The Real American
Exceptionalism
From Torture to Drone Assassination, How
Washington Gave Itself a Global
Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card
By Alfred W. McCoy
February 24, 2015 "ICH"
- "Tom
Dispatch" -
"The sovereign is he who decides on the
exception,” said conservative thinker Carl
Schmitt in 1922, meaning that a nation’s
leader can defy the law to serve the greater
good. Though Schmitt’s service as Nazi
Germany’s chief jurist and his unwavering
support for Hitler from the night of the
long knives to Kristallnacht and beyond
damaged his reputation for decades, today
his ideas have achieved unimagined
influence. They have, in fact, shaped the
neo-conservative view of presidential power
that has become broadly bipartisan since
9/11. Indeed, Schmitt has influenced
American politics directly through his
intellectual protégé Leo Strauss who, as an
émigré professor at the University of
Chicago, trained Bush administration
architects of the Iraq war Paul Wolfowitz
and Abram Shulsky.
All that should be impressive enough for a
discredited, long dead authoritarian
thinker. But Schmitt’s dictum also became a
philosophical foundation for the exercise of
American global power in the quarter century
that followed the end of the Cold War.
Washington, more than any other power,
created the modern international community
of laws and treaties, yet it now reserves
the right to defy those same laws with
impunity. A sovereign ruler should, said
Schmitt, discard laws in times of national
emergency. So the United States, as the
planet’s last superpower or, in Schmitt’s
terms, its global sovereign, has in these
years repeatedly ignored international law,
following instead its own unwritten rules of
the road for the exercise of world power.
Just as Schmitt’s
sovereign preferred to rule in a state of
endless exception without a constitution for
his Reich, so Washington is now well into
the second decade of an endless War on
Terror that seems the sum of its exceptions
to international law: endless incarceration,
extrajudicial killing, pervasive
surveillance, drone strikes in defiance of
national boundaries, torture on demand, and
immunity for all of the above on the grounds
of state secrecy. Yet these many American
exceptions are just surface manifestations
of the ever-expanding clandestine dimension
of the American state. Created at the cost
of more than a trillion dollars since 9/11,
the purpose of this vast apparatus is to
control a covert domain that is fast
becoming the main arena for geopolitical
contestation in the twenty-first century.
This should be (but seldom
is considered) a jarring, disconcerting path
for a country that, more than any other,
nurtured the idea of, and wrote the rules
for, an international community of nations
governed by the rule of law. At the First
Hague Peace Conference in 1899, the U.S.
delegate, Andrew Dickson White, the founder
of Cornell University, pushed for the
creation of a Permanent Court of Arbitration
and persuaded Andrew Carnegie to build the
monumental Peace Palace at The Hague as its
home. At the Second Hague Conference in
1907, Secretary of State Elihu Root urged
that future international conflicts be
resolved by a court of professional jurists,
an idea realized when the Permanent Court of
International Justice was established in
1920.
After World War II, the
U.S. used its triumph to help create the
United Nations, push for the adoption of its
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
ratify the Geneva Conventions for
humanitarian treatment in war. If you throw
in other American-backed initiatives like
the World Health Organization, the World
Trade Organization, and the World Bank, you
pretty much have the entire infrastructure
of what we now casually call “the
international community.”
Breaking the Rules
Not only did the U.S. play
a crucial role in writing the new rules for
that community, but it almost immediately
began breaking them. After all, despite the
rise of the other superpower, the Soviet
Union, Washington was by then the world
sovereign and so could decide which should
be the exceptions to its own rules,
particularly to the foundational principle
for all this global governance: sovereignty.
As it struggled to dominate the hundred new
nations that started appearing right after
the war, each one invested with an
inviolable sovereignty, Washington needed a
new means of projecting power beyond
conventional diplomacy or military force. As
a result, CIA covert operations became its
way of intervening within a new world order
where you couldn’t or at least shouldn’t
intervene openly.
All of the exceptions that
really matter spring from America’s decision
to join what former spy John Le Carré
called that “squalid procession of vain
fools, traitors... sadists, and drunkards,”
and embrace espionage in a big way after
World War II. Until the creation of the CIA
in 1947, the United States had been an
innocent abroad in the world of
intelligence. When General John J. Pershing
led two million American troops to Europe
during World War I, the U.S. had the only
army on either side of the battle lines
without an intelligence service. Even though
Washington built a substantial security
apparatus during that war, it was quickly
scaled back by Republican conservatives
during the 1920s. For decades, the impulse
to cut or constrain such secret agencies
remained robustly bipartisan, as when
President Harry Truman abolished the CIA’s
predecessor, the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS), right after World War II or
when President Jimmy Carter fired 800 CIA
covert operatives after the Vietnam War.
Yet by fits and starts,
the covert domain inside the U.S. government
has grown stealthily from the early
twentieth century to this moment. It began
with the formation of the FBI in 1908 and
Military Intelligence in 1917. The Central
Intelligence Agency followed after World War
II along with most of the alphabet agencies
that make up the present
U.S. Intelligence Community, including
the National Security Agency (NSA), the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and last
but hardly least, in 2004, the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence. Make no
mistake: there is a clear correlation
between state secrecy and the rule of law --
as one grows, the other surely shrinks.
World Sovereign
America’s irrevocable
entry into this covert netherworld came when
President Truman deployed his new CIA to
contain Soviet subversion in Europe. This
was a continent then thick with spies of
every stripe: failed fascists, aspirant
communists, and everything in between.
Introduced to spycraft by its British
“cousins,” the CIA soon mastered it in part
by establishing sub rosa ties to networks of
ex-Nazi spies, Italian fascist operatives,
and dozens of continental secret services.
As the world’s new
sovereign, Washington used the CIA to
enforce its chosen exceptions to the
international rule of law, particularly to
the core principle of sovereignty. During
his two terms, President Dwight Eisenhower
authorized 104 covert operations on four
continents, focused largely on controlling
the many new nations then emerging from
centuries of colonialism. Eisenhower’s
exceptions included blatant transgressions
of national sovereignty such as turning
northern Burma into an unwilling springboard
for abortive invasions of China, arming
regional revolts to partition Indonesia, and
overthrowing elected governments in
Guatemala and Iran. By the time Eisenhower
left office in 1961, covert ops had acquired
such a powerful mystique in Washington that
President John F. Kennedy would authorize
163 of them in the three years that preceded
his assassination.
As a senior CIA official
posted to the Near East in the early 1950s
put it, the Agency then saw every Muslim
leader who was not pro-American as “a target
legally authorized by statute for CIA
political action.” Applied on a global scale
and not just to Muslims, this policy helped
produce a distinct “reverse wave” in the
global trend towards democracy from 1958 to
1975, as coups -- most of them
U.S.-sanctioned -- allowed military men to
seize power in more than three-dozen
nations, representing a quarter of the
world’s sovereign states.
The
White House’s “exceptions” also produced a
deeply contradictory U.S. attitude toward
torture from the early years of the Cold War
onward. Publicly, Washington’s opposition to
torture was manifest in its advocacy of the
U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
in 1948 and the Geneva Conventions in 1949.
Simultaneously and secretly, however, the
CIA began developing ingenious new torture
techniques in contravention of those same
international conventions. After a decade of
mind-control research, the CIA
actually codified its new method of
psychological torture in a secret
instructional handbook, the "KUBARK
Counterintelligence Interrogation" manual,
which it then disseminated within the U.S.
Intelligence Community and to allied
security services worldwide.
Much of the torture that
became synonymous with the era of
authoritarian rule in Asia and Latin America
during the 1960s and 1970s seems to have
originated in U.S. training programs that
provided sophisticated techniques,
up-to-date equipment, and moral legitimacy
for the practice. From 1962 to 1974, the CIA
worked through the Office of Public Safety
(OPS), a division of the U.S. Agency for
International Development that sent American
police advisers to developing nations.
Established by President Kennedy in 1962, in
just six years OPS
grew into a global anti-communist
operation with over 400 U.S. police
advisers. By 1971, it had trained more than
a million policemen in 47 nations, including
85,000 in South Vietnam and 100,000 in
Brazil.
Concealed within this
larger OPS effort,
CIA interrogation training became
synonymous with serious human rights abuses,
particularly in Iran, the Philippines, South
Vietnam, Brazil, and Uruguay. Amnesty
International
documented widespread torture, usually
by local police, in 24 of the 49 nations
that had hosted OPS police-training teams.
In tracking torturers across the globe,
Amnesty seemed to be following the trail of
CIA training programs. Significantly,
torture began to recede when America again
turned resolutely against the practice at
the end of the Cold War.
The War on Terror
Although the CIA’s
authority for assassination, covert
intervention, surveillance, and torture was
curtailed at the close of the Cold War, the
terror attacks of September 2001 sparked an
unprecedented expansion in the scale of the
intelligence community and a corresponding
resurgence in executive exceptions. The War
on Terror’s voracious appetite for
information produced, in its first decade,
what the Washington Post
branded a veritable "fourth branch" of
the U.S. federal government with 854,000
vetted security officials, 263 security
organizations, over 3,000 private and public
intelligence agencies, and 33 new security
complexes -- all pumping out a total of
50,000 classified intelligence reports
annually by 2010.
By that time, one of the
newest members of the Intelligence
Community, the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
already had 16,000 employees, a $5
billion budget, and a massive nearly $2
billion headquarters at Fort
Belvoir, Maryland -- all aimed at
coordinating the flood of surveillance data
pouring in from drones, U-2 spy planes,
Google Earth, and orbiting satellites.
According to documents
whistleblower Edward Snowden leaked to the
Washington Post, the U.S.
spent $500 billion on its intelligence
agencies in the dozen years after the 9/11
attacks,
including annual appropriations in 2012
of $11 billion for the National Security
Agency (NSA) and $15 billion for the CIA. If
we add the $790 billion
expended on the Department of Homeland
Security to that $500 billion for overseas
intelligence, then Washington had spent
nearly $1.3 trillion to build a secret
state-within-the-state of absolutely
unprecedented size and power.
As this secret state
swelled, the world’s sovereign decided that
some extraordinary exceptions to civil
liberties at home and sovereignty abroad
were in order. The most glaring came with
the CIA’s now-notorious renewed use of
torture on suspected terrorists and its
setting up of its own global network of
private prisons, or “black
sites,” beyond the reach of any court or
legal authority. Along with piracy and
slavery, the abolition of torture had long
been a signature issue when it came to the
international rule of law. So strong was
this principle that the U.N. General
Assembly voted unanimously in 1984 to adopt
the Convention Against Torture. When it came
to ratifying it, however, Washington
dithered on the subject until the end of the
Cold War when it finally resumed its
advocacy of international justice,
participating in the World Conference on
Human Rights at Vienna in 1993 and, a year
later, ratifying the U.N. Convention Against
Torture.
Even then, the sovereign
decided to reserve some exceptions for his
country alone. Only a year after President
Bill Clinton signed the U.N. Convention, CIA
agents
started snatching terror suspects in the
Balkans, some of them Egyptian nationals,
and sending them to Cairo, where a
torture-friendly autocracy could do whatever
it wanted to them in its prisons. Former CIA
director George Tenet
later testified that, in the years
before 9/11, the CIA shipped some 70
individuals to foreign countries without
formal extradition -- a process dubbed
“extraordinary rendition” that had been
explicitly banned under Article 3 of the
U.N. Convention.
Right after his public
address to a shaken nation on September 11,
2001, President George W. Bush gave his
staff wide-ranging secret orders to use
torture,
adding (in a vernacular version of
Schmitt’s dictum),“I don’t care what the
international lawyers say, we are going to
kick some ass.” In this spirit, the White
House authorized the CIA to develop that
global matrix of secret prisons, as well as
an
armada of planes for spiriting kidnapped
terror suspects to them, and a
network of allies who could
help seize those suspects from sovereign
states and levitate them into a
supranational gulag of eight agency
black sites from Thailand to Poland or into
the crown jewel of the system, Guantánamo,
thus eluding laws and treaties that remained
grounded in territorially based concepts of
sovereignty.
Once the CIA
closed the black sites in 2008-2009, its
collaborators in this global gulag began to
feel the force of law for their crimes
against humanity. Under pressure from the
Council of Europe, Poland
started an ongoing criminal
investigation in 2008 into its security
officers who had facilitated the CIA’s
secret prison in the country’s northeast. In
September 2012, Italy’s supreme court
confirmed the convictions of 22 CIA agents
for the illegal rendition of Egyptian exile
Abu Omar from Milan to Cairo, and ordered a
trial for Italy’s military intelligence
chief on charges that
sentenced him to 10 years in prison. In
2012, Scotland Yard opened a criminal
investigation into MI6 agents who rendered
Libyan dissidents to Colonel Gaddafi’s
prisons for torture, and two years later the
Court of Appeal
allowed some of those Libyans to file a
civil suit against MI6 for kidnapping and
torture.
But
not the CIA. Even after the Senate’s
2014 Torture Report
documented the Agency’s
abusive tortures in painstaking detail,
there was no move for either criminal or
civil sanctions against those who had
ordered torture or those who had carried it
out. In a
strong editorial on December 21, 2014,
the New York Times asked “whether
the nation will stand by and allow the
perpetrators of torture to have perpetual
immunity.” The answer, of course, was yes.
Immunity for hirelings is one of the
sovereign’s most important exceptions.
As President Bush finished
his second term in 2008, an inquiry by the
International Commission of Jurists found
that the CIA’s mobilization of allied
security agencies worldwide had done serious
damage to the international rule of law.
“The executive… should under no circumstance
invoke a situation of crisis to deprive
victims of human rights violations… of
their… access to justice,” the Commission
recommended after documenting the
degradation of civil liberties in some 40
countries. “State secrecy and similar
restrictions must not impede the right to an
effective remedy for human rights
violations.”
The Bush years also
brought Washington’s most blatant
repudiation of the rule of law. Once the
newly established International Criminal
Court (ICC) convened at The Hague in 2002,
the Bush White House “un-signed”
or “de-signed” the U.N. agreement creating
the court and then mounted a sustained
diplomatic effort to immunize U.S. military
operations from its writ. This was an
extraordinary abdication for the nation that
had breathed the concept of an international
tribunal into being.
The Sovereign’s
Unbounded Domains
While Presidents
Eisenhower and Bush decided on exceptions
that violated national boundaries and
international treaties, President Obama is
exercising his exceptional prerogatives in
the unbounded domains of aerospace and
cyberspace.
Both are new, unregulated
realms of military conflict beyond the
rubric of international law and Washington
believes it can use them as Archimedean
levers for global dominion. Just as Britain
once ruled from the seas and postwar America
exercised its global reach via airpower, so
Washington now sees aerospace and cyberspace
as special realms for domination in the
twenty-first century.
Under Obama, drones have
grown from a tactical Band-Aid in
Afghanistan into a strategic weapon for the
exercise of global power. From 2009 to 2015,
the CIA and the U.S. Air Force deployed a
drone armada of over 200 Predators and
Reapers,
launching 413 strikes in Pakistan alone,
killing as many as 3,800 people. Every
Tuesday inside the White House Situation
Room, as the New York Times
reported in 2012, President Obama
reviews a CIA drone “kill list” and
stares at the faces of those who are
targeted for
possible assassination from the air. He
then decides, without any legal procedure,
who will live and who will die, even in the
case of
American citizens. Unlike other world
leaders, this sovereign applies the ultimate
exception across the Greater Middle East,
parts of Africa, and elsewhere if he
chooses.
This lethal success is the
cutting edge of a top-secret Pentagon
project that will, by 2020, deploy a
triple-canopy space “shield” from
stratosphere to exosphere, patrolled by
Global Hawk and X-37B drones armed with
agile missiles.
As Washington seeks to
police a restless globe from sky and space,
the world might well ask: How high is any
nation’s sovereignty? After the successive
failures of the Paris flight conference of
1910, the Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare of
1923, and Geneva’s
Protocol I of 1977 to establish the
extent of sovereign airspace or restrain
aerial warfare, some puckish Pentagon lawyer
might reply: only as high as you can enforce
it.
President Obama has also
adopted the NSA’s vast surveillance system
as a permanent weapon for the exercise of
global power. At the broadest level, such
surveillance complements Obama’s overall
defense strategy, announced in 2012, of
cutting conventional forces while
preserving U.S. global power through a
capacity for “a combined arms campaign
across all domains: land, air, maritime,
space, and cyberspace.” In addition, it
should be no surprise that, having pioneered
the war-making possibilities of cyberspace,
the president did not hesitate to
launch the first cyberwar in history
against Iran.
By the end of Obama’s
first term, the NSA could sweep up billions
of messages worldwide through its agile
surveillance architecture. This included
hundreds of
access points for penetration of the
Worldwide Web’s fiber optic cables;
ancillary intercepts through special
protocols and “backdoor” software flaws;
supercomputers to crack the encryption of
this digital torrent; and a massive data
farm in
Bluffdale, Utah, built at a cost of $2
billion to store yottabytes of purloined
data.
Even after angry Silicon
Valley executives
protested that the NSA’s “backdoor”
software surveillance threatened their
multi-trillion-dollar industry, Obama
called the combination of Internet
information and supercomputers “a powerful
tool.” He insisted that, as “the world’s
only superpower,” the United States “cannot
unilaterally disarm our intelligence
agencies.” In other words, the sovereign
cannot sanction any exceptions to his
panoply of exceptions.
Revelations from Edward
Snowden’s cache of leaked documents in late
2013 indicate that the NSA has conducted
surveillance of
leaders in some 122 nations worldwide,
35 of them
closely, including Brazil’s president
Dilma Rousseff, former Mexican president
Felipe Calderón, and
German Chancellor Angela Merkel. After her
forceful protest, Obama agreed to exempt
Merkel’s phone from future NSA surveillance,
but
reserved the right, as he put it, to
continue to “gather information about the
intentions of governments… around the
world.” The sovereign
declined to say which world leaders
might be exempted from his omniscient gaze.
Can there be any question
that, in the decades to come, Washington
will continue to violate national
sovereignty through old-style covert as well
as open interventions, even as it insists on
rejecting any international conventions that
restrain its use of aerospace or cyberspace
for unchecked force projection, anywhere,
anytime? Extant laws or conventions that in
any way check this power will be violated
when the sovereign so decides. These are now
the unwritten rules of the road for our
planet. They represent the real American
exceptionalism.
Alfred W. McCoy is
professor of history at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison. A
TomDispatch regular, he is
the author of
Torture & Impunity: The U.S. Doctrine of
Coercive Interrogation,
among other works.
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Single-Superpower World.
Copyright 2015 Alfred W.
McCoy