Non-Dollar Trading Is
Killing the Petrodollar
And the Foundation of U.S.-Saudi Policy in
the Middle East
By Alastair Crooke
December 29, 2014 "ICH"
- "HP"
- -
BEIRUT -- A profound transformation of the
global monetary system is underway. It is
being driven by a perfect storm: the need
for Russia and Iran to escape Western
sanctions, the low interest rate policy of
the U.S. Federal Reserve to keep the
American economy afloat and the increasing
demand for Middle East oil by China.
The implications of this
transformation are immense for U.S. policy
in the Middle East which, for 50 years, has
been founded on a partnership with Saudi
Arabia.
ESCAPING SANCTIONS
As economic sanctions are
increasingly part of the West's arsenal,
those non-Western countries that are the
target -- or potential target -- of such
sanctions are devising a counterpunch:
non-dollar trading. It would, in effect,
nullify the impact of sanctions.
Whether in yuan or roubles,
non-dollar trading -- which enables
countries to bypass U.S. claims to legal
jurisdiction -- will transform the prospects
facing Iran and Syria, particularly in the
field of energy reserves, and deeply affect
Iraq which is situated between the two.
President Putin has said
(in the context of reducing Russia's
economic vulnerabilities) that he views the
dollar monopoly in energy trade as damaging
to the Russian economy. Since
hydrocarbon revenues form the most
substantive part of Russia's revenues,
Putin's desire to take action in this area
is not surprising.
In the face of sanctions,
Putin is seeking to reduce its economic
dependence on the West. Russia has signed
two "holy grail"
gas contracts with China and is in
negotiations to offer the latter
sophisticated weaponry. It is also in
the process of finalizing significant trade
deals with
India and
Iran. All of this will be to the benefit
of Iran, too: the Russians
recently announced a deal to build
several new nuclear power plants there.
THE RISE OF THE
PETRODOLLAR
The dollar's role as the
world's reserve currency was first
established in 1944 with the
Bretton Woods agreement. The U.S. was
able assume this role by virtue of it then
having the largest gold reserves in the
world. The dollar was
pegged at $35 an ounce -- and freely
exchangeable into gold at that rate. But by
1971, convertibility into gold was no longer
viable as America's gold resources drained
away. Instead, the dollar became a pure fiat
currency (decoupled from any physical store
of value), until the petrodollar agreement
was
concluded by President Nixon in 1973.
The essence of the deal
was that the U.S. would agree to military
sales and defense of Saudi Arabia in return
for all oil trade being denominated in U.S.
dollars.
As a result of this
agreement, the dollar then became the only
medium in which energy exchange could be
transacted. This underpinned its reserve
currency status through the need for foreign
governments to hold dollars; recirculated
the dollar costs of oil back into the U.S.
financial system and -- crucially -- made
the dollar effectively convertible into
barrels of oil. The dollar was moved from a
gold standard onto a crude oil standard.
U.S. interest rates were
then managed so that oil exporters (who
formerly looked to gold as the basis of
their reserves) would be indifferent to
whether they stored their currency reserves,
earned from oil exports, in U.S. treasuries,
or in gold. The value was equivalent.
According to
Sprott Global, a specialist
U.S. energy consultancy:
The Fed consistently
managed Fed funds rates to keep oil
prices steady, even when it required
mid-teens interest rates and
back-to-back recessions in 1980-1982.
Since U.S. Fed funds rates were managed
to preserve U.S. creditors' and oil
exporters' purchasing power in oil
terms, the system proved acceptable to
most nations.
While the petrodollar
arrangement worked well for nearly 30
years, the arrangement began to wobble
around 2002-2004. . . Oil prices began
steadily rising in 2002 and 2003 while
Fed funds rates remained low to mitigate
the fallout from the 2001 U.S.
recession/tech bubble.
As a result, the
number of barrels of oil that could be
purchased for a face value U.S. Treasury
bond declined sharply. . . After
maintaining a range of 55-60 barrels of
oil per U.S. Treasury from 1986-1999, a
$1,000 face value U.S. Treasury went
from buying 60 barrels of oil in 1999 to
under 30 by early 2004.
TOO MANY DOLLARS
But what may ultimately be
seen to have proved fateful to the
petrodollar system has been the policy of
zero interest rate policy and "quantitative
easing" pursued so unrestrainedly since
2008. Effectively, energy producers saw that
the U.S. economy had now become so dependent
on low interest rates that it could never
again manage to keep oil prices steady
relative to U.S. treasuries without blowing
up the global financial system. The U.S.
economy had now become so dependent on low
interest rates that it could never again
manage to keep oil prices steady relative to
U.S. treasuries without blowing up the
global financial system. The U.S. economy
had now become
too "financialized" to withstand
anything more than a token interest rate
hike.
The petrodollar system,
which had allowed the U.S. dollar to
supplant gold as the backing for the oil
trade from 1973-2002, was broken.
Energy producers began to
accumulate real assets (such as real
estate), and returned to purchasing physical
gold in lieu of U.S. treasuries. Finally
this year, the long established
re-circulation of petrodollars back into the
U.S. financial system came to an end --
according to BNP. "The oil producers
will effectively import capital amounting to
$7.6 billion. By comparison, they exported
$60 billion in 2013 and $248 billion in
2012,"
Reuters reported. "This will be the
first year in a long time that energy
exporters will be sucking capital [and
liquidity] out," noted
David Spegel, global head of emerging
market sovereign and corporate research at
BNP.
THE STRAW THAT
BREAKS THE PETRODOLLAR'S BACK
This then, is the backdrop
to Putin's remarks about the dollar monopoly
and against which he is likely to craft his
response to Saudi Arabia's decision to
message the market into accepting that the
Kingdom
would not defend $100 oil, but will be
content to see the price drop 30 percent.
(And whatever the market circumstances --
and other Saudi objectives -- that may have
contributed to the fall in price, there is
little doubt that"'oil price war" is the
interpretation that President Putin will
place on it).
This new oil price drop
simply is
crushing producers' currencies in
foreign exchange markets. The combination of
the petrodollar losing its ability to act as
a store of value, combined now with exchange
rate blues, may be the straw that breaks the
producer "camel's back" in respect to OPEC
and dollar denomination.
IRAN AND RUSSIA
VS. SAUDI ARABIA?
Such a moment would seem
ripe for Russia and Iran to begin a gradual
challenge to Saudi's leadership of the OPEC
cartel and to the dollar-denominated energy
system, if enough OPEC members and other
producers are prepared to rebel. Iran has
been lobbying hard in this direction.
In the longer term, Russia
might take up Prince Bandar's suggestion
that Russia become a key determiner of oil
prices and output -- but in a cartel of its
own making, rather than in the manner Bandar
had proposed in July 2013 when he said: "Let
us examine how to put together a unified
Russian-Saudi strategy on the subject of
oil. The aim is to agree on the price of oil
and production quantities that keep the
price stable in global oil markets,"
according to one diplomatic account.
WHY THE ROUBLE OR
YUAN INSTEAD OF THE DOLLAR?
And why should producers
opt for roubles or yuan? Well, both China
and Russia have recently been big buyers of
physical gold. Russia's present gold
reserves would back
27 percent of the narrow rouble money
supply. That is a high ratio -- far in
excess of any other major country, and also
in excess of the U.S. Fed's original
stipulated gold coverage minimum. Moreover,
Russia is a large net exporter of goods and
energy, notwithstanding sanctions. So
Russia's gold reserves, by implication, are
likely to continue to grow, rather than
decline.
In the longer term,
holding roubles or yuan may allow producers
to escape the damaging inflationary effects
of a dollar system now dependent for its
stability on low interest rates and monetary
expansion.
These prospective changes
are still speculative, but are potentially
highly significant. The petrodollar has
lasted for over 41 years, and has been the
driving force behind America's economic,
political and military power. It would be
ironic, indeed, were the tensions with
Russia inadvertently to become the driver of
America finally losing its petrodollar card.
Alastair Crooke is a
fmr. MI-6 agent; Author, 'Resistance: The
Essence of Islamic Revolution'
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