How Bolton, Netanyahu and Pompeo
sabotaged talks with Iran
In his new book, John
Bolton recounts how a potential meeting between the U.S.
president and Iran’s foreign minister spread panic among
top U.S. and Israeli officials last summer
By Amir Tibon
June 23, 2020 "Information
Clearing House" - WASHINGTON – Benjamin Netanyahu is mentioned over 30
times in John Bolton’s new book, “The Room Where it
Happened,” which details his tumultuous 18 months
working as President Donald Trump’s national security
adviser.
Most of the references to the Israeli prime minister
are short descriptions of conversations between
Netanyahu and Bolton regarding
Iran, containing very little new or significant
information.
One story Bolton tells in more detail, however,
reveals how Netanyahu – together with Bolton and
Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo – reportedly sabotaged
Trump’s attempts to open diplomatic channels with
Tehran last summer.
Bolton recounts this story with pride, and hints that
the efforts by himself and Pompeo, with Netanyahu’s
backing, stopped Trump from going for a broader
U.S.-Iran deal, which was being pushed at the time by
French President
Emmanuel Macron.
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The events Bolton describes happened in the lead-up
to his own ouster from the White House. First, in
June 2019, Trump surprised and disappointed Bolton and
the other Iran hawks in his administration by canceling,
at the last moment, a military strike against Iranian
targets in retaliation for an
Iranian attack on a U.S. military drone. Bolton
describes that event as one of the most unprofessional
decisions he had ever witnessed in his career in
national security.
Later that summer, as tensions with Iran continued to
rise, Macron began to offer Trump his help as a mediator
between the two countries. His grand plan, according to
Bolton, was for Trump to meet with a senior Iranian
official in late August in the French coastal town of
Biarritz, as France was hosting a meeting of the G-7
countries with the American president in attendance.
Bolton writes how he and Pompeo, the administration’s
two most prominent Iran hawks, both worked during the
summer to scuttle Macron’s diplomatic efforts and
convince Trump to reject any proposal. But Macron, he
explains, surprised them by inviting Mohammad Javad
Zarif to the G-7 gathering, opening the door for a
potential meeting between Iran’s foreign minister and
Trump.
For Bolton, Pompeo and Netanyahu, this was
unacceptable, especially because Macron was also
promoting another idea: an international “credit line”
to Iran that would ease some of the grave economic
pressure placed on the country by Trump’s imposition of
sanctions.
Bolton writes that when Trump arrived in Biarritz in
August, he had an unscheduled one-on-one meeting with
Macron, during which Iran was the sole topic under
discussion. According to Bolton, Trump later described
that conversation as “the best hour and a half he’d ever
spent.”
The next day, rumors about
Zarif’s imminent arrival in southern France began to
surface. Bolton received a worried call from Pompeo,
who had spoken earlier with Netanyahu about airstrikes
against Iranian targets in Syria that had been
attributed to Israel. Bolton fails to mention in the
book that all of this was happening just three weeks
before Israel’s September 17 election, at a point in
time when Netanyahu was down in the polls and short of
the majority he needed in order to be granted immunity
from prosecution on corruption charges.
After the call with Pompeo, Bolton heard from Trump’s
personal staff that Macron had invited the president to
meet with Zarif, and he was “eager” to take the meeting.
Bolton’s reaction was to ask his own staff to prepare a
flight for him to return to the United States: if the
meeting were to go ahead, he would resign immediately
from the White House.
Pompeo and Bolton continued to communicate in an
attempt to stop Trump from meeting Zarif, and Bolton
writes that both of them were at the same time also
speaking to Netanyahu and his ambassador to Washington,
Ron Dermer. Bolton asked Pompeo to tell Netanyahu and
Dermer that he “felt like the Light Brigade” – meaning
that his efforts to stop the meeting were running into
powerful forces he was not necessarily equipped to
overcome.
In Bolton’s telling, two other senior administration
officials – Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and
Trump’s son-in-law and senior adviser,
Jared Kushner – were in favor of taking the Zarif
meeting. Pompeo complained to Bolton that “we have
Mnuchin and Jared, two Democrats, running our foreign
policy.”
Bolton told Pompeo of his intention to resign, and
the secretary of state replied that if the meeting went
through, he would do the same, according to Bolton.
Bolton wrote that he then had a conversation with
Trump, in which he told the president that if the United
States released even just a bit of the pressure placed
on Iran, it would be “very difficult” to put it back in
place. He urged Trump not to meet Zarif at all – not
even for a private handshake, as Trump suggested at some
point he wanted to do. Bolton said he was encouraged,
however, by the fact that Trump had soured on the credit
line idea, stating: “They’re not getting any line of
credit until the whole deal is done.” This, Bolton
writes, was the opposite of what Macron suggested –
opening a line of credit as a gesture of goodwill that
would lead to further negotiations.
Netanyahu, meanwhile, was trying to reach Trump
directly to explain his strong opposition to the meeting
but, in Bolton’s telling, could not get through to the
president. Bolton said Kushner was against connecting
the two men, because he found it inappropriate for a
foreign leader to try to dictate to Trump whom he should
speak to.
Bolton was convinced the meeting with Zarif would
happen before the end of the G-7 summit, but he provides
no clear explanation as to why it eventually didn’t. At
the time, most analysts wrote that the meeting never
took place mostly because of the Iranians, who demanded
a concrete easing of sanctions before giving Trump the
photo opportunity he was craving.
Bolton concludes the chapter by writing that he
“couldn’t rule out” the possibility that Kushner or
Mnuchin met with Zarif instead of Trump, in order to
“create a future channel of communication,” and that
this option caused great concern to Israeli officials
and made Pompeo “livid.”
“I don’t know if I had talked Trump out of meeting
Zarif,” Bolton concluded, “but the decision [not to hold
the meeting] was enough” to stop Bolton from resigning,
at least for a few more weeks. Eventually, he left the
White House in early September 2019. In the year that
has passed since those summer months, there has been no
diplomatic progress between the United States and Iran.
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