Why The US and Iran Aren’t Cooperating Against IS
By Gareth Porter
September 10, 2015 "Information
Clearing House" - "MEE"
- By the logic of geopolitics, the United
States and Iran ought to be cooperating to contain and weaken the
Islamic State (also known as ISIS, ISIL or Daesh). Both countries
have declared that the group is a very serious threat to their own
security and to the security of the entire Middle East.
Indeed, it has become evident to all – besides
those who are determined for their own reasons not to see it – that
the Islamic State’s intent on setting up an Islamic caliphate has
the potential to dissolve the basic international order that has
governed the Middle East for a century. So the logic of Iran-U.S.
strategic cooperation against Daesh (as the group is referred to in
Arabic) is no less compelling than was the logic of the Nixon
administration in reaching an understanding with Maoist China to
counter-balance their common Soviet adversary.
But that logical development isn’t happening,
contrary to the fears of some and hopes of others, and it isn’t
likely to happen any time soon, despite the nuclear agreement and
the Obama administration’s success in beating back the unprecedented
campaign by the Israel lobby to defeat it. The reason is that it is
not the logic of geopolitics, in the end, that is governing the
problem.
It isn’t the Iranian side of the equation that is
failing to follow the geopolitical logic. Contrary to the constantly
reiterated propaganda theme of the anti-Iran forces in the region
and in the United States that Iran’s ruling elite simply wants
“death to America,” Iran has publicly signalled to the Obama
administration repeatedly that it was open to such cooperation. But
the Obama administration has refused to reciprocate, for the simple
reason that it is not capable of formulating a regional policy on
the basis of an objective analysis of strategic interests.
To understand the why the international politics
of the Middle East are now so profoundly dysfunctional, one must
begin with the contrasting modes of Iranian and American foreign
policymaking. The dramatic differences between the two approaches to
defining interests and policy toward the region has produced a
fundamental mismatch between the US and Iranian ways of responding
to the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Middle East.
For Iran, geopolitics does indeed shape policy
toward the region and the US. Iran, as a middle power that is
vulnerable to threats from enemies in the region, cannot afford to
base its policies on anything but a realistic appraisal of the
threats and opportunities. Specifically, Iran has been facing
explicit threats of attack from both Israel and the United States
since the mid to late-1990s. Now Daesh and al-Qaeda are on the
offensive in Iraq and Syria, threatening the twin pillars of Iran’s
security strategy.
Under those circumstances, Iranian officials know
that they must take advantage of any possible opening to improve
relations with the United States. Iranian officials have made it
clear that they are prepared to take advantage of any possibility –
even if slight – of reaching an historic agreement with the United
States that could lead to strategic understanding on the threat from
Daesh.
One of the conceits of the US political and
national security elite is that the real power in the Islamic
Republic is held by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the
Revolutionary Guard leadership, and that their interests lie in
continuing hostility toward the United States. But that convenient
belief is belied by Khamenei’s own public position. On 9 April,
Khamenei clearly articulated the view that Iran is ready to
cooperate with the United States on regional issues if the US would
indicate some willingness to change its policy. In the context of
the negotiations on the nuclear issue, Khamenei declared: “If the
counterpart stops its bad behaviour, one could expand this
experience to other issues, but if the counterpart continues its bad
behaviour, it would only reinforce our experiences of the past and
distrust in the United States.”
Iran has made it clear that it is prepared to
think creatively and flexibly about a modus vivendi with the United
States. Last December, the Secretary of the Supreme National
Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, recognised that the United States
was unlikely to cooperate explicitly with Iran, because of its
continued support for Israel. But he suggested that a change in US
policy toward Israel was “not impossible” and then raised the
possibility of something less than explicit cooperation. “The two
can behave in a way that they do not use their energy against each
other,” he said, and he called the nuclear agreement “crucial in
this regard”.
In the final round of negotiations on the nuclear
agreement from late June to mid-July, Iranian officials in Vienna
confirmed to me that Iran and the United States had not discussed
regional issues during the nearly 18 months of negotiations. But
senior Iranian officials were still holding out some hope, however
slight, that the Obama administration might soften its hostility
toward Iran sufficiently to make at least tacit cooperation possible
once the agreement was reached and approved by Congress.
The Iranians were basing their hope on an analysis
of the objective situation in the region. One official told me on 2
July: “The United States doesn’t have any reason to trust its allies
in regard to Daesh.” He was alluding to the well-established fact
that major funding for the terrorist organisation had come from Gulf
Sunni regimes and that they were clearly more interested in taking
down the Assad regime than in stopping Daesh. But the same official
also said: “Some in the United States may see Daesh as a source of
pressure on the Syrian regime.”
But while Iran acknowledges the need for a change
in US-Iran relations to ease regional security threats, the United
States has not made a move toward any such acknowledgment. US policy
toward the Middle East has long been defined primarily not by
threats originating in the region but by much more potent domestic
political interests, both electoral and bureaucratic. The power of
the Israel lobby in Washington, primarily but not exclusively over
Congress, is well known, and that has imposed a rigid political and
legal framework of hostility toward Iran on the US government for
two decades, beginning with a complete trade embargo that remains in
place and creates major obstacles to any shift in policy.
What is seldom acknowledged, however, is that the
interests of the Pentagon, the CIA and the NSA have become tightly
intertwined with those of the anti-Iran coalition in the Middle
East. A set of mutually reinforcing bureaucratic interests now binds
US policy to an alliance structure and military and intelligence
programmes in the Middle East that have come to replace objective
analysis of regional realities in determining US policy.
The first is the imperative for the US military of
holding on to US air, naval and land bases in the region, all but
one of which are located in states that are part of the anti-Iran
coalition. Continuing long-term control of those bases is the coin
of the realm for US military institutions that trumps possible
competing policy concerns. Similarly, arms sales to Saudi Arabia,
the other Gulf sheikhdoms and Israel are a primary interest of the
Pentagon, its arms contractor partners and its congressional allies.
And the determination of that same set of domestic interests to
continue the bonanza or research-and-development spending on a
missile defense system requires a continued identification of Iran
as primary regional adversary and threat.
Finally, the US national security state has never
given up its ambition to regain primary influence in Iraq, despite
the political legacy of the Iraq war and a Shia-dominated regime in
the country. That quite unrealistic interest reduces still further
the space for any cooperation with Iran in the region.
The interaction of all those dynamics leave the
Obama administration in a position where it cannot adopt a real
Middle East strategy that reflects the gravity of the current
situation. The paradoxical result is that, instead of responding to
the regional crisis by applying creative diplomacy involving an
opening to Iran, the Obama administration is reduced to manoeuvring
within the tight constraints imposed by the dominant political
interests in cleaving to the status quo.
- Gareth
Porter is an independent
investigative journalist and winner of the 2012 Gellhorn Prize
for journalism. He is the author of the newly published
Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare.
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