U.S. Secretly Tracked Billions of Calls for Decades
By Brad Heath
April 08, 2015 "ICH"
- "USA
Today" -
WASHINGTON — The U.S. government started keeping secret records of Americans'
international telephone calls nearly a decade before the Sept. 11 terrorist
attacks, harvesting billions of calls in a program that provided a blueprint for
the far broader National Security Agency surveillance that followed.
For more
than two decades, the Justice Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration
amassed logs of virtually all telephone calls from the USA to as many as 116
countries linked to drug trafficking, current and former officials involved with
the operation said. The targeted countries changed over time but included
Canada, Mexico and most of Central and South America.
Federal investigators used the call records to track drug cartels'
distribution networks in the USA, allowing agents to detect previously unknown
trafficking rings and money handlers. They also used the records to help rule
out foreign ties to the bombing in 1995 of a federal building in Oklahoma City
and to identify U.S. suspects in a wide range of other investigations.
The Justice Department
revealed in January that the
DEA had collected data about calls to "designated foreign countries." But
the history and vast scale of that operation have not been disclosed until now.
The now-discontinued operation, carried out by the DEA's intelligence arm,
was the government's first known effort to gather data on Americans in bulk,
sweeping up records of telephone calls made by millions of U.S. citizens
regardless of whether they were suspected of a crime. It was a model for the
massive phone surveillance system the NSA launched to identify terrorists after
the Sept. 11 attacks. That dragnet drew sharp criticism that the government had
intruded too deeply into Americans' privacy after former NSA contractor Edward
Snowden leaked it to the news media two years ago.
More than a dozen current and former law enforcement and intelligence
officials described the details of the Justice Department operation to USA
TODAY. Most did so on the condition of anonymity because they were not
authorized to publicly discuss the intelligence program, part of which remains
classified.
The DEA program did not intercept the content of Americans' calls, but the
records — which numbers were dialed and when — allowed agents to map suspects'
communications and link them to troves of other police and intelligence data. At
first, the drug agency did so with help from military computers and intelligence
analysts.
That data collection was "one of the most important and effective Federal
drug law enforcement initiatives," the Justice Department said in a 1998 letter
to Sprint asking the telecom giant to turn over its call records. The previously
undisclosed letter was signed by the head of the department's Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs Section, Mary Lee Warren, who wrote that the operation had "been
approved at the highest levels of Federal law enforcement authority," including
then-Attorney General Janet Reno and her deputy, Eric Holder.
The data collection began in 1992 during the administration of President
George H.W. Bush, nine years before his son, President George W. Bush,
authorized the NSA to gather its own logs of Americans' phone calls in 2001. It
was approved by top Justice Department officials in four presidential
administrations and detailed in occasional briefings to members of Congress but
otherwise had little independent oversight, according to officials involved with
running it.
The DEA used its data collection extensively and in ways that the NSA is now
prohibited from doing. Agents gathered the records without court approval,
searched them more often in a day than the spy agency does in a year and
automatically linked the numbers the agency gathered to large electronic
collections of investigative reports, domestic call records accumulated by its
agents and intelligence data from overseas.
The result was "a treasure trove of very important information on
trafficking," former DEA administrator Thomas Constantine said in an interview.
The extent of that surveillance alarmed privacy advocates, who questioned its
legality. "This was aimed squarely at Americans," said Mark Rumold, an attorney
with the Electronic Frontier Foundation. "That's very significant from a
constitutional perspective."
Holder halted the data collection in September 2013 amid the fallout from
Snowden's revelations about other surveillance programs. In its place, current
and former officials said the drug agency sends telecom companies daily
subpoenas for international calling records involving only phone numbers that
agents suspect are linked to the drug trade or other crimes — sometimes a
thousand or more numbers a day.
Tuesday, Justice Department spokesman Patrick Rodenbush said the DEA "is no
longer collecting bulk telephony metadata from U.S. service providers." A DEA
spokesman declined to comment.
HARVESTING DATA TO BATTLE CARTELS
The DEA began assembling a data-gathering program in the 1980s as the
government searched for new ways to battle Colombian drug cartels. Neither
informants nor undercover agents had been enough to crack the cartels'
infrastructure. So the agency's intelligence arm turned its attention to the
groups' communication networks.
Calling records – often called "toll records" – offered one way to do that.
Toll records are comparable to what appears on a phone bill – the numbers a
person dialed, the date and time of the call, its duration and how it was paid
for. By then, DEA agents had decades of experience gathering toll records of
people they suspected were linked to drug trafficking, albeit one person at a
time. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, officials said the agency had little
way to make sense of the data their agents accumulated and almost no ability to
use them to ferret out new cartel connections. Some agents used legal pads.
"We were drowning in toll records," a former intelligence official said.
The DEA asked the Pentagon for help. The military responded with a pair of
supercomputers and intelligence analysts who had experience tracking the
communication patterns of Soviet military units. "What they discovered was that
the incident of a communication was perhaps as important as the content of a
communication," a former Justice Department official said.
The military installed the supercomputers on the fifth floor of the DEA's
headquarters, across from a shopping mall in Arlington, Va.
The system they built ultimately allowed the drug agency to stitch together
huge collections of data to map trafficking and money laundering networks both
overseas and within the USA. It allowed agents to link the call records its
agents gathered domestically with calling data the DEA and intelligence agencies
had acquired outside the USA. (In some cases, officials said the DEA paid
employees of foreign telecom firms for copies of call logs and subscriber
lists.) And it eventually allowed agents to cross-reference all of that against
investigative reports from the DEA, FBI and Customs Service.
The result "produced major international investigations that allowed us to
take some big people," Constantine said, though he said he could not identify
particular cases.
In 1989, President George H.W. Bush proposed in his first prime-time address
using "sophisticated intelligence-gathering and Defense Department technology"
to disrupt drug trafficking. Three years later, when violent crime rates were at
record highs, the drug agency intensified its intelligence push, launching a
"kingpin strategy" to attack drug cartels by going after their finances,
leadership and communication.
THE START OF BULK COLLECTION
In 1992, in the last months of Bush's administration, Attorney General
William Barr and his chief criminal prosecutor, Robert Mueller, gave the DEA
permission to collect a much larger set of phone data to feed into that
intelligence operation.
Instead of simply asking phone companies for records about calls made by
people suspected of drug crimes, the Justice Department began ordering telephone
companies to turn over lists of all phone calls from the USA to countries where
the government determined drug traffickers operated, current and former
officials said.
Barr and Mueller declined to comment, as did Barr's deputy, George
Terwilliger III, though Terwilliger said, "It has been apparent for a long time
in both the law enforcement and intelligence worlds that there is a tremendous
value and need to collect certain metadata to support legitimate
investigations."
The data collection was known within the agency as USTO (a play on the fact
that it tracked calls from the U.S. to other countries).
The DEA obtained those records using administrative subpoenas that allow the
agency to collect records "relevant or material to" federal drug investigations.
Officials acknowledged it was an expansive interpretation of that authority but
one that was not likely to be challenged because unlike search warrants, DEA
subpoenas do not require a judge's approval. "We knew we were stretching the
definition," a former official involved in the process said.
Officials said a few telephone companies were reluctant to provide so much
information, but none challenged the subpoenas in court. Those that hesitated
received letters from the Justice Department urging them to comply.
After Sprint executives expressed reservations in 1998, for example, Warren,
the head of the department's drug section, responded with a letter telling the
company that "the initiative has been determined to be legally appropriate" and
that turning over the call data was "appropriate and required by law." The
letter said the data would be used by authorities "to focus scarce investigative
resources by means of sophisticated pattern and link analysis."
The letter did not name other telecom firms providing records to the DEA but
did tell executives that "the arrangement with Sprint being sought by the DEA is
by no means unique to Sprint" and that "major service providers have been eager
to support and assist law enforcement within appropriate bounds." Former
officials said the operation included records from AT&T and other telecom
companies.
A spokesman for AT&T declined to comment. Sprint spokeswoman Stephanie Vinge
Walsh said only that "we do comply with all state and federal laws regarding law
enforcement subpoenas."
Agents said that when the data collection began, they sought to limit its use
mainly to drug investigations and turned away requests for access from the FBI
and the NSA. They allowed searches of the data in terrorism cases, including the
bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City that killed 168 people in 1995,
helping to rule out theories linking the attack to foreign terrorists. They
allowed even broader use after Sept. 11, 2001. The DEA's
public disclosure of its program in January came in the case of a man
charged with violating U.S. export restrictions by trying to send electrical
equipment to Iran.
At first, officials said the DEA gathered records only of calls to a handful
of countries, focusing on Colombian drug cartels and their supply lines. Its
reach grew quickly, and by the late 1990s, the DEA was logging "a massive number
of calls," said a former intelligence official who supervised the program.
Former officials said they could not recall the complete list of countries
included in USTO, and the coverage changed over time. The Justice Department and
DEA added countries to the list if officials could establish that they were home
to outfits that produced or trafficked drugs or were involved in money
laundering or other drug-related crimes.
The Justice Department
warned when it disclosed the program in January that the list of countries
should remain secret "to protect against any disruption to prospective law
enforcement cooperation."
At its peak, the operation gathered data on calls to 116 countries, an
official involved in reviewing the list said. Two other officials said they did
not recall the precise number of countries, but it was more than 100. That gave
the collection a considerable sweep; the U.S. government
recognizes a total of 195 countries.
At one time or another, officials said, the data collection covered most of
the countries in Central and South America and the Caribbean, as well as others
in western Africa, Europe and Asia. It included Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran,
Italy, Mexico and Canada.
The DEA often — though not always — notified foreign governments it was
collecting call records, in part to make sure its agents would not be expelled
if the program was discovered. In some cases, the DEA provided some of that
information to foreign law enforcement agencies to help them build their own
investigations, officials said.
The DEA did not have a real-time connection to phone companies' data;
instead, the companies regularly provided copies of their call logs, first on
computer disks and later over a private network. Agents who used the system said
the numbers they saw were seldom more than a few days old.
The database did not include callers' names or other identifying data.
Officials said agents often were able to identify individuals associated with
telephone numbers flagged by the analysis, either by cross-referencing them
against other databases or by sending follow-up requests to the phone companies.
To keep the program secret, the DEA sought not to use the information as
evidence in criminal prosecutions or in its justification for warrants or other
searches. Instead, its Special Operations Division passed the data to field
agents as tips to help them find new targets or focus existing investigations, a
process approved by Justice Department lawyers. Many of those tips were
classified because the DEA phone searches drew on other intelligence data.
That practice sparked a furor when
the Reuters news agency reported in 2013 that the DEA trained agents to
conceal the sources of those tips from judges and defense lawyers. Reuters said
the tips were based on wiretaps, foreign intelligence and a DEA database of
telephone calls gathered through routine subpoenas and search warrants.
As a result, "the government short-circuited any debate about the legality
and wisdom of putting the call records of millions of innocent people in the
hands of the DEA," American Civil Liberties Union lawyer Patrick Toomey said.
Listen to Brad Heath detail his investigation into decades of bulk data
collection in the audio player below:
A BLUEPRINT FOR BROADER SURVEILLANCE
The NSA began collecting its own data on Americans' phone calls within months
of Sept. 11, 2001, as a way to identify potential terrorists within the USA. At
first, it did so without court approval. In 2006, after
The New York Times and
USA TODAY began reporting on the surveillance program, President George W.
Bush's administration brought it under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, which allows the government to use secret court orders to get access to
records relevant to national security investigations. Unlike the DEA, the NSA
also gathered logs of calls within the USA.
The similarities between the NSA program and the DEA operation established a
decade earlier are striking – too much so to have been a coincidence, people
familiar with the programs said. Former NSA general counsel Stewart Baker said,
"It's very hard to see (the DEA operation) as anything other than the precursor"
to the NSA's terrorist surveillance.
Both operations relied on an expansive interpretation of the word "relevant,"
for example — one that allowed the government to collect vast amounts of
information on the premise that some tiny fraction of it would be useful to
investigators. Both used similar internal safeguards, requiring analysts to
certify that they had "reasonable articulable suspicion" – a comparatively low
legal threshold – that a phone number was linked to a drug or intelligence case
before they could query the records.
"The foundation of the NSA program was a mirror image of what we were doing,"
said a former Justice Department official who helped oversee the surveillance.
That official said he and others briefed NSA lawyers several times on the
particulars of their surveillance program. Two former DEA officials also said
the NSA had been briefed on the operation. The NSA declined to comment.
There were also significant differences.
For one thing, DEA analysts queried their data collection far more often. The
NSA said analysts searched its telephone database only about 300 times in 2012;
DEA analysts routinely performed that many searches in a day, former officials
said. Beyond that, NSA analysts must have approval from a judge on the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court each time they want to search their own
collection of phone metadata, and they do not
automatically cross-reference it with other intelligence files.
Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., then the chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, complained last year to Holder that the DEA had been gathering phone
data "in bulk" without judicial oversight. Officials said the DEA's database was
disclosed to judges only occasionally, in classified hearings.
Holder pulled the plug on the phone data collection in September 2013.
That summer, Snowden leaked a remarkable series of classified documents
detailing some of the government's most prized surveillance secrets, including
the NSA's logging of domestic phone calls and Internet traffic.
Reuters and
The New York Times raised questions about the drug agency's own
access to phone records.
Officials said the Justice Department told the DEA that it had determined it
could not continue both surveillance programs, particularly because part of its
justification for sweeping NSA surveillance was that it served national security
interests, not ordinary policing. Eight months after USTO was halted, for
example, department lawyers defended the spy agency's phone dragnet in court
partly on the grounds that it "serves special governmental needs above and
beyond normal law enforcement."
Three months after USTO was shut down, a review panel commissioned by
President Obama urged Congress to bar the NSA from gathering telephone data on
Americans in bulk. Not long after that, Obama instructed the NSA to get
permission from the surveillance court before querying its phone data
collection, a step the drug agency never was required to take.
The DEA stopped searching USTO in September 2013. Not long after that, it
purged the database.
"It was made abundantly clear that they couldn't defend both programs," a
former Justice Department official said. Others said Holder's message was more
direct. "He said he didn't think we should have that information," a former DEA
official said.
By then, agents said USTO was suffering from diminishing returns. More
criminals — especially the sophisticated cartel operatives the agency targeted —
were communicating on Internet messaging systems that are harder for law
enforcement to track.
Still, the shutdown took a toll, officials said. "It has had a major impact
on investigations," one former DEA official said.
The DEA asked the Justice Department to restart the surveillance program in
December 2013. It withdrew that request when agents came up with a new solution.
Every day, the agency assembles a list of the telephone numbers its agents
suspect may be tied to drug trafficking. Each day, it sends electronic subpoenas
— sometimes listing more than a thousand numbers — to telephone companies
seeking logs of international telephone calls linked to those numbers, two
official familiar with the program said.
The data collection that results is more targeted but slower and more
expensive. Agents said it takes a day or more to pull together communication
profiles that used to take minutes.
The White House
proposed a similar approach for the NSA's telephone surveillance program,
which is set to expire June 1. That approach would halt the NSA's bulk data
collection but would give the spy agency the power to force companies to turn
over records linked to particular telephone numbers, subject to a court order.
Follow investigative reporter Brad Heath on Twitter at
@bradheath.
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