Delusionary Thinking in Washington
The Desperate Plight of a Declining Superpower
By Michael T. Klare
May 28, 2015 "Information
Clearing House" - "Tom
Dispatch" - Take a look
around the world and it’s hard not to conclude that the United States is a
superpower in decline. Whether in Europe, Asia, or the Middle East, aspiring
powers are flexing their muscles, ignoring Washington’s dictates, or actively
combating them. Russia refuses to
curtail its support for armed separatists in Ukraine; China refuses to
abandon its base-building endeavors in the South China Sea; Saudi Arabia refuses to
endorse the U.S.-brokered nuclear deal with Iran; the Islamic State movement
(ISIS) refuses to
capitulate in the face of U.S. airpower. What is a declining superpower supposed
to do in the face of such defiance?This is no small
matter. For decades, being a superpower has been the defining characteristic of
American identity. The embrace of global supremacy began after World War II when
the United States assumed responsibility for resisting Soviet expansionism
around the world; it persisted through the Cold War era and only grew after the
implosion of the Soviet Union, when the U.S. assumed sole responsibility for
combating a whole new array of international threats. As General Colin Powell
famously exclaimed in the final days of the Soviet era, “We have to put a
shingle outside our door saying, ‘Superpower Lives Here,’ no matter what the
Soviets do, even if they evacuate from Eastern Europe.”
Imperial Overstretch Hits Washington
Strategically, in the Cold War years, Washington’s power
brokers assumed that there would always be two superpowers perpetually battling
for world dominance. In the wake of the utterly unexpected Soviet collapse,
American strategists began to envision a world of just one, of a “sole
superpower” (aka
Rome on the
Potomac). In line with this new outlook, the administration of George H.W.
Bush soon
adopted a long-range plan intended to preserve that status indefinitely.
Known as the Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 1994-99, it
declared: “Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new
rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that
poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union.”
H.W.’s son, then the governor of Texas, articulated a similar
vision of a globally encompassing Pax Americana when campaigning for
president in 1999. If elected, he
told military cadets at the Citadel in Charleston, his top goal would be “to
take advantage of a tremendous opportunity -- given few nations in history -- to
extend the current peace into the far realm of the future. A chance to project
America’s peaceful influence not just across the world, but across the years.”
For Bush, of course, “extending the peace” would turn out to
mean invading Iraq and igniting a devastating regional conflagration that only
continues to grow and spread to this day. Even after it began, he did not doubt
-- nor (despite the reputed wisdom offered by hindsight)
does he today -- that this was the price that had to be paid for the U.S. to
retain its vaunted status as the world’s sole superpower.
The problem, as many mainstream observers now acknowledge, is
that such a strategy aimed at perpetuating U.S. global supremacy at all costs
was always destined to result in what Yale historian Paul Kennedy, in his
classic book
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, unforgettably termed
“imperial overstretch.” As he presciently wrote in that 1987 study, it would
arise from a situation in which “the sum total of the United States’ global
interests and obligations is… far larger than the country’s power to defend all
of them simultaneously.”
Indeed, Washington finds itself in exactly that dilemma today.
What’s curious, however, is just how quickly such overstretch engulfed a country
that, barely a decade ago, was being hailed as the planet’s first “hyperpower,”
a status even more exalted than superpower. But that was before George W.’s
miscalculation in Iraq and other missteps left the U.S. to face a war-ravaged
Middle East with an exhausted military and a depleted treasury. At the same
time, major and regional powers like China, India, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
and Turkey have been building up their economic and military capabilities and,
recognizing the weakness that accompanies imperial overstretch, are beginning to
challenge U.S. dominance in many areas of the globe. The Obama
administration has been trying, in one fashion or another, to respond in all of
those areas -- among them Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and the South China Sea
-- but without, it turns out, the capacity to prevail in any of them.
Nonetheless,
despite a range of setbacks, no one in Washington’s power elite -- Senators Rand
Paul and Bernie Sanders being the exceptions that prove the rule -- seems to
have the slightest urge to abandon the role of sole superpower or even to back
off it in any significant way. President Obama, who is clearly
all too aware of the country’s strategic limitations, has been typical in
his unwillingness to retreat from such a supremacist vision. “The United States
is and remains the one indispensable nation,” he
told graduating cadets at West Point in May 2014. “That has been true for
the century past and it will be true for the century to come.”
How, then, to reconcile the reality of superpower overreach
and decline with an unbending commitment to global supremacy?
The first of two approaches to this conundrum in Washington
might be thought of as a high-wire circus act. It involves the constant
juggling of America’s capabilities and commitments, with its limited resources
(largely of a military nature) being rushed relatively fruitlessly from one
place to another in response to unfolding crises, even as attempts are made to
avoid yet more and deeper entanglements. This, in practice, has been the
strategy pursued by the current administration. Call it the
Obama Doctrine.
After concluding, for instance, that China had taken advantage
of U.S. entanglement in Iraq and Afghanistan to advance its own strategic
interests in Southeast Asia, Obama and his top advisers
decided to downgrade the U.S. presence in the Middle East and free up
resources for a more robust one in the western Pacific. Announcing this shift
in 2011 -- it would first be called a “pivot to Asia” and then a “rebalancing”
there -- the president made no secret of the juggling act involved.
“After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us
dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States is turning our attention to the
vast potential of the Asia Pacific region,” he
told members of the Australian Parliament that November. “As we end today’s
wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and mission
in the Asia Pacific a top priority. As a result, reductions in U.S. defense
spending will not -- I repeat, will not -- come at the expense of the Asia
Pacific.”
Then, of course, the new Islamic State launched its offensive
in Iraq in June 2014 and the American-trained army there collapsed with the loss
of
four northern cities. Videoed beheadings of American hostages followed,
along with a looming threat to the U.S.-backed regime in Baghdad. Once again,
President Obama found himself pivoting -- this time
sending thousands of U.S. military advisers back to that country,
putting American air power into its skies, and laying the groundwork for
another major conflict there.
Meanwhile, Republican critics of the president, who
claim he’s doing too little in a losing effort in Iraq (and Syria), have
also taken him to task for
not doing enough to implement the pivot to Asia. In reality, as his juggling
act that satisfies no one continues in Iraq and the Pacific, he’s had a hard
time finding the wherewithal to effectively confront Vladimir Putin in Ukraine,
Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, the various militias
fighting for power in fragmenting Libya, and so on.
The Party of Utter Denialism
Clearly, in the face of multiplying threats, juggling has not
proven to be a viable strategy. Sooner or later, the “balls” will simply go
flying and the whole system will threaten to fall apart. But however risky
juggling may prove, it is not nearly as dangerous as the other strategic
response to superpower decline in Washington: utter denial.
For those who adhere to this outlook, it’s not America’s
global stature that’s eroding, but its will -- that is, its willingness to talk
and act tough. If Washington were simply to speak more loudly, so this argument
goes, and brandish bigger sticks, all these challenges would simply melt away.
Of course, such an approach can only work if you’re prepared to back up your
threats with actual force, or “hard
power,” as some like to call it.
Among the most vocal of those touting this line is
Senator John
McCain, the chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a persistent
critic of President Obama. “For five years, Americans have been told that ‘the
tide of war is receding,’ that we can pull back from the world at little cost to
our interests and values,” he
typically wrote in March 2014 in a New York Times op-ed. “This has
fed a perception that the United States is weak, and to people like Mr. Putin,
weakness is provocative.” The only way to prevent aggressive behavior by Russia
and other adversaries, he stated, is “to restore the credibility of the United
States as a world leader.” This means, among other things, arming the Ukrainians
and anti-Assad Syrians, bolstering the NATO presence in Eastern Europe,
combating “the larger strategic challenge that Iran poses,” and playing a “more
robust” role (think: more “boots” on more ground) in the war against ISIS.
Above all, of course, it means a willingness to employ
military force. “When aggressive rulers or violent fanatics threaten our ideals,
our interests, our allies, and us,” he
declared last November, “what ultimately makes the difference… is the
capability, credibility, and global reach of American hard power.”
A similar approach -- in some cases
even more bellicose -- is being articulated by the bevy of Republican
candidates now in the race for president, Rand Paul again excepted. At a recent
“Freedom Summit” in the early primary state of South Carolina, the various
contenders sought to out-hard-power each other. Florida Senator Marco Rubio was
loudly cheered for promising to make the U.S. “the strongest military power
in the world.” Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker received a standing ovation for
pledging to further escalate the war on international terrorists: “I want a
leader who is willing to take the fight to them before they take the fight to
us.”
In this overheated environment, the 2016 presidential campaign
is certain to be dominated by calls for increased military spending, a tougher
stance toward Moscow and Beijing, and an expanded military presence in the
Middle East. Whatever her personal views, Hillary Clinton, the presumed
Democratic candidate, will be forced to demonstrate her backbone by embracing
similar positions. In other words, whoever enters the Oval Office in January
2017 will be expected to wield a far bigger stick on a significantly less stable
planet. As a result, despite the last decade and a half of
interventionary disasters, we’re likely to see an even more interventionist
foreign policy with an even greater impulse to use military force.
However initially gratifying such a stance is likely to prove
for John McCain and the growing body of war hawks in Congress, it will
undoubtedly prove disastrous in practice. Anyone who believes that the clock can
now be turned back to 2002, when U.S. strength was at its zenith and the Iraq
invasion had not yet depleted American wealth and vigor, is undoubtedly
suffering from delusional thinking. China is
far more
powerful than it was 13 years ago, Russia has
largely recovered from its post-Cold War slump, Iran has
replaced the U.S. as the dominant foreign actor in Iraq, and other powers
have acquired significantly greater freedom of action in an unsettled world.
Under these circumstances, aggressive muscle-flexing in Washington is likely to
result only in calamity or humiliation.
Time to Stop Pretending
Back, then, to our original question: What is a declining
superpower supposed to do in the face of this predicament?
Anywhere but in Washington, the obvious answer would for it to
stop pretending to be what it’s not. The first step in any 12-step
imperial-overstretch recovery program would involve accepting the fact that
American power is limited and global rule an impossible fantasy. Accepted as
well would have to be this obvious reality: like it or not, the U.S. shares the
planet with a coterie of other major powers -- none as strong as we are, but
none so weak as to be intimidated by the threat of U.S. military intervention.
Having absorbed a more realistic assessment of American power, Washington would
then have to focus on how exactly to cohabit with such powers -- Russia, China,
and Iran among them -- and manage its differences with them without igniting yet
more disastrous regional firestorms.
If strategic juggling and massive denial were not so embedded
in the political life of this country’s “war capital,” this would not be an
impossibly difficult strategy to pursue, as others have suggested. In 2010, for
example, Christopher Layne of the George H.W. Bush School at Texas A&M
argued in the American Conservative that the U.S. could no longer
sustain its global superpower status and, “rather than having this adjustment
forced upon it suddenly by a major crisis… should get ahead of the curve by
shifting its position in a gradual, orderly fashion.” Layne and others have
spelled out what this might entail: fewer military entanglements abroad, a
diminishing urge to
garrison the
planet, reduced military spending, greater reliance on allies, more funds to
use at home in rebuilding the crumbling infrastructure of a divided society, and
a diminished military footprint in the Middle East.
But for any of this to happen, American policymakers would
first have to abandon the pretense that the United States remains the sole
global superpower -- and that may be too bitter a pill for the present American
psyche (and for the political aspirations of certain Republican candidates) to
swallow. From such denialism, it’s already clear, will only come further
ill-conceived military adventures abroad and, sooner or later, under far grimmer
circumstances, an American reckoning with reality.
Michael T. Klare, a
TomDispatch regular, is a professor of peace and world security
studies at Hampshire College and the author, most recently, of
The Race for What’s Left. A documentary movie version of his book
Blood and Oil is available from the Media Education Foundation. Follow
him on Twitter at @mklare1.
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Copyright 2015 Michael T. Klare