Neocons Launch 2016 Manifesto
By Jim Lobe
October 29, 2015 "Information
Clearing House" - A
mostly neoconservative group of national-security
analysts have published perhaps the first comprehensive
outline of what they believe a Republican foreign policy
should look like as of Inauguration Day 2017. It’s
titled
“Choosing to Lead: American Foreign Policy for a
Disordered World.” Although it concedes that “there
are limitations on American power,” according to the
book’s “Forward” by former George W. Bush speechwriter,
Peter Wehner, all of the
contributors
…understand, too, that with the
right leadership and policies in place, the United
States can once again be a guarantor of global order
and peace, a champion of human rights, and a beacon
of economic growth and human flourishing. There is
no reason the 21st century cannot be the
next American Century. …Choosing to
Lead offers perspectives and recommendations on how
to make the next American Century happen. In doing
so, we believe it will serve the world as well as
the United States of America. [Emphasis added.]
If you sense a rebirth of the
Project for the New American Century (PNAC), you’re
probably not far off, although
Bob Kagan and
Bill Kristol, who co-founded PNAC, are not among the
large number of contributors. PNAC published two
volumes, Present Dangers and Rebuilding
American Defenses, that together formed a neocon
manifesto for the Republican presidential candidate in
the 2000 election in which the organization initially
backed John McCain.
John Hay Initiative
The new compilation is the product of
the
John Hay Initiative, named after Theodore
Roosevelt’s chief diplomat, and brings together many of
the foreign-policy advisers to Mitt Romney’s 2012
presidential campaign. The Initiative is co-chaired by
Eliot Cohen (a charter member of PNAC), former
Romney adviser Brian Hook, and
Eric Edelman (who succeeded
Doug Feith as undersecretary of defense under George
W. Bush and has since served as co-founder and
director—with Kagan and Kristol—of PNAC’s lineal
descendant, the
Foreign Policy Initiative). The 200 “experts”
connected to the Initiative have reportedly advised
almost all of the 2016 Republican presidential
candidates.
The Initiative
has made no secret of its hope that a successful
Republican presidential candidate will appoint many of
its members to senior policy-making positions (much as
PNAC’s charter members, such as Dick Cheney, Donald
Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and
Elliott Abrams, were all rewarded with senior posts
under George W. Bush. Cohen positioned himself for an
appointment in that administration by writing the
perfectly timed book, Supreme Command, in the
run-up to the Iraq invasion about how the best wartime
presidents ignored the more cautious advice of their
generals. A faithful signer of PNAC’s letters, Cohen was
named counsel to Condoleezza Rice in Bush’s second term.
In a chapter entitled “Rebuilding
American Foreign Policy,” Cohen, Edelman, and Hook offer
the predictable Republican/neocon critique of current
U.S. foreign policy. They describe what they are against
and hint—albeit not explicitly—that maybe the Bush
administration may have made some mistakes.
U.S. foreign policy today is
failing every test that a great power’s foreign
policy can fail. Today, America’s enemies do not
fear the United States and America’s friends doubt
that they can trust it. Neither the American people
nor the world-at-large understands anymore either
the purposes of American power or even, in some
respects, the principles that shape them. Indeed,
after a decade and a half of conflict in the Middle
East and South Asia, some Americans have concluded
that the best thing to do is to pull back from the
world and its troubles. Some argue that America’s
role as guarantor of global order is no longer
necessary, history having ended with the Cold War;
there are also those who think the United States is
too clumsy and incompetent to do much of anything
right; and there are, finally, those who think that
“nation-building at home” is some kind of
alternative to engagement abroad.
We disagree. We believe that a
strong United States is essential to the maintenance
of the open global order under which this country
and the rest of the world have prospered since 1945;
that the alternative is not a self-regulating
machine of balancing states but a landscape marked
by eruptions of chaos and destruction. We
recognize the failures as well as the successes of
past policies, because to govern is to choose, and
to choose in the world as it is, is necessarily to
err. But while we believe that we must
understand those failures and learn from them, we
also believe that American power and influence has,
on the whole, served our country and the world far
better than American weakness and
introversion.[Emphasis added.]
In the same essay, the authors also
assert that “the first principle of American foreign
policy…should be prudence” given the fact that, among
other things, the U.S. economy is not nearly as dominant
in relative terms as it was after World War II. “Our
resources will be finite, and so will be the ability of
our leaders to focus on more than a few problems at a
time.” It’s somewhat refreshing there’s no more talk
here about being mightier than the Roman or British
Empires. But they still believe that the U.S. should be
the “guarantor of global order.”
Thus, they deem Beijing’s aspirations
unacceptable and decry “replac[ing] the American-shaped
order that enabled China’s ‘peaceful rise’ with a system
in which we are only one of multiple, equal
participants.” Russia, Iran, North Korea and “non-state
actors—most notably, jihadi movements of several
stripes”—also qualify as key threats.
Unlike the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission and most
other nuclear proliferation experts, the authors also
believe that Iran’s “nuclear ambitions will not be
blocked and, indeed, may even be eased by the Obama
Administration’s misconceived deal with it.”
Although the authors do not believe
that this is 1938, and Iran is Nazi Germany, they don’t
hesitate to invoke the 1930s—the neocon touchstone for
understanding just about any challenge to American power
and prestige—to depict the present moment and the
consequences that may be drawn from it:
We do not yet face a cataclysm
like that of the late 1930s. But it is fair to
compare our era to that of the early 1930s, when the
democratic powers seemed to have lost much of their
military edge and, equally important, their
self-confidence and will to use their power. At the
same time, pitiless dictators and virulent
ideologies were making use of new technologies to
threaten, in ways previously inconceivable, the
international order.
A New Generation
Most of the book’s contributors,
unlike Cohen, were not associated with PNAC in its early
years. This is a somewhat younger generation.
Nonetheless there are some golden
oldies, too, most noteworthy Elliott Abrams who wrote
the chapter 16 years ago on “Israel and the ‘Peace
Process'” in Present Dangers. Abrams had the
opportunity to put his ideas about the “peace process”
(his quotation marks) into practice when he served as
George W. Bush’s top Middle East aide on the on the
National Security Council, and we can all see how that
turned out. In light of his outstanding achievements in
that position, the John Hay Initiative awarded him
responsibility for writing the chapter on the entire
“Middle East.” And, surprise, surprise, his views
correspond almost precisely with those of Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, particularly in how to deal
with Palestinians and on the overriding necessity of
“defeating Iran’s regional ambitions.” Abrams, who was
also in charge of democracy promotion under Bush,
believes in establishing an alliance between the U.S.,
Israel, and Sunni-led (authoritarian) Arab states in an
echo of the elusive “strategic consensus” sought 35
years ago by Alexander Haig after the Iranian
revolution.
Another Present Dangers
contributor and PNAC alumnus,
Aaron Friedberg of the
American Enterprise Institute, reprises his role as
the Paul Revere of the China threat in a chapter
entitled “A New China Strategy.” He served as Cheney’s
top Asia adviser.
I couldn’t find any reference to
“climate change” in the main chapters, which is
consistent with Republican orthodoxy, but a more careful
reading may find a reference.
If you want to see the likely
foreign-policy worldview of a Republican administration,
should one take office in 2017, Choosing to Lead
offers a pretty reliable guide.
Jim Lobe has served as
Washington DC correspondent and chief of the Washington
bureau of Inter Press Service (IPS), an international
news agency specializing in coverage of issues and
events of interest to developing countries, from 1980 to
1985, and again from 1989 to the present. He also runs
the influential LobeLog website.
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