Of Course, It is an Intifada: This is What
You Must KnowBy Ramzy
Baroud
October 15, 2015 "Information
Clearing House" - When my book ‘Searching
Jenin’ was published soon after the Israeli massacre in the
Jenin refugee camp in 2002, I was quizzed repeatedly by the media
and many readers for conferring the word ‘massacre’ on what Israel
has depicted as a legitimate battle against camp-based ‘terrorists’.
The interrogative questions were aimed at
relocating the narrative from a discussion regarding possible war
crimes into a technical dispute over the application of language.
For them, the evidence of Israel’s violations of human rights
mattered little.
This kind of reductionism has often served as the
prelude to any discussion concerning the so-called Arab-Israeli
conflict: events are depicted and defined using polarizing
terminology that pay little heed to facts and contexts, and focus
primarily on perceptions and interpretations.
Hence, it should also matter little to those same
individuals whether or not Palestinian youth such as
Isra’ Abed, 28, shot repeatedly on October 9 in Affula – and
Fadi Samir, 19, killed by Israeli police a few days earlier,
were, in fact, knife-wielding Palestinians who were in a state of
self-defense and shot by the police. Even when video evidence
emerges countering the official Israeli narrative and revealing, as
in most other cases, that the murdered youth posed no threat, the
official Israeli narrative will always be accepted as facts, by
some. Isra’, Fadi, and all the rest are ‘terrorists’ who endangered
the safety of Israeli citizens and, alas, had to be eliminated as a
result.
The same logic has been used throughout the last
century, when the current so-called Israeli Defense Forces were
still operating as armed militias and organized gangs in Palestine,
before it was ethnically-cleansed to become Israel. Since then, this
logic has applied in every possible context in which Israel has
found itself, allegedly: compelled to use force against Palestinian
and Arab ‘terrorists’, potential ‘terrorists’ along with their
‘terror infrastructure.’
It is not at all about the type of weapons that
Palestinians use, if any at all. Israeli violence largely pertains
to Israel’s own perception of its self-tailored reality: that of
Israel being a beleaguered country, whose very existence is under
constant threat by Palestinians, whether they are resisting by use
of arms, or
children playing at the beach in Gaza. There has never been a
deviation from the norm in the historiography of the official
Israeli discourse which explains, justifies or celebrates the death
of tens of thousands of Palestinians throughout the years: the
Israelis are never at fault, and no context for Palestinian
‘violence’ is ever required.
Much of our current discussion regarding the
protests in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and
as of late at the Gaza border is centred on Israeli priorities,
not Palestinian rights, which is clearly prejudiced. Once more,
Israel is speaking of ‘unrest’ and ‘attacks’ originating from the
‘territories’, as if the priority is guaranteeing the safety of the
armed occupiers – soldiers and extremist settlers, alike.
Rationally, it follows that the opposite state of
‘unrest’, that of ‘quiet’ and ‘lull’, are when millions of
Palestinians agree to being subdued, humiliated, occupied, besieged
and habitually killed or, in some cases, lynched by Israeli Jewish
mobs or
burned alive, while embracing their miserable fate and carrying
on with life as usual.
The return to ‘normalcy’ is thus achieved;
obviously, at the high price of blood and violence, which Israel has
a monopoly on, while its actions are rarely questioned, Palestinians
can then assume the role of the perpetual victim, and their Israeli
masters can continue manning military checkpoints, robbing land and
building yet more illegal settlements in violation of international
law.
The question, now, ought not to be basic queries
about whether some of the murdered Palestinians wielded knives or
not, or truly posed a threat to the safety of the soldiers and armed
settlers. Rather, it should be centred principally on the very
violent act of military occupation and illegal settlements in
Palestinian land in the first place.
From this perspective then, wielding a knife is,
in fact, an act of self-defence; arguing about the disproportionate,
or otherwise, Israeli response to the Palestinian ‘violence’ is,
altogether moot.
Cornering oneself with technical definitions is
dehumanizing to the collective Palestinian experience.
“How many Palestinians would have to be killed to
make a case for using the term ‘massacre’?” was my answer to those
who questioned my use of the term. Similarly, how many would have to
be killed, how many protests would have to be mobilised and for how
long before the current ‘unrest’, ‘upheaval’ or ‘clashes’ between
Palestinian protesters and the Israeli army become an ‘Intifada’?
And why should it even be called a ‘Third
Intifada’?
Mazin Qumsiyeh describes what is happening in
Palestine as the ‘14th Intifada’. He should know best, for he
authored the outstanding book,
Popular Resistance in Palestine: A History of Hope and Empowerment.
However, I would go even further and suggest that there have been
many more intifadas, if one is to use definitions that are relevant
to the popular discourse of the Palestinians themselves. Intifadas –
shaking off – become such when Palestinian communities mobilise
across Palestine, unifying beyond factional and political agendas
and carry out a sustained campaign of protests, civil disobedience
and other forms of grassroots resistance.
They do so when they have reached a breaking
point, the process of which is not declared through press releases
or televised conferences, but is unspoken, yet everlasting.
Some, although well-intentioned, argue that
Palestinians are not yet ready for a third intifada, as if
Palestinian uprisings are a calculated process, carried out after
much deliberation and strategic haggling. Nothing can be further
from the truth.
An example is the 1936 Intifada against British
and Zionist colonialism in Palestine. It was initially organized by
Palestinian Arab parties, which were mostly sanctioned by the
British Mandate government itself. But when the fellahin, the poor
and largely uneducated peasants, began sensing that their leadership
was being co-opted – as is the case today – they operated outside
the confines of politics, launching and sustaining a rebellion that
lasted for three years.
The fellahin then, as has always been the case,
carried the brunt of the British and Zionist violence, as they fell
in droves. Those unlucky enough to be caught, were tortured and
executed: Farhan al-Sadi, Izz al-Din al-Qassam, Mohammed Jamjoom,
Fuad Hijazi are among the many leaders of that generation.
These scenarios have been in constant replay
since, and with each intifada, the price paid in blood seems to be
constantly increasing. Yet more intifadas are inevitable, whether
they last a week, three or seven years, since the collective
injustices experienced by Palestinians remain the common denominator
among the successive generations of fellahin and their descendants
of refugees.
What is happening today is an Intifada, but it is
unnecessary to assign a number to it, since popular mobilization
does not always follow a neat rationale required by some of us. Most
of those leading the current Intifada were either children, or not
even born when the Intifada al-Aqsa started in 2000; they were
certainly not living when the Stone Intifada exploded in 1987. In
fact, many might be oblivious of the details of the original
Intifada of 1936.
This generation grew up oppressed, confined and
subjugated, at complete odds with the misleading ‘peace process’
lexicon that has prolonged a strange paradox between fantasy and
reality. They are protesting because they experience daily
humiliation and have to endure the unrelenting violence of
occupation.
Moreover, they feel a total sense of betrayal by
their leadership, which is corrupt and co-opted. So they rebel, and
attempt to mobilize and sustain their rebellion for as long as they
can, because they have no horizon of hope outside their own action.
Let us not get bogged down by details,
self-imposed definitions and numbers. This is a Palestinian
Intifada, even if it ends today. What truly matters is how we
respond to the pleas of this oppressed generation; will we continue
to assign greater importance to the safety of the armed occupier
than to the rights of a burdened and oppressed nation?
– Dr. Ramzy Baroud has been writing about the
Middle East for over 20 years. He is an internationally-syndicated
columnist, a media consultant, an author of several books and the
founder of PalestineChronicle.com. His books include Searching Jenin,
The Second Palestinian Intifada and his latest My Father Was a
Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story. His website is:
www.ramzybaroud.net.