If Europe has any insight, it will separate
itself from these U.S. foreign policy
debacles.
By Jeffrey D. Sachs
The
war in Ukraine is the culmination of a
30-year project of the American
neoconservative movement. The Biden
administration is packed with the same
neocons who championed the U.S. wars of
choice in Serbia (1999), Afghanistan (2001),
Iraq (2003), Syria (2011), Libya (2011), and
who did so much to provoke Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine.
The neocon
track record is one of unmitigated disaster,
yet Biden has staffed his team with neocons.
As a result, Biden is steering Ukraine, the
U.S. and the European Union towards yet
another geopolitical debacle. If Europe has
any insight, it will separate itself from
these U.S. foreign policy debacles.
The neocon
movement emerged in the 1970s around a group
of public intellectuals, several of whom
were influenced by University of Chicago
political scientist Leo Strauss and Yale
University classicist Donald Kagan. Neocon
leaders included Norman Podhoretz, Irving
Kristol, Paul Wolfowitz, Robert Kagan (son
of Donald), Frederick Kagan (son of Donald),
Victoria Nuland (wife of Robert), Elliott
Cohen, Elliott Abrams and Kimberley Allen
Kagan (wife of Frederick).
The main
message of the neocons is that the U.S. must
predominate in military power in every
region of the world and must confront rising
regional powers that could someday challenge
U.S. global or regional dominance, most
important Russia and China. For this
purpose, U.S. military force should be
pre-positioned in hundreds of military bases
around the world and the U.S. should be
prepared to lead wars of choice as
necessary. The United Nations is to be used
by the U.S. only when useful for U.S.
purposes.
Wolfowitz Spelled It Out
This approach
was spelled out first by Paul Wolfowitz in
his draft Defense Policy Guidance (DPG)
written for the Department of Defense in
2002. The draft called for extending the
U.S.-led security network to Central and
Eastern Europe despite the explicit promise
by German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich
Genscher in 1990 that German unification
would not be followed by NATO’s eastward
enlargement.
Wolfowitz also
made the case for American wars of choice,
defending America’s right to act
independently, even alone, in response to
crises of concern to the U.S. According to
General Wesley Clark, Wolfowitz already made
clear to Clark in May 1991 that the U.S.
would lead regime-change operations in Iraq,
Syria and other former Soviet allies.
The neocons
championed NATO enlargement to Ukraine even
before that became official U.S. policy
under President George W. Bush, Jr. in 2008.
They viewed Ukraine’s NATO membership as key
to U.S. regional and global dominance.
Robert Kagan spelled out the neocon case for
NATO enlargement in April 2006:
“[T]he
Russians and Chinese see nothing natural
in [the ‘color revolutions’ of the
former Soviet Union], only
Western-backed coups designed to advance
Western influence in strategically vital
parts of the world. Are they so wrong?
Might not the successful liberalization
of Ukraine, urged and supported by the
Western democracies, be but the prelude
to the incorporation of that nation into
NATO and the European Union — in short,
the expansion of Western liberal
hegemony?”
Kagan
acknowledged the dire implication of NATO
enlargement. He quotes one expert as saying,
“the Kremlin is getting ready for the
‘battle for Ukraine’ in all seriousness.”
The neocons
sought this battle. After the fall of the
Soviet Union, both the U.S. and Russia
should have sought a neutral Ukraine, as a
prudent buffer and safety valve. Instead,
the neocons wanted U.S. “hegemony” while the
Russians took up the battle partly in
defense and partly out of their own imperial
pretensions as well. Shades of the Crimean
War (1853-6), when Britain and France sought
to weaken Russia in the Black Sea following
Russian pressures on the Ottoman empire.
Kagan penned
the article as a private citizen while his
wife Victoria Nuland was the U.S. ambassador
to NATO under George W. Bush, Jr.
Nuland has been
the neocon operative par excellence. In
addition to serving as Bush’s ambassador to
NATO, Nuland was President Barack Obama’s
assistant secretary of state for European
and Eurasian Affairs during 2013-17, when
she participated in the overthrow of
Ukraine’s pro-Russian President Viktor
Yanukovych and now serves as Biden’s
undersecretary of state guiding U.S. policy
vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine.
The neocon
outlook is based on an overriding false
premise: that the U.S. military, financial,
technological, and economic superiority
enables it to dictate terms in all regions
of the world. It is a position of both
remarkable hubris and remarkable disdain of
evidence.
Since the
1950s, the U.S. has been stymied or defeated
in nearly every regional conflict in which
it has participated. Yet in the “battle for
Ukraine,” the neocons were ready to provoke
a military confrontation with Russia by
expanding NATO over Russia’s vehement
objections because they fervently believe
that Russia will be defeated by U.S.
financial sanctions and NATO weaponry.
The Institute
for the Study of War (ISW), a neocon
think-tank led by Kimberley Allen Kagan (and
backed by a who’s who of defense contractors
such as General Dynamics and Raytheon),
continues to promise a Ukrainian victory.
Regarding
Russia’s advances, the ISW offered a
typical comment:
“[R]egardless of which side holds the
city [of Sievierodonetsk], the Russian
offensive at the operational and
strategic levels will probably have
culminated, giving Ukraine the chance to
restart its operational-level
counteroffensives to push Russian forces
back.”
The facts on
the ground, however, suggest otherwise. The
West’s economic sanctions have had little
adverse impact on Russia, while their
“boomerang” effect on the rest of the world
has been large.
Moreover, the
U.S. capacity to resupply Ukraine with
ammunition and weaponry is seriously
hamstrung by America’s limited production
capacity and broken supply chains. Russia’s
industrial capacity of course dwarfs that of
Ukraine’s. Russia’s GDP was roughly 10X
that of Ukraine before the war and Ukraine
has now lost much of its industrial capacity
in the war.
The most likely
outcome of the current fighting is that
Russia will conquer a large swath of
Ukraine, perhaps leaving Ukraine landlocked
or nearly so. Frustration will rise in
Europe and the U.S. with the military losses
and the stagflationary consequences of war
and sanctions.
The knock-on
effects could be devastating, if a
right-wing demagogue in the U.S. rises to
power (or in the case of Trump, returns to
power) promising to restore America’s faded
military glory through dangerous
escalation.
Instead of
risking this disaster, the real solution is
to end the neocon fantasies of the past 30
years and for Ukraine and Russia to return
to the negotiating table, with NATO
committing to end its commitment to the
eastward enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia
in return for a viable peace that respects
and protects Ukraine’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity.
Jeffrey D.
Sachs is
a university professor and director of the
Center for Sustainable Development at
Columbia University, where he directed The
Earth Institute from
2002 until 2016. He is also president of the
U.N. Sustainable Development Solutions
Network and a commissioner of the U.N.
Broadband Commission for Development. He has
been adviser to three United Nations
secretaries-general and currently serves as
an SDG advocate under Secretary-General
Antonio Guterres. Sachs is the author, most
recently, of
A New Foreign Policy: Beyond American
Exceptionalism
(2020). Other books include:
Building the New American Economy:
Smart, Fair, and Sustainable
(2017) and The
Age of Sustainable Development,
(2015) with Ban Ki-moon.
This
article is from Common
Dreams.