The
Bloodstained Rise of Global Populism
A Political Movement’s Violent Pursuit of
“Enemies”
By Alfred W. McCoy
April 03,
2017 "Information
Clearing House"
- "Tom
Dispatch"
- In 2016, something extraordinary happened in
the politics of diverse countries around the
world. With surprising speed and simultaneity, a
new generation of populist leaders emerged from
the margins of nominally democratic nations to
win power. In doing so, they gave voice, often
in virulent fashion, to public concerns about
the social costs of globalization.
Even in
societies as disparate as the affluent United
States and the impoverished Philippines,
similarly violent strains of populist rhetoric
carried two unlikely candidates from the
political margins to the presidency. On opposite
sides of the Pacific, these outsider campaigns
were framed by lurid calls for violence and even
murder.
As his insurgent crusade gained momentum,
billionaire Donald Trump moved beyond his
repeated promises to fight Islamic terror with
torture and brutal bombing by also advocating
the murder of women and children. “The other
thing with the terrorists is you have to take
out their families, when you get these
terrorists, you have to take out their
families,” he
told Fox News.
“They care about their lives, don’t kid
yourself. When they say they don’t care about
their lives, you have to take out their
families.”
At the same time, campaigning in the Philippines
on a law-and-order program of his own, Rodrigo
Duterte, then mayor of a remote
provincial city, swore that he would kill drug
dealers across the nation, sparing nothing in
the way of violent imagery. “If by chance that
God will place me [in the presidency],” he
promised in
launching his campaign, “watch out because the
1,000 [people executed while he was a mayor]
will become 100,000. You will see the fish in
Manila Bay getting fat. That is where I will
dump you.”
The
rise of these political soulmates and populist
strongmen not only resonated deeply in their
political cultures, but also reflected global
trends that made their bloodstained rhetoric
paradigmatic of our present moment. After a
post-Cold War quarter-century of globalization,
displaced workers around the world began
mobilizing angrily to oppose an economic order
that had made life so good for transnational
corporations and social elites.
Between 1999 and 2011, for instance, Chinese
imports had eliminated 2.4 million American
jobs,
closing
furniture manufacturers in North Carolina,
factories that produced glass in Ohio, and auto
parts and steel companies across the Midwest. As
a range of nations worldwide reacted to such
realities by imposing a combined 2,100
restrictions on imports to staunch similar job
losses, world trade actually started to
slow down
without a major recession for the first time
since 1945.
The
Bloodstained History of Populism
Across Europe, hyper-nationalist right-wing
parties like the French National Front, the
Alternative for Germany, and the UK Independence
Party
won over voters
by cultivating nativist, especially
anti-Islamic, responses to globalization.
Simultaneously, a generation of populist
demagogues either held, gained, or threatened to
take power in democracies around the world:
Marine Le Pen in France, Geert Wilders in the
Netherlands, Viktor Orban in Hungary, Vladimir
Putin in Russia, Recep Erdogan in Turkey, Donald
Trump in the U.S., Narendra Modi in India,
Prabowo Subianto in Indonesia, and Rodrigo
Duterte in the Philippines, among others.
Indian essayist Pankaj Mishra recently
summed up their
successes this way: “Demagogues are still
emerging, in the West and outside it, as the
promise of prosperity collides with massive
disparities of wealth, power, education, and
status.” The Philippine economy offered
typically grim news on this score. It
grew by an
impressive 6% annually in the six years before
Duterte launched his presidential campaign, even
as a staggering 26 million poor Filipinos
struggled to
survive on a dollar a day. In those years, just
40 elite Filipino families
grabbed an
estimated 76% of all the wealth this growth
produced.
Scholar Michael Lee
suggests that a
populist leader succeeds by rhetorically
defining his or her national community by both
its supposedly “shared characteristics” and its
inevitable common “enemy,” whether Mexican
“rapists” or Muslim refugees, much as the Nazis
created a powerful sense of national selfhood by
excluding certain groups by “blood.” In
addition, he argues, such movements share the
desire for an “apocalyptic confrontation”
through a final “mythic battle” as “the vehicle
to revolutionary change.”
Although scholars like Lee emphasize the ways in
which populist demagogues rely on violent
rhetoric for their success, they tend to focus
less on another crucial aspect of such populists
globally: actual violence. These movements might
still be in their (relatively) benign phase in
the United States and Europe, but in less
developed democracies around the world populist
leaders haven’t hesitated to inscribe their
newfound power on the battered bodies of their
victims.
For more than a decade, for
instance, Russian President Vladimir Putin, a
reasonable candidate for sparking this wave of
populism, has demonstrated his famously
bare-chested
version of power politics by
ensuring that
opponents and critics meet grim ends under
“mysterious” circumstances. These include the
lethal spritz of polonium 210 that killed
Russian secret police defector Alexander
Litvinenko in London in 2006; the shooting of
journalist and Putin critic Anna Politkovskaya
outside her Moscow apartment that same year; a
dose of rare Himalayan plant poison for banker
and Putin nemesis Alexander Perepilichny in
London in 2012; a fusillade that felled
opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in downtown
Moscow in 2015; and four
fatal bullets
this March for refugee whistleblower Denis
Voronenkov on a Kiev sidewalk, which Ukraine has
denounced as “an act of state terrorism.”
As an Islamist populist, Turkish president Recep
Erdogan has projected his power through a
bloody repression
of, and a new war with, the country’s Kurdish
minority. He portrays the Kurds as a cancer
within the country’s body politic whose identity
must be extinguished, much as his forebears rid
themselves of the Armenians. In addition, since
mid-2016, he’s overseen a
wholesale purge
of 50,000 officials, journalists, teachers, and
military officers in the aftermath of a failed
coup, and in a
brutal round of
torture and rape filled Turkish prisons to the
brim.
In 2014, retired general Prabowo Subianto nearly
won Indonesia’s presidency with a populist
campaign of
“strength and order.” In fact, Prabowo’s
military career had long been steeped in such
violence. In 1998, when the authoritarian
regime of his father-in-law Suharto was at the
brink of collapse, Prabowo, then commander of
the Kopassus Rangers, staged the
kidnapping-disappearance of a dozen student
activists, the
savage rape of
168 Chinese women (acts meant to incite racial
violence), and the
burning of 43
shopping malls and 5,109 buildings in Jakarta,
the country’s capital, that left more than 1,000
dead.
During his first months in power, newly elected
Philippine President Duterte waged his highly
publicized war on the drug trade in city slums
by loosing the police and vigilantes nationwide
in a campaign already marked, in its first six
months, by at least
7,000 extrajudicial killings.
The bodies of his victims were regularly dumped
on Manila’s streets as warnings to others and as
down payments on Duterte’s promises of a new,
orderly country.
And he wasn’t the first populist in Asia to take
such a path either. In 2003, Thai Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra launched his “red
shirt” movement as a war on his country’s
rampant methamphetamine abuse. In just three
months under Thaksin’s rule, the police carried
out 2,275
extrajudicial killings
of suspected drug dealers and users, often
leaving the
bodies where they fell as a twisted tribute to
his power.
Such
examples of populist political carnage and the
likelihood of more to come -- including what
Donald Trump’s presidency might have in store --
raise certain questions: Just what dynamics lie
behind the urge toward violence that seems to
propel such movements? Why does the virulent
campaign rhetoric of populist political
movements so often morph into actual violence
once a populist wins power? And why is that
violence invariably aimed at enemies believed to
threaten the imagined integrity of the national
community?
In
their compulsion to “protect” the nation from
what are seen as pernicious alien influences,
such populist movements are defined by their
need for enemies. That need, in turn, infuses
them with an almost uncontrollable compulsion
for conflict that transcends actual threats or
rational political programs.
To give
this troubling trend its political due, it’s
necessary to understand how, at a particular
moment in history, global forces have produced a
generation of populist leaders with such
potential compulsions. And at the moment, there
may be no better example to look to than the
Philippines.
During
its last half-century of bloodstained elections,
two populists, Ferdinand Marcos and Rodrigo
Duterte, won exceptional power by combining the
high politics of diplomacy with the low politics
of performative violence, scattering corpses
scarred by their signature brutality as if they
were so many political pamphlets. A quick look
at this history offers us an unsettling glimpse
of America’s possible political future.
Populism
in the Philippines: the Marcos Era
Although now remembered mainly as a “kleptocrat”
who plundered his country and enriched himself
with shameless abandon (epitomized by the
discovery that his wife possessed 3,000 pairs of
shoes), Ferdinand Marcos was, in fact, a
brilliant populist, thoroughly skilled in the
symbolic uses of violence.
As his legal term as president came to an end in
1972, Marcos -- who, like many populists, saw
himself as chosen by destiny to save his people
from perdition -- used the military to declare
martial law. He then
jailed 50,000
opponents, including the senators who had
blocked his favored legislation and the gossip
columnists who had mocked his wife’s
pretensions.
The first months of his dictatorship actually
lacked any official violence. Then, just before
dawn on January 15, 1973, Constabulary officers
read a presidential execution order and strapped
Lim Seng, an overseas Chinese heroin
manufacturer, to a post at a Manila military
camp. As a battery of press photographers stood
by, an eight-man firing squad raised their
rifles. Replayed endlessly on television and in
movie theaters, the dramatic footage of bullets
ripping open
the victim’s chest was clearly meant to be a
vivid display of the new dictator’s power, as
well as an appeal to his country’s ingrained
anti-Chinese racism. Lim Seng would be the only
victim legally executed in the 14 years of the
Marcos dictatorship. Extra-judicial killings
were another matter, however.
Marcos made clever use of the massive U.S.
military bases near Manila to win continuing
support for his authoritarian (and increasingly
bloody) rule from three successive American
administrations, even effectively neutralizing
President Jimmy Carter’s human rights policy.
After a decade of dictatorship, however, the
economy began to
collapse from a
too-heavy dose of “crony capitalism” and the
political opposition started to challenge
Marcos’s self-image as destiny’s chosen one.
To either sate or subdue an increasingly restive
population, he soon resorted to escalating raw
violence. His security squads conducted what
were referred to as “salvagings,” more than
2,500 of them (or 77% of the
3,257 extrajudicial killings
during his 14-year dictatorship). Bodies
scarred by torture were regularly abandoned in
public plazas or at busy intersections so
passers-by could read the transcript of terror
in their stigmata. In the capital, Manila, with
only 4,000 police for six million residents, the
Marcos regime also deputized hundreds of “secret
marshals” responsible for more than 30
shoot-on-sight fatalities during May 1985, the
program’s first month, alone.
Yet the
impact of Marcos’s version of populist violence
proved mutable -- effective at the start of
martial law when people yearned for order and
counterproductive at its close when Filipinos
again longed for freedom. That shift in
sentiment soon led to his downfall in the first
of the dramatic “people power” revolutions that
would challenge autocratic regimes from Beijing
to Berlin.
Populism
in the Philippines: Duterte’s Violence
Rodrigo
Duterte, the son of a provincial governor,
initially pursued a career as the mayor of Davao
City, a site of endemic violence that left a
lasting imprint on his political persona.
In 1984, after the communist New People’s Army
made Davao its testing ground for urban guerilla
warfare, the city’s murders soared, doubling to
800, including the assassination of 150
policemen. To check the communists, who took
over part of the city, the military
mobilized
criminals and ex-communists as death squad
vigilantes in a lethal counterterror campaign.
When I visited Davao in 1987 to investigate
death squad killings, that remote southern city
already had an unforgettable air of desolation
and hopelessness.
It was
in this context of rising national and local
extrajudicial slaughter that the 33-year old
Rodrigo Duterte launched his political career as
the elected mayor of Davao City. That was in
1988, the first of seven terms that would keep
him in office, on and off, for another 21 years
until he won the country’s presidency in 2016.
His first campaign was hotly contested and he
barely beat his rivals, taking only 26% of the
vote.
Around 1996, he reportedly mobilized his own
vigilante group, the
Davao Death Squad.
It would be responsible for many of the city’s
814 extrajudicial killings over the next decade,
as victims were dumped on city streets with
faces
wrapped bizarrely
in packing tape. Duterte himself may have
killed one or
more of the squad’s victims. Apart from
liquidating criminals, the Davao Death Squad
also conveniently
eliminated the
mayor’s political rivals.
Campaigning for president in 2016, Duterte would
proudly point to the killings in Davao City and
promise a drug
war that would murder 100,000 Filipinos if
necessary. In doing so, he was also drawing on
historical resonances from the Marcos era that
lent some political depth to his violent
rhetoric. By specifically praising Marcos,
promising to finally
bury his body
in the National Heroes Cemetery in Manila, and
supporting
Ferdinand Marcos Jr. for vice president, Duterte
identified himself with a political lineage of
populist strongmen epitomized by the old
dictator at a time when desperate Filipinos were
looking for new hope of a decent life.
On taking office, President Duterte promptly
started his promised anti-drug campaign and
dead bodies
became commonplace sights on city streets
nationwide, sometimes accompanied by a crude
cardboard sign reading “I am a pusher,” or
simply with their faces wrapped in the by-now
trademark
packing tape
used by the Davao Death Squad. Although Human
Rights Watch would
declare his
drug war a “calamity,” a resounding 85% of
Filipinos
surveyed were
“satisfied,” apparently seeing each body
sprawled on a city street as another testament
to the president’s promise of order.
At the same time, like Marcos, Duterte deployed
a new style of diplomacy as part of his populist
reach for unrestrained power. Amid rising
tensions in the South China Sea between Beijing
and Washington, he improved his country’s
bargaining position by distancing himself from
the Philippines’ classic alliance with the
United States. At the 2016 ASEAN conference,
reacting to Barack Obama’s criticism of his drug
war, he
said bluntly of
the American president, “Your mother’s a whore.”
A
month later during a state visit to Beijing,
Duterte publicly
proclaimed
“separation from the United States.’’ By setting
aside his country’s recent slam-dunk
win over China
at the Court of Arbitration in the Hague in a
legal dispute over rival claims in the South
China Sea, Duterte
came home with
$24 billion in Chinese trade deals and a sense
that he was helping establish a new world order.
In January, after his police tortured and
killed a South
Korean businessman on the pretext of a drug
bust, he was forced to call a sudden halt to the
nationwide killing spree. Like his role model
Marcos, however, Duterte’s populism seems to
contain an insatiable appetite for violence and
so it was not long before bodies were once again
being dumped on the streets of Manila, pushing
the
death toll past
8,000.
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Success
and the Strongman
The
histories of these Filipino strongmen, past and
present, reveal two overlooked aspects of the
ill-defined phenomenon of global populism: the
role of what might be termed performative
violence in projecting domestic strength and a
complementary need for diplomatic success to
show international influence. How skillfully
these critical poles of power are balanced may
offer one gauge for speculating about the fate
of populist strongmen in disparate parts of the
globe.
In Russia’s case, Putin’s projection of strength
through the murder of selected domestic
opponents has been matched by
unchecked aggression
in Georgia and Ukraine -- a successful balancing
act that has made his country, with its rickety
economy the
size of Italy’s,
seem like a great power again and is likely to
extend his autocratic rule into the foreseeable
future.
In Turkey, Erdogan’s harsh repression of ethnic
and political enemies has essentially
sunk his bid
for entry into the European Union, plunged him
into an
unwinnable war
with Kurdish rebels, and complicated his
alliance with the United States against Islamic
fundamentalism -- all potential barriers to his
successful bid for unchecked power.
In Indonesia, Prabowo Subianto
failed in his
critical first step: building a domestic base
large enough to sweep him into the presidency,
in part because his call for order
resonated so
discordantly with a public still capable of
remembering his earlier bid for power through
eerie violence that roiled Jakarta with hundreds
of rapes, fires, and deaths.
Without the popular support generated by his
local spectacle of violence, President Duterte’s
de facto abrogation
of his country’s claims to the South China Sea’s
rich
fishing grounds
and oil reserves in his bid for Chinese support
risks a popular backlash, a military coup, or
both. For the time being, however, Duterte’s
deft juxtaposition of international maneuvering
and local bloodletting has made him a successful
Philippine
strongman with,
as yet, few apparent checks on his power.
While
the essential weakness of the Philippine
military limits Duterte’s outlets for his
populist violence to the police killings of poor
street drug dealers, Donald Trump faces no such
restraints. Should Congress and the courts check
the virulence of his domestic attacks on
Muslims, Mexicans, or other imagined enemies and
should his presidency run into further setbacks
like the recent repeal-Obamacare humiliation, he
could readily resort to violent military
adventures not only in Iraq, Syria, Yemen,
Afghanistan, and Libya, but even in Iran, not to
speak of North Korea, in a bid to recover his
populist aura of overweening power. In this way,
unlike any other potential populist politician
on the planet, he holds the fate of countless
millions in his much-discussed hands.
If
populism’s need for what scholar Michael Lee
calls an “apocalyptic confrontation” and a
“mythic battle” proves accurate, it might, in
the end, lead the Trump administration’s
“systemic revolutionaries” far beyond even their
most extreme rhetoric into an endlessly
escalating cycle of violence against foreign
enemies, using whatever weapons are available,
whether drones, special operations forces,
fighter bombers, naval armadas, or even nuclear
weapons.
Alfred W. McCoy, a
TomDispatch regular,
is the Harrington professor of history at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison. He is the
author of the now-classic book The Politics
of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug
Trade, which probed the conjuncture of
illicit narcotics and covert operations over 50
years, among other works. His newest book,
In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise
and Decline of U.S. Global Power
(Dispatch Books/Haymarket) will be published
this September. This article is
based on a lecture he delivered in February at
the Third World Studies Center, University of
the Philippines.
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and Tom Engelhardt's latest book,
Shadow Government: Surveillance, Secret Wars,
and a Global Security State in a
Single-Superpower World.
Copyright 2017 Alfred W. McCoy
The
views expressed in this article are solely those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
opinions of Information Clearing House.
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