How
U.S. military engagement will proceed under the
Trump administration remains to be seen. The
president-elect has said or tweeted
little about
Africa in recent years (aside from long
trading in baseless
claims that the current president was
born there). Given his choice for national
security adviser,
Michael Flynn -- a former director of
intelligence for
Joint Special Operations Command who
believes that the United States is in a “world
war” with Islamic militants -- there is good
reason to believe that Special Operations
Command Africa will continue its border-busting
missions across that continent. That, in turn,
means that Africa is likely to remain crucial to
America’s nameless global war on terror.
Publicly, the command
claims that it conducts its operations to
“promote regional stability and prosperity,”
while Bolduc emphasizes that its missions are
geared toward serving the needs of African
allies. The FOIA files make clear, however,
that U.S. interests are the command’s principal
and primary concern -- a policy in keeping with
the America First mindset and mandate of
incoming commander-in-chief Donald J. Trump --
and that support to “partner nations” is
prioritized to suit American, not African, needs
and policy goals.
Shades of
Gray
Bolduc
is fond of
saying that his troops -- Navy SEALs and
Army Green Berets, among others -- operate in
the “gray
zone,” or what he calls “the spectrum of
conflict between war and peace.” Another of his
favored
stock phrases is: “In Africa, we are not the
kinetic solution” -- that is, not pulling
triggers and dropping bombs. He
also regularly
takes pains to
say that “we are not at war in Africa -- but
our African partners certainly are.”
That is
not entirely true.
Earlier
this month, in fact, a White House report made
it
clear, for instance, that “the United States
is currently using military force” in Somalia.
At about the same moment, the New York Times
revealed an imminent Obama administration
plan to deem al-Shabab “to be part of the armed
conflict that Congress authorized against the
perpetrators of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, according to senior American
officials,” strengthening President-elect Donald
Trump’s authority to carry out missions there in
2017 and beyond.
As part
of its long-fought shadow war against al-Shabab
militants, the U.S. has carried out
commando
raids and
drone assassinations there (with the latter
markedly increasing in 2015-2016). On
December 5th, President Obama
issued his latest biannual “war powers”
letter to Congress which noted that the military
had not only “conducted strikes in defense of
U.S. forces” there, but also in defense of local
allied troops. The president also acknowledged
that U.S. personnel “occasionally accompany
regional forces, including Somali and African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces, during
counterterrorism operations.”
Obama’s
war powers letter also
mentioned American deployments in Cameroon,
Djibouti, and Niger, efforts aimed at countering
Joseph Kony’s murderous Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) in Central Africa, a long-running mission
by military observers in Egypt, and a continuing
deployment of forces supporting “the security of
U.S. citizens and property” in rapidly
deteriorating South Sudan.
The
president offered only two sentences on U.S.
military activities in Libya, although a
long-running special ops and
drone
campaign there has been joined by a
full-scale American air war, dubbed Operation
Odyssey Lightning, against Islamic State
militants, especially those in the city of Sirte.
Since August 1st, in fact, the United States has
carried out nearly 500 air strikes in Libya,
according to figures
supplied by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).
Odyssey
Lightning is, in fact, no outlier. While the
“primary named operations” involving America’s
elite forces in Africa have been redacted from
the declassified secret files in TomDispatch’s
possession, a November 2015 briefing by Bolduc,
obtained via a separate FOIA request, reveals
that his command was then involved in seven such
operations on the continent. These likely
included at least some of the following:
Enduring Freedom-Horn of Africa,
Octave Shield, and/or
Juniper Garret, all aimed at East Africa;
New Normal, an effort to secure U.S.
embassies and assets around the continent;
Juniper Micron, a U.S.-backed French and
African mission to stabilize Mali (following a
2012 coup there by a U.S.-trained officer and
the chaos that followed);
Observant Compass, the long-running effort
to decimate the Lord’s Resistance Army (which
recently retired AFRICOM chief General David
Rodriguez
derided as expensive and strategically
unimportant); and
Juniper Shield, a wide-ranging effort
(formerly known as Operation Enduring
Freedom-Trans Sahara)
aimed at Algeria, Burkina Faso, Morocco,
Tunisia, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
and Senegal. A 2015 briefing document by
SOCAFRICA’s parent unit, U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM), also lists an ongoing “gray
zone” conflict in
Uganda.
On any
given day, between 1,500 and 1,700 American
special operators and support personnel are
deployed somewhere on the continent. Over the
course of a year they conduct missions in more
than 20 countries. According to Bolduc’s
November 2015 briefing, Special Operations
Command Africa carries out 78 separate “mission
sets.” These include
activities that range from enhancing
“partner capability and capacity” to the sharing
of intelligence.
Mission
Creep
Most of
what Bolduc’s troops do involves working
alongside and mentoring local allies.
SOCAFRICA’s showcase effort, for instance, is
Flintlock, an annual training exercise in
Northwest Africa involving elite American,
European, and African forces, which provides the
command with a
plethora of
publicity. More than 1,700 military
personnel from 30-plus nations
took part in Flintlock 2016. Next year,
according to Bolduc, the exercise is expected
“to grow to include SOF from more countries, [as
well as] more interagency partners.”
While
the information has been redacted, the SOCAFRICA
strategic planning document -- produced in 2012
and scheduled to be fully declassified in 2037
-- indicates the existence of one or more other
training exercises. Bolduc recently
mentioned two:
Silent Warrior and
Epic Guardian. In the past, the command has
also taken part in exercises like Silver Eagle
10 and
Eastern Piper 12. (U.S. Africa Command did
not respond to requests for comment on these
exercises or other questions related to this
article.)
Such
exercises are, however, just a small part of the
SOCAFRICA story. Joint Combined Exchange
Training (JCET) missions are a larger one.
Officially authorized to enable U.S. special
operators to “practice skills needed to conduct
a variety of missions, including foreign
internal defense, unconventional warfare, and
counterterrorism,” JCETs actually serve as a
backdoor method of expanding U.S. military
influence and contacts in Africa, since they
allow for "incidental-training benefits" to
"accrue to the foreign friendly forces at no
cost." As a result, JCETs play an important
role in forging and sustaining military
relationships across the continent.
Just how many of these missions the
U.S. conducts in Africa is apparently unknown --
even to the military commands involved. As
TomDispatch
reported earlier this year, according to
SOCOM, the U.S. conducted 19 JCETs in 2012, 20
in 2013, and 20, again, in 2014. AFRICOM,
however, claims that there were nine JCETs in
2012, 18 in 2013, and 26 in 2014.
Whatever the true number, JCETs are a crucial
cog in the SOCAFRICA machine. “During a JCET,
exercise or training event, a special forces
unit might train a partner force in a particular
tactical skill and can quickly ascertain if the
training audience has adopted the capability,”
explained Brigadier General Bolduc. “Trainers
can objectively measure competency, then
exercise... that particular skill until it
becomes a routine.”
In
addition, SOCAFRICA also utilizes a confusing
tangle of State Department and Pentagon programs
and activities, aimed at local allies that
operate under a crazy quilt of funding schemes,
monikers, and acronyms. These include
deployments of Mobile Training Teams, Joint
Planning Advisory Teams, Joint Military
Education Teams, Civil Military Support
Elements, as well as Military Information
Support Teams that engage in what once was
called
psychological operations, or
psyops -- that is, programs designed to
“inform and influence foreign target audiences
as appropriately authorized.”
Special
Operations Command Africa also utilizes an
almost mind-numbing panoply of “security
cooperation programs” and other training
activities including Section 1207(n) (also known
as the Transitional Authorities for East Africa
and Yemen, which provides equipment, training,
and other aid to the militaries of Djibouti,
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Yemen “to conduct
counter-terrorism operations against al-Qaeda,
al-Qaeda affiliates, and al-Shabab” and “enhance
the capacity of national military forces
participating in the African Union Mission in
Somalia”); the Global Security Contingency Fund
(designed to enhance the “capabilities of a
country’s national military forces, and other
national security forces that conduct border and
maritime security, internal defense, and
counterterrorism operations”); the Partnership
for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (or
PREACT, designed to build counterterror
capacities and foster military and law
enforcement efforts in East African countries,
including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia,
Tanzania, and Uganda); and, among others, the
Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership, the
Global Peace Operations Initiative, the Special
Operations to Combat Terrorism, the Combatting
Terrorism Fellowship, and another known as
Counter-Narcotic Terrorism.
Like
Africa’s terror groups and Bolduc’s special ops
troops, the almost 20 initiatives utilized by
SOCAFRICA -- a sprawling mass of programs that
overlie and intersect with each other -- have a
border-busting quality to them. What they don’t
have is clear records of success. A 2013 RAND
Corporation analysis called such
capacity-building programs “a tangled web, with
holes, overlaps, and confusions.” A 2014 RAND
study
analyzing U.S. security cooperation (SC)
found that there “was no statistically
significant correlation between SC and change in
countries’ fragility in Africa or the Middle
East.” A 2016 RAND report on “defense
institution building” in Africa
noted a “poor understanding of partner
interests” by the U.S. military.
“We’re
supporting African military professionalization
and capability-building efforts, we’re
supporting development and governance via civil
affairs and military information support
operations teams,” Bolduc insisted publicly.
“[A]ll programs must be useful to the partner
nation (not the foreign agenda) and necessary to
advance the partner nations' capabilities. If
they don’t pass this simple test... we need to
focus on programs that do meet the African
partner nation’s needs.”
The
2012 SOCAFRICA strategic planning document
obtained by TomDispatch reveals,
however, that Special Operations Command
Africa’s primary aim is not fostering African
development, governance, or military
professionalization. “SOCAFRICA’s foremost
objective is the prevention of an attack against
America or American interests,” according to the
declassified secret report. In other words, a
“foreign agenda,” not the needs of African
partner nations, is what’s driving the elite
force’s border-busting missions.
American
Aims vs. African Needs
Special Operations Command spokesman Ken McGraw
cautioned that because SOCAFRICA and AFRICOM
have both changed commanders since the 2012
document was issued, it was likely out of date.
“I recommend you contact SOCAFRICA,” he
advised. That command failed to respond to
multiple requests for information or comment.
There are, however, no indications that it has
actually altered its “foremost objective,” while
Bolduc’s public comments suggest that the U.S.
military’s engagement in the region is going
strong.
“Our
partners and [forward deployed U.S. personnel]
recognize the arbitrary nature of borders and
understand the only way to combat modern-day
threats like ISIS, AQIM [al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb], Boko Haram, and myriad others is to
leverage the capabilities of SOF professionals
working in concert,” said Bolduc. “Borders may
be notional and don’t protect a country from the
spread of violent extremism... but neither do
oceans, mountains... or distance.”
In
reality, however, oceans and distance have kept
most Americans
safe from terrorist organizations like AQIM
and Boko Haram. The same cannot be said for
those who live in the nations menaced by these
groups. In Africa, terrorist organizations and
attacks have spiked alongside the increase in
U.S. Special Operations missions there. In
2006, the percentage of forward-stationed
special operators on the continent
hovered at 1% of total globally deployed SOF
forces. By 2014, that number had hit 10% -- a
jump of 900% in less than a decade. During that
same span, according to information from the
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
and Responses to Terrorism at the University of
Maryland, terror incidents in Africa
increased precipitously -- from just over
100 per year to nearly 2,400 annually. During
the
same period, the number of transnational
terrorist organizations and illicit groups
operating on the continent jumped from one to,
according to
Bolduc’s reckoning, nearly 50.
Correlation may not equal causation, but
SOCAFRICA’s efforts have coincided with
significantly worsening terrorist violence and
the growth and spread of terror groups. And it
shouldn’t be a surprise. While Bolduc publicly
talks up the needs of African nations, his
border-busting commandos operate under a
distinctive America-first mandate and a mindset
firmly in keeping with that of the incoming
commander-in-chief. “My foreign policy will
always put the interests of the American people
and American security above all else. It has to
be first,” Donald Trump
said earlier this year in a major foreign
policy speech. Kicking off his victory tour
earlier this month, the president-elect echoed
this theme. “From now on, it's going to be
America first. Okay? America first. We're going
to put ourselves first,” he
told a crowd in Cincinnati, Ohio.
In
Africa, the most elite troops soon to be under
his command have, in fact, been operating this
way for years. “[W]e will prioritize and focus
our operational efforts in those areas where the
threat[s] to United States interests are most
grave,” says the formerly secret SOCAFRICA
document. “Protecting America, Americans, and
American interests is our overarching objective
and must be reflected in everything we do.”
Nick Turse is the managing editor
of TomDispatch, a
fellow at the Nation Institute, and a
contributing writer for the Intercept.
His book Tomorrow's Battlefield: U.S. Proxy
Wars and Secret Ops in Africa recently
received an American
Book Award. His latest book is Next
Time They’ll Come to Count the Dead: War and
Survival in South Sudan. His website is
NickTurse.com.
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