New
Declassified CIA Memo Presents Blueprint for
Syrian Regime Collapse
By Brad
Hoff
February 15, 2017 "Information
Clearing House"
-
"Libertarian
Institute" -
A newly
declassified CIA document explored multiple
scenarios of Syrian regime collapse at a time
when Hafez al-Assad’s government was embroiled
in a covert “dirty war” with Israel and the
West, and in the midst of a diplomatic crisis
which marked an unprecedented level of isolation
for Syria.
The 24-page formerly classified memo entitled
Syria: Scenarios of Dramatic Political
Change was produced in July 1986, and
had high level distribution within the Reagan
administration and to agency directors,
including presidential advisers, the National
Security Council, and the US ambassador to
Syria. The memo appears in the CIA’s latest
CREST release (CIA Records Search Tool)
of over 900,000 recently declassified documents.
A “severely
restricted” report
The
memo’s cover letter, drafted by the CIA’s
Director of Global Issues (the report itself
was prepared by the division’s Foreign
Subversion and Instability Center),
introduces the purpose of presenting “a number
of possible scenarios that could lead to the
ouster of President Assad or other dramatic
change in Syria.”
It
further curiously warns that, “Because the
analysis out of context is susceptible to
misunderstanding, external distribution has been
severely restricted.” The report’s narrowed
distribution list (sent to specific named
national security heads, not entire agencies)
indicates that it was considered at the highest
levels of the Reagan administration.
The coming sectarian
war for Syria
The
intelligence report’s contents contain some
striking passages which seem remarkably
consistent with events as they unfolded decades
later at the start of the Syrian war in 2011:
Although we judge that fear of
reprisals and organizational problems make a
second Sunni challenge unlikely, an excessive
government reaction to minor outbreaks of Sunni
dissidence might trigger large-scale unrest. In
most instances the regime would have the
resources to crush a Sunni opposition movement,
but we believe widespread violence among the
populace could stimulate large numbers of Sunni
officers and conscripts to desert or munity,
setting the stage for civil war.
[pg.2]
The
“second Sunni challenge” is a reference to the
Syrian government’s prior long running war
against a Muslim Brotherhood insurgency which
culminated in the 1982 Hama Massacre. While
downplaying the nationalist and
pluralistic composition of the ruling Ba’ath
party, the report envisions a renewal and
exploitation of sectarian fault lines pitting
Syria’s Sunni population against its Alawite
leadership:
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Join with over 100,000 people in more than 140
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Sunnis make up 60 percent of the
Syrian officer corps but are concentrated in
junior officer ranks; enlisted men are
predominantly Sunni conscripts. We believe that
a renewal of communal violence between Alawis
and Sunnis could inspire Sunnis in the military
to turn against the regime.
[pg.12]
Regime change and the
Muslim Brotherhood
The
possibility of the Muslim
Brotherhood spearheading another future armed
insurgency leading to regime change is given
extensive focus. While the document’s
tone suggests this as a long term future
scenario (especially considering the Brotherhood
suffered overwhelming defeat and went completely
underground in Syria by the mid-1980’s), it is
considered one of the top three “most likely”
drivers of regime change (the other scenarios
include “Succession Power Struggle” and
“Military Reverses Spark a Coup”).
The
potential for revival of the Muslim
Brotherhood’s “militant faction” is introduced
in the following:
Although the Muslim Brotherhood’s
suppression drastically reduced armed
dissidence, we judge a significant potential
still exists for another Sunni opposition
movement. In part the Brotherhood’s role was to
exploit and orchestrate opposition activity by
other organized groups… These groups still
exist, and under proper leadership they could
coalesce into a large movement… …young
professionals who formed the base of support for
the militant faction of the Muslim Brotherhood;
and remnants of the Brotherhood itself who could
become leaders in a new Sunni opposition
movement…
[pp.13-14]
The
Brotherhood’s role is seen as escalating the
potential for initially small Sunni protest
movements to morph into violent sectarian civil
war:
Sunni dissidence has been minimal since Assad
crushed the Muslim Brotherhood in the early
1980s, but deep-seated tensions remain–keeping
alive the potential for minor incidents to grow
into major flareups of communal violence…
Excessive government force in quelling such
disturbances might be seen by Sunnis as evidence
of a government vendetta against all Sunnis,
precipitating even larger protests by other
Sunni groups…
Mistaking the new protests as a
resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood, the
government would step up its use of force and
launch violent attacks on a broad spectrum of
Sunni community leaders as well as on those
engaged in protests. Regime efforts to restore
order would founder if government violence
against protestors inspired broad-based communal
violence between Alawis and Sunnis.
[pp.19-20]
The CIA
report describes the final phase of an evolving
sectarian war which witnesses the influx of
fighters and weapons from neighboring
countries. Consistent with a
1983 secret report that called for a US
covert operation to utilize then US-allied Iraq
as a base of attack on Syria, the 1986 analysis
says, “Iraq might supply them with sufficient
weapons to launch a civil war”:
A general campaign of Alawi
violence against Sunnis might push even moderate
Sunnis to join the opposition. Remnants of the
Muslim Brotherhood–some returning from exile in
Iraq–could provide a core of leadership for the
movement. Although the regime has the resources
to crush such a venture, we believe brutal
attacks on Sunni civilians might prompt large
numbers of Sunni officers and conscripts to
desert or stage mutinies in support of
dissidents, and Iraq might supply them with
sufficient weapons to launch a civil war.
[pp.20-21]
A Sunni regime
serving Western economic interests
While
the document is primarily a theoretical
exploration projecting scenarios of Syrian
regime weakening and collapse (its purpose is
analysis and not necessarily policy), the
authors admit of its “purposefully provocative”
nature (see
PREFACE) and closes with a list desired
outcomes. One provocative outcome describes a
pliant “Sunni regime” serving US economic
interests:
In our view, US interests would
be best served by a Sunni regime controlled by
business-oriented moderates. Business moderates
would see a strong need for Western aid and
investment to build Syria’s private economy,
thus opening the way for stronger ties to
Western governments.
[pg. 24]
Ironically, the Syrian government would accuse
the United States and its allies of covert
subversion within Syria after a string of
domestic bombings created diplomatic tensions
during the mid-1980’s.
Dirty tricks and
diplomacy in the 1980’s
According to Patrick Seale’s landmark book,
Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle
East, 1986 was a year that marked
Syria’s greatest isolation among world powers as
multiple diplomatic crises and terror events put
Syria more and more out in the cold.
The
year included
“the Hindawi affair”—a
Syrian intelligence sponsored attempt to hijack
and bomb an El Al flight to Tel Aviv—and
may or may not have involved Nezar Hindawi
working as a double agent on behalf of Israel.
The foiled plot brought down international
condemnation on Syria and lives on as one of the
more famous and bizarre terror conspiracies in
history. Not only were Syria and Israel once
again generally on the brink of war in 1986, but
a string of “dirty tricks” tactics were being
utilized by Syria and its regional enemies to
shape diplomatic outcomes primarily in Lebanon
and Jordan.
In
March and April of 1986 (months prior to the
distribution of the CIA memo),
a string of still largely unexplained car bombs
rocked Damascus and at least 5 towns throughout
Syria, leaving over 200 civilians dead in the
most significant wave of attacks since the
earlier ’79-’82 war with the Muslim Brotherhood
(also see
BBC News recount the attacks).
Patrick Seale’s book speculates of the bombings
that, “It may not have been unconnected that in
late 1985 the NSC’s Colonel Oliver North and
Amiram Nir, Peres’s counter-terrorism expert,
set up a dirty tricks outfit to strike back at
the alleged sponsors of Middle East terrorism.”*
Consistency with
future WikiLeaks files
The
casual reader of
Syria: Scenarios of Dramatic Political
Change will immediately recognize a
strategic thinking on Syria that looks much the
same as what is revealed in national security
memos produced decades later in the run up to
the current war in Syria.
When US
cables or intelligence papers talk
regime change in Syria they usually
strategize in terms of exploiting sectarian
fault lines. In a sense, this is the US national
security bureaucracy’s fall-back approach to
Syria.
One
well-known
example is contained in a December 2006
State Dept.
cable sent from the US embassy in Syria
(subsequently released by WikiLeaks). The
cable’s stated purpose is to explore Syrian
regime vulnerabilities and weaknesses to exploit
(in similar fashion to the 1986 CIA memo):
PLAY ON SUNNI FEARS OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE: There
are fears in Syria that the Iranians are active
in both Shia proselytizing and conversion of,
mostly poor, Sunnis. Though often exaggerated,
such fears reflect an element of the Sunni
community in Syria that is increasingly upset by
and focused on the spread of Iranian influence
in their country through activities ranging from
mosque construction to business.
Another
section of the
2006 cable explains precisely the same
scenario laid out in the 1986 memo in describing
the increased “possibility of a self-defeating
over-reaction” on the part of the regime.:
ENCOURAGE RUMORS AND SIGNALS OF EXTERNAL
PLOTTING: The regime is intensely sensitive to
rumors about coup-plotting and restlessness in
the security services and military. Regional
allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia should be
encouraged to meet with figures like [former
Vice President Abdul Halim] Khaddam and [younger
brother of Hafez] Rif’at Asad as a way of
sending such signals, with appropriate leaking
of the meetings afterwards. This again touches
on this insular regime’s paranoia and increases
the possibility of a self-defeating
over-reaction.
And ironically, Rif’at Asad and Khaddam are both
mentioned extensively in the 1986 memo as key
players during a speculative future “Succession
Power Struggle.”
[p.15]
An Islamic State in
Damascus?
While
the 1986 CIA report makes a case in its
concluding paragraph for “a Sunni regime
controlled by business-oriented moderates” in
Syria, the authors acknowledge that the collapse
of the Ba’ath state could actually usher in the
worst of all possible outcomes for Washington
and the region: “religious zealots” might seek
to establish “an Islamic Republic”. The words
take on a new and special importance now, after
the rise of ISIS:
Although Syria’s secular
traditions would make it extremely difficult for
religious zealots to establish an Islamic
Republic, should they succeed they would likely
deepen hostilities with Israel and provide
support and sanctuary to terrorists groups.
[pg.24]
What
continues to unfold in Syria has apparently
surpassed even the worst case scenarios of
intelligence planners in the 1980’s. Tinkering
with regime change has proven itself to be the
most dangerous of all games.
*Seale,
Patrick. Asad of Syria : the struggle for
the Middle East (Berkeley, CA : University
of California Press, 1989)p.474.
Brad
is a native Texan and US Marine veteran who
after leaving the military began wandering
around the Middle East, eventually making Syria
his second home. He's authored multiple stories
for his blog Levant Report which gained
international attention. Find his writing at
Antiwar.com, SOFREP, Foreign Policy Journal, The
Canary (UK),
The views expressed in this article are solely
those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the opinions of Information Clearing
House.
