June 15, 2021 "Information
Clearing House" - - "Moon
Of Alabama" -
On June 16 the Presidents of Russia and the
United States
will hold talks:
Biden ends the trip Wednesday with summit in
Geneva with Russia’s Vladimir Putin. The White
House announced Saturday that the leaders
will not hold a joint news conference
after meeting, removing the opportunity
for comparisons to the availability that
followed Trump and Putin’s 2018 Helsinki summit
in which Trump sided with Moscow over his own
intelligence agencies.
Aides have suggested that the U.S. did not
want to elevate Putin further by having the two
men appear together in such a format. Others
have expressed concern that Putin could try to
score points on Biden, 78, who will be in the
final hours of a grueling eight-day European
trip.
The real reason for not holding a joint press
conference is of course that a senile Biden is
likely to
brabble some nonsense and ruin the summit spin
his minders want to put out there.
The U.S. initiated the summit which comes early
in Biden's presidency. The not yet answered question
is why, and what the U.S. wants to achieve with it?
The short answer, discussed in length below, is
that:
- The U.S. wants to take on China. The U.S.
recognized that it can not take on China and
Russia simultaneously. Russia must thus be split
from its China alliance and brought back into
Europe.
- Russia's new strategic weapon systems may
enable a first strike on the U.S. A new
strategic arms agreement is the only way to
avert that existential threat. (It would also
save a lot of money.)
Both of these strategic aims are unlikely to get
achieved because the U.S. foreign policy community
is still misjudging the global situation as well as
Russia's strength and position. It wants the summit
to fail.
Now the long version.
In an essay published on his email list
Prof. Michael Brenner, a regular reader of
Moon of Alabama, gives his answer to our
questions:
Biden, long the absentee overseer of Ukraine
under Obama, backed a plan to put an end to the
secessionist, Russified provinces of Lugansk and
Donetsk in the Donbass. It was seen as a way to
discipline Vladimir Putin whose interference in
Syria and blood-minded actions elsewhere
irritated American policy-makers, to complete
Russia’s isolation (along with an overthrow of
the Belarus government), and to solidify NATO/EU
control of the European continent.
Washington expanded its program of arming and
training the Ukrainian army arm and militias
(including the neo-Nazi Azov battalion), gave
President (and ex-comedian) President Vladimir
Zielenski the green light to move his military
to the contact line, and led an orchestrated
denunciation of Russia and all its work loudly
reinforced by the ever-obedient chorus of
European dependents. Biden himself struck the
tone in declaring that Putin was a ‘killer.’
It was classic coercion via military
intimidation – although hardly classic
in insulting your opponent unless you follow up
with a bugle call for attack. The entire project
is now in ruins – a miserable failure. The ‘why’
carries heavy – if unrecognized – lessons.
The Kremlin had given clear signs that it no
longer was going to turn the other cheek to what
it saw as hostile, belittling Western moves. The
eastward expansion of NATO right to Russia’s
border, the Washington approved Georgian assault
on South Ossetia by American trained/advised
forces, the color revolutions culminating in the
American instigated Nuland coup in Kiev that
toppled a democratically elected President,
undocumented accusations of meddling in the
tranquil waters of American politics, the
repeated sanctions, the relentless campaign to
sabotage Nordstrom II etc. etc. Those clear
signs were ignored, as are all other facts that
don’t conform with the self-serving,
self-deluding Washington narrative. There, gross
misinterpretations of conditions in Russia
prevail.
They truly believe that Navalny is the
country’s great white hope when in truth his
modest support lies only among the liberal
intelligensia of Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Putin’s popularity, especially in regard to
relations with the West, is undiminished. The
public fully backs Putin. Moreover, he is at the
’soft’ end of a continuum among political elites
- including officials within his government.
Hence, his response to the renewed threat to the
Donbass was quick and decisive. He deployed
75,000 heavily armed army units with supporting
air power to the border while Lavrov stated
baldly that any offensive by the Ukrainians
would be met with overwhelming force, and that
would mean the destruction of the current
Ukrainian regime.
The call up of a five divisions strong battle
ready force within 10 days, which NATO is unable to
match in size and speed, had the desired effects:
The United States and its allies had no
counter; they had to back down. Within days,
Biden made an impromptu call to ‘killer’ Putin
calling for a relaxing of tensions while looking
forward to stable, predictable relations between
their two countries. That week, Blinken flew to
Kiev to bluntly tell Zelenski to call it all
off. If that meant throwing him to the
ultra-nationalist wolves in Kiev, he always had
his comedian gig to fall back on. Great power
politics as burlesque!
There was a dawning awareness that contending
with a fully aroused Russia, in Europe and
elsewhere, was no piece of cake. It
followed that the United States should not be
conducting all-out ‘Cold War’ with China and
Russia simultaneously. Since China was the much
greater challenger to American global hegemony,
somehow working out a tacit modus vivendi,
or, at least, ceasefire, with Moscow was called
for. That should have been obvious for
at least the past 12 years to anyone with a
strategic brain. Instead, American leaders had
done everything possible to solidify a
Sino-Russian alliance as has materialized in
their ‘strategic partnership’ which grows in
strength and confidence by the day.
...
The abject failure in Ukraine
(simultaneously with the thwarted attempt to
overthrow Lukashenko in Belarus) shook
Washington’s unbounded self-confidence enough
for it to recognize the error of its ways.
A series of moves in Europe signaled the
intention to change course. The announced
dispatch of a naval battle group to the Black
Sea was summarily cancelled, pressure on Germany
to prevent the completion of Nordstrom II was
lifted, and the plans for a Ukrainian attack on
the Donbass was abruptly dumped. Biden clearly
intends next week’s meeting with Putin in Geneva
as a crucial step paving the way for a tempering
of the hostility that has marked relations
between Washington and Moscow. The hope is that
the gestures noted above combined with an
expressed readiness to work together on handful
of contentious issues can mollify Russian
antagonism toward the West. That, in turn, could
cool its enthusiasm for the strategic
partnership with Beijing – making it easier for
the U.S. to concentrate on its struggle for
global supremacy with China while weakening the
latter’s hand.
The ploy is doomed to failure.
It indeed is. The last 30 years have shown that
Russia can absolutely not trust Washington whatever
it might promise. Its partnership with China though
is solid.
A quote in a recent New York Times piece
seems to confirm Brenner's take:
Charles A. Kupchan, a professor at Georgetown
University who worked on European affairs in the
Obama administration, said Mr. Biden’s goal was
to head off the creation of a Sino-Russian bloc
against the West. That will require the help of
allies, which is why he predicted Mr. Biden
would not only listen to, but hear, the
Europeans.
Russia analyst Gilbert Doctorow has a
slightly different take:
[W]hy is Joe Biden pressing ahead with a meeting
so early in his tenure in office? We are told
that the objective is to achieve “greater
stability” in bilateral relations. But I have
not heard from our commentators what
stability is to be addressed.
...
In my reductionist approach, the summit
has one driver behind it, namely to put a cap on
an arms race that the United States is losing,
if it has not already irrevocably lost, and to
prevent the adverse shift in the strategic
balance against America from getting still
worse. The side benefit would be to strike down
planned military expenditures budgeted for well
over a trillion dollars to modernize the nuclear
triad alone. This would thereby free funds for
the massive infrastructure investments that
Biden is presently trying to push through
Congress.
...
Since the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty in
2002 under George Bush, US policy had aimed at
enabling a first strike knocking out Russian
ICBMs and then rendering useless Russia’s
residual nuclear forces which could be shot out
of the air by U.S. anti-ballistic missile
systems. Russia’s new, maneuverable and
ultra-high speed missiles could evade all known
ABMs. According to Putin’s text in March 2018,
the new Russian strategic arms relegated the
hundreds of billions that the Americans had
invested in achieving superiority to the status
of a modern day Maginot Line. Whatever
Washington could throw at Russia, the residual
Russian forces would penetrate American defenses
and wreak havoc on the American homeland.
Russia's
new weapons are something that Washington can
only dream of. Announced in 2018 the new systems are
now being introduced in frontline units. U.S. weapon
development is at least 10 years behind Russia's.
Nuclear parity
has been restored (vid).
Some of Russia's new system do not fall under the
New START nuclear arms reduction treaty. If the U.S.
does not manage to achieve a new agreement with
Russia that limits its new weapon systems, Russia
could soon achieve first strike capability. This
would be an existential threat to the U.S. The
Pentagon is surely not happy about the situation.
That Biden needs to get a new strategic arms
agreement as fast as possible may indeed be the
reason why the summit is happening so early.
Unfortunately a success, says Doctorow,
is far from guaranteed:
Mutual respect is what Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov has demanded as a starting point
for diplomatic negotiations with the Americans.
Respect is not conferred on an interlocutor
“from a position of strength,” the typical
American approach to such talks.
The problem for Washington is that no one on
Capitol Hill or in the foreign policy community
wants to acknowledge the obvious facts about
Russia today. Everyone is happy with the vision
of a slovenly, chaotic Russia ruled by a
merciless dictator, whose regime is fragile and
just needs a little push, like Nicholas II’s
autocracy, to tilt over and collapse. This is
rubbish and if it remains the foundation of U.S.
policy towards Russia under Biden then we can
expect nothing much to happen to reduce the
dangers of nuclear war or move towards calmer
waters in international relations.
An example of the foreign policy community
Doctorow describes is the former U.S. ambassador to
NATO Kurt Volker who
wants the summit to fail:
It is surely not in the interests of the U.S.,
the EU, NATO, and other allies to see a summit
in which Putin leaves convinced that he has
blunted the United States and faces no
consequences for his behavior. It would send a
signal globally that authoritarians can get away
with aggressive acts at home and abroad, and
that the U.S. and the West will not take any
meaningful action to stop them.
...
For the U.S., therefore, the best possible
outcome is not one of modest agreements and a
commitment to “predictability,” but one of a
lack of agreements altogether. Success is
confrontation.
The Canadian professor Paul Robinson
takes aim at such lunacy but concludes:
Now, you might say that this is just one guy’s
opinion. We can ignore it. It doesn’t mean
anything. But Volker isn’t just some guy. From
2017 to 2019, he was the US Special
Representative for Ukraine Negotiations – so in
effect America’s point guy for its relationship
with Ukraine and for negotiations concerning a
peace settlement for that country’s civil war.
On the basis of this article, one shudders to
think what advice he was giving the Ukrainian
government. Certainly not advice conducive to
peace, I imagine. It’s more than a little scary.
So, this is more than just one man. This
article is a window into the way that an
influential part of the American foreign policy
establishment thinks. It rejects negotiation. It
regards compromise as dangerous. It openly
prefers conflict. “Success is confrontation” –
the worse the better. Wow!
As long as they help to prevent war I am happy
about each and every summit between superpowers. But
I do not expect any great results from this one.
U.S. policies do not turn on a dime and the borg is
currently far from accepting compromises to which
Russia can agree.
No Advertising - No Government Grants - This Is
Independent Media
Registration is necessary to post comments.
We ask only that you do not use obscene or offensive
language. Please be respectful of others.