Playing the Long Game on Iran
The Neoconservatives, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Republicans Game
the System
By David Bromwich
August 24, 2015 "Information
Clearing House" - "TomDispatch"
- “We’re going to push and push until some
larger force makes us stop.”
David Addington, the legal adviser to Vice
President Dick Cheney, made that declaration to Jack Goldsmith of
the Office of Legal Counsel in the months after September 11, 2001.
Goldsmith would
later recall that Cheney and Addington were the first people he
had ever met of a certain kind: “Cheney is not subtle, and he has
never hidden the ball. The amazing thing is that he does what he
says. Relentlessness is a quality I saw in him and Addington that I
never saw before in my life.”
Goldsmith did not consider himself an adversary of
Cheney and Addington. He probably shared many of their political
views. What shocked him was their confidence in a set of secret laws
and violent policies that could destroy innocent lives and warp the
Constitution. The neoconservatives -- the opinion-makers and
legislative pedagogues who since 2001 have justified the Cheney-Bush
policies -- fit the same description. They are relentless, they push
until they are stopped, and thus far they have never been stopped
for long.
The campaign for the Iraq war of 2003, the purest
example of their handiwork, began with a strategy memorandum
in 1996, so it is fair to say that they have been pitching to
break up the Middle East for a full two decades. But fortune played
them a nasty trick with the signing of the nuclear agreement between
the P5+1 powers and Iran. War and the prospect of war have been the
source of their undeniable importance. If the Iran nuclear deal
attains legitimacy, much of their power will slip through their
fingers. The
imperialist idealism that drives their ventures from day to day
will be cheated of the enemy it cannot live without.
Iran might then become just one more unlucky
country -- authoritarian and cruelly oppressive but an object of
persuasion and not the focus of a never-ending threat of force. The
neoconservatives are enraged and their response has been feverish:
if they were an individual, you would say that he was a danger to
himself and others. They still get plenty of attention and airtime,
but the main difference between 2003 and 2015 is the absence of a
president who obeys them -- something that has only served to
sharpen their anger.
President Obama
defended the nuclear deal vigorously in a recent speech at
American University. This was the first such extended explanation of
a foreign policy decision in his presidency, and it lacked even an
ounce of inspirational fluff. It was, in fact, the first of his
utterances not likely to be remembered for its “eloquence,” because
it merits the higher praise of good sense. It has been predictably
denounced in some quarters as stiff, unkind, ungenerous, and
“over the top.”
Obama began by speaking of the ideology that
incited and justified the Iraq War of 2003. He called it a
“mindset,” and the word was appropriate -- suggesting a pair of
earphones around a head that prevents us from hearing any
penetrating noise from the external world. Starting in the summer of
2002, Americans heard a voice that said: Bomb, invade, occupy
Iraq! And do the same to other countries! For the sake of our
sanity, Obama explained, we had to take off those earphones:
“We had to end the mindset that got us there in the first place. It
was a mindset characterized by a preference for military action over
diplomacy; a mindset that put a premium on unilateral U.S. action
over the painstaking work of building international consensus; a
mindset that exaggerated threats beyond what the intelligence
supported. Leaders did not level with the American people about the
costs of war, insisting that we could easily impose our will on a
part of the world with a profoundly different culture and history.
And, of course, those calling for war labeled themselves strong and
decisive, while dismissing those who disagreed as weak -- even
appeasers of a malevolent adversary.”
In this precise catalogue of mental traits, Obama
was careful to name no names, but he made it easy to construct a
key:
A mindset characterized by a preference for
military action: President George W. Bush
ordering the U.N. nuclear inspectors out of Iraq (though they had
asked to stay and complete their work) because there was a pressing
need to bomb in March 2003;
A mindset that put a premium on unilateral
U.S. action: Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld dismissing the skeptical challenge and eventual
non-participation of France and Germany as proof of the irrelevance
of “old
Europe”;
A mindset that exaggerated threats:
the
barely vetted New York Times stories by Judith Miller
and Michael Gordon, which an administration bent on war first molded
and then
cited on TV news shows as evidence to justify preventive war;
Leaders did not level with the American people
about the costs of war: Deputy Secretary
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
pooh-poohing the estimate by Army Chief of Staff General Eric
Shinseki that it would take 400,000 troops to maintain order in Iraq
after the war;
Insisting that we could easily impose our will
on a part of the world with a profoundly different culture and
history: the
bromides of Bush and National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice on the indwelling Arab spirit that yearns for
American-style democracy across the Middle East.
Obama went on to assert that there was a
continuity of persons as well as ideas between the propagandists who
told us to bomb, invade, and occupy Iraq in 2003 and those now
spending tens of millions of dollars to ensure that Congress
will abort the nuclear deal. “The same mindset,” the president
remarked, “in many cases offered by the same people who seem to have
no compunction with being repeatedly wrong, led to a war that did
more to strengthen Iran, more to isolate the United States, than
anything we have done in the decades before or since.”
Those people have never recognized that they were
wrong. Some put the blame on President Bush or
his viceroy in Baghdad, the administrator of the Coalition
Provisional Authority, L. Paul Bremer, for mismanaging the
occupation that followed the invasion; others continue to nurse the
fantastic theory that Saddam Hussein really was in possession of
nuclear weapons but
somehow smuggled them across the border to Syria and fooled both
U.S. reconnaissance teams and the U.N. inspectors; still others
maintain that Shiite militias and weaponry dispatched to Iraq
from Iran were the chief culprits in the disaster of the postwar
insurgency.
Bear in mind that these opinion-makers, in 2003,
hardly understood the difference between Shiite and Sunni in the
country they wanted to invade. To put the blame now on Iran betrays
a genius for circular reasoning. Since all Shia militias are allied
by religion with Iran, it can be argued that Iraq was not destroyed
by a catastrophic war of choice whose effects set the region on
fire. No: the United States under Bush and Cheney was an unpresuming
superpower doing its proper work, bringing peace and democracy to
one of the dark places of the earth by means of a clean, fast,
“surgical” war. In 2004 and 2005, just as in 2015, it was Iran that
caused the trouble.
Simple Facts That Are Not Known
Because the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu has scorned the nuclear deal without any attention to
detail, the president felt compelled in his speech to recognize
candidly the difference of national interest that exists between
Israel and the United States. Though we are allies, he said, we are
two different countries, and he left his listeners to draw the
necessary inference: it is not possible for two countries (any more
than two persons) to be at once different and the same. Obama went
on to connect the nations in question to this premise of
international politics:
“I
believe [the terms of the agreement] are in America’s interest and
Israel’s interest. And as president of the United States, it would
be an abrogation of my constitutional duty to act against my best
judgment simply because it causes temporary friction with a dear
friend and ally.”
The last affirmation is critical. A president
takes
an oath to “preserve, protect, and defend the constitution of
the United States” -- that is, to attend to the interest of his own
country and not another.
The danger of playing favorites in the world of
nations, with a partiality that knows no limits, was a main topic of
George Washington’s great
Farewell Address. “Permanent, inveterate antipathies against
particular nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be
excluded,” said Washington, because
“a
passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety
of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the
illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real
common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the
other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and
wars of the latter without adequate inducement or justification.”
There are Americans today who submit to a ruling
passion that favors uniquely the interests of Israel, and the
president had them in mind when he invoked his duties under the
Constitution toward the only country whose framework of laws and
institutions he had sworn to uphold. Genuine respect for another
democracy formed part of his thinking here. Not only was Obama not
elected to support Netanyahu’s idea of America’s interest, he was
also not elected by Israelis to support his own idea of Israel’s
interest.
In a recent
commentary in Foreign Affairs, the prominent Israeli
journalist and former government adviser Daniel Levy pointed out a
fact that is not much remembered today regarding Netanyahu’s
continuous effort to sabotage negotiations with Iran. It was the
Israeli prime minister who initially demanded that nuclear
negotiations be pursued on a separate track from any agreement about
the trade or sale of conventional weapons. He chose that path
because he was certain it would cause negotiations to collapse. The
gambit having failed, he now makes the lifting of sanctions on
conventional weaponry a significant objection to the “bad deal” in
Vienna.
Obama concluded his argument by saying that
“alternatives to military action will have been exhausted if we
reject a hard-won diplomatic solution that the world almost
unanimously supports. So let’s not mince words. The choice we face
is ultimately between diplomacy or some form of war -- maybe not
tomorrow, maybe not three months from now, but soon.” A measured
statement and demonstrably true.
But you would never come within hailing distance
of this truth if you listened to the numbers of Congressional
Republicans who repeat the neoconservative watchwords and their
accompanying digests of the recent history of the Middle East. They
run through recitations of the dramatis personae of the war
on terror with the alacrity of trained seals. Israel lives in a
“dangerous neighborhood.” Islamists are “knocking on our door” and
“looking for
gaps in the border with Mexico.” Iran is “the
foremost state sponsor of terrorism in the world.” Barack Obama
is “an appeaser” and “it’s five minutes to midnight
in Munich.” Elected officials who walk on two legs in the
twenty-first century are not embarrassed to say these things without
the slightest idea of their provenance.
If there was a fault in the president’s
explanation of his policy, it lay in some things he omitted to say.
When you are educating a people who have been proselytized, as
Americans have been, by a political cult for the better part of two
decades, nothing should be taken for granted. Most
Americans do not know that the fanatical Islamists, al-Qaeda,
al-Nusra, the Islamic State (IS) -- the active and destructive
revolutionary force in the greater Middle East at the moment -- are
called Sunni Muslims. Nor do they know that the Shia Muslims who
govern Iran and who support the government of Syria have never
attacked the United States.
To say it as simply as it should be said: the
Shiites and Sunnis are different sects, and the Shiites of Iran are
fighting against the same enemies the U.S. is fighting in Syria and
elsewhere. Again, most Americans who get their information from
miscellaneous online scraps have no idea that exclusively Sunni
fanatics made up the force of hijackers who struck the World Trade
Center on September 11, 2001. They would be surprised to learn that
none of these people came from Iraq or Iran. They do not know that
15 of the 19 came from Saudi Arabia -- a supposed ally of the
United States. And they do not know that the Islamist warriors who
brought chaos and destruction to Syria and Iraq are bankrolled in
part by members of the Saudi and Qatari elite who have nothing to do
with Iran. It has never been emphasized -- it is scarcely written in
a way that might be noticeable even in our newspaper of record --
that Iran itself has carried the heaviest burden of the fight
against IS.
Throughout his presidency, when speaking of Iran,
Obama has mixed every expression of hope for improved relations with
a measure of opprobrium. He has treated Iran as an exceptional
offender against the laws of nations, a country that requires
attention only in the cause of disarmament. He does this to assure
the policy elite that he respects and can hum the familiar tunes.
But this subservience to cliché is timid, unrealistic, and
pragmatically ill advised. Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill
did not denounce the Soviet Union when they took that country’s
dictator, Joseph Stalin, as a partner in war in 1941, though
Stalin’s crimes exceeded anything attributable to the Iranian
mullahs. Ritual denunciation of a necessary ally is a transparent
absurdity. And in a democracy, it prevents ordinary people from
arriving at an understanding of what is happening.
Nuclear Deals and Their Critics, Then and
Now
What are the odds that the neoconservatives and
the Republicans whose policy they manage will succeed in aborting
the P5+1 nuclear deal? One can take some encouragement from the last
comparably ambitious effort at rapprochement with an enemy: the
conversations between President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet head of
state Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow in
1986, 1987, and 1988. At the same time, one ought to be forewarned
by the way that unexpected change of course was greeted. The
neoconservative cult was just forming then. Some of its early
leaders like Richard Perle had positions in the Reagan
administration, and they were unanimously hostile to the talks that
would yield the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)
of 1988. The agreement set out the terms for the destruction of
2,611 missiles, capable of delivering 4,000 warheads -- the biggest
step in lowering the risk of nuclear war since the Test Ban Treaty
championed by President Kennedy and passed in late 1963.
But as James Mann recounted in
The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan -- a narrative
of the anticommunist president’s surprising late turn in foreign
policy -- all of Reagan’s diplomatic efforts were deeply disapproved
at the time, not only by the neoconservative hotheads but by those
masters of the “diplomatic breakthrough,” former President Richard
Nixon and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; by the most
widely quoted columnists of the right, George Will and William
Safire; and by Time magazine, which ran a
story titled “Has Reagan Gone Soft?” The Reagan-Gorbachev talks
were looked upon with suspicion, too, by “realists” and “moderates”
of the political and security establishment, including Robert Gates
and then-Vice President George H.W. Bush. Why Gates? Because he was
deputy director of the CIA and the Agency was thoroughly convinced
that Soviet Russia and its leadership could never change. Why Bush?
Because he was already running for president.
The political and media establishment of that
moment was startled by the change that President Reagan first
signaled in 1986, as startled as today’s establishment has been by
the signing of the P5+1 agreement. This was the same Ronald Reagan
who in 1983 had called the Soviet Union “an evil empire.” At the end
of his visit to Moscow in June 1988, Reagan was asked by the ABC
News reporter Sam Donaldson, “Do you still think you’re in an evil
empire, Mr. President?”
“No,” Reagan replied. “I was talking about another
time and another era.” And he stuck to that answer at a press
conference the next day, adding: “I think that a great deal of [the
change] is due to the General Secretary, who I have found different
than previous Soviet leaders... A large part of it is Mr. Gorbachev
as a leader.”
By 1987, Reagan’s popularity had hit a low of 47%
-- largely because of the Iran-Contra scandal -- but he still
retained his reputation as the most irreproachable defender of the
West against world communism. Obama for his part has done everything
he could -- short of emulating the invade-and-occupy strategy of
Bush -- to maintain U.S. force projection in the Middle East in a
manner to which Washington has become accustomed since 9/11. He
doubtless believes in this policy, and he has
surrounded himself with adepts of “humanitarian
war”; but he clearly also calculated that a generous ration of
conformity would protect him when he tried for his own breakthrough
in negotiations with Iran.
In the end, Reagan got a 93-5 vote in the Senate
for his nuclear treaty with the Soviet Union. Obama is hoping for
much less -- a vote of less than two thirds of that body opposed to
the Iran settlement. But he is confronted by the full-scale
hostility of a Republican party with a new character and with
financial backing of a new kind.
The U.S. military and security establishment has
sided with the president. And though the fact is little known here,
so have the
vast majority of Israelis who can speak with any authority on
issues of defense and security. Even the president of Israel,
Reuven Rivlin, has
signaled his belief that Netanyahu’s interventions in American
politics are wrong. Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak has advised
that, however reluctantly, Israel should accept the nuclear
agreement and forge an understanding with the U.S. about what to do
in case of its violation. To this remarkable consensus should be
added
the public letter -- signed by 29 American scientists, many of
them deeply involved in nuclear issues, including six recipients of
the Nobel Prize -- which vouches for the stringency of the agreement
and praises the “unprecedented” rigor of the 24-day cap on Iranian
delays for site inspection: an interval so short (as no one knows
better than these scientists) that successful concealment of traces
of nuclear activity becomes impossible.
Two other public letters supporting the nuclear
deal have been notable. The first was
signed by former U.S. diplomats endorsing the agreement
unambiguously, among them Ryan Crocker, the American ambassador to
Iraq after 2003; Nicholas Burns, who negotiated with Iran for the
younger Bush; and Daniel Kurtzer, a former ambassador to Israel and
Egypt who served under both President Bill Clinton and George W.
Bush. A further letter carried the personal and institutional
authority of
dozens of retired admirals and generals. So close an approach to
unanimity on the benefits of an agreement among the U.S. military,
diplomatic, and scientific communities has seldom been achieved.
Even President Reagan could not claim this degree of support by
qualified judges when he submitted the INF treaty to the Senate.
Such endorsements ought to represent a substantial
cause for hope. But Obama’s supporters would be hard pressed to call
the contest a draw on television and radio. The neoconservatives --
and the Republicans channeling them -- are once again
working with
boundless
energy. Careers are being built on this fight, as in the case
of
Senator Tom Cotton, and more than one
presidential candidacy has been staked on it.
On the day of Obama’s speech, even a relatively
informed talk show host like Charlie Rose
allowed his coverage to slant sharply against the agreement. His
four guests were the Haaretz reporter Chemi Shalev; the
Daily Beast columnist Jonathan Alter; the former State
Department official and president of the Council on Foreign
Relations Richard Haass; and the neoconservative venture capitalist,
Mark Dubowitz, who has come to be treated as an expert on the
nuclear policies and government of Iran.
Haass, passionately opposed to the agreement, said
that the president’s speech had been “way over the top,” and hoped
Congress would correct its “clear flaws.” Shalev rated the speech
honest and “bracing” but thought it would leave many in the Jewish
community “offended.” Dubowitz spoke of Iran as a perfidious nation
that ought to be subjected to relentless and ever-increasing
penalties. His solution: “empower the next president to go back and
renegotiate.” Jonathan Alter alone defended the agreement.
Planning to Attack Iran, 2002-2015
By now, the active participants in mainstream
commentary on the War on Terror all have a history, and one can
learn a good deal by looking back. Haass, for example, a pillar of
the foreign policy establishment, worked in the State Department
under Bush and Cheney and
made no public objection to the Iraq War. Dubowitz has recently
co-authored several articles with Reuel Marc Gerecht, a leading
propagandist for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In a
characteristic piece in the Wall Street Journal last
November, Gerecht and Dubowitz argued that the P5+1 negotiations
opened a path to a nuclear bomb for Iran. President Obama, they
said, was too weak and trapped by his own errors to explore any
alternatives, but there were three “scenarios” that a wiser and
stronger president might consider. First, “the White House could
give up on diplomacy and preemptively strike Iran’s nuclear sites”;
second, “the administration could give up on the current talks and
default back to sanctions”; third, “new, even more biting sanctions
could be enacted, causing Tehran considerable pain.” The range of
advisable policy, for Gerecht and Dubowitz, begins with “crippling
sanctions” and ends with a war of aggression.
These scenarios typify the neoconservative
“options.” Writing on his own in
the Atlantic in June 2013, Dubowitz informed American
readers that there was nothing to celebrate in the Iranian
presidential election that brought to power the apparently rational
and moderate Hassan Rouhani. “A loyalist of Iran's supreme leader
and a master of nuclear deceit,” Rouhani, as interpreted by
Dubowitz, is a false friend whose new authority “doesn't get us any
closer to stopping Iran's nuclear drive.”
Consider Gerecht in his solo flights and you can
see what made the president say that these are the people who gave
us the Iraq War. They were as sure then about the good that would
follow the bombing and invasion of that country as they are now
about the benefits of attacking Iran. Indeed, Gerecht has the
distinction of having called for an attack on Iran even before the
official launch of the Bush strategy on Iraq.
It is said that Dick Cheney’s August 26, 2002,
speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars marked the first formal
description of the War on Terror offered by a U.S. leader to
American citizens. But Gerecht, a former CIA specialist on the
Middle East, stole a march on the vice president. In the Weekly
Standard of August 6, 2002, under the title “Regime
Change in Iran?,” he declared his belief that President Bush was
the possessor of a “revolutionary edge and appeal... in the Middle
East.” The younger Bush had
“sliced across national borders and civilizational divides with an
unqualified assertion of a moral norm. The president declared, ‘The
people of Iran want the same freedoms, human rights, and
opportunities as people around the world.’ America will stand
‘alongside people everywhere determined to build a world of freedom,
dignity, and tolerance.’”
The analyst Gerecht took up where the evangelist
Bush left off: the relevant country to attack in August 2002 -- on
behalf of its people of course -- was Iran. Gerecht had no doubt
that
“the Iranian people overwhelmingly view clerical rule as
fundamentally illegitimate. The heavily Westernized clerics of
Iran's religious establishment -- and these mullahs are on both
sides of the so-called 'moderate-conservative' split -- know
perfectly well that the Persian word azadi, ‘freedom,’ is perhaps
the most evocative word in the language now... Azadi has also become
indissolubly associated with the United States.”
This was the way the neoconservatives were already
writing and thinking back in August 2002. It is hard to know which
is more astounding, the show of philological virtuosity or the
self-assurance regarding the advisability of war against a nation of
70 million.
General prognostications, however, are never
enough for the neoconservatives, and Gerecht in 2002 enumerated the
specific benefits of disorder in Iraq and Iran:
“An American invasion [of Iraq] could possibly provoke riots in Iran
-- simultaneous uprisings in major cities that would simply be
beyond the scope of regime-loyal specialized riot-control units. The
army or the Revolutionary Guard Corps would have to be pulled into
service in large numbers, and that's when things could get
interesting.”
That was how he had it scored. Bush, the voice of
freedom, would be adored as a benevolent emperor at a distance:
“President Bush, of course, doesn't need National Iranian Television
broadcasts to beam his message into the Islamic Republic. Everything
he says moves at light speed through the country. The president just
needs to keep talking about freedom being the birthright of Muslim
peoples.”
Such was the neoconservative recipe for democracy
in the Middle East: beam the words of George W. Bush to people
everywhere, invade Iraq, and spark a democratic uprising in Iran
(assisted if necessary by U.S. bombs and soldiers).
For a final glimpse of the same “mindset,” look
closely at Gerecht’s advice on Syria in June 2014.
Writing again in the Weekly Standard, he deprecated the
very idea of getting help from Iran in the fight against the Islamic
State. “The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Enemy” declares the title of the
piece, and the article makes the same point with a minimal reliance
on facts. Sunni terrorists are portrayed as impetuous youngsters who
naturally go too far, but it is too early to gauge their trajectory:
the changes they bring may not ultimately be uncongenial to American
interest. The Shiite masterminds of Iran, on the other hand, have
long ago attained full maturity and will never change. Gerecht’s
hope, last summer, was that substantial Iranian casualties in a war
against IS would lead to the spontaneous uprising that failed to
materialize in 2003.
“It is possible that the present Sunni-Shiite conflict could, if the
Iranian body count rises and too much national treasure is spent,
produce shock waves that fundamentally weaken the clerical regime...
Things could get violent inside the Islamic Republic.”
The vision underlying this policy amounts to
selective or strategic tolerance of al-Qaeda and IS for the sake of
destroying Iran.
Will the War on Terror Be Debated?
How can such opinions be contested in American
politics? The answer will have to come from what remains of the
potential opposition party in the war on terror. Senator Chris
Murphy of Connecticut has been a
remarkable exception, but for the most part the Democrats are
preoccupied with domestic policy. If almost two-thirds of Congress
today is poised to vote against the Iran settlement, this
embarrassment is the result of years of systematic neglect. Sherrod
Brown, Elizabeth Warren, Dick Durbin, Ron Wyden, Tammy Baldwin, and
a few others have the talent to lead an opposition to a pursuit of
the war on terror on the neoconservative plan, but to have any
effect they would have to speak up regularly on foreign policy.
Meanwhile, the Republican Party and its
billionaire bankrollers are playing the long game on Iran. They
would like to gain the two-thirds majority to override Obama’s veto
of a Congressional vote against the nuclear agreement, but they
do not really expect that to happen. The survival of any
agreement, however, depends not only on its approval but on its
legitimation. Their hope is to depress public support for the P5+1
deal so much that the next president and members of the next
Congress would require extraordinary courage to persist with
American participation.
In the Foreign Affairs column mentioned
earlier, Daniel Levy concluded that the long game is also Benjamin
Netanyahu’s strategy:
”Netanyahu is going for a twofer -- if he loses on the veto-proof
super majority in Congress, he can still succeed in keeping the Iran
deal politically controversial and fragile and prevent any further
détente with Iran. The hope, in this case, is that the next U.S.
administration can resume the status quo ante in January 2017.”
What we are seeing, then, is not simply a
concentrated effort that will end with the vote by the Senate in
September on the P5+1 nuclear deal. It is the earliest phase of a
lobbying campaign intended to usher in a Republican president of
appropriate views in January 2017.
One may recognize that the money is there for such
a long-term drive and yet still wonder at the virulence of the
campaign to destroy Iran. What exactly allows the war party to keep
on as they do? Within Israel, the cause is a political theology that
obliges its believers to fight preemptive wars without any end in
sight in order to guard against enemies who have opposed the
existence of the Jewish state ever since its creation. This is a
defensive fear that responds to an irrefutable historical reality.
The neoconservatives and the better informed among their Republican
followers are harder to grasp -- harder anyway until you realize
that, for them, we are Rome and the Republican Party is the cradle
of future American emperors, praetors, and proconsuls.
“Ideology,” as the
political essayist and Czech dissident Vaclav Havel once wrote,
is “the bridge of excuses” a government offers to the people it
rules. Between 2001 and 2009, the U.S. government was run by
neoconservatives; they had a fair shot and the public judgment went
against them; but in a climate of resurgent confusion about the
Middle East, they have come a long way toward rebuilding their
bridge. They are zealots but also prudent careerists, and the
combination of money and revived propaganda may succeed in blurring
many unhappy memories. Nor can they be accused of insincerity. When
a theorist at a neoconservative think tank, the Foundation for
Defense of Democracies or the American Enterprise Institute, affirms
that democracy is what the Iranian people will have as soon as the
U.S. cripples the resources of that country, he surely believes what
he is saying. The projection seems as true to them now as it was in
2002, 2007, and 2010, as true as it will be in 2017 when a new
president, preferably another young man of “spirit” like George W.
Bush, succeeds the weak and deplorable Barack Obama. For such
people, the battle is never over, and there is always another war
ahead. They will push until they are stopped.
David Bromwich, a
TomDispatch regular, teaches literature at Yale
University and is the author of
Moral Imagination.
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Copyright 2015 David Bromwich.