The
Reasons for Netanyahu’s Panic
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is pushing the
panic button over the collapse of the
Saudi-Israeli jihadist proxies in Syria and now
threatening to launch a major air war, as
ex-British diplomat Alastair Crooke describes.
By Alastair Crooke
September
02, 2017 "Information
Clearing House"
- A
very senior Israeli intelligence delegation, a
week ago, visited Washington. Then, Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu broke into
President Putin’s summer holiday to meet him in
Sochi, where, according to a senior Israeli
government official (as cited in the
Jerusalem Post),
Netanyahu threatened to bomb the Presidential
Palace in Damascus, and to disrupt and nullify
the Astana cease-fire process, should Iran
continue to “extend its reach in Syria.”
Russia’s
Pravda wrote,
“according to eyewitnesses of the open part of
the talks, the Israeli prime minister was too
emotional and at times even close to panic. He
described a picture of the apocalypse to the
Russian president that the world may see, if no
efforts are taken to contain Iran, which, as
Netanyahu believes, is determined to destroy
Israel.”
So, what is going on here? Whether or not
Pravda’s quote is fully accurate (though
the description was confirmed
by senior Israeli commentators), what is
absolutely clear (from Israeli
sources) is
that both in Washington and at Sochi, the
Israeli officials were heard out, but
got nothing. Israel
stands alone. Indeed, it is
reported that
Netanyahu was seeking “guarantees” about the
future Iranian role in Syria, rather than
“asking for the moon” of an Iranian exit. But
how could Washington or Moscow realistically
give Israel such guarantees?
Belatedly, Israel has understood that it backed
the wrong side in Syria – and it has lost. It is
not really in a position to demand
anything. It will not get an American enforced
buffer zone beyond the Golan armistice line, nor
will the Iraqi-Syrian border be closed, or
somehow “supervised” on Israel’s behalf.
Of course, the Syrian aspect is important, but
to focus only on that, would be to “miss the
forest for the trees.” The 2006 war by Israel to
destroy Hizbullah (egged on by the U.S., Saudi
Arabia – and even a few Lebanese) was a
failure. Symbolically, for the first time in the
Middle East, a technologically sophisticated,
and lavishly armed, Western nation-state
simply failed. What
made the failure all the more striking (and
painful) was that a Western state was not just
bested militarily, it had lost also the
electronic and human intelligence war, too —
both spheres in which the West thought their
primacy unassailable.
The
Fallout from Failure
Israel’s unexpected failure was deeply feared in
the West, and in the Gulf too. A small, armed
(revolutionary) movement had stood up to Israel
– against overwhelming odds – and prevailed: it
had stood its ground. This precedent was widely
perceived to be a potential regional “game
changer.” The feudal Gulf autocracies sensed in
Hizbullah’s achievement the latent danger to
their own rule from such armed resistance.
The
reaction was immediate. Hizbullah was
quarantined — as best the full sanctioning
powers of America could manage. And the war in
Syria started to be mooted as the “corrective
strategy” to the 2006 failure (as early as 2007)
— though it was only with the events following
2011 that the “corrective strategy” came to
implemented, à outrance.
Against Hizbullah, Israel had thrown its full
military force (though Israelis always say,
now, that they could have done more). And
against Syria, the U.S., Europe, the Gulf States
(and Israel in the background) have thrown the
kitchen sink: jihadists, al-Qaeda, ISIS (yes),
weapons,
bribes, sanctions and the most overwhelming
information war yet witnessed. Yet Syria – with
indisputable help from its allies – seems about
to prevail: it has stood its ground, against
almost unbelievable odds.
Just to
be clear: if 2006 marked a key point of
inflection, Syria’s “standing its ground”
represents a historic turning of much
greater magnitude. It should be understood that
Saudi Arabia’s (and Britain’s and America’s)
tool of fired-up, radical Sunnism has been
routed. And with it, the Gulf States, but
particularly Saudi Arabia are damaged. The
latter has relied on the force of Wahabbism
since the first foundation of the kingdom: but
Wahabbism in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq has been
roundly defeated and discredited (even for most
Sunni Muslims). It may well be defeated in Yemen
too. This defeat will change the face of Sunni
Islam.
Already, we see the Gulf Cooperation Council,
which originally was founded in 1981 by six Gulf
tribal leaders for the sole purpose of
preserving their hereditary tribal rule in the
Peninsula, now warring with each other,
in what is likely to be a protracted and bitter
internal fight. The “Arab system,” the
prolongation of the old Ottoman structures by
the complaisant post-World War I victors,
Britain and France, seems to be out of its 2013
“remission” (bolstered by the coup in Egypt),
and to have resumed its long-term decline.
The Losing
Side
Netayahu’s “near panic” (if that is indeed what
occurred) may well be a reflection of this
seismic shift taking place in the region. Israel
has long backed the losing side – and now finds
itself “alone” and fearing for its near proxies
(the Jordanians and the Kurds). The “new”
corrective strategy from Tel Aviv, it appears,
is to focus on winning Iraq away from Iran, and
embedding it into the Israel-U.S.-Saudi
alliance.
If so,
Israel and Saudi Arabia are probably too late
into the game, and are likely underestimating
the visceral hatred engendered among so many
Iraqis of all segments of society for the
murderous actions of ISIS. Not many believe the
improbable (Western) narrative that ISIS
suddenly emerged armed, and fully financed, as a
result of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki’s alleged “sectarianism”: No, as
rule-of-thumb, behind each such well-breached
movement – stands a state.
Daniel Levy has written a compelling
piece to argue
that Israelis generally would not subscribe to
what I have written above, but rather:
“Netanyahu’s lengthy term in office, multiple
electoral successes, and ability to hold
together a governing coalition … [is based on]
him having a message that resonates with a
broader public. It is a sales pitch that
Netanyahu … [has] ‘brought the state of Israel
to the best situation in its history, a rising
global force … the state of Israel is
diplomatically flourishing.’ Netanyahu had
beaten back what he had called the ‘fake-news
claim’ that without a deal with the Palestinians
‘Israel will be isolated, weakened and
abandoned’ facing a ‘diplomatic tsunami.’
“Difficult though it is for his political
detractors to acknowledge, Netanyahu’s claim
resonates with the public because it reflects
something that is real, and that has shifted the
center of gravity of Israeli politics further
and further to the right. It is a claim that, if
correct and replicable over time, will leave a
legacy that lasts well beyond Netanyahu’s
premiership and any indictment he might face.
“Netanyahu’s assertion is that he is not merely
buying time in Israel’s conflict with the
Palestinians to improve the terms of an eventual
and inevitable compromise. Netanyahu is laying
claim to something different — the possibility
of ultimate victory, the permanent and
definitive defeat of the Palestinians, their
national and collective goals.
“In
over a decade as prime minister, Netanyahu has
consistently and unequivocally rejected any
plans or practical steps that even begin to
address Palestinian aspirations. Netanyahu is
all about perpetuating and exacerbating the
conflict, not about managing it, let alone
resolving it…[The] message is clear: there will
be no Palestinian state because the West Bank
and East Jerusalem are simply Greater Israel.”
No
Palestinian State
Levy
continues: “The approach overturns assumptions
that have guided peace efforts and American
policy for over a quarter of a century: that
Israel has no alternative to an eventual
territorial withdrawal and acceptance of
something sufficiently resembling an independent
sovereign Palestinian state broadly along the
1967 lines. It challenges the presumption that
the permanent denial of such an outcome is
incompatible with how Israel and Israelis
perceive themselves as being a democracy.
Additionally, it challenges the peace-effort
supposition that this denial would in any way be
unacceptable to the key allies on which Israel
depends…
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Grants
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Is
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Media
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“In
more traditional bastions of support for Israel,
Netanyahu took a calculated gamble — would
enough American Jewish support continue to stand
with an increasingly illiberal and
ethno-nationalist Israel, thereby facilitating
the perpetuation of the lopsided U.S.-Israel
relationship? Netanyahu bet yes, and he was
right.”
And
here is another interesting point that Levy
makes:
“And
then events took a further turn in Netanyahu’s
favor with the rise to power in the United
States and parts of Central Eastern Europe (and
to enhanced prominence elsewhere in Europe and
the West) of the very ethno-nationalist trend to
which Netanyahu is so committed, working to
replace liberal with illiberal democracy. One
should not underestimate Israel and Netanyahu’s
importance as an ideological and practical
avant-garde for this trend.”
Former U.S. Ambassador and respected political
analyst Chas Freeman
wrote recently
very bluntly: “the central objective of U.S.
policy in the Middle East has long been to
achieve regional acceptance for the
Jewish-settler state in Palestine.” Or, in other
words, for Washington, its Middle East policy –
and all its actions – have been determined by
“to be, or not to be”: “To be” (that is) – with
Israel, or not “to be” (with Israel).
Israel’s
Lost Ground
The key
point now is that the region has just made a
seismic shift into the “not to be” camp. Is
there much that America can do about that?
Israel very much is alone with only a weakened
Saudi Arabia at its side, and there are clear
limits to what Saudi Arabia can do.
The U.S. calling on Arab states to engage more
with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi seems
somehow inadequate. Iran is not looking
for war with Israel (as a number of Israeli
analysts have
acknowledged);
but, too, the Syrian President has made clear
that his government intends to recover “all
Syria” – and all Syria
includes the
occupied Golan Heights. And this week, Hassan
Nasrallah called on the Lebanese government “to devise
a plan and take
a sovereign decision to liberate the Shebaa
Farms and the Kfarshouba Hills” from Israel.
A
number Israeli commentators already are saying
that the “writing is on the wall” – and that it
would be
better for
Israel to cede territory unilaterally, rather
than risk the loss of hundreds of lives of
Israeli servicemen in a futile attempt to retain
it. That, though, seems hardly congruent with
the Israeli Prime Minister’s “not an inch, will
we yield” character and recent
statements.
Will
ethno-nationalism provide Israel with a new
support base? Well, firstly, I do not see
Israel’s doctrine as “illiberal democracy,” but
rather an apartheid system intended to
subordinate Palestinian political rights. And as
the political schism in the West widens, with
one “wing” seeking to delegitimize the other by
tarnishing them as racists, bigots and Nazis, it
is clear that the real America
First-ers will try, at any price, to distance
themselves from the extremists.
Daniel
Levy points out that the Alt-Right leader,
Richard Spencer, depicts his movement as
White Zionism. Is this really likely to
build support for Israel? How long before the
“globalists” use precisely Netanyahu’s
“illiberal democracy” meme to taunt the U.S.
Right that this is precisely the kind of society
for which they too aim: with Mexicans and black
Americans treated like Palestinians?
‘Ethnic
Nationalism’
The
increasingly “not to be” constituency of the
Middle East has a simpler word for Netanyahu’s
“ethnic nationalism.” They call it simply
Western colonialism. Round one of Chas Freeman’s
making the Middle East “be with Israel”
consisted of the shock-and-awe assault on
Iraq. Iraq is now allied with Iran, and the
Hashad militia (PMU) are becoming a widely
mobilized fighting force. The second stage was
2006. Today, Hizbullah is a regional force, and
not a just Lebanese one.
The
third strike was at Syria. Today, Syria is
allied with Russia, Iran, Hizbullah and Iraq.
What will comprise the next round in the “to be,
or not to be” war?
For all
Netanyahu’s bluster about Israel standing
stronger, and having beaten back “what he had
called the ‘fake-news claim’ that without a deal
with the Palestinians ‘Israel will be isolated,
weakened and abandoned’ facing a ‘diplomatic
tsunami,’” Netanyahu may have just discovered,
in these last two weeks, that he confused facing
down the weakened Palestinians with
“victory” — only at the very moment of his
apparent triumph, to find himself alone in a
new, “New Middle East.”
Perhaps
Pravda was right, and Netanyahu did
appear close to panic, during his hurriedly
arranged, and urgently called, Sochi summit.
Alastair
Crooke is a former British diplomat who was a
senior figure in British intelligence and in
European Union diplomacy. He is the founder and
director of the Conflicts Forum.