suggestions placed for you by
the poor slave of God, the servant of the Islamic State, in order to
be a lighthouse by which there is guidance, as well as general and
prompt systems of organisation.
And the administrative cadres will receive
training sessions on operating according to the following programme.
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