By Ron Unz
February 05, 2020 "Information
Clearing House" -
The January 2nd American
assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani of Iran was
an event of enormous moment.
Gen. Soleimani had been the
highest-ranking military figure in his nation of 80
million, and with a storied career of 30 years, one
of the most universally popular and highly regarded.
Most analysts ranked him second in influence only to
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s elderly Supreme
Leader, and there were widespread reports that he
was being urged to run for the presidency in the
2021 elections.
The circumstances of his
peacetime death were also quite remarkable. His
vehicle was incinerated by the missile of an
American Reaper drone near Iraq’s Baghdad
international airport just after he had arrived
there on a regular commercial flight for peace
negotiations originally suggested by the American
government.
Our major media hardly
ignored the gravity of this sudden, unexpected
killing of so high-ranking a political and military
figure, and gave it enormous attention. A day or so
later, the front page of my morning New York
Times was almost entirely filled with coverage
of the event and its implications, along with
several inside pages devoted to the same topic.
Later that same week, America’s national newspaper
of record allocated more than one-third of all the
pages of its front section to the same shocking
story.
But even such copious
coverage by teams of veteran journalists failed to
provide the incident with its proper context and
implications. Last year, the Trump Administration
had declared the Iranian Revolutionary Guard “a
terrorist organization,” drawing widespread
criticism and even ridicule from national security
experts appalled at the notion of classifying a
major branch of Iran’s armed forces as “terrorists.”
Gen. Soleimani was a top commander in that body, and
this apparently provided the legal figleaf for his
assassination in broad daylight while on a
diplomatic peace mission.
But consider that Congress
has been considering
legislation declaring Russia an official state
sponsor of terrorism, and Stephen Cohen, the
eminent Russia scholar, has argued that no foreign
leader since the end of World War II has been so
massively demonized by the American media as Russian
President Vladimir Putin. For years, numerous
agitated
pundits have denounced Putin as “the new
Hitler,” and some prominent figures have even called
for
his overthrow or death. So we are now only a
step or two removed from undertaking a public
campaign to assassinate the leader of a country
whose nuclear arsenal could quickly annihilate the
bulk of the American population. Cohen has
repeatedly warned that the current danger of global
nuclear war may exceed what which we faced during
the days of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and can
we entirely dismiss his concerns?
Even if we focus solely upon
Gen. Solemaini’s killing and entirely disregard its
dangerous implications, there seem few modern
precedents for the official public assassination of
a top-ranking political figure by the forces of
another major country. In groping for past examples,
the only ones that come to mind occurred almost
three generations ago during World War II, when
Czech agents assisted by the Allies assassinated
Reinhard Heydrich in Prague in 1941 and the US
military later shot down the plane of Japanese
admiral Isoroku Yamamoto in 1943. But these events
occurred in the heat of a brutal global war, and the
Allied leadership hardly portrayed them as official
government assassinations. Historian David Irving
reveals that when one of Adolf Hitler’s aides
suggested that an attempt be made to assassinate
Soviet leaders in that same conflict, the German
Fuhrer immediately forbade such practices as obvious
violations of the laws of war.
The 1914 terrorist
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to
the throne of Austria-Hungary, was certainly
organized by fanatical elements of Serbian
Intelligence, but the Serbian government fiercely
denied its own complicity, and no major European
power was ever directly implicated in the plot. The
aftermath of the killing soon led to the outbreak of
World War I, and although many millions died in the
trenches over the next few years, it would have been
completely unthinkable for one of the major
belligerents to consider assassinating the
leadership of another.
A century earlier, the
Napoleonic Wars had raged across the entire
continent of Europe for most of a generation, but I
don’t recall reading of any governmental
assassination plots during that era, let alone in
the quite gentlemanly wars of the preceding 18th
century when Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa
disputed ownership of the wealthy province of
Silesia by military means. I am hardly a specialist
in modern European history, but after the 1648 Peace
of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War and
regularized the rules of warfare, no assassination
as high-profile as that of Gen. Soleimani comes to
mind.
The bloody Wars of Religion
during previous centuries did see their share of
assassination schemes. For example, I think that
Philip II of Spain supposedly encouraged various
plots to assassinate Queen Elizabeth I of England on
grounds that she was a murderous heretic, and their
repeated failure helped persuade him to launch the
ill-fated Spanish Armada; but being a pious
Catholic, he probably would have balked at using the
ruse of peace-negotiations to lure Elizabeth to her
doom. In any event, that was more than four
centuries ago, so America has now placed itself in
rather uncharted waters.
Different peoples possess
different political traditions, and this may play a
major role in influencing the behavior of the
countries they establish. Bolivia and Paraguay were
created in the early 18th century as shards from the
decaying Spanish Empire, and according to Wikipedia
they have experienced nearly three dozen successful
coups in their history, the bulk of these prior to
1950, while Mexico has had a half-dozen. By
contrast, the U.S. and Canada were founded as
Anglo-Saxon settler colonies, and neither history
records even a failed attempt.
During our Revolutionary War,
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and our other
Founding Fathers fully recognized that if their
effort failed, they would all be hanged as rebels by
the British. However, I have never heard that they
feared falling to an assassin’s blade, nor that King
George III ever considered such an underhanded means
of attack. During the first century and more of our
nation’s history, nearly all our presidents and
other top political leaders traced their ancestry
back to the British Isles, and political
assassinations were exceptionally rare, with Abraham
Lincoln’s death being one of the very few that come
to mind.
At the height of the Cold
War, our CIA did involve itself in various secret
assassination plots against Cuba’s Communist
dictator Fidel Castro and other foreign leaders
considered hostile to US interests. But when these
facts later came out in the 1970s, they evoked such
enormous outrage from the public and the media, that
three consecutive American presidents—Gerald
R. Ford,
Jimmy Carter, and
Ronald Reagan—issued successive Executive Orders
absolutely prohibiting assassinations by the CIA or
any other agent of the US government.
Although some cynics might
claim that these public declarations represented
mere window-dressing,
a March 2018 book review in the New York
Times strongly suggests otherwise. Kenneth M.
Pollack spent years as a CIA analyst and National
Security Council staffer, then went on to publish a
number of influential books on foreign policy and
military strategy over the last two decades. He had
originally joined the CIA in 1988, and opens his
review by declaring:
One of the very first
things I was taught when I joined the CIA was
that we do not conduct assassinations. It was
drilled into new recruits over and over again.
Yet Pollack notes with dismay
that over the last quarter-century, these once solid
prohibitions have been steadily eaten away, with the
process rapidly accelerating after the 9/11 attacks
of 2001. The laws on our books may not have changed,
but
Today, it seems that all
that is left of this policy is a euphemism.
We don’t call them
assassinations anymore. Now, they are “targeted
killings,” most often performed by drone strike,
and they have become America’s go-to weapon in
the war on terror.
The Bush Administration had
conducted 47 of these
assassinations-by-another-name, while his successor
Barack Obama, a constitutional scholar and Nobel
Peace Prize Laureate, had raised his own total to
542. Not without justification, Pollack wonders
whether assassination has become “a very effective
drug, but [one that] treats only the symptom and so
offers no cure.”
Thus over the last couple of
decades American policy has followed a disturbing
trajectory in its use of assassination as a tool of
foreign policy, first restricting its application
only to the most extreme circumstances, next
targeting small numbers of high-profile “terrorists”
hiding in rough terrain, then escalating those same
such killings to the many hundreds. And now under
President Trump, the fateful step has been taken of
America claiming the right to assassinate any world
leader not to our liking whom we unilaterally
declare worthy of death.
Pollack had made his career
as a Clinton Democrat, and is best known for his
2002 book The Threatening Storm that
strongly endorsed President Bush’s proposed invasion
of Iraq and was
enormously influential in producing bipartisan
support for that ill-fated policy. I have no doubt
that he is a committed supporter of Israel, and he
probably falls into a category that I would loosely
describe as “Left Neocon.”
But while reviewing a history
of Israel’s own long use of assassination as a
mainstay of its national security policy, he seems
deeply disturbed that America might be following
along that same terrible path. Less than two years
later, our sudden assassination of a top Iranian
leader demonstrates that his fears may have been
greatly understated.
The book being reviewed was
Rise and Kill First by New York Times
reporter Ronen Bergman, a weighty study of the
Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence service,
together with its sister agencies. The author
devoted six years of research to the project, which
was based upon a thousand personal interviews and
access to an enormous number of official documents
previously unavailable. As suggested by the title,
his primary focus was Israel’s long history of
assassinations, and across his 750 pages and
thousand-odd source references he recounts the
details of an enormous number of such incidents.
That sort of topic is
obviously fraught with controversy, but Bergman’s
volume carries glowing cover-blurbs from Pulitzer
Prize-winning authors on espionage matters, and the
official cooperation he received is indicated by
similar endorsements from both a former Mossad chief
and Ehud Barak, a past Prime Minister of Israel who
himself had once led assassination squads. Over the
last couple of decades, former CIA officer Robert
Baer has become one of our most prominent authors in
this same field, and he praises the book as “hands
down” the best he has ever read on intelligence,
Israel, or the Middle East. The reviews across our
elite media were equally laudatory.
Although I had seen some
discussions of the book when it appeared, I only got
around to reading it a few months ago. And while I
was deeply impressed by the thorough and meticulous
journalism, I found the pages rather grim and
depressing reading, with their endless accounts of
Israeli agents killing their real or perceived
enemies in operations that sometimes involved
kidnappings and brutal torture, or resulted in
considerable loss of life to innocent bystanders.
Although the overwhelming majority of the attacks
described took place in the various countries of the
Middle East or the occupied Palestinian territories
of the West Bank and Gaza, others ranged across the
world, including Europe. The narrative history began
in the 1920s, decades before the actual creation of
the Jewish Israel or its Mossad organization, and
extended down to the present day.
The sheer quantity of such
foreign assassinations was really quite remarkable,
with the knowledgeable reviewer in the New York
Times suggesting that the Israeli total over
the last half-century or so seemed far greater than
that of any other nation. I might even go farther:
if we excluded domestic killings, I wouldn’t be
surprised if the body-count exceeded the combined
total for that of all other major countries in the
world. I think all the lurid revelations of lethal
CIA or KGB Cold War assassination plots that I have
seen discussed in newspaper articles might fit
comfortably into just a chapter or two of Bergman’s
extremely long book.
National militaries have
always been nervous about deploying biological
weapons, knowing full well that once released, the
deadly microbes might easily spread back across the
border and inflict great suffering upon the
civilians of the country that deployed them.
Similarly, intelligence operatives who have spent
their long careers so heavily focused upon planning,
organizing, and implementing what amount to
officially-sanctioned murders may develop ways of
thinking that become a danger both to each other and
to the larger society they serve, and some examples
of this possibility leak out here and there in
Bergman’s comprehensive narrative.
In the so-called “Askelon
Incident” of 1984, a couple of captured Palestinians
were beaten to death in public by the notoriously
ruthless head of the Shin Bet domestic security
agency and his subordinates. Under normal
circumstances, this deed would have carried no
consequences, but the incident happened to be
captured by the camera by a nearby Israeli
photo-journalist, who managed to avoid confiscation
of his film. His resulting scoop sparked an
international media scandal, even reaching the pages
of the New York Times, and this forced a
governmental investigation aimed at criminal
prosecution. To protect themselves, the Shin Bet
leadership infiltrated the inquiry and organized an
effort to fabricate evidence pinning the murders
upon ordinary Israeli soldiers and a leading
general, all of whom were completely innocent. A
senior Shin Bet officer who expressed misgivings
about this plot apparently came close to being
murdered by his colleagues until he agreed to
falsify his official testimony. Organizations that
increasingly operate like mafia crime families may
eventually adopt similar cultural norms.
Israeli operatives sometimes
even contemplated the elimination of their own
top-ranking leaders whose policies they viewed as
sufficiently counter-productive. For decades, Gen.
Ariel Sharon had been one of Israel’s greatest
military heroes and someone of extreme right-wing
sentiments. As Defense Minister in 1982, he
orchestrated the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which
soon turned into a major political debacle,
seriously damaging Israel’s international standing
by inflicting great destruction upon that
neighboring country and its capital city of Beirut.
As Sharon stubbornly continued his military strategy
and the problems grew more severe, a group of
disgruntled officers decided that the best means of
cutting Israel’s losses was to assassinate Sharon,
though the proposal was never carried out.
An even more striking example
occurred a decade later. For many years, Palestinian
leader Yasir Arafat had been the leading object of
Israeli antipathy, so much so that at one point
Israel made plans to shoot down an international
civilian jetliner in order to assassinate him. But
after the end of the Cold War, pressure from America
and Europe led Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to sign
the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords with his Palestinian
foe. Although the Israeli leader received worldwide
praise and shared a Nobel Peace Prize for his
peacemaking efforts, powerful segments of the
Israeli public and its political class regarded the
act as a betrayal, with some extreme nationalists
and religious zealots demanding that he be killed
for his treason. A couple of years later, he was
indeed shot dead by a lone gunman from those
ideological circles, becoming the first Middle
Eastern leader in decades to suffer that fate.
Although his killer was mentally unbalanced and
stubbornly insisted that he acted alone, he had had
a long history of intelligence associations, and
Bergman delicately notes that the gunman slipped
past Rabin’s numerous bodyguards “with astonishing
ease” in order to fire his three fatal shots at
close range.
Many observers drew parallels
between Rabin’s assassination and that of our own
president in Dallas three decades earlier, and the
latter’s heir and namesake, John F. Kennedy, Jr.,
developed a strong personal interest in the tragic
event. In March 1997, his glossy political magazine
George published an article by the Israeli
assassin’s mother, implicating her own country’s
security services in the crime, a theory also
promoted by the late Israeli-Canadian writer Barry
Chamish. These accusations sparked a furious
international debate, but after Kennedy himself died
in an unusual plane crash a couple of years later
and his magazine quickly folded, the controversy
soon subsided. The George archives are not
online nor easily available, so I cannot easily
judge the credibility of the charges.
Having himself narrowly
avoided assassination by Israeli operatives, Sharon
gradually regained his political influence, and did
so without compromising his hard-line views, even
boastfully describing himself as a “Judeo-Nazi” to
an appalled journalist. A few years after Rabin’s
death, he provoked major Palestinian protests, then
used the resulting violence to win election as Prime
Minister, while once in office, his very harsh
methods led to a widespread uprising in Occupied
Palestine. But Sharon merely redoubled his
repression, and after world attention was diverted
by 9/11 attacks and the American invasion of Iraq,
he began assassinating numerous top Palestinian
political and religious leaders in attacks that
sometimes inflicted heavy civilian casualties.
The central object of
Sharon’s anger was Palestine President Yasir Arafat,
who suddenly took ill and died, thereby joining his
erstwhile negotiating partner Rabin in permanent
repose. Arafat’s wife claimed that he had been
poisoned and produced some medical evidence to
support this charge, while longtime Israeli
political figure Uri Avnery published
numerous articles
substantiating those
accusations. Bergman simply reports the
categorical Israeli denials while noting that “the
timing of Arafat’s death was quite peculiar,” then
emphasizes that even if he knew the truth, he
couldn’t publish it since his entire book was
written under strict Israeli censorship.
This last point seems an
extremely important one, and although it only
appears just that one time in the body of the text,
the disclaimer obviously applies to the entirety of
the long volume and should always be kept in the
back of our minds. Bergman’s book runs some 350,000
words and even if every single sentence were written
with the most scrupulous honesty, we must recognize
the huge difference between “the Truth” and “the
Whole Truth.”
Another item also raised my
suspicions. Thirty years ago, a disaffected Mossad
officer named Victor Ostrovsky left that
organization and wrote By Way of Deception,
a highly critical book recounting numerous alleged
operations known to him, especially those contrary
to American and Western interests. The Israeli
government and its pro-Israel advocates launched an
unprecedented legal campaign to block publication,
but this produced a major backlash and media uproar,
with the heavy publicity landing it as #1 on the
New York Times sales list. I finally got around
to reading his book about a decade ago and was
shocked by many of the remarkable claims, while
being reliably informed that CIA personnel had
judged his material as probably accurate when they
reviewed it.
Although much of Ostrovsky’s
information was impossible to independently confirm,
for more than a quarter-century his international
bestseller and its 1994 sequel The Other Side of
Deception have heavily shaped our understanding
of Mossad and its activities, so I naturally
expected to see a detailed discussion, whether
supportive or critical, in Bergman’s exhaustive
parallel work. Instead, there was only a single
reference to Ostrovsky buried in a footnote on p.
684. There we are told of Mossad’s utter horror at
the numerous deep secrets that Ostrovsky was
preparing to reveal, which led its top leadership to
formulate a plan to assassinate him. Ostrovsky only
survived because Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, who
had formerly spent decades as the Mossad
assassination chief, vetoed the proposal on the
grounds that “We don’t kill Jews.” Although this
reference is brief and almost hidden, I regard it as
providing considerable support for Ostrovsky’s
general credibility.
Having thus acquired serious
doubts about the completeness of Bergman’s seemingly
comprehensive narrative history, I noted a curious
fact. I have no specialized expertise in
intelligence operations in general nor those of
Mossad in particular, so I found it quite remarkable
that the overwhelming majority of all the
higher-profile incidents recounted by Bergman were
already familiar to me merely from the decades I had
spent closely reading the New York Times
every morning. Is it really plausible that six years
of exhaustive research and so many personal
interviews would have uncovered so few major
operations that had not already been known and
reported in the international media? Bergman
obviously provides a wealth of detail previously
limited to insiders, along with numerous unreported
assassinations of relatively minor individuals, but
it seems strange that he came up with so few
surprising revelations.
Indeed, some major gaps in
his coverage are quite apparent to anyone who has
even somewhat investigated the topic, and these
begin in the early chapters of his volume, which
include coverage of the Zionist prehistory in
Palestine prior to the establishment of the Jewish
state.
Bergman would have severely
damaged his credibility if he had failed to include
the infamous 1940s Zionist assassinations of
Britain’s Lord Moyne or U.N. Peace Negotiator Count
Folke Bernadotte. But he unaccountably fails to
mention that in 1937 the more right-wing Zionist
faction whose political heirs have dominated Israel
in recent decades assassinated Chaim Arlosoroff, the
highest-ranking Zionist figure in Palestine.
Moreover, he omits a number of similar incidents,
including some of those targeting top Western
leaders. As
I wrote last year:
Indeed, the inclination
of the more right-wing Zionist factions toward
assassination, terrorism, and other forms of
essentially criminal behavior was really quite
remarkable. For example, in 1943 Shamir
had arranged the assassination of his factional
rival, a year after the two men had escaped
together from imprisonment for a bank robbery in
which bystanders had been killed, and he claimed
he had acted to avert the planned assassination
of David Ben-Gurion, the top Zionist leader and
Israel’s future founding-premier. Shamir and his
faction certainly continued this sort of
behavior into the 1940s, successfully
assassinating Lord Moyne, the British Minister
for the Middle East, and Count Folke Bernadotte,
the UN Peace Negotiator, though they failed in
their other attempts to kill
American President Harry Truman and
British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, and
their plans to assassinate Winston Churchill
apparently never moved past the discussion
stage. His group also
pioneered the use of terrorist car-bombs and
other explosive attacks against innocent
civilian targets, all long before any Arabs
or Muslims had
ever thought of using similar tactics; and
Begin’s larger and more “moderate” Zionist
faction did much the same.
As far as I know, the early
Zionists had a record of political terrorism almost
unmatched in world history, and in 1974 Prime
Minister Menachem Begin
once even boasted to a television interviewer of
having been the founding father of terrorism across
the world.
In
the aftermath of World War II, Zionists were
bitterly hostile towards all Germans, and Bergman
describes the campaign of kidnappings and murders
they soon unleashed, both in parts of Europe and in
Palestine, which claimed as many as two hundred
lives. A small ethnic German community had lived
peacefully in the Holy Land for many generations,
but after some of its leading figures were killed,
the rest permanently fled the country, and their
abandoned property was seized by Zionist
organizations, a pattern which would soon be
replicated on a vastly larger scale with regard to
the Palestinian Arabs.
These facts were new to me,
and Bergman seemingly treats this wave of
vengeance-killings with considerable sympathy,
noting that many of the victims had actively
supported the German war effort. But oddly enough,
he fails to mention that throughout the 1930s, the
main Zionist movement had itself maintained a strong
economic partnership with Hitler’s Germany, whose
financial support was crucial to the establishment
of the Jewish state. Moreover, after the war began a
small right-wing Zionist faction led by a future
prime minister of Israel attempted to enlist in the
Axis military alliance, offering to undertake a
campaign of espionage and terrorism against the
British military in support of the Nazi war effort.
These undeniable historical facts have obviously
been a source of immense embarrassment to Zionist
partisans, and over the last few decades they have
done their utmost to expunge them from public
awareness, so as a native-born Israeli now in his
mid-40s, Bergman may simply be unaware of this
reality.
Bergman’s long book contains
thirty-five chapters of which only the first two
cover the period prior to the creation of Israel,
and if his notable omissions were limited to those,
they would merely constitute to a blemish on an
otherwise reliable historical narrative. But a
considerable number of major lacunae seem evident
across the decades that follow, though they may be
less the fault of the author himself than the tight
Israeli censorship he faced or the realities of the
American publishing industry. By the year 2018,
pro-Israeli influence over America and other Western
countries had reached such enormous proportions that
Israel would risk little international damage by
admitting to numerous illegal assassinations of
various prominent figures in the Arab world or the
Middle East. But other sorts of past deeds might
still be considered far too damaging to yet
acknowledge.
In 1991 renowned
investigative journalist Seymour Hersh published
The Samson Option, describing Israel’s secret
nuclear weapons development program of the early
1960s, which was regarded as an absolute national
priority by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, There
are widespread claims that it was the threatened use
of that arsenal that later blackmailed the Nixon
Administration into its all-out effort to rescue
Israel from the brink of military defeat during the
1973 war, a decision that provoked the Arab Oil
Embargo and led to many years of economic hardship
for the West.
The Islamic world quickly
recognized the strategic imbalance produced by their
lack of nuclear deterrent capability, and various
efforts were made to redress that balance, which Tel
Aviv did its utmost to frustrate. Bergman covers in
great detail the widespread campaigns of espionage,
sabotage, and assassination by which the Israelis
successfully forestalled the Iraqi nuclear program
of Saddam Hussein, finally culminating in the
long-distance 1981 air raid that destroyed his
Osirik reactor complex. The author also covers the
destruction of a Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007 and
Mossad’s assassination campaign that claimed the
lives of several leading Iranian physicists a few
years later. But all these events were reported at
the time in our major newspapers, so no new ground
is being broken. Meanwhile, an important story not
widely known is entirely missing.
About seven months ago, my
morning New York Times carried
a glowing 1,500 word tribute to former U.S.
ambassador John Gunther Dean, dead at age 93, giving
that eminent diplomat the sort of lengthy obituary
usually reserved these days for a rap-star slain in
a gun-battle with his drug-dealer. Dean’s father had
been a leader of his local Jewish community in
Germany, and after the family left for America on
the eve of World War II, Dean became a naturalized
citizen in 1944. He went on to have a very
distinguished diplomatic career, notably serving
during the Fall of Cambodia, and under normal
circumstances, the piece would have meant no more to
me than it did to nearly all its other readers. But
I had spent much of the first decade of the 2000s
digitizing the complete archives of hundreds of our
leading periodicals, and every now and then a
particularly intriguing title led me to read the
article in question. Such was the case with “Who
Killed Zia?” which appeared in 2005.
Throughout the 1980s,
Pakistan had been the lynchpin of America’s
opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan,
with its military dictator Zia ul-Haq being one of
our most important regional allies. Then in 1988, he
and most of his top leadership died in a mysterious
plane crash, which also claimed the lives of the
U.S. ambassador and an American general.
Although the deaths might
have been accidental, Zia’s wide assortment of
bitter enemies led most observers to assume foul
play, and there was some evidence that a nerve gas
agent, possibly released from a crate of mangos, had
been used to incapacitate the crew and thereby cause
the crash.
At the time, Dean had reached
the pinnacle of his career, serving as our
ambassador in neighboring India, while the U.S.
ambassador killed in the crash, Arnold Raphel, had
been his closest personal friend, also Jewish. By
2005, Dean was elderly and long-retired, and he
finally decided to break his seventeen years of
silence and reveal the strange circumstances
surrounding the event, saying that he was convinced
that the Israeli Mossad had been responsible.
A few years before his death,
Zia had boldly declared that the production of an
“Islamic atomic bomb” was a top Pakistani priority.
Although his primary motive was the need to balance
India’s small nuclear arsenal, he promised to share
such powerful weapons with other Muslim countries,
including those in the Middle East. Dean describes
the tremendous alarm Israel expressed at this
possibility, and how pro-Israel members of Congress
began a fierce lobbying campaign to stop Zia’s
efforts. According to longtime journalist Eric
Margolis, a leading expert on South Asia, Israel
repeatedly tried to enlist India in launching a
joint all-out attack against Pakistan’s nuclear
facilities, but after carefully considering the
possibility, the Indian government declined.
This left Israel in a
quandary. Zia was a proud and powerful military
dictator and his very close ties with the U.S.
greatly strengthened his diplomatic leverage.
Moreover, Pakistan was 2,000 miles from Israel and
possessed a strong military, so that any sort of
long-distance bombing raid similar to the one used
against the Iraqi nuclear program was impossible.
This left assassination as the remaining option.
Given Dean’s awareness of the
diplomatic atmosphere prior to Zia’s death, he
immediately suspected an Israeli hand, and his past
personal experiences supported that possibility.
Eight years earlier, while posted in Lebanon, the
Israelis had sought to enlist his personal support
in their local projects, drawing upon his sympathy
as a fellow Jew. But when he rejected those
overtures and declared that his primary loyalty was
to America, an attempt was made to assassinate him,
with the munitions used being eventually traced back
to Israel.
Although Dean was tempted to
immediately disclose his strong suspicions regarding
the annihilation of the Pakistani government to the
international media, he decided instead to pursue
proper diplomatic channels, and immediately departed
for Washington to share his views with his State
Department superiors and other top Administration
officials. But upon reaching DC, he was quickly
declared mentally incompetent, prevented from
returning to his India posting, and soon forced to
resign. His four decade long career in government
service ended summarily at that point. Meanwhile,
the US government refused to assist Pakistan’s
efforts to properly investigate the fatal crash and
instead tried to convince a skeptical world that
Pakistan’s entire top leadership had died because of
a simple mechanical failure in their American
aircraft.
This remarkable account would
surely seem like the plot of an implausible
Hollywood movie, but the sources were extremely
reputable. The author of the 5,000 word article was
Barbara Crossette, the former New York Times
bureau chief for South Asia, who had held that post
at the time of Zia’s death, while the piece appeared
in World Policy Journal, the prestigious
quarterly of The New School in New York City. The
publisher was academic Stephen Schlesinger, son of
famed historian Arthur J. Schlesinger, Jr.
One might naturally expect
that such explosive charges from so solid a source
might provoke considerable press attention, but
Margolis noted that the story was instead totally
ignored and boycotted by the entire North American
media. Schlesinger had spent a decade at the helm of
his periodical, but a couple of issues later he had
vanished from the masthead and his employment at the
New School came to an end. The text is no longer
available on the World Policy Journal
website, but it can still be accessed via
Archive.org, allowing those so interested to
read it and decide for themselves.
The complete historical
blackout of that incident has continued down to the
present day. Dean’s detailed Times obituary
portrayed his long and distinguished career in
highly flattering terms, yet failed to devote even a
single sentence to the bizarre circumstances under
which it ended.
At the time I originally read
that article a dozen or so years ago, I had mixed
feelings about the likelihood of Dean’s provocative
hypothesis. Top national leaders in South Asia do
die by assassination rather regularly, but the means
employed are almost always quite crude, usually
involving one or more gunman firing at close range
or perhaps a suicide-bomber. By contrast, the highly
sophisticated methods apparently used to eliminate
the Pakistani government seemed to suggest a very
different sort of state actor. Bergman’s book
catalogs the enormous number and variety of Mossad’s
assassination technologies.
Given the important nature of
Dean’s accusations and the highly reputable venue in
which they had appeared, Bergman must certainly have
been aware of the story, so I wondered what
arguments his Mossad sources might provide to rebut
or debunk them. Instead, I discovered that the
incident appears nowhere in Bergman’s exhaustive
volume, perhaps reflecting the author’s reluctance
to assist in deceiving his readers.
I also noticed that Bergman
made absolutely no mention of the earlier
assassination attempt against Dean when he was
serving as our ambassador in Lebanon, even though
the serial numbers of the anti-tank rockets fired at
his armored limousine were traced to a batch sold to
Israel. However,
sharp-eyed journalist Philip Weiss did notice
that the shadowy organization which officially
claimed credit for the attack was revealed by
Bergman to have been a Israel-created front group
used for numerous car-bombings and other terrorist
attacks. This seems to confirm Israel’s
responsibility in the assassination plot.
Let us assume that this
analysis is correct and that there is a good
likelihood that Mossad was indeed behind Zia’s
death. The broader implications are considerable.