Why Does North Korea Hate Us?
By Robert C. Koehler
“The bombing was long, leisurely and
merciless . . .”
August 17, 2017 "Information
Clearing House"
- And so we return to the Korean
War, when North Korea was
carpet-bombed to the edge of
existence. The American media
doesn’t have a memory that stretches
quite so far back, at least not
under present circumstances. One
commentator at MSNBC recently
explained, for instance, that the
tiny pariah nation “has been
preparing for war for 63 years.”
That would be since, uh, 1954, the
year after the war ended. But the
war wasn’t mentioned. It never is.
Doing so would disrupt the consensus
attitude that Kim Jong-Un is a
nuclear-armed crazy and that North
Korea’s hatred of the United States
is just . . . hatred, dark and
bitter, the kind of rancor you’d
expect from a communist dictatorship
and certified member of the Axis of
Evil.
And now Donald Trump is taunting the
crazy guy, disrupting the
U.S.-maintained normalcy of global
relations and putting this country
at risk. And that’s almost always
the focus: not the use of nuclear
weapons per se, but the possibility
that a North Korean nuke could reach
the United States, as though
American lives and “national
security” mattered more than, or
were separate from, the safety of
the whole planet.
Indeed, the concept of national
security justifies pretty much every
action, however destructive and
horrifically consequential in the
long term. The concept justifies
armed short-sightedness, which
equals militarism. Apparently
protecting national security also
means forgetting the Korean War, or
never facing the reality of what we
did to North Korea from 1950 to
1953.
But as Trump plays war in his own
special way, the time to explore
this media memory void is now.
I
return to my opening quote, which is
from a two-year-old story in the
Washington Post:
“The bombing was long, leisurely and
merciless, even by the assessment of
America’s own leaders. ‘Over a
period of three years or so, we
killed off — what — 20 percent of
the population,’ Air Force Gen.
Curtis LeMay, head of the Strategic
Air Command during the Korean War,
told the Office of Air Force History
in 1984. Dean Rusk, a supporter of
the war and later secretary of
state, said the United States bombed
‘everything that moved in North
Korea, every brick standing on top
of another.’ After running low on
urban targets, U.S. bombers
destroyed hydroelectric and
irrigation dams in the later stages
of the war, flooding farmland and
destroying crops.”
Specifically, “the U.S. dropped
635,000 tons of explosives on North
Korea, including 32,557 tons of
napalm, an incendiary liquid that
can clear forested areas and cause
devastating burns to human skin,”
Tom O’Connor wrote recently in
Newsweek.
This is more bomb tonnage than the
U.S. dropped in the Pacific Theater
during World War II.
He quoted historian Bruce Cumings:
“Most Americans are completely
unaware that we destroyed more
cities in the North then we did in
Japan or Germany during World War
II.”
And so
we start to open the wound of this
war, in which possibly as many as 3
million North Koreans died, a number
that would have been even higher had
Gen. Douglas MacArthur
gotten his way. He proposed nuclear
holocaust in the name of national
security, figuring he could win the
war in ten days.
“Between 30 and 50 atomic bombs
would have more than done the job,”
he said in an interview shortly
after the end of the war. “Dropped
under cover of darkness, they would
have destroyed the enemy’s air force
on the ground, wiped out his
maintenance and his airmen.”
“For
the Americans, strategic bombing
made perfect sense, giving advantage
to American technological prowess
against the enemy’s numerical
superiority,” historian Charles K.
Armstrong wrote for the
Asia Pacific Journal.
“. . . But for the North Koreans,
living in fear of B-29 attacks for
nearly three years, including the
possibility of atomic bombs, the
American air war left a deep and
lasting impression. The (Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea)
government never forgot the lesson
of North Korea’s vulnerability to
American air attack, and for half a
century after the Armistice
continued to strengthen
anti-aircraft defenses, build
underground installations, and
eventually develop nuclear weapons
to ensure that North Korea would not
find itself in such a position
again. The long-term psychological
effect of the war on the whole of
North Korean society cannot be
overestimated.”
Why is this reality not part of the
current news? In what way is
American safety furthered by such
willful ignorance?
Cumings,
writing recently in
The Nation,
noted that he participated in a
forum about North Korea in Seoul
last fall with Strobe Talbott,
deputy secretary of state in the
Bill Clinton administration. At one
point, Cumings brought up Robert
McNamara’s comment in the
documentary The Fog of War,
regarding Vietnam, that “we never
put ourselves in the shoes of the
enemy and attempted to see the world
as they did.” Shouldn’t this apply
to our negotiations with North
Korea?
“Talbott,” Cumings wrote, “then
blurted, ‘It’s a grotesque regime!’
There you have it: It’s our
number-one problem, but so grotesque
that there’s no point trying to
understand Pyongyang’s point of view
(or even that it might have some
valid concerns).”
And so we remain caged in military
thinking and the need to win, rather
than understand. But as long as we
feel no need to understand North
Korea, we don’t have to bother
trying to understand ourselves. Or
face what we have done.
© 2017
Common Wonders