We
Should Fear Trump More Than Ever
By
Patrick Cockburn
May
01, 2017 "Information
Clearing House"
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Politicians and establishment media have
greeted what they see as President Trump’s
return to the norms of American foreign
policy. They welcome the actual or
threatened use of military force in Syria,
Afghanistan and North Korea, and praise his
appointment of a bevvy of generals to senior
security posts. A striking feature of
Trump’s first 100 days was the way in which
the campaign to demonise him and his
entourage as creatures of the Kremlin was
suddenly switched off like a light as soon
as he retreated from his earlier radicalism.
In
reality, the Trump administration should be
more feared as a danger to world peace at
the end of his first 100 days in office than
it was at the beginning. This is because
Trump in the White House empowers many of
those who, so far from being “a safe pair of
hands”, have led the US into a series of
disastrous wars in the Middle East in the
post 9/11 era. There is no reason to think
that they have changed their ways or learned
from past mistakes.
This
point is understood better in the Middle
East than in it is in the US and Europe. In
Baghdad, for instance, people are worried
because they see the US building towards a
renewed confrontation with Iran, possibly
reneging on the nuclear agreement with
Tehran and trying to curtail or eliminate
Iranian influence in Iraq. Jim Mattis, the
Secretary for Defence and former Marine
general, and HR McMaster, the National
Security Adviser and a general with combat
experience in Iraq, are both volubly
anti-Iranian. For soldiers like McMaster,
the US failure in Iraq was unnecessary and
self-inflicted and they intend to reverse
it.
A
US-Iran confrontation is bad news for Iraq
because it may not mean an all-out war
(though this is perfectly possible), but
will be fought out on Iraqi territory by
local proxies and allies. “Iraq really
cannot take any more violence,” says one
Iraqi commentator, “and there would be no
clear winner.” He argues that the experience
of the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, when the
Iranians lost half a million dead, is seared
into the minds of Iranian leaders and they
will never permit a hostile foreign state
like the US to become dominant in Iraq.
Many
Western commentators were jubilant over
Trump’s missile strike in Syria on 7 April,
interpreting it as a return to a US policy
that demands Assad’s departure as part of a
peace deal. But this policy has long been
dead in the water because Assad has no
reason to go. Trump’s Syrian policy during
the presidential election campaign always
made more sense than that of Hillary Clinton
as the voice of the US foreign policy
establishment.
The
great dilemma for ordinary Syrians and the
Western powers is that if Assad goes or is
weakened, then the main beneficiaries will
be al-Qaeda and Isis. The choice is between
very bad and even worse. There have been
propaganda efforts to pretend that the
Syrian armed opposition is not
overwhelmingly led by Salafi-Jihadi groups.
But these attempts are dying away as Jabhat
al-Nusra, which is prone to name changes,
mops up its last opponents in northern
Syria.
An
influential piece of propaganda has been to
claim that the Syrian government is either
complicit with Isis or not doing anything to
fight them. But this is contradicted by a
new analysis by the monitoring group IHS
Markit, revealing that over the last year
Isis has fought the Syrian government forces
more than any other opponent. Between 1
April 2016 and 31 March 2017, 43 per cent of
Isis fighting in Syria was directed against
Assad forces, 17 per cent against the US
backed but Kurdish dominated Syrian
Democratic Forces and 40 per cent against
other groups, most notably Turkish proxies
reinforced by the Turkish army north of
Aleppo.
“It is
an inconvenient reality that any US action
taken to weaken the Syrian government will
inadvertently benefit the Islamic State and
other Jihadi groups,” says Columb Strack,
senior Middle East analyst at IHS Markit.
“The Syrian government is essentially the
anvil to the US-led coalition’s hammer.
While the US-backed forces surround Raqqa,
the Islamic State is engaged in intense
fighting with the Syrian Government around
Palmyra and in other parts of Homs and Deir
al-Zour provinces.” If Isis was to capture
Deir al-Zour, the largest city in eastern
Syria, this would rejuvenate the group even
if it loses Raqqa and Mosul.
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The
Trump administration says its priority is
still to eliminate Isis and nobody openly
disagrees with this. But the resurgent
influence of the US foreign policy
establishment along with that of Israel and
the neo-cons, despite their dismal record in
Iraq and Syria, is good news for Isis.
Washington is seeking closer relations with
Sunni states like Turkey and Saudi Arabia
which have shadowy links to Salafi-jihadi
groups and were at odds with President Obama.
People
and policies gaining the power to make
decisions in the Trump administration are
the very same as those who helped turn the
wider Middle East from Hindu Kush to the
Sahara into an arena for endless wars. They
have no idea how to end these conflicts and
show little desire to do so.
There
is a more general reason why Washington may
in future be more inclined to employ the
threat or use of military force to project
its power. This is because its political,
economic and ideological power is declining
relative to the rest of the world. It was at
its apogee between the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991 and the financial
crisis of 2007-8. The rise of China and the
return of Russia as an international player
cramps its ability to act unilaterally. The
election of Trump is evidence of a deeply
divided society.
As a
military power the US can still claim
predominance: international derision of
Trump was instantly muted when he fired 59
Tomahawk missiles into Syria, dropped a big
bomb in Afghanistan and claimed, falsely as
it turns out, that a US armada was sailing
towards North Korea. The lesson of recent US
foreign interventions is that it is
difficult to turn military power into
political gains, but this does not mean that
Washington will not try to do so.
Trump
will have learned over the last month that
minimal sabre rattling abroad produces major
political dividends at home. Leaders down
the ages have been tempted to stage a small
short successful war to rally their country
behind them. Frequently they have got this
absolutely and self-destructively wrong and
these wars have turned out to be large, long
and unsuccessful.
Trump
campaigned as an isolationist, which should
protect him from foreign misadventures, but
he has never had many isolationists around
him. The architects of America’s failed
military interventions since Afghanistan are
still in business. Strip Trump of his
isolationism and what you have left is
largely jingoistic bravado and bragging
about a return of American greatness. In
future crises, both these impulses will make
compromise more difficult and war more
likely.