Britain's Drone Strike in Syria: These
Executions are a Mark of Tyranny
The ability to execute its own citizens has been a mark of
tyrannical government from Rome in the days of the Caesars to Moscow
during the Great Purge in the 1930s
By Patrick Cockburn
September 14, 2015 "Information
Clearing House"
- "The
Independent" -
The lack of public response to the British
government
ordering the assassination by pilotless drones of two British
citizens, Reyaad Khan and Rahul Amin, is alarming but
scarcely surprising. The two Isis members were killed outside
Raqqa in Syria because they were allegedly planning attacks in
Britain, though the nature of the threat they posed remains a
secret. Their deaths were never going to shock many people in
Britain, given IS’s ghastly record for carrying out ritual
murders, rapes and massacres.
But the drone attack should cause real alarm because it
is an extraordinary extension of the powers of government to
be able to execute its own citizens with no explanation,
except that the killing was for the public good and against
an unnamed but horrendous threat, the nature of which is
known only to the government itself. Keep in mind that the
ability to execute its own citizens has been a mark of
tyrannical government from Rome in the days of the Caesars
to Moscow during the Great Purge in the 1930s. Where
evidence for an existential threat is lacking, it can be
exaggerated or manufactured, as notoriously happened in 2003
over Iraqi WMD.
Avoiding a descriptive word such as
“assassination” and the use instead of phrases such as “targeted
killings” shows that governments are themselves a little edgy about
the rightness of what they are doing. Even so, drone warfare has
become highly attractive to political leaders in the US, Britain and
the rest of the world. They like it above all because it shows them
doing something easily explained and apparently effective against
evil-doers of whom their own people are frightened. The use of
drones means that there will be no American or British soldiers
coming back in coffins, so even if the attacks fail there will be no
political price to pay domestically.
In addition, though this justification is a bit
discredited these days, the drone strikes can be sold as being of
such pin-point accuracy against terrorist leaders that civilian
casualties are negligible. The use of drones has all the advantages
for politicians of going to war, in terms of rallying public support
behind them, but without the costs and uncertainty of real
conflict.
The problem is that experience has shown again and
again that drone warfare does not work and generally increases the
terrorist threat rather than reducing it. The drone strikes become a
highly publicised melodrama that substitutes for a real and
effective policy. For instance, in September 2011, in Yemen, a US
drone killed Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen who was one of the
leaders of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The Obama
administration, which has conducted some 500 drone strikes,
presented this killing as a high point in its counter-terrorist
campaign. But four years later
AQAP is spreading through Yemen, capturing the port city of
Mukalla, and stronger than it has ever been. It has done so by
taking advantage of the chaos that followed the Saudi military
intervention in Yemen in March, which is backed by the US. If
Washington is embarrassed by its demonstrable failure in Yemen, it
is showing no sign of it, presumably calculating that the rest of
the world is paying little attention to the calamitous war there.
Drone strikes and the killing of selected
individuals by US special forces have been directed at different
times against supposed “king pins” or more junior commanders. The
original concept appears to have been pioneered by the Israelis in
Gaza, a small besieged enclave where targeted individuals could be
easily located and eliminated. Elsewhere, drones were sold by their
advocates as a “magic bullet” whereby war could be conducted on the
cheap.
Like many simple solutions to complex problems,
their shortcomings are easy to describe but difficult to prove –
often because the military commanders who owe their promotion to
advocating new weapons or strategies have no wish to have their
effectiveness accurately tested.
When such measurements do take place, the results
are often highly disconcerting and contradict upbeat propaganda
claims. A fascinating concrete example of this is given by my
brother Andrew Cockburn in his recently published book, Kill
Chain: Drones and the Rise of High-Tech Assassins, in a chapter
describing the US campaign in Iraq to eliminate “High Value
Individuals” held responsible for the IEDs, or Improvised Explosive
Devices, that inflicted heavy casualties on US troops. No less than
70,000 of these had been put in place by insurgents by 2007. The
counter-measure adopted by the US Army was to target and kill
leaders of “the IED networks”, and many were assassinated or
otherwise disposed of.
For once there was a rigorous study of what had
been achieved, which was carried out by Rex Rivolo, who worked for
the Institute for Defense Analysis, the Pentagon’s think tank.
Visiting frontline military units with Colonel Jim Hickey, who had
led the final, successful, hunt for Saddam Hussein, Rivolo asked
about the effect of killing high value individuals (HVIs) on the
number of IEDs being used against US troops. Without exception, the
soldiers said that the campaign to kill those responsible was
counter-effective. One soldier said: “Once you knock them off, a day
later you have a new guy who’s smarter, younger, more aggressive and
is out for revenge.”
Rivolo conducted a study on 200 cases where high
value targets had been killed or captured between June and October
2007. He looked at the neighbourhood of the local leader who had
been eliminated, in order to see if the number of IEDs had gone up
or down in the 30 days after his death or arrest. According to the
book, it turned out that “hitting HVIs did not reduce attacks and
save American lives. It increased them. Each killing had quickly
prompted mayhem. Within 3 kilometres of the target’s base of
operations, attacks over the following 30 days shot up by 40 per
cent.”
The miscalculation by the US Army was
political as well as military. It assumed that there were a finite
number of insurgents, though by 2007 they must have known they were
fighting the six million strong Sunni community in Iraq. Leaders and
local commanders could be replaced and they usually were within 24
hours, and, by a Darwinian process of natural selection, the
replacements were better able to survive than their predecessors.
The main reason why Isis is so militarily expert and successful
today is that its commanders are survivors of a dozen years of
intense warfare and attempts to kill them.
Of course, drone attacks and assassination teams
are nothing like as accurate – or draw on such impeccable
intelligence – as they claim, and a significant proportion of those
killed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Yemen have been civilians.
Such mistakes have repeatedly occurred and are usually met with
official mendacity, evasion and, on occasion, shame-faced admission
and payment of meagre compensation. I once reported the bombing of
an Afghan village by US planes that had left craters 20ft deep which
a US spokesman said might have been caused by grenades thrown by
Taliban fighters.
It is into this dubious high-tech world of
pretended success and real failure that Britain is entering with its
first assassination by drone strike.
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independent.co.uk