The
Mother of All Bombs: How badly did it hurt IS in
Afghanistan?
"[Dropping the bomb] was a trick to show the
world that their mission was going well. But
this wasn't the type of bomb they showed in the
media. The bomb did nothing."
The BBC's
Auliya Atrafi found fighting continues close to
where the MOAB hit
On 13
April the US dropped one of its largest
non-nuclear bombs on a tunnel complex used by
so-called Islamic State militants in eastern
Afghanistan. It was the first time such a weapon
had been used in battle.
The BBC's Auliya Atrafi has been to the area to
see if it really had any impact in the battle
against IS.
The view from the hills overlooking the Mamand
Valley is beautiful. Green fields and trees fill
the valley floor. Ahead, the valley narrows and
hills become mountains. In the distance rises
the magnificent Spin-Ghar, the White Mountain,
which marks the border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
But there was no chance of quiet contemplation
when I visited this area of Nangarhar province.
Above, three types of American fighter planes
were circling and dropping bombs.
One bomb hit the narrow part of the valley. It
was there, a young soldier told me, that the
weapon known as the Mother of All Bombs (MOAB)
had been used.
I was confused. Reports of the bomb had made me
think that it had wiped out the IS stronghold
here in Achin district. I assumed that US and
Afghan troops would have sealed off the area and
that IS (or Daesh, as it is known here) would be
in disarray.
An Afghan officer corrected me. "For a start
this bomb wasn't as powerful as you think," he
said.
"There are still green trees standing 100m away
from the site of the impact."
A large number of IS militants were killed by
the MOAB, but it is hard to know how many. The
Achin district governor, Ismail Shinwary, says
at least 90.
Either way, the battle against IS continues.
"Daesh hasn't gone anywhere; there are hundreds
of caves like the one the Americans bombed," the
officer says, adding that strikes have continued
since the bomb was dropped. "They can't get rid
of them like this."
The fighting appeared to be taking place along a
huge area in the mountains. The bombardment was
relentless, filling the valley with smoke and
noise.
But IS were taking casualties. Over a breakfast
of eggs and green tea, the district police
chief, Major Khair Mohammad Sapai, showed us
pictures of dead IS fighters. They had beards
and long hair.
In death they looked pitiable, quite unlike the
image they try to portray in their propaganda
videos - riding horses, carrying their black
flags or making the local Shinwari people sit on
bombs and then blowing them up.
Major Khair said some of them were foreigners,
but from their disintegrating, dust-covered
faces it was hard to tell.
He showed us hand-written lists of Afghan
telephone numbers seized during operations, and
some of the names on the list were indeed Arabic
or Pakistani.
The major's claims were backed up by Hakim Khan
Momand and his friends. They are members of the
so-called "people's uprising" - new militias
made up of local people that help with security
in the area. They cooperate with state security
forces but their existence is seen as a sign of
weak central government and instability.
The bearded men lay on portable cots, drinking
strong green tea and relishing the sight of IS
fighters being bombed by American planes.
"They are all sorts - Uzbeks, Tajiks, Arabs and
Wahhabis from Kunar Province. They have nowhere
to go; best to bury them in the caves where they
happen to be hiding," Hakim Khan said.
His house lies in the Mamand Valley, in an area
still under the control of IS. He adds: "God
willing, the Americans have given us their word
that they would clear the entire valley of Daesh
fighters."
Unlike the Taliban, who tend to have many
supporters in their core areas, IS seem to have
angered a lot of people. Few seemed unhappy
about the US bombardment.
A couple of kilometres from the frontline,
ordinary life was continuing. Women carried
water, boys played cricket and people went about
their daily tasks.
However, there was anxiety. One man, Khaled,
said local people were pawns in a US game.
"[Dropping the bomb] was a trick to show the
world that their mission was going well. But
this wasn't the type of bomb they showed in the
media. The bomb did nothing."
"Will IS come back?" I asked.
"Yes, as soon as the government leaves, the
locals won't be able to fight them. If the
government makes permanent bases in the area and
helps us, then we will be happy," he answered.
Another local resident suggested IS could do
with something a little stronger.
"Let Americans bring down a bigger one, this one
was small," he said.
Back in the hills, Hakim Khan and his friends
were listening in to IS fighters communicating
via walkie-talkies with the help of their radio.
The fighters were reassuring each other and
communicating with their comrades in a
neighbouring district.
A border police officer wondered aloud if the
commitment of the Trump administration would
match that of IS.
"The more we kill, the more they come from the
other side of the Durand line, in Pakistan," he
said.
After a night back in the safety of Jalalabad,
we returned the next morning.
There was no fighting so we drove into the
valley until we were stopped near the bomb
impact site by Afghan special forces, who agreed
to show us around.
They said that IS fighters saw the district as
their own. After most locals fled, IS banned
poppy cultivation and began farming wheat,
turning the valley green.
Now the lush allotments were their battlefields.
Bodies lay next to hollow trees that fighters
had been sleeping inside.
Shear, a tough-looking special forces soldier,
said that IS fighters were "crazy" and very
committed.
"They make the most of their basic Russian guns;
they are technical fighters," he said.
"You can't hear them coming in the mountains:
they will wear six pairs of socks and get within
striking distance without you hearing them.
"In the mountains they fight individually or in
groups of two or three. They don't leave their
positions, so you have to kill them. And their
friends don't come to collect their bodies; they
lie where they die."
We waited for permission to visit the impact
site, surrounded by crates of military supplies
dropped from the air.
Our escort was Haji Beag, a unit commander, who
first showed us a smaller "IS command base and
prison".
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One door
opening into a spacious courtyard led to a room
which led to a small cave that could house
around 10 people.
It was dug into the rock and felt very solid. It
was clear why finding and killing IS militants
in these mountains took so much time and energy.
At the entrance to the cave stood an improvised
cage, made of mesh frames. It held two tight
spaces which Haji Beag said were used as prison
cells.
He said he believed the US made a good decision
to use the MOAB to target caves used over
decades by different militant groups - from the
Mujahedeen, to the Taliban, and most recently
IS.
"We found about 20 bodies around the site after
the explosion. The cave system has been
destroyed," he said. "It's possible that most of
dead are buried inside those caves."
The drive to the impact site with Haji Beag and
his unit was a short one. American planes were
still flying above us, targeting the next valley
a kilometre away. The mountainous terrain was
hard on our four-wheel drive and as we
approached the site a rocket landed 200m in
front of us.
No one was hurt, but it made Haji Beag cautious,
and we weren't allowed to set foot on the impact
site.
But we could see it, and it was unremarkable.
There was no big crater. Trees had been burnt
and a few rooms had been flattened. Not far from
it, houses still stood and there were green
trees around.
As we left the valley, the bombardment
continued. It seemed clear that the bomb that
was dropped on 13 April had not come close to
delivering a knock-out blow to IS militants
entrenched in the area, and the locals certainly
expect more conflict ahead.
To me, at least, the Mother Of All Bombs failed
to live up to her reputation.
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