The Trans-Pacific Free-Trade Charade
By Joseph Stiglitz, Adam Hersh
October 03, 2015 "Information
Clearing House" - "Project
Syndicate"- NEW
YORK – As negotiators and ministers from the United
States and 11 other Pacific Rim countries meet in
Atlanta in an effort to finalize the details of the
sweeping new
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), some sober analysis
is warranted. The biggest regional trade and investment
agreement in history is not what it seems.
You will hear much about the importance
of the TPP for “free trade.” The reality is that this is
an agreement to manage its members’ trade and
investment relations – and to do so on behalf of each
country’s most powerful business lobbies. Make no
mistake: It is evident from the main outstanding issues,
over which negotiators are still haggling, that the
TPP is not about “free” trade.
New Zealand has threatened to walk
away from the agreement over the way Canada and the US
manage trade in dairy products. Australia is not happy
with how the US and Mexico manage trade in sugar. And
the US is not happy with how Japan manages trade in
rice. These industries are backed by significant voting
blocs in their respective countries. And they represent
just the tip of the iceberg in terms of how the TPP
would advance an agenda that actually runs counter
to free trade.
For starters, consider what the
agreement would do to expand intellectual property
rights for big pharmaceutical companies, as we learned
from leaked versions of the negotiating text.
Economic research clearly shows the argument that
such intellectual property rights promote research to be
weak at best. In fact, there is evidence to the
contrary: When the Supreme Court invalidated Myriad’s
patent on the BRCA gene, it led to a burst of innovation
that resulted in better tests at lower costs. Indeed,
provisions in the TPP would restrain open competition
and raise prices for consumers in the US and around the
world – anathema to free trade.
The TPP would manage trade in
pharmaceuticals through a variety of seemingly arcane
rule changes on issues such as “patent linkage,” “data
exclusivity,” and “biologics.” The upshot is that
pharmaceutical companies would effectively be allowed to
extend – sometimes almost indefinitely – their
monopolies on patented medicines, keep cheaper generics
off the market, and block “biosimilar” competitors from
introducing new medicines for years. That is how the TPP
will manage trade for the pharmaceutical industry if the
US gets its way.
Similarly, consider how the US hopes
to use the TPP to manage trade for the tobacco industry.
For decades, US-based tobacco companies have used
foreign investor adjudication mechanisms created by
agreements like the TPP to fight regulations intended to
curb the public-health scourge of smoking. Under these
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) systems,
foreign investors gain new
rights to sue national governments in binding
private arbitration for regulations they see as
diminishing the expected profitability of their
investments.
International corporate interests tout
ISDS as necessary to protect property rights where the
rule of law and credible courts are lacking. But that
argument is nonsense. The US is seeking the same
mechanism in a similar mega-deal with the European
Union, the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership, even though there
is little question about the quality of Europe’s legal
and judicial systems.
To be sure, investors – wherever they
call home – deserve protection from expropriation or
discriminatory regulations. But ISDS goes much further:
The obligation to compensate investors for losses of
expected profits can and has been applied even where
rules are nondiscriminatory and profits are made from
causing public harm.
The corporation formerly known as
Philip Morris is currently prosecuting such cases
against Australia and Uruguay (not a TPP partner) for
requiring cigarettes to carry warning labels. Canada,
under threat of a similar suit, backed down from
introducing a similarly effective warning label a few
years back.
Given the veil of secrecy surrounding
the TPP negotiations, it is not clear whether tobacco
will be excluded from some aspects of ISDS. Either way,
the broader issue remains: Such provisions make it hard
for governments to conduct their basic functions –
protecting their citizens’ health and safety, ensuring
economic stability, and safeguarding the environment.
Imagine what would have happened if
these provisions had been in place when the lethal
effects of asbestos were discovered. Rather than
shutting down manufacturers and forcing them to
compensate those who had been harmed, under ISDS,
governments would have had to pay the manufacturers
not to kill their citizens. Taxpayers would have
been hit twice – first to pay for the health damage
caused by asbestos, and then to compensate manufacturers
for their lost profits when the government stepped in to
regulate a dangerous product.
It should surprise no one that
America’s international agreements produce managed
rather than free trade. That is what happens when the
policymaking process is closed to non-business
stakeholders – not to mention the people’s elected
representatives in Congress.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel
laureate in economics and University Professor at
Columbia University, was Chairman of President Bill
Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers and served as
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the
World Bank.
© 2015 Project Syndicate