Noam Chomsky on
Institutional Stupidity
By Noam Chomsky
Noam
Chomsky winner of this year’s
Philosophy Now Award for
contributions in the fight
against stupidity . The Award
was presented on Tuesday 27th
January 2015
March 27, 2015 "ICH"
- "Philosophy
Now" - Naturally I
am very pleased to be granted this honour,
and to be able to accept this award also in
the name of my colleague Edward Herman, the
co-author of Manufacturing Consent,
who himself has done a great deal of
outstanding work on this crucial topic. Of
course, we’re not the first people to have
addressed it.
Predictably, one of the
earlier ones was George Orwell. He’s written
a not very well known essay that is the
introduction of his famous book Animal
Farm. It’s not known because it wasn’t
published – it was found decades later in
his unpublished papers, but it is now
available. In this essay he points out that
Animal Farm is obviously a satire
on the totalitarian enemy; but he urges
people in free England to not feel too
self-righteous about that, because as he
puts it, in England, unpopular ideas can be
suppressed without the use of force. He goes
on to give examples of what he means, and
only a few sentences of explanation, but I
think they’re to the point.
One reason, he says, is
that the press is owned by wealthy men who
have every interest in not having certain
ideas expressed. His second is a interesting
point, that we didn’t go into but should
have: a good education. If you go to the
best schools you have instilled into you the
understanding that there are certain things
it just wouldn’t do to say. That, Orwell
claims, is a powerful hook that goes well
beyond the influence of the media.
Stupidity comes in many
forms. I’d like to say a few words on one
particular form that I think may be the most
troubling of all. We might call it
‘institutional stupidity’. It’s a kind of
stupidity that’s entirely rational within
the framework within which it operates: but
the framework itself ranges from grotesque
to virtual insanity.
Instead of trying to
explain it, it may be more helpful to
mention a couple of examples to illustrate
what I mean. Thirty years ago, in the early
eighties – the early Reagan years – I wrote
an article called ‘The Rationality of
Collective Suicide’. It was concerned with
nuclear strategy, and was about how
perfectly intelligent people were designing
a course of collective suicide in ways that
were reasonable within their framework of
geostrategic analysis.
I did not know at the time
quite how bad the situation was. We have
learnt a lot since. For instance, a recent
issue of The Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists presents a study of false
alarms from the automatic detection systems
the US and others use to detect incoming
missile attacks and other threats that could
be perceived as nuclear attack. The study
ran from 1977 to 1983, and it estimates that
during this period there were a minimum of
about 50 such false alarms, and a maximum of
about 255. These were alarms aborted by
human intervention, preventing disaster by a
matter of a few minutes.
It’s plausible to assume
that nothing substantial has changed since
then. But it actually gets much worse –
which I also did not understand at the time
of writing the book.
In 1983, at about the time
I was writing it, there was a major war
scare. This was in part due to what George
Kennan, the eminent diplomat, at the time
called “the unfailing characteristics of the
march towards war – that, and nothing else.”
It was initiated by programs the Reagan
administration undertook as soon as Reagan
came into office. They were interested in
probing Russian defences, so they simulated
air and naval attacks on Russia.
This was a time of great
tension. US Pershing missiles had been
installed in Western Europe, with a flight
time of about five to ten minutes to Moscow.
Reagan also announced his ‘Star Wars’
program, understood by strategists on both
sides to be a first strike weapon. In 1983,
Operation Able Archer included a practice
that “took Nato forces through a full-scale
simulated release of nuclear weapons.” The
KGB, we have learnt from recent archival
material, concluded that armed American
forces had been placed on alert, and might
even have begun the countdown to war.
The world has not quite
reached the edge of the nuclear abyss; but
during 1983, it had, without realizing it,
come frighteningly close – certainly closer
than at any time since the Cuban Missile
Crisis of 1962. The Russian leadership
believed that the US was preparing a first
strike, and might well have launched a
preemptive strike. I am actually quoting
from a recent US high-level intelligence
analysis, which concludes that the war scare
was for real. The analysis points out that
in the background was the Russians’ enduring
memory of Operation Barbarossa, the German
code-name for Hitler’s 1941 attack on the
Soviet Union, which was the worst military
disaster in Russian history, and came very
close to destroying the country. The US
analysis says that was exactly what the
Russians were comparing the situation to.
That’s bad enough, but it
gets still worse. About a year ago we
learned that right in the midst of these
world-threatening developments, Russia’s
early-warning system – similar to the
West’s, but much more inefficient – detected
an incoming missile strike from the US and
sent off the highest-level alert. The
protocol for the Soviet military was to
retaliate with a nuclear strike. But the
order has to pass through a human being. The
duty officer, a man named Stanislav Petrov,
decided to disobey orders and not to report
the warning to his superiors. He received an
official reprimand. But thanks to his
dereliction of duty, we’re now alive to talk
about it.
We know of a huge number
of false alarms on the US side. The Soviet
systems were far worse. Now nuclear systems
are being modernised.
The Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists have a
famous Doomsday Clock, and they recently
advanced it two minutes. They explain that
the clock “ticks now at three minutes to
midnight because international leaders are
failing to perform their most important
duty, ensuring and preserving the health and
vitality of human civilisation.”
Individually, these
international leaders are certainly not
stupid. However, in their institutional
capacity their stupidity is lethal in its
implications. Looking over the record since
the first – and so far only – atomic attack,
it’s a miracle that we’ve escaped.
Nuclear destruction is one
of the two major threats to survival, and a
very real one. The second, of course, is
environmental catastrophe.
There’s a well-known
professional services group at
PricewaterhouseCoopers who have just
released their annual study of the
priorities of CEOs. At the top of the list
is over-regulation. The report says
that climate change did not make it into the
top nineteen. Again, the CEOs are doubtless
not stupid individuals. Presumably they run
their businesses intelligently. But the
institutional stupidity is colossal,
literally life-threatening for the species.
Individual stupidity can
be remedied, but institutional stupidity is
much more resistant to change. At this stage
of human society, it truly endangers our
survival. That’s why I think institutional
stupidity should be a prime concern.
Thank you.
Questions From The Audience:
How could we overcome
media propaganda and improve the media?
Through education?
This is an old debate. In
the US it has been debated for over a
century within the framework of the First
Amendment to the US Constitution, which bars
government action from preventing
publication. Notice that it doesn’t protect
freedom of speech, nor block punishment for
speech.
There weren’t really many
cases dealing with the First Amendment up
until the Twentieth Century. The American
press were very free previously, and there
were a wide variety of all kinds of media:
journals, magazines, pamphlets. The Founding
Fathers believed in the freedom of
information, and there were many efforts to
stimulate the widest possible range of
independent media. Freedom of speech,
however, was not strongly protected.
Decisions on free speech
began to be made around the First World War,
but not by the courts. It wasn’t until the
1960s that the US established a high level
of protection of freedom of speech.
Meanwhile in the interwar period there was
extensive discussion within the framework of
what has been called ‘negative’ and
‘positive’ freedom, after Isaiah Berlin, of
what the First Amendment implies about
freedom of expression and of the press.
There was a view sometimes called ‘corporate
libertarianism’, which held that the First
Amendment should concern negative
freedom: that is the government can’t
interfere with the right of media owners to
do what they want. The other view was social
democratic, and came out of the New Deal
after the Depression and the early post-WWII
period. That view held that there should
also be positive freedom: in other
words, that people should have the right to
information as the basis for a democratic
society. That battle was waged in the 1940s,
and corporate libertarianism won. The US is
unusual in this respect. There’s nothing
like the BBC in the US. Most countries have
some kind of national media which are as
free as the society is. The US whacks that
to the margins. The media were basically
handed over to private power to exercise
their capacities as they choose. That’s an
interpretation of freedom of expression in
terms of negative freedom: the state can’t
intervene to affect what the private owners
decide to do. There are a few restrictions,
but not much. The consequences are pretty
much a control of ideas as Orwell describes,
and Edward Herman and I discuss this in
great detail.
How do you overcome it?
One way is education; but another way is by
returning to the concept of positive
freedom, which means recognising that in a
democratic society we put a high value on
the right of citizens to have access to a
wide range of opinions and beliefs. That
would, in the US, mean going back to what
was in effect the earliest conception of the
founders of the Republic, that there should
be, not so much government regulation of
what is said, but rather government support
for a wide variety of opinions,
news-gathering and interpretation – which
can be stimulated in many ways.
Government means
public: in a democratic society,
government ought not to be some Leviathan
making decisions. There are major grassroots
projects that are trying to develop a more
democratic media. This is a big battle
because of the enormous power of the
concentrated capital that of course tries to
impede this in every possible way. But it’s
a battle that has been going on for a long
time, and there are fundamental issues at
stake, including the issues of negative and
positive freedoms.
Do you have any
thoughts about the impact of search
algorithms and search bubbles on the
individual’s attempts to find information in
their attempts to subvert Big Media?
Like all of you, I use
search engines all the time. For people who
are sufficiently privileged, the internet is
very useful; but it’s usefulness is roughly
to the extent that you do have privilege.
‘Privileged’ here means education,
resources, a background ability to know what
to look for.
It’s like a library.
Suppose you decide ‘I want to be a
biologist’, and so you join the Harvard
Biology Library. Everything is in there, so
in principle you can become a biologist; but
of course it’s useless if you don’t know
what to look for, and don’t know how to
interpret what you see, and so on. It’s the
same with the internet. There’s a huge
amount of material out there – some valuable
and some not – but it takes understanding,
interpretation and background even to know
what to look for. That’s quite apart from
the fact that the Google system, for
instance, is not a neutral system. It
reflects advertiser interests in determining
what’s prominent and what isn’t, and you
have to know how to work your way through
this maze. So it’s back to education and
organisation enabling you to proceed.
I should stress that as an
individual, you’re pretty limited in what
you can come to understand, what ideas you
can develop, how to think, even. So if
you’re isolated, that highly restricts your
ability to have and evaluate ideas, either
in becoming a creative scientist or a
functioning citizen. That’s one reason why
the labor movement has always been at the
forefront against information suppression,
with workers education programs, for
example, which were once extremely
influential in both the UK and the US. The
decline of what sociologists call ‘secondary
associations’, where people come together to
search and inquire, is one of the processes
of atomisation which lead to people being
isolated and facing this mass of information
alone. So, the net’s a valuable tool, but as
with all tools, you have to be in a position
to be able to use it, and that’s not so
simple. It requires significant social
development.
How might it be
possible to make institutions less stupid?
Well, it depends on what
the institution is. I mentioned two: one is
the government in control of a nuclear
capacity; the other is the private sector,
which is pretty much controlled through
rather narrow concentrations of capital.
They require different approaches. With
regard to the government situation, this
requires developing a functioning democratic
society, in which an informed citizenry
would play a central role in determining
policy. The public is not in favour of
facing death and destruction from nuclear
weapons, and in this case we know in
principle how to eliminate the threat. If
the public were involved in developing
security policy, I think this institutional
stupidity could be overcome.
There’s a thesis in
international relations theory that the
prime concern of states is security. But
that leaves open the question: Security for
whom? If you look closely, it turns out it’s
not security of the population, it’s
security for privileged sectors within the
society – the sectors who hold state power.
There’s overwhelming evidence for this,
which unfortunately I don’t have time to
review. So one thing to do is to come to an
understanding of whose security the state is
in fact protecting: it’s not your
security. It can be tackled by building a
functioning democratic society.
On the issue of the
concentration of private power, there’s also
basically a problem of democratisation. A
corporation is a tyranny. It’s the purest
example of a tyranny you can imagine: power
resides at the top, orders are sent down
stage by stage, and at the very bottom, you
have the option of purchasing what it
produces. The population, the so-called
stakeholders in the community, have almost
no role in deciding what this entity does.
And these entities have been granted
extraordinary powers and rights, way beyond
those of the individual. But none of it is
graven in stone. None of it lies in economic
theory. This situation is the result of,
basically, class struggle, carried out by
highly class-conscious business classes over
a long period, which have now established
their effective domination over society in
various forms. But it doesn’t have to exist,
it can change. Again, that’s a matter of
democratising the institutions of social,
political, and economic life. Easy to say,
hard to do, but I think essential.
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