NATO Knew Its Intervention
In Libya Would Create Chaos And Aid al-Qaeda
By What's Left
March 17, 2015 "ICH"
- "What's
Left" -
Canadian military intelligence knew that
NATO’s March 2011 intervention in Libya
would aid militant theocratic Islamists
aligned with al-Qaeda and could create
long-term chaos in the country, according to
David Pugliese, a reporter with The Ottawa
Citizen, who obtained Canadian intelligence
documents.
At the time, NATO military
leader, U.S. Admiral James Stavridis, denied
that opposition to the secular leftist
Libyan leader Muamar Gaddafi was dominated
by rightwing Islamist theocrats, calling the
bulk of the opposition forces “responsible
men and women.”
But Canadian intelligence
was clear-eyed about the nature of the
Libyan opposition.
Pugliese revealed that “A
Canadian intelligence report written in late
2009 described the anti-Gadhafi stronghold
of eastern Libya,” from which the uprising
against Gaddafi erupted, “as an epicentre of
Islamist extremism.”
And Canadian pilots joked
privately that they were part of al-Qaeda’s
air force, “since their bombing runs helped
to pave the way for rebels aligned with the
terrorist group.”
Pugliese reports that just
days before NATO’s intervention in Libya,
Canadian intelligence
specialists sent a briefing report
shared with senior officers. ‘There is
the increasing possibility that the
situation in Libya will transform into a
long-term tribal/civil war,’ they wrote
in their March 15, 2011 assessment.
‘This is particularly probable if
opposition forces receive military
assistance from foreign militaries.’
Canada’s Prime Minister
Stephen Harper later denied that NATO’s
intervention created the chaos that has
paralyzed Libya, despite his own military’s
warning that there was a good chance it
would.
This reveals a dishonest
attempt to manipulate public opinion through
outright deception, in line with Israeli
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s efforts
to mobilize support for military
intervention in Iran by warning in 2012 that
Iran was only a year away from making a
nuclear bomb when his own intelligence
agency had concluded that Iran was “not
performing the activity necessary to produce
weapons”.
Pugliese’s report can be
read
here.