January 06, 2020 "Information
Clearing House" - The
assassination by the United States of Qassem
Suleimani, a senior Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps general and commander of the
Quds Force, an Iranian paramilitary force
specializing in covert operations on foreign
soil, has sent shock waves through the
Middle East and around the globe.
The Trump administration has justified
its action, citing unspecified intelligence
that indicated Suleimani was in the process
of finalizing plans for attacks on U.S.
personnel and interests in the region,
claiming that Suleimani’s death “saved
American lives.” This narrative has been
challenged by Lebanese officials familiar
with Suleimani’s itinerary, noting that the
Iranian general had been in Beirut on
diplomatic business, and had travelled to
Baghdad via a commercial air flight, where
he had been diplomatically cleared to enter.
These officials claim Suleimani was killed
while riding in a convoy on his way from
Baghdad International Airport into the city
of Baghdad.
In any event, Suleimani’s death resonates
in a region already on edge because of
existing tensions between the U.S. and Iran.
The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei,
has announced three days of mourning for
Suleimani, an indication of his status as
national hero. Khamenei also vowed revenge
on those who perpetrated the attack. Concern
over imminent Iranian retaliation has
prompted the State Department to order all
American citizens to leave Iraq, and for
U.S. forces in the region to be placed on
the highest level of alert. Hundreds of
American soldiers have been flown into the
region as reinforcements, with thousands
more standing by if needed.
For many analysts and observers, Iran and
the U.S. are on the cusp of a major
confrontation. While such an outcome is
possible, the reality is that the Iranian
policy of asymmetrical response to American
aggression that had been put in place by
Qassem Suleimani when he was alive is still
in place today. While emotions run high in
the streets of Iranian cities, with angry
crowds demanding action, the Iranian
leadership, of which Suleimani was a trusted
insider, recognizes that any precipitous
action on its part only plays into the hands
of the United States. In seeking revenge for
the assassination of Qassem Suleimani, Iran
will most likely play the long game, putting
into action the old maxim that revenge is a
dish best served cold.
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In many ways, the United States has
already written the script regarding
major aspects of an Iranian response.
The diplomatic missions Suleimani may
have been undertaking at the time of his
death centered
on gaining regional support for
pressuring the United States to withdraw
from both Syria and Iraq. Of the
two, Iraq was, and is, the highest
priority, if for no other reason that
there can be no sustained U.S. military
presence in Syria without the existence
of a major U.S. military presence in
Iraq. Suleimani had been working with
sympathetic members of the Iraqi
Parliament to gain support for
legislation that would end Iraq’s
support for U.S. military forces
operating on Iraqi soil. Such
legislation was viewed by the United
States as a direct threat to its
interests in both Iraq and the region.
The U.S. had been engaged in a diplomatic
tug of war with Iran to sway Iraqi
politicians regarding such a vote. However,
this effort was dealt a major blow when
Washington conducted a bombing attack Sunday
which targeted Khaitab Hezbollah along the
border with Syria, killing scores of Iraqis.
The justification for these attacks was
retaliation for a series of rocket attacks
on an American military base that had killed
one civilian contractor and wounded several
American soldiers. The U.S. blamed
Iranian-backed Khaitab Hezbollah (no
relation to the Lebanese Hezbollah group),
for the attacks.
There are several problems with this
narrative, first and foremost being that the
bases bombed
were reportedly more than 500 kilometers
removed from the military base where the
civilian contractor had been killed. The
Iraqi units housed at the bombed facilities,
including Khaitab Hezbollah, were engaged,
reportedly, in active combat operations
against ISIS remnants operating in both
Iraq and Syria. This calls into question
whether they would be involved in an attack
against an American target. In fact, given
the recent resurgence of ISIS, it is
entirely possible that ISIS was responsible
for the attack on the U.S. base, creating a
scenario where the U.S. served as the de
facto air force for ISIS by striking Iraqi
forces engaged in anti-ISIS combat
operations.
ISIS has emerged as a major feature in
the Iranian thinking regarding how best to
strike back at the US for Suleimani’s death.
The Iranian government has gone out of its
way to announce that, in the wake of
Suleimani’s assassination, that Washington
would be held fully responsible for any
resurgence of ISIS in the region. Given the
reality that Iran has been at the forefront
of the war against ISIS, and that
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias such as
Khaitab Hezbollah have played a critical
role in defeating ISIS on the ground, there
is no doubt that Iran has the ability to
take its foot off of the neck of a prostrate
ISIS and facilitate their resurgence in
areas under U.S. control.
Such an outcome would serve two purposes.
First, U.S. forces would more than likely
suffer casualties in the renewed fighting,
especially since their primary proxy force,
the Syrian Kurds, have been diminished in
the aftermath of Turkey’s incursion late
last year in northern Syria. More
importantly, however, is the political cost
that will be paid by President Trump, forced
to explain away a resurgent ISIS during an
election year after going on record that
ISIS had been completely defeated.
But the real blow to American prestige
would be for the Iraqi government to sever
relations with the American military. The
U.S. bombing of the Iraqi bases severely
stressed U.S.-Iraqi relations, with the
Iraqi government protesting the attacks as a
violation of their sovereignty. One of the
ways the Iraqi government gave voice to its
displeasure was by facilitating access by
protestors affiliated with Khaitab Hezbollah
to gain access to the highly secure Green
Zone in downtown Baghdad where the U.S.
Embassy is situated, where they set fire to
some buildings and destroyed property before
eventually dispersing. While commentators
and politicians have described the actions
targeting the US Embassy as an “attack,” it
was a carefully choreographed bit of theater
designed to ease passions that had built up
as a result of the U.S. attack.
Getting the Iraqi Parliament to formally
reject the U.S. military presence on Iraqi
soil has long been a strategic objective of
Iran. As such, Iran would be best served by
avoiding direct conflict with the US, and
letting events take their expected course.
If Iraq votes to expel American forces,
the Trump administration will be tied up
trying to cope with how to manage that new
reality. Add to that the problems that will
come in confronting a resurgent ISIS, and it
becomes clear that by simply doing nothing,
Iran will have already gained the strategic
upper hand in a post-Suleimani world. The
Trump administration will find it hard to
sustain the deployment of thousands of
troops in the Middle East if there is no
Iranian provocation to respond to. Over
time, the American presence will lessen.
Security will lapse. And, when the time is
right, Iran will strike, most probably by
proxy, but in a manner designed to inflict
as much pain as possible.
Trump started this fight by recklessly
ordering the assassination of a senior
Iranian government official. The Trump
administration now seeks to shape events in
the region to best support a direct
confrontation with Iran. Such an outcome is
not in Iran’s best interests. Instead, they
will erode Trump’s political base by
embarrassing him in Iraq and with ISIS. Iran
will respond, that much can be assured. But
the time and place will be of their
choosing, when the U.S. expects it least.
Scott Ritter is a former Marine Corps
intelligence officer who served in the
former Soviet Union implementing arms
control treaties, in the Persian Gulf during
Operation Desert Storm, and in Iraq
overseeing the disarmament of WMD. He is the
author of several books, most
recently, Deal
of the Century: How Iran Blocked the West’s
Road to War (2018).
This article was originally published
by "The
American Conservative" -
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